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In This Issue

Karen Halttunen writes about the changes that humanitarianism and the culture of sensibility produced in the meaning of pain. She argues that once pain had been redefined as unacceptable in the eighteenth century, it came to be understood as obscene. Subsequently, a variety of literary forms, including sentimental and Gothic fiction, sexual pornography, and murder literature, began to treat the now forbidden topic of pain as prurient. Humanitarian reformers soon came to fear that in using graphic illustrations of the infliction of pain to turn people away from such practices, they were generating an illicit excitement in the spectacle of suffering. Some reformers shifted attention from the effort to eradicate pain-inflicting practices to their privatization. But, according to Halttunen, privatization only enhanced the pornographic appeal of pain by reinforcing the notion that hidden pain was obscene and by contributing to the transformation of the social theater of public punishment into the illicit interior theater of sadomasochism, best exemplified by the clients and case studies of turn-of-the-century psychopathology, who fantasized and enacted the same pain scenarios condemned by humanitarians.

Pamela Scully analyzes the interplay of local Cape Colony and metropolitan British ideas about race, class, sex, and honor as they affected sentencing in rape cases. She begins with the story of a black man condemned to death for the rape of a white woman, a sentence later commuted when white men of the community informed the judge that in their opinion the raped woman was not actually white. Previous studies of rape in the period following slave emancipation in South Africa have focused on fears about the rape of white women by black men. The cases discussed by Scully suggest that colonialism and the pliable categories of race and class that accompanied it encouraged the rape of black women by white men.

John Markoff challenges the recent revisions of the history of the French Revolution that argue for the anti-liberal, anti-democratic outcomes produced by popular revolutionary violence. Markoff contends that insurrectionary actions in the French countryside were essential to ending the rights of the lords. Neither the nobles nor the Third Estate were inclined to abolish these rights without indemnification until faced with the militant refusal of the peasants to accept anything less. Markoff finishes with a comparative analysis, showing that where other Old Regime states had begun reform and were not prodded by peasant violence (or a military

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threat from the French), full defeudalization did not take place. While the memory of popular violence may have nurtured anti-democratic movements in nineteenth-century France, the insurrectionary events themselves played a central part in creating a democratic society.

J. William Harris examines two instances of racial violence in Vicksburg, Mississippi, at the end of World War I: the tar-and-feathering of an African-American physician, John Miller, and the lynching of another black man, Lloyd Clay. Harris sees these events as ritual responses to the breakdown of racial boundaries resulting from the war, the northern migration of the black labor force, and the growth (typified by Dr. Miller) of an educated, moneyed, and activist black elite. His stories suggest the importance of cultural codes—etiquette backed up by the threat of violence—in maintaining racial boundaries in contrast to theories of the material foundations of American racism.

John A. Phillips and **Charles Wetherell** argue for the powerful impact of England's Great Reform Act of 1832. In doing so, they seek to revise four decades of historiography that has downplayed the importance of the act. The authors advance a model of English electoral politics during the century from the accession of George III to 1880 and use it to demonstrate that the vigorous debate over the Reform Bill in 1831 and its enactment the following year set off a wave of political modernization to which the Whig and Tory parties successfully adapted. The reform quickly destroyed the political system that had prevailed during the reign of George III and replaced it with a modern electoral system based on rigid partisanship and clearly articulated political principle.

A review article by **Russell A. Kazal** traces the rise, decline, and then recent reappearance of "assimilation" as the reigning concept in American immigration studies. The centrality of assimilation first emerged in the work of sociologists and historians in the second decade of this century and remained prominent until the 1960s. During the two succeeding decades, a number of scholars began to stress the failure of assimilation and the persistence of ethnic group identities. Since the early 1980s, however, assimilation has returned to the works of three different groups of historians. Those who focus primarily on ethnic groups now give increased weight in their analyses to processes of assimilation that affect immigrants, while labor historians observe assimilation in the rise of a common working-class consciousness, and students of racial identity note that ethnic

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groups of European origin have come closer to one another through a shared sense of "whiteness." Although these analyses emphasize assimilation, they do not resurrect the earlier notions of it as assimilation toward a coherent and unchanging Anglo-American core culture. Kazal suggests that it is now time for the practitioners of these subfields to work together in defining a new concept of assimilation.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

VOLUME 100 • NUMBER 2 • APRIL 1995

Articles

Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture
BY KAREN HALTTUNEN 303

Rape, Race, and Colonial Culture: The Sexual Politics of Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony, South Africa
BY PAMELA SCULLY 335

Violence, Emancipation, and Democracy: The Countryside and the French Revolution
BY JOHN MARKOFF 360

Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial Boundaries in Southern History: A Mississippi Example
BY J. WILLIAM HARRIS 387

The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England
BY JOHN A. PHILLIPS and CHARLES WETHERELL 411

Review Article

Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History
BY RUSSELL A. KAZAL 437

Featured Reviews

Sidney Tarrow
Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics
BY JEFFREY N. WASSERSTROM 472

Pierre Péan
Une jeunesse française: François Mitterand, 1934–1947
Éric Conan and Henry Rousso
Vichy: Un passé qui ne passe pas
BY JOHN F. SWEETS 474

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Thongchai Winichakul
Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation
By Prasenjit Duara 477

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

Leonard W. Levy. *Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie*; David Lawton, *Blasphemy.*
By Edward Peters 480

Karen Armstrong. *A History of God: The 4000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.*
By Herbert Mason 481

Michael Adas, editor. *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order.*
By Ira M. Lapidus 482

Gertrude Himmelfarb. *On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on Culture and Society.*
By James J. Sheehan 483

Michael Mann. *The Sources of Social Power.* Volume 2, *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914.*
By Peter N. Stearns 484

Bernard S. Silberman. *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.*
By George Yaney 485

John B. Williamson and Fred C. Pampel. *Old-Age Security in Comparative Perspective.*
By Carole Haber 486

Colleen A. Dunlavy. *Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia.*
By Eric Dorn Brose 487

Terry G. Jordan. *North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation.*
By David H. Breen 488

James O. Gump. *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux.*
By William F. Lye 488

Geneviève Fraisse and Michelle Perrot, editors. *A History of Women in the West.* Volume 4, *Emerging Feminism from Revolution to World War.*
By Mary Jo Maynes 489

Christine Bolt. *The Women's Movements in the United States and Britain from the 1790s to the 1920s.*
By Sandra Stanley Holton 490

W. Peter Ward. *Birth Weight and Economic Growth: Women's Living Standards in the Industrializing West.*
By Katherine A. Lynch 491

Leonie Star. *Julius Stone: An Intellectual Life.*
By Hilary L. Rubinstein 492

Barbara J. Smith. *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920–1929.*
By Ylana N. Miller 493

Richard J. Aldrich. *The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929–1942.*
By David K. Wyatt 493

A. Martin Wainwright. *Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India, and the Balance of Power in Asia, 1938–55.*
By Peter Ward Fay 494

Robert J. McMahon. *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan.*
By Kenton J. Clymer 494

Rami Ginat. *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945–1955.*
By Joel Gordon 495

Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.*
By Richard C. Thornton 496

Jeffrey Herf. *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles.*
By Christian Søe 497

ANCIENT

Leslie J. Worley. *Hippeis: The Cavalry of Ancient Greece.*
By Glenn Richard Bugh 498

James F. McGlew. *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece.*
By Michael Gagarin 498

S. C. Todd. *The Shape of the Athenian Law.*
By James F. McGlew 499

Lisa Kallet-Marx. *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.25.*
By Thomas Kelly 500

Peter White. *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome.*
By C. Robert Phillips III 501

J. Donald Hughes. *Pan's Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans.*
By Susan E. Alcock 501

Gillian Clark. *Women in Late Antiquity: Pagan and Christian Lifestyles.*
By Natalie Boymel Kampen 502

MEDIEVAL

Ian Wood. *The Merovingian Kingdoms 450–751.*
By J. N. Hillgarth 502

Jaroslav Pelikan. *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism.*
By Stephen A. Stertz 503

Paul Magdalino. *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180.*
By George T. Dennis 504

David J. Wasserstein. *The Caliphate in the West: An Islamic Political Institution in the Iberian Peninsula.*
By Thomas F. Glick 504

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JOHN DAGENAIS. *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the Libro de buen amor.*
By Karen Gould 505

C. H. LAWRENCE. *The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society.*
By Robert E. Lerner 505

LINDA M. PATERSON. *The World of the Troubadours: Medieval Occitan Society, c. 1100–c. 1300.*
By James A. Brundage 506

JOHN W. BERNHARDT. *Itinerant Kingship and Royal Monasteries in Early Medieval Germany, c. 936–1075.*
By Joel T. Rosenthal 506

VALENTIN GROEBNER. *Ökonomie ohne Haus: Zum Wirtschaften armer Leute in Nürnberg am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts.*
By William J. Wright 507

PHILLIP H. STUMP. *The Reforms of the Council of Constance (1414–1418).*
By Thomas E. Morrissey 508

ANTONIO IVAN PINI. *Campagne bolognesi: Le radici agrarie di una metropoli medievale.*
By Jane K. Laurent 508

LAURA IKINS STERN. *The Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence.*
By Charles M. Radding 509

ALESSANDRO STELLA. *La révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail.*
By Lauro Martines 510

MODERN EUROPE

LONDA SCHIEBINGER. *Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science.*
By Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr. 510

MARIE TANNER. *The Last Descendant of Aeneas: The Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of the Emperor.*
By H. Liebel-Weckowicz 511

MARIE-CHRISTINE LEPS. *Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse.*
By Elizabeth Lunbeck 512

ABRAHAM BOXHOORN. *The Cold War and the Rift in the Governments of National Unity: Belgium, France, and Italy in the Spring of 1947; A Comparison.*
By Irwin M. Wall 512

EILEEN SPRING. *Law, Land, and Family: Aristocratic Inheritance in England, 1300 to 1800.*
By Lloyd Bonfield 513

DOUGLAS R. BISSON. *The Merchant Adventurers of England: The Company and the Crown, 1474–1564.*
By Roger B. Manning 514

CHRISTOPHER HAIGH. *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors.*
By Robert Tittler 515

PETER S. BEARMAN. *Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540–1640.*
By Joel Berlatsky 515

GLENN BURGESS. *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603–1642.*
By Derek Hirst 516

PETER WHITE. *Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War.*
By Barbara Donagan 517

PHILLIP HARTH. *Pen for a Party: Dryden's Tory Propaganda in Its Contexts.*
By Gary S. De Krey 517

F. M. G. WILLSON. *A Strong Supporting Cast: The Shaw Lefevres, 1789–1936.*
By Abraham D. Kriegel 518

ANTHONY BRUNDAGE. *The People's Historian: John Richard Green and the Writing of History in Victorian England.*
By Leslie Howsam 519

FRANK M. TURNER. *Contesting Cultural Authority: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life.*
By Sheldon Rothblatt 519

T. R. GOURVISH and R. G. WILSON. *The British Brewing Industry, 1830–1980.*
By Michael Dintenfass 520

DOROTHY MERMIN. *Godiva's Ride: Women of Letters in England, 1830–1880.*
By Deborah Epstein Nord 521

J. MIRIAM BENN. *Predicaments of Love.*
By Terry M. Parssinen 522

STANLEY WEINTRAUB. *Disraeli: A Biography.*
By Todd M. Endelman 522

CHARLES TOWNSHEND. *Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain.*
By Stanley H. Palmer 523

DAVID FELDMAN. *Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840–1914.*
By R. W. Davis 524

SHARMAN KADISH. *Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution.*
By Henry Srebrnik 524

WILLIE THOMPSON. *The Good Old Cause: British Communism, 1920–1991.*
By Chris Waters 525

JOHN KENT. *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944–49.*
By Peter Weiler 526

GREGORY HANLON. *Confession and Community in Seventeenth-Century France: Catholic and Protestant Coexistence in Aquitaine.*
By James R. Farr 526

LIANA VARDI. *The Land and the Loom: Peasants and Profit in Northern France, 1680–1800.*
By James R. Lehning 527

JACK THOMAS. *Le temps des foires: Foires et marchés dans le Midi toulousain de la fin de l'Ancien Régime à 1914.*
By Eugen Weber 528

SARAH MAZA. *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France.*
By Lenard R. Berlanstein 528

HARRIET B. APPLEWHITE. *Political Alignment in the French National Assembly, 1789–1791.*
By Jeremy D. Popkin 529

DORA B. WEINER. *The Citizen-Patient in Revolutionary and Imperial Paris.*
By Evelyn Bernette Ackerman 530

JONATHAN P. RIBNER. *Broken Tablets: The Cult of the Law in French Art from David to Delacroix.*
By Lloyd Kramer 530

JANN MATLOCK. *Scenes of Seduction: Prostitution, Hysteria, and Reading Difference in Nineteenth-Century France.*
By Robert A. Nye 531

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NICHOLAS PAPAYANIS. *The Coachmen of Nineteenth-Century Paris: Service Workers and Class Consciousness.*
By Kathryn E. Amdur 532

RICHARD ABEL. *The Ciné Goes to Town: French Cinema 1896–1914.*
By Charles Rearick 532

LEONARD V. SMITH. *Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I.*
By Jan Karl Tanenbaum 533

STEPHEN D. CARLS. *Louis Loucheur and the Shaping of Modern France, 1916–1931.*
By Joel Colton 534

JONATHAN BOYARIN. *Polish Jews in Paris: The Ethnography of Memory.*
By Phyllis Cohen Albert 535

MARTIN S. ALEXANDER. *The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933–1940.*
By William D. Irvine 535

BERND KASTEN. *"Gute Franzosen": Die französische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungmacht im besetzten Frankreich 1940–1944.*
By Bertram M. Gordon 536

JAY A. LEVENSON, editor. *The Age of the Baroque in Portugal.*
By Carl A. Hanson 537

MARTINE GOOSSENS. *The Economic Development of Belgian Agriculture: A Regional Perspective, 1812–1846;* JAN BLOMME, *The Economic Development of Belgian Agriculture, 1880–1980: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis.*
By George Grantham 537

MARTIN CONWAY. *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940–1944.*
By Werner Warmbrunn 538

RICHARD L. GAWTHROP. *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia.*
By James Van Horn Melton 539

KARL-PETER ELLERBROCK. *Geschichte der deutschen Nahrungs- und Genussmittelindustrie 1750–1914.*
By Udo Heyn 540

WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN. *Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik: Die Aussenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914.*
By Paul W. Schroeder 540

JOHN MONCURE. *Forging the King's Sword: Military Education between Tradition and Modernization; The Case of the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps, 1871–1918.*
By Arden Bucholz 541

LOTHAR HÖBELT. *Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882–1918.*
By James William Miller 542

JOHN MCCOLE. *Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition.*
By David Gross 543

MANFRED OVERESCH. *Hermann Brill in Thüringen 1895–1946: Ein Kämpfer gegen Hitler und Ulbricht.*
By Donna Harsch 544

ALAN E. STEINWEIS. *Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts.*
By Jay W. Baird 544

KRISTIE MACRAKIS. *Surviving the Swastika: Scientific Research in Nazi Germany.*
By Robert N. Proctor 545

KONRAD H. JARAUSCH. *The Rush to German Unity.*
By Diethelm Prowe 546

JAN HERMAN BRINKS. *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Luther, Friedrich II und Bismarck als Paradigmen politischen Wandels.*
By Lee Congdon 546

K. J. P. LOWE. *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: The Life and Career of Cardinal Francesco Soderini (1453–1524).*
By Paula Clarke 547

CHRISTINE SHAW. *Julius II: The Warrior Pope.*
By William V. Hudon 548

JOHN M. NAJEMY. *Between Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513–1515.*
By Wayne A. Rebhorn 549

GUIDO RUGGIERO. *Binding Passions: Tales of Magic, Marriage, and Power and the End of the Renaissance.*
By Paul F. Grendler 549

DAVID GENTILCORE. *From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto.*
By Anne Jacobson Schutte 550

CHRISTOPHER M. S. JOHNS. *Papal Art and Cultural Politics: Rome in the Age of Clement XI.*
By Laurie Nussdorfer 550

WALTER L. ADAMSON. *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism.*
By David D. Roberts 551

ELENA AGA ROSSI. *Una nazione allo sbando: L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943.*
By Alan Cassels 552

STEPHEN VELYCHENKO. *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914.*
By Paul Bushkovitch 552

GÉZA ANDREAS VON GEYR. *Sándor Wekerle 1848–1921: Die politische Biographie eines ungarischen Staatsmannes der Donaumonarchie.*
By Peter F. Sugar 553

MARK MAZOWER. *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44.*
By S. Victor Papacosma 554

GALE STOKES. *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.*
By Sabrina Petra Ramet 555

ANDREW BARUCH WACHTEL. *An Obsession with History: Russian Writers Confront the Past.*
By Samuel H. Baron 555

MICHAEL F. HAMM. *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917.*
By Paul Robert Magocsi 556

WENDY Z. GOLDMAN. *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936.*
By Laura Engelstein 557

ALAN M. BALL. *And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918–1930.*
By Joan Neuberger 557

AMY KNIGHT. *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant.*
By Robert V. Daniels 558

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEAR EAST

CARL F. PETRY. *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashrāf Qāytbāy and Qānsūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt.*
By Fred H. Lawson 559

LESLIE P. PEIRCE. *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire.*
By Jonathan P. Berkey 560

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN. *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic.*
By Fakhreddin Azimi 561

JACOB ABADI. *Israel's Leadership: From Utopia to Crisis.*
By Gregory S. Mahler 561

AFRICA

MICHAEL A. GOMEZ. *Pragmatism in the Age of Jihad: The Precolonial State of Bundu.*
By James L. A. Webb, Jr. 562

JEFFREY A. FADIMAN. *When We Began There Were Witchmen: An Oral History from Mount Kenya.*
By Thomas Spear 563

HENRIETTA L. MOORE and MEGAN VAUGHAN. *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia 1890–1990.*
By Sara Berry 563

LES SWITZER. *Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of South Africa.*
By Alan R. Booth 564

ASIA

EDWARD A. MCCORD. *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism.*
By Edward Rhoads 565

DEBORAH A. KAPLE. *Dream of A Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China.*
By Steven I. Levine 566

A. DOAK BARNETT. *China's Far West: Four Decades of Change.*
By Linda Benson 567

DENNIS DALTON. *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action.*
By Blair B. Kling 568

JOHN MURPHY. *Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War.*
By William J. Duiker 569

UNITED STATES

RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN. *Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It?*
By Jack N. Rakove 569

DAVID A. J. RICHARDS. *Conscience and the Constitution: History, Theory, and Law of The Reconstruction Amendments.*
By Roberta Sue Alexander 570

WILLIAM P. LAPIANA. *Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education.*
By Maxwell Bloomfield 571

TONI MARIE MASSARO. *Constitutional Literacy: A Core Curriculum for a Multicultural Nation.*
By Gerald L. Gutek 571

MARK V. TUSHNET. *Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–1961.*
By John Braeman 572

MARTHA F. DAVIS. *Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960–1973.*
By Walter I. Trattner 573

KENNETH L. KARST. *Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power in the Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion.*
By Mark Tushnet 574

CAROLE HABER and BRIAN GRATTON. *Old Age and the Search for Security: An American Social History.*
By Michel R. Dahlin 575

PETER KOLCHIN. *American Slavery: 1619–1877.*
By Gwendolyn Midlo Hall 575

EDGAR J. MCMANUS. *Law and Liberty in Early New England: Criminal Justice and Due Process, 1620–1692.*
By Jack P. Greene 576

LARRY D. ELDRIDGE. *A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America.*
By A. G. Roeber 577

CHARLES G. STEFFEN. *From Gentlemen to Townsmen: The Gentry of Baltimore County, Maryland, 1660–1776.*
By David W. Jordan 577

JOYCE E. CHAPLIN. *An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South, 1730–1815.*
By Sally McMurry 578

KATHRYN E. HOLLAND BRAUND. *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685–1815.*
By Francis Jennings 579

R. DAVID EDMUNDS and JOSEPH L. PEYSER. *The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France.*
By Yasuhide Kawashima 580

WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN. *After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees' Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839–1880.*
By Duane Champagne 581

JAMES R. SHARP. *American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis.*
By Paul Goodman 581

JOHN P. KAMINSKI. *George Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Republic.*
By James Roger Sharp 582

CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS. *Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic.*
By Ronald L. Filippelli 583

DAVID W. KLING. *A Field of Divine Wonders: The New Divinity and Village Revivals in Northwestern Connecticut, 1792–1822.*
By John A. Andrew III 584

WALTER H. CONSER, JR. *God and the Natural World: Religion and Science in Antebellum America.*
By Steven M. Stowe 584

CHARLES HOFFMANN and TESS HOFFMANN. *Brotherly Love: Murder and the Politics of Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century Rhode Island.*
By Randolph A. Roth 585

KATHERINE K. PRESTON. *Opera on the Road: Traveling Opera Troupes in the United States, 1825–60.*
By John F. Cone 586

STANTON GARNER. *The Civil War World of Herman Melville.*
By David S. Reynolds 586

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATHANIEL CHEAIRS HUGHES, JR., and ROY P. STONESIFER, JR. *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow.*
By James A. Ramage 587

STEPHEN D. ENGLE. *Yankee Dutchman: The Life of Franz Sigel.*
By Craig L. Symonds 587

JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR. *Partners in Command: The Relationships between Leaders in the Civil War.*
By Steven E. Woodworth 588

DAVID B. CHESEBROUGH. *"No Sorrow Like Our Sorrow": Northern Protestant Ministers and the Assassination of Lincoln.*
By James H. Moorhead 588

WILLIAM CLARK GRIGGS. *Parson Henry Renfro: Free Thinking on the Texas Frontier.*
By John W. Storey 589

MICHAEL A. GORDON. *The Orange Riots: Irish Political Violence in New York City, 1870 and 1871.*
By David M. Emmons 590

MARK WYMAN. *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930.*
By John W. Briggs 590

PETER MCCAFFERY. *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia: The Emergence of the Republican Machine, 1867–1933.*
By Bruce M. Stave 591

WILLIAM B. WAITS. *The Modern Christmas in America: A Cultural History of Gift Giving.*
By Stephen Nissenbaum 592

JEFFREY D. MASON. *Melodrama and the Myth of America.*
By Benjamin McArthur 592

H. WAYNE MORGAN. *Kenyon Cox, 1856–1919: A Life in American Art.*
By Sarah Burns 593

KATHLEEN MINNIX. *Laughter in the Amen Corner: The Life of Evangelist Sam Jones.*
By William Kenney 594

EDITH L. BLUMHOFER. *Restoring the Faith: The Assemblies of God, Pentecostalism, and American Culture.*
By James R. Goff, Jr. 594

EDITH L. BLUMHOFER. *Aimee Semple McPherson.*
By Robert Booth Fowler 595

ROBERT GREGG. *Sparks from the Anvil of Oppression: Philadelphia's African Methodists and Southern Migrants, 1890–1940.*
By James Findlay 595

DAVID C. FREDERICK. *Rugged Justice: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the American West, 1891–1941.*
By David J. Langum 596

WILFORD M. MCCLAY. *The Masterless: Self and Society in Modern America.*
By Robert B. Westbrook 597

DAVID NASAW. *Going Out: The Rise and Fall of Public Amusements.*
By Lewis A. Erenberg 598

ROBERT W. RYDELL. *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions.*
By Robert Muccigrosso 598

PAUL J. ZINGG. *Harry Hooper: An American Baseball Life.*
By Jules Tygiel 599

J. STUART MOORE. *Chiropractic in America: The History of a Medical Alternative.*
By Martin Kaufman 599

TRACY CAMPBELL. *The Politics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars.*
By Barbara S. Griffith 600

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By Melton A. McLaurin 600

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By Miriam Z. Langsam 601

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By Judith R. Raftery 602

BERNICE JOHNSON REAGON, editor. *We'll Understand It Better By and By: Pioneering African American Gospel Composers.*
By Stephen W. Angell 602

KENNETH L. STEWART and ARNOLDO DE LEÓN. *Not Room Enough: Mexicans, Anglos, and Socio-economic Change in Texas, 1850–1900.*
By David J. Weber 603

GEORGE J. SÁNCHEZ. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945.*
By Ricardo Romo 604

BENJAMIN MÁRQUEZ. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization.*
By Oscar J. Martínez 604

SANDRA C. TAYLOR. *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz.*
By Paul R. Spickard 605

EILEEN H. TAMURA. *Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei Generation in Hawaii.*
By Gary Y. Okihiro 606

JACK SHULIMSON. *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880–1898.*
By Joyce S. Goldberg 607

CRAIG M. CAMERON. *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951.*
By Beth Bailey 607

PETER MASLOWSKI. *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II.*
By David P. Peeler 608

CLAUS-DIETER KROHN. *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research.*
By William B. Scott 608

RICHARD O. DAVIES. *Defender of the Old Guard: John Bricker and American Politics.*
By Allen Yarnell 609

JOHN A. GOLDSMITH. *Colleagues: Richard B. Russell and His Apprentice, Lyndon B. Johnson.*
By Lewis L. Gould 610

STEPHEN VAUGHN. *Ronald Reagan in Hollywood: Movies and Politics.*
By Bernard F. Dick 610

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By Leo P. Ribuffo 611

JAMES G. HERSHBERG. *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age.*
By Allan M. Winkler 611

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CRAIG MINER. *Wolf Creek Station: Kansas Gas and Electric Company in the Nuclear Era.*
By J. Samuel Walker 612

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By Frederick W. Marks III 613

ELIZABETH KIMBALL MACLEAN. *Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets.*
By Edward M. Bennett 613

HUA QINGZHAO. *From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman's Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945–1953.*
By June Grasso 614

VAN GOSSE. *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left.*
By Terry Anderson 614

CANADA

CYNTHIA R. COMACCHIO. *"Nations Are Built of Babies": Saving Ontario's Mothers and Children 1900–1940.*
By Wendy Mitchinson 615

DAVID MACKENZIE. *Arthur Irwin: A Biography.*
By J. L. Granatstein 616

LATIN AMERICA

ROBERT W. PATCH. *Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1648–1812.*
By Susan Schroeder 616

GUSTAVO GUTIÉRREZ. *Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ.*
By Benjamin Keen 617

JASPER RIDLEY. *Maximilian and Juárez.*
By Stan Green 618

DAVID BLOCK. *Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon: Native Tradition, Jesuit Enterprise, and Secular Policy in Moxos, 1660–1880.*
By Dauril Alden 618

MARTIN MINCHOM. *The People of Quito, 1690–1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass.*
By Susan E. Ramírez 619

ANTHONY MCFARLANE. *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics under Bourbon Rule.*
By Maurice P. Brungardt 620

CARLOS AGUIRRE. *Agentes de su propia libertad: Los esclavos de Lima y la desintegración de la esclavitud 1821–1854.*
By Peter Blanchard 621

EDUARDO SILVA. *Prince of the People: The Life and Times of a Brazilian Free Man of Colour.*
By Robert E. Conrad 621

JOEL WOLFE. *Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, 1900–1955.*
By Peter Winn 622

Collected Essays 624
Documents and Bibliographies 632
Other Books Received 634
Communications 640
Index of Advertisers 42(a)

Topical Table of Contents

Administration
485, 566

Agricultural
488, 508, 527, 563, 578, 600

Art
530, 537, 544, 550, 551, 593

Biography
492, 522, 534, 543, 544, 547, 553, 558, 561, 568, 572, 582, 586, 587, 593, 594, 595, 599, 609, 611, 613, 616, 618, 621

Business
487, 520, 540, 566, 612

Civil War
515, 588

Class
577

Colonialism
488, 564, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620

Comparative
472, 482, 484, 485, 487, 488, 490, 491

Constitutional
569, 571

Crime and Violence
512, 558, 585, 590

Cultural
480, 511, 519, 528, 532, 539, 544, 550, 555, 592, 598, 608, 616

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Demography
491, 513

Economics
486, 493, 500, 507, 514, 537, 540, 616

Education
541, 571, 602

Empire
504, 526

Environment
501, 563

Ethnicity
524, 535, 556, 563, 564, 567, 579, 581, 595, 604, 605, 606, 616

Family
518, 557, 600, 615

Film
532, 610

Foreign Relations
493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 512, 526, 540, 569, 613, 614, 618

Gender
489, 510, 521, 563, 574

Historiography
519, 546, 552

Immigration
535, 590

Institutions
504, 607

Intellectual
492, 506, 516, 519, 543, 549, 551, 597, 608, 611, 617

Journalism
616

Labor
510, 532, 583, 600, 622

Legal
492, 499, 509, 513, 516, 523, 528, 530, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 576, 577, 583, 596

Literature
480, 501, 505, 531, 555, 586

Medicine
530, 599, 615

Methods
477, 563

Military
497, 498, 533, 535, 536, 541, 548, 565, 587, 607, 608

Music
586, 602

Nationalism
539, 546, 552

Political
474, 498, 502, 504, 517, 525, 529, 534, 538, 542, 544, 546, 547, 553, 555, 558, 559, 561, 562, 569, 581, 582, 590, 591, 604, 609, 610, 611, 614

Race Relations
488, 572, 574, 579, 580, 603, 604, 606, 621

Radicalism
561

Religion
480, 481, 503, 505, 506, 508, 515, 517, 524, 526, 539, 547, 549, 550, 562, 584, 588, 589, 594, 595, 611, 617, 618

Revolution
529, 555

Science and Technology
510, 545, 584, 611

Sexuality
522, 531

Slavery
575, 621

Social
486, 506, 507, 556, 557, 575, 600, 619, 622

Sports
599

Theory
472, 477, 483, 484, 485, 512

Urban
510, 556, 591, 604, 621

Wars
496, 533, 535, 538, 552, 554, 569, 580, 586, 587, 588, 607, 613

Women
489, 490, 491, 502, 513, 521, 531, 557, 560, 615

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Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture

KAREN HALTTUNEN

"IT IS GRIEVOUS TO SEE OR HEAR (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in *torment.*" With these words in 1724, William Wollaston captured the culture of sensibility that was emerging in eighteenth-century England, a new set of attitudes and emotional conventions at the heart of which was a sympathetic concern for the pain and suffering of other sentient beings. Shaped by John Locke's psychology of sensation and by the moral-sense philosophy of his followers, the cult of sensibility took for its hero "the man of feeling," whose tender-hearted susceptibility to the torments of others was the mark of his deeply virtuous nature. The culture of sensibility steadily broadened the arena within which humanitarian feeling was encouraged to operate, extending compassion to animals and to previously despised types of persons including slaves, criminals, and the insane and generating a reformist critique of forms of cruelty that had once gone unquestioned. As part of a broader "reformation of manners" reshaping English social (and especially male) behavior in this period, the culture of sensibility even contributed to a long-term decline in the incidence of casual criminal violence. In the context of the bourgeois "civilizing process," compassion and a reluctance to inflict pain became identified as distinctively *civilized* emotions, while cruelty was labeled as *savage* or *barbarous.*[1]

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Center for Comparative Research at the University of California, Davis, and at the 1994 meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The research was funded in part by an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Fellowship at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California; I am grateful to Robert C. Ritchie, director of research, for his assistance and support, and to the staff in Readers' Services. For critical comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Joel Bernard, Paula Findlen, Paul Goodman, Thomas L. Haskell, Lynn Hunt, Norma Landau, Roland Marchand, Michael Meranze, Lewis Perry, and James Turner. For assistance with illustrations, I am grateful to Nancy H. Burkett, Georgia B. Barnhill, and Laura Wasowicz at the American Antiquarian Society; Kelli Ann Bronson at the Huntington Library; and Molly Laird at the Woodow Wilson Center.

[1] [William Wollaston], *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (London, 1724), 139. For discussions of the emergence of the new humanitarian sensibility, see Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility* (New York, 1983); G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago, 1992); and Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783* (Oxford, 1989), chap. 10. On the "civilizing process," see Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*, Edmund Jephcott, trans. (New York, 1978); Langford, *Polite and Commercial People*, chap. 3; Pieter Spierenburg, *The Broken Spell: A Cultural and Anthropological History of Preindustrial Europe* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1991); John F. Kasson, *Rudeness and Civility: Manners in Nineteenth-Century Urban America* (New York, 1990). On the decline of casual criminal violence, see Lawrence Stone, "Interpersonal Violence in English Society 1300–1980," *Past and Present*, 101 (November 1983): 22–33; Ted Robert Gurr, "Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A

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The new humanitarian sensibility revolutionized the meaning of pain in Anglo-American culture. "Pain," as David B. Morris has observed, "is always historical—always reshaped by a particular time, place, culture." Orthodox Christianity had traditionally viewed pain not only as God's punishment for sin (the English term is derived from the Latin *poena*, punishment) but also as a redemptive opportunity to transcend the world and the flesh by imitating the suffering Christ. "Preanesthetic cultures responded to pain not with denial but with curious forms of affirmation" that were rooted in a pre-modern acceptance of the inescapability of pain.[2] The eighteenth-century cult of sensibility redefined pain as unacceptable and indeed eradicable and thus opened the door to a new revulsion from pain, which, though later regarded as "instinctive" or "natural," has in fact proved to be distinctly modern.[3] This essay addresses a phenomenon closely related to this emergent revulsion from pain: the pornography of pain, which represented pain as obscenely titillating precisely because the humanitarian sensibility deemed it unacceptable, taboo. The modern pornography of pain taking shape in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was not merely a seamy sideline to humanitarian reform literature but rather an integral aspect of the humanitarian sensibility.

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS of the humanitarian sensibility lay with the Latitudinarian divines of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In reaction to English Puritanism and to the secular Calvinism of Thomas Hobbes, the Latitudinarians argued that human nature is instinctively sympathetic, naturally inclined to virtuous actions because of the pleasurable feelings such actions generate. God had "implanted in our very Frame and Make a compassionate Sense of the Sufferings and Misfortunes of other People, which disposes us to contribute to their Relief."[4] The Latitudinarian tradition exerted an important

Critical Review of the Evidence," *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, 3 (1981): 295–353; J. M. Beattie, "The Pattern of Crime in England 1660–1800," *Past and Present*, 62 (February 1974): 47–95; Spierenburg, *Broken Spell*, chap. 7. According to political theorist Judith N. Shklar, the Enlightenment involved a shift in value structures that placed cruelty first among the "ordinary vices" (as opposed to the traditional seven deadly sins) that define the modern moral universe, and thus generated a critique of traditional political, moral, and religious systems on the grounds of their own fundamental cruelty; see Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); for an application of her thesis to American Christianity, see Ava Chamberlain, "The Theology of Cruelty: A New Look at the Rise of Arminianism in Eighteenth-Century New England," *Harvard Theological Review*, 85 (1992): 335–56.

[2] David B. Morris, *The Culture of Pain* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), 6, 48. Also see John Kirkup, "Surgery before General Anaesthesia," in *The History of the Management of Pain: From Early Principles to Present Practice*, Ronald D. Mann, ed. (Carnforth, Lancashire, 1988), 23, 28.

[3] See James Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian Mind* (Baltimore, Md., 1980).

[4] Richard Fiddes, *Fifty-Two Practical Discourses on Several Subjects* (1720), quoted in Ronald S. Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" *Journal of English Literary History*, 1 (1934): 205–30. Crane remains the best authority on the Latitudinarian origins of the cult of sensibility. Although his argument has been challenged by Donald Greene, "Latitudinarianism and Sensibility: The Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling' Reconsidered," *Modern Philology*, 75 (1977): 159–83, and by Chester Chapin, "Shaftesbury and the Man of Feeling," *Modern Philology*, 81 (1983): 47–50, Crane's position has been effectively defended by Frans de Bruyn in "Latitudinarianism and Its Importance

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influence on the third earl of Shaftesbury, who learned from John Locke the importance of sensation to knowledge but diverged from his tutor by positing an innate "moral sense," more akin to intuition than to reason, capable of distinguishing good from evil through an instinctive grasp of the beauty of virtue, and inclined to the good through innate sympathy.[5] The philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment developed further Shaftesbury's views on human benevolence, finding in sensibility the best way to counteract the perils of rampant self-interest and preserve moral community in a rapidly commercializing society. David Hume asserted that morality "is more properly felt than judg'd of" and human nature so constructed that "virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." Similarly, Francis Hutcheson posited a "sense of the soul we may call the *sympathetick*" such that "when we see or know the pain, distress, or misery of any kind which another suffers, and turn our thoughts to it, we feel a strong sense of pity, and a great proneness to relieve, where no contrary passion withholds us."[6] (See Figure 1.)

Influenced by Locke's understanding of the primacy of vision among the senses, eighteenth-century moral philosophers treated sympathy as a sentiment stirred primarily through sight. "For when we *see* a miserable Object, Nature it self moves our Bowels to compassion," wrote Latitudinarian divine Zacheus Isham in 1700; and Hume and Hutcheson, as quoted above, assumed this visual emphasis.[7] The

as a Precursor of Sensibility," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 80 (1981): 349–68. For an excellent overview of the emergence of the new ethic of benevolence, see David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), 348–64.

[5] For discussions of the origin of the "moral sense," see Ernest Lee Tuveson, *The Imagination as a Means of Grace: Locke and the Aesthetics of Romanticism* (Berkeley, Calif., 1960), chap. 2; and John K. Sheriff, *The Good-Natured Man: The Evolution of a Moral Ideal, 1660–1800* (University, Ala., 1982), chap. 1. On the earl of Shaftesbury, see Basil Willey, *The English Moralists* (London, 1964), chap. 14; Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period* (New York, 1940), chap. 4; Janet Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction* (London, 1986), chap. 2; and John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1988), chap. 1.

[6] On the Scottish Enlightenment, see John Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1987); Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1945); *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, eds. (Edinburgh, 1982); *A Hotbed of Genius: The Scottish Enlightenment 1730–1790*, David Daiches, Peter Jones, and Jean Jones, eds. (Edinburgh, 1986). David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Welby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford, 1978), Book 3, Section 2, 470 and 475. Francis Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1755), in *Four Early Works on Motivation*, Paul McReynolds, ed. (Gainesville, Fla., 1969), 131–32.

On sentimental neurophysiology, which treated "sympathy" as an organic sensitivity structured into the nervous system, see G. S. Rousseau, "Nerves, Spirits and Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility," in *Studies in the Eighteenth Century*, Papers Presented at the David Nichol Smith Memorial Seminar, Canberra, 1966 (Toronto, 1968), 137–57; John Mullan, "Hypochondria and Hysteria: Sensibility and the Physicians," *The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation*, 25 (1984): 141–74; Christopher Lawrence, "The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment," Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, eds., *Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1979), 19–39; Barker-Benfield, *Culture of Sensibility*, chap. 1. Also see Norman Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37 (1976): 195–218.

[7] Z. Isham, *A Sermon* (1700), quoted in Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy," 225, emphasis added. Locke thought of sensory impressions as pictures: although he affirmed that simple ideas of sensation come in through all the senses, he believed that "only sight is significant for the understanding faculty, for thought is seeing"; Tuveson, *Imagination as a Means of Grace*, 21. Barbara

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


FIGURE 1. The sentimental scenario of suffering: the curate and little Charles extend virtuous sympathy to an impoverished inebriate dying of consumption. Rev. C. G. Salzmann, *Elements of Morality, for the Use of Children; With an Introductory Address to Parents*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1796), vol. 1, plate 5, between 108 and 109. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

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spectatorial nature of sympathy was most fully developed by Hutcheson's student and successor at the University of Glasgow, Adam Smith, who learned from Hume and Hutcheson to treat ethics as a matter of sentiment, sentiment as a matter of sympathy, and sympathy as a matter of spectatorship. Smith's man of virtue feels sympathy by first seeing the sufferings of another, either in reality or in his mind's eye, and then exercising his imagination in an effort to enter into those sufferings: "By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them."[8]

The concept of spectatorial sympathy was instrumental in shaping the eighteenth-century literature of sensibility, a substantial body of English novels, plays, and poems that proved an important medium for popularizing the basic tenets of sentimental ethics. Sentimental art undertook to teach virtue by softening the heart and eliciting tears of tender sympathy, an aim reinforced by eighteenth-century art criticism, which emphasized emotional response rather than rational judgment as the proper criterion for evaluation. Sentimental art offered tableau after tableau of pitiful suffering—scenes of poverty, imprisonment, slavery, the aftermath of war, tormented animals, women in distress—all aimed at arousing readers' spectatorial sympathy and thus enhancing (and demonstrating) their virtue. In sentimental drama, which had the advantage of appealing literally to spectators, emotional tableaux took precedence over narrative coherence, and center stage was held less by active heroes than by passively suffering female victims, who used body language and gesture to communicate emotion and evoke the sympathetic response. Sentimental poetry aimed to teach the feeling heart a correct response in works such as "On Seeing an Officer's Widow Distracted, Who Had Been Driven to Despair by a Long and Fruitless Solicitation for the Arrears of Her Pension." Sentimental painting also specialized in the scenario of suffering, as in William Redmore Bigg, *A Lady and Her Children Relieving a Cottager* (1780) and Francis Wheatley, *John Howard Visiting and Relieving the Miseries of Prison* (1787).[9]

Maria Stafford has explored the eighteenth-century "tendency to collapse all sensory experience into the visual" in *Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 28. William Wollaston wrote, "One can scarce know the *sufferings* of another without having at least some image of them in his mind . . . Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one"; *Religion of Nature Delineated*, 139.

[8] John Dwyer refers to Smith's "principle of spectatorial sympathy" in *Virtuous Discourse*, 53. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. (Oxford, 1976), 9. On the distinctions among the views of "sympathy" held by Shaftesbury, Hume, Hutcheson, and Smith, see Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability*, chap. 1.

[9] On sentimental literature and art, see Todd, *Sensibility*; R. F. Brissenden, *Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade* (London, 1974); Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability*; Louis I. Bredvold, *The Natural History of Sensibility* (Detroit, Mich., 1962); Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse*, chap. 6; J. M. S. Tompkins, *The Popular Novel in England 1770–1800* (London, 1932), esp. chap. 3. Most useful for an understanding of the spectacle of suffering in sentimental literature is Ann Jessie Van Sant, *Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context* (Cambridge, 1993). The poem on the "Officer's Widow" is cited in Todd, *Sensibility*, 60. On the visual arts, see David H. Solkin, *Painting for Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century England* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), esp. chap. 5.

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The convention of spectatorial sympathy at the core of the eighteenth-century literature of sensibility was deeply ambivalent in its treatment of the pain and suffering of other sentient beings. Sentimental sympathy was said to be a "dear delicious pain," "a sort of pleasing Anguish"—an emotional experience that liberally mingled pleasure with vicarious pain. By the last decades of the century, what critic Anna Laetitia Barbauld called the "exquisite pleasure" of spectatorial sympathy was generating serious doubts about the underlying virtue of its exercise.[10] Avid readers of sentimental fiction fell under suspicion of moral passivity and even hypocrisy: Oliver Goldsmith ridiculed sentimentalists for weeping over the sufferings of helpless animals even as they consumed at dinner the flesh of six different creatures in a single fricassee. Other critics focused on the sentimentalists' alleged habit of quickly turning from others' misery to contemplate their own sensations: John Keats and William Hazlitt would soon charge that the poetry of sensibility actually explored not the feelings of the imagined sufferer but the feelings of the spectator watching that sufferer and was geared to demonstrating the spectator/reader's own exquisite sensibility. Wrote Barbauld, "we take upon ourselves this burden of adscititious sorrows, in order to feast upon the consciousness of our own virtue."[11]

But the most serious contemporary indictment of sentimentalism, which emerged fully in the last decades of the eighteenth century, concerned its alleged sadism. William Godwin called sensibility a "moon-struck madness, hunting after torture," and an essay in *The Watchman* (1796) agreed, saying of the sentimental reader, "She sips a beverage sweetened with human blood, even while she is weeping over the refined sorrows of Werther and Clementina."[12] Between its early appearance in the 1740s and the last decades of the century, sentimental literature did grow steadily more self-indulgent in stimulating artificial emotional excitement. But the sadistic proclivities of the genre were present from the beginning. Samuel Richardson's early sentimental masterpieces, *Pamela* (1740–41) and *Clarissa* (1747–48), were heavy with sexual victimization, psychological torture, and a sadistic voyeurism that would eventually appeal to the marquis de Sade, who reveled in the prolonged torment and rape of Clarissa and based his novel *Justine* (1791) on the perils of Pamela.[13] The literary scenario of suffering, which made

[10] "Delicious pain" is from William Wordsworth, "Sonnet on Seeing Miss Helen Maria Williams Weep at a Tale of Distress," in *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth: Poems Written in Youth; Poems Referring to the Period of Childhood*, E. de Selincourt, ed. (Oxford, 1940), 269; "pleasing Anguish" is Scottish moralist David Fordyce, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* (1754), quoted in Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy," 205; "exquisite pleasure" is Barbauld, "An Inquiry into Those Kinds of Distress Which Excite Agreeable Sensations:—With a Tale" (1773), in *The Works of Anna Laetitia Barbauld, With a Memoir by Lucy Aikin*, 2 vols. (London, 1825), 2: 228.

[11] Goldsmith's fricassee is cited in Langford, *Polite and Commercial People*, 504; on the critical views of Keats and Hazlitt, see Todd, *Sensibility*, 143; Anna Laetita Barbauld, "On Romances: An Imitation" (1773), in *Works of Barbauld*, 2: 174. Barbauld referred here to a contemporary critical position that was not her own.

[12] Godwin and *The Watchman* are quoted in Todd, *Sensibility*, 139, 141.

[13] On the connections between Sade and English sentimentalism (especially the works of Richardson), see Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony*, Angus Davidson, trans., 2d edn. (Oxford, 1970), chap. 3; Brissenden, *Virtue in Distress*, part 2, chaps. 1 and 5; Todd, *Sensibility*, chaps. 5 and 8; Van Sant, *Eighteenth-Century Sensibility*, chap. 4. Voyeurism, as Lennard J. Davis has observed, was essential to the novel's "private world-made-public" evidenced, for example, in the suggestion that *Pamela* invites the reader to peer into a young woman's private (and most distressed) correspondence; see Davis, *Factual*

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ethics a matter of viewing the pain of another, from the outset lent itself to an aggressive kind of voyeurism in which the spectator identified not just with the sufferings of the virtuous victim but with the cruelty of her or his tormentor. Pleasure mixed with pain, and pain with pleasure, in an eighteenth-century culture of sensibility intensely preoccupied with both.

G. J. Barker-Benfield offers a useful social-historical explanation of the pleasures of spectatorial sympathy. "Transcendence of long-standing forms of the suffering brought about by natural and human causes preceded the widespread expression of the refined kind of suffering that preoccupied cultivators of sensibility."[14] He points to the slowdown in the rate of population growth, the increasing production of food, relative price stability and rising real wages, the disappearance of the plague, the end to civil wars, a dramatic increase in English wealth, and the growing accessibility of consumer luxuries to the expanding middle classes in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as evidence of a growing distance from suffering in the experience of many English people.[15] Following Daniel Defoe's lead in *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), Barker-Benfield characterizes the eighteenth-century English middle classes in terms of their consciousness of a new distance from physical discomfort. That consciousness, he argues, explains the delights of spectatorial sympathy. As the aptly named *Spectator* observed in 1712, "when we read of torments, wounds, deaths and the like dismal accidents, our pleasure does not flow so properly from the grief which such melancholy description gives us, as from the secret comparison which we make between ourselves and the person who suffers. Such representations teach us to set a just value upon our own condition, and make us prize our good fortune, which exempts us from the like calamities."[16] Although spectatorial sympathy claimed to demolish social distance, it actually rested on social distance—a distance reinforced, in sentimental art, by the interposition of written text, stage, or canvas between the virtuous spectator and the (imaginary) suffering victim. As Edmund Burke explained, even though immediate pain or danger are "simply terrible . . . *at certain distances*, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful."[17]

The increasing middle-class sensitivity to pain contributed to the late eighteenth-century intensification of medical efforts to discover an effective form of anesthesia. Traditionally, Western medicine had joined with orthodox Christianity in regarding pain as inevitable. Medicine had tended to discourage efforts to interfere with pain on the grounds that suffering was a vital part of the body's natural healing process. In the eighteenth century, however, physicians and

Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel (New York, 1983), 189, and esp. chap. 3. The history of the visual arts also suggests the expansion of the voyeuristic motif since the sixteenth century; see Mirjam Westen, "The Woman on a Swing and the Sensuous Voyeur: Passion and Voyeurism in French Rococo," in *From Sappho to De Sade: Moments in the History of Sexuality*, Jan Bremmer, ed. (London, 1989), 69–83.

[14] Barker-Benfield, *Culture of Sensibility*, xx.

[15] For a similar treatment, see Langford, *Polite and Commercial People*, chap. 3.

[16] Quoted in Barker-Benfield, *Culture of Sensibility*, 62–63.

[17] [Edmund Burke], *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (London, 1757), 14, emphasis added.

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surgeons grew more sensitive to the pain they inflicted on their patients, until, "By the 1750s, the man of feeling had truly entered the operating room."[18] The medical establishment began a systematic search for a painless surgical technique, beginning with Joseph Priestley's discovery of nitrous oxide gas in 1773 and culminating in Boston dentist William T. G. Morton's successful administration of ether anesthesia to a surgical patient at Massachusetts General Hospital in 1846. What one medical historian has called the "pre-anaesthetic era" (1754–1846) also saw efforts to alleviate surgical pain by refrigeration techniques, nerve compression, hypnosis, subcutaneous injection of morphine (first isolated in 1806), controlled asphyxia, and drastic bleeding to the point of syncope just before operating. In the early eighteenth century, the term "anesthesia" had referred to a defective lack of feeling; by the end of the century, it had come to connote a "positive medical relieving of feeling, a blessing rather than a defect."[19] By 1845, the American patent medicine business had discovered (and to some extent helped create) a lucrative national market for general pain cures, with Perry Davis's registering of the trademark for his "Celebrated Pain Killer," which promised to treat not disease but pain itself.[20]

THE SEARCH FOR SURGICAL ANESTHESIA both reflected and reinforced what James Turner has called "that dread of pain—that 'instinctive' revulsion from the physical suffering even of others," which has in fact proved to be "uniquely characteristic of the modern era." The modern sensitivity to the very thought of pain was well expressed by British antivivisectionist Frances Power Cobbe: "The infliction of pain is a thing naturally so revolting to the cultivated mind, that any description of it inevitably arouses strong sentiments of dislike, if not of horror." Turner argues that, while the eighteenth-century culture of sensibility marked the beginnings of the transition from a traditional view of pain as unavoidable to a modern sense of pain as loathsome and unacceptable, it was only in the nineteenth century that the new distaste for pain achieved the level of full revulsion and horror. But the growing "obsession with pain"[21] that he documents was clearly at work shaping a wide range of popular literature, fictional and

[18] Steven Bruhm, "Aesthetics and Anesthetics at the Revolution," *Studies in Romanticism*, 32 (Fall 1993): 403. Bruhm cites the story of surgeon William Cheselden (1688–1752), who experienced nausea the night before he operated at the prospect of the pain he was going to inflict; see n. 8, 403.

[19] Bruhm, "Aesthetics and Anesthetics," 404.

[20] See F. F. Cartwright, *The English Pioneers of Anaesthesia (Beddoes, Davy, and Hickman)* (Bristol, 1952); M. H. Armstrong Davison, *The Evolution of Anaesthesia* (Baltimore, Md., 1965), which surveys the "pre-anaesthetic era," 73–96; James E. Eckenhoff, *Anesthesia from Colonial Times: A History of Anesthesia at the University of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1966); Martin S. Pernick, *A Calculus of Suffering: Pain, Professionalism, and Anesthesia in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 1985). Daniel de Moulin challenges the notion that pain has been experienced more acutely since the eighteenth century but nonetheless concedes "a rapidly dwindling readiness to accept pain" in the modern period; see Moulin, "A Historical-Phenomenological Study of Bodily Pain in Western Man," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 48 (1974): 540–70, quote 569.

[21] See Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, 80, xii. On 79, he quotes Frances Power Cobbe, "The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes"; see her *Studies New and Old of Ethical and Social Subjects* (Boston, 1866), 220. Dr. Valentine Mott used the term "instinctive aversion to pain" in *Pain and Anaesthetics: An Essay, Introductory to a Series of Surgical and Medical Monographs* (prepared by request of the Sanitary Commission) (Washington, D.C., 1862), 5.

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nonfictional, in the last decades of the eighteenth century—a literature that fully expressed the new view of pain as loathsome and revolting, a source of moral horror.

The most obvious example of a new literary genre geared to the exploration of the horror of pain was Gothic fiction, an offshoot and close relation to sentimental fiction that had emerged with the publication of Horace Walpole's *Castle of Otranto* in 1764 and by the last decades of the century become one of the most popular genres in both England and the United States. Gothic fiction embodied Burke's aesthetic theory of the sublime and beautiful, first published in 1756: "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger . . . is a source of the *sublime*; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling."[22] Pain and danger were abundantly present in such Gothic works as William Beckford's novel *Vathek* (1786), Ann Radcliffe's *The Italian* (1797), and Charles Robert Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820). Over time, the genre shifted from the gloomy but veiled terrors of earlier works toward the ever-cruder and more lurid representations of violence at work in the *Schauer-Romantik* school, exemplified by Matthew Lewis's famous novel *The Monk* (1796), which reveled in scenes of rape, torture, and charnel-house corruption and decay. Gothic fiction in general showed a predilection for scenes of torture—sometimes setting them in the historical context of the Inquisition—and for sexual violation and murder, treating such subjects in a manner calculated to arouse maximum revulsion and disgust.[23] Its treatment of torture closely linked pain with beauty and cruelty with sexual desire, articulating an erotic sensibility that helps explain de Sade's admiration for "Monk" Lewis's work. That erotic sensibility exerted a powerful influence on English Romanticism from the late eighteenth century through the Decadents. The literature of "Romantic agony" carried forward the Gothic exploration of that mysterious bond between pleasure and suffering that Maturin called "delicious agony."[24]

"So strangely was the mind of man constructed," observed Daniel Webster in closing for the prosecution at a murder trial, "that pleasure could be gathered from the elements of pain, and beauty seen in the Gorgon head of horror." The renowned attorney thus revealed the impact of the Romantic agony on a different form of literary expression: the nonfictional accounts of murder in America.[25] In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the early American execution

[22] [Burke], *Philosophical Enquiry*, 13.

[23] For general discussions of Gothic fiction, see *The Gothic Imagination: Essays in Dark Romanticism*, G. R. Thompson, ed. (Pullman, Wash., 1974); Elizabeth MacAndrew, *The Gothic Tradition in Fiction* (New York, 1979); David Punter, *The Literature of Terror: A History of Gothic Fictions from 1765 to the Present Day* (London, 1980); Devendra P. Varma, *The Gothic Flame* (1957; rpt. edn., Metuchen, N.J., 1987); James B. Twitchell, *Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy of Modern Horror* (New York, 1985). On the Gothic novel in America, see Cathy N. Davidson, *Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America* (New York, 1986), chap. 8; and Donald A. Ringe, *American Gothic: Imagination and Reason in Nineteenth-Century Fiction* (Lexington, Ky., 1982).

[24] See Praz, *Romantic Agony*; Philip P. Hallie, "Horror and the Paradox of Cruelty" (Middletown, Conn., 1969); Lowry Nelson, Jr., "Night Thoughts on the Gothic Novel," *Yale Review*, 52 (1962): 236–57 (Maturin is quoted on 238).

[25] Webster's speech was recorded in the *Trial of George Crowninshield, J. J. Knapp, Jun. and John Francis Knapp, for the Murder of Capt. Joseph White . . .* (Boston, 1830), 93. White had been clubbed and stabbed to death in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1830. Webster's reference to the Gorgon reflects the Romantic agony's fascination with the beauty of the Medusa, emblem of human agony and mortal corruption; see Praz, *Romantic Agony*, chap. 1.

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sermon, which had focused not on the crime of murder but on the state of the condemned criminal's soul just before the execution, was gradually replaced by a variety of new genres—trial reports, criminal biographies and autobiographies, journalistic accounts of the crime, and detection narratives—whose central concern was with the murder itself.[26] The popular account of murder became increasingly visual in its treatment of the violence of the crime, offering detailed verbal descriptions sometimes accompanied by illustrations, labeling murder a "bloody spectacle," a "shocking scene."[27] Readers were expressly invited to envision the murder in question, to reconstruct it imaginatively in their mind's eye, to watch the violence unfold (see Figure 2). And their attention was directed to the carnage of the scene, the wounds inflicted, the sufferings of the victim, the state of the corpse, in language calculated to evoke readers' horror even as it testified to their presumed fascination with such shocking bloodshed. Similar concerns shaped nonfictional murder narratives in England, and, in both England and the United States, bloody murder became a prominent concern in popular fiction.[28]

Both Gothic fiction and the popular accounts of murder exemplified a broader literary trend in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that was captured in the neologism "sensationalism." According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the earliest usage of the term "sensation" as "an excited or violent feeling" or "the production of violent emotion as an aim in works of literature or art" was in 1779.[29] Over time, the term increasingly lent itself to what was perceived to be a degraded commercial tendency to pander to public excitement in the face of particularly terrible or shocking events, to what William Wordsworth in 1801 characterized as a "craving for extraordinary incident" and "a degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation." Wordsworth attributed the phenomenon to urbanization and modern information technology, which were intensifying the popular desire to be shocked or thrilled so long as the beholder could remain safe (an explanation that would support the Barker-Benfield thesis). Within fifty years of Wordsworth's lament, the English periodical *Punch* was blaming the very term "sensation" on the Americans, specifically on American journalism, with its heavy reliance on steamboat explosions, train wrecks, and horrid murders to sell

[26] See Karen Halttunen, "Early American Murder Narratives: The Birth of Horror," in *The Power of Culture: Critical Essays in American History*, Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds. (Chicago, 1993), 67–101; Daniel A. Cohen, *Pillars of Salt, Monuments of Grace: New England Crime Literature and the Origins of American Popular Culture, 1674–1860* (New York, 1993), esp. chaps. 8–9; David Ray Papke, *Framing the Criminal: Crime, Cultural Work, and the Loss of Critical Perspective, 1830–1900* (Hamden, Conn., 1987), chaps. 2–3; Daniel E. Williams, "'Behold a Tragick Scene Strangely Changed into a Theater of Mercy': The Structure and Significance of Criminal Conversion Narratives in Early New England," *American Quarterly*, 38 (Winter 1986): 827–47.

[27] William B. Sprague, *Wicked Men Ensnared by Themselves . . .* (Springfield [Mass.], 1826), 41; *The Trial of Alpheus Livermore and Samuel Angier . . .* (Boston, 1813), 36 (the actual quote is "shocking scenes").

[28] See Richard D. Altick, *Victorian Studies in Scarlet* (New York, 1970), chaps. 1–5; David Brion Davis, *Homicide in American Fiction, 1798–1860: A Study in Social Values* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957); and Keith Hollingsworth, *The Newgate Novel 1830–1847: Bulwer, Ainsworth, Dickens, and Thackeray* (Detroit, Mich., 1963).

[29] The first usage cited in the *OED* of the term "sensationalism" meaning "addiction to what is sensational in literature or art" is from 1865. See *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d edn., vol. 14 (Oxford, 1991), 976.

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FIGURE 2. Sensationalistic violence: Michael McGarvey, Philadelphia carter, flogs his wife to death with a leather whip, having tied her to the bedpost by her hair (1828). The apparently passive spectatorship of the woman in the doorway underlines the voyeuristic quality of this print. *Tragedies on the Land, Containing an Authentic Account of the Most Awful Murders That Have Been Committed in This Country . . . Embellished with Numerous Spirited Engravings* (Philadelphia, 1841), 149. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

newspapers to a readership with an insatiable hunger for "sensationalist" shocks and thrills.[30] The American penny press was certainly a major expression of the new taste for sensation; in *Martin Chuzzlewit* (1843–44), Charles Dickens tellingly satirized the New York papers as the *New York Stabber* and the *New York Sewer*. But there were others. Captivity narratives and their literary successors the dime novels, the popular "mysteries of the city" genre, historical works on the Inquisition (see Figure 3), the literature of "counter-subversion" produced by social opponents of Mormonism, Masonry, and Catholicism, the semi-sociological literature of exposé, which purported to unveil the evils of mental institutions and prisons, all were sensationalistic in nature; all appealed to a popular voyeuristic taste for scenarios of suffering. "Reader," wrote James Brice in *Secrets of the Mount-Pleasant State Prison*, "if you could but once witness a state prison flogging. The victim is stripped naked and beaten with a cruel instrument of torture called a cat, from his neck to his heels, until as raw as a piece of beef."[31]

[30] See Richard D. Altick, *Deadly Encounters: Two Victorian Sensations* (Philadelphia, 1986), 4–6; William Wordsworth, Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* (1800), in *Lyrical Ballads*, R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones, eds. (Edinburgh, 1963), 243.

[31] James R. Brice, Esq., *Secrets of the Mount-Pleasant State Prison, Revealed and Exposed . . .* (Albany, N.Y., 1839), 69; also see *Astounding Disclosures! Three Years in a Mad-house, By a Victim, Written by Himself*

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FIGURE 3. The historical interest in torture: agents of the Inquisition administer the "torture of the rack, also called that of water and ropes" to a prisoner in the presence of ecclesiastical spectators. Rev. Cyrus Mason, *A History of the Holy Catholic Inquisition, Compiled from Various Authors* (Philadelphia, 1835), 156, 157. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

Perhaps most revealing, a growing predilection for scenarios of suffering was, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, becoming increasingly central to pornography *qua* pornography. Traditional English erotica had been dominated by bawdy, an innocent and unself-conscious kind of sexual writing, especially attentive to themes of cuckoldry and scatology, which tended to treat sex as an uncomplicated animal act and a source of ribald humor. But in the second half of the seventeenth century, English booksellers and printers began to import and translate from French and Italian a more modern kind of sexual writing, pornography, which was designed to arouse lust and encourage the

. . . (n.p., 1852); and *The Mysteries of Bedlam; or, Annals of the Madhouse* . . . (Philadelphia, n.d.). On the asylum exposé literature, see Norman Dain, *Concepts of Insanity in the United States, 1789–1865* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), chap. 9. For discussions of sensationalism, see Thomas Boyle, *Black Swine in the Sewers of Hampstead: Beneath the Surface of Victorian Sensationalism* (New York, 1989); David S. Reynolds, *Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of Emerson and Melville* (New York, 1988); Winifred Hughes, *The Maniac in the Cellar: Sensation Novels of the 1860s* (Princeton, N.J., 1980); Jane P. Tompkins, *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790–1860* (New York, 1985). On specific manifestations of sensationalism, see Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York, 1978); Roy Harvey Pearce, "The Significance of the Captivity Narrative," *American Literature*, 19 (March 1947): 1–20; Michael Denning, *Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working-Class Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London, 1987); David Brion Davis, "Some Themes of Countersubversion: An Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature," in Davis, *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), 9–22.

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creation of sexual fantasies.[32] As Peter Wagner has usefully defined it, pornography was "the written or visual presentation in a realistic form of any genital or sexual behaviour with a deliberate violation of existing and widely accepted moral and social taboos."[33] Not until the eighteenth century did those taboos include, on any significant scale, the infliction of pain.

Sexual flagellation apparently interested few readers and authors before the eighteenth century. In 1718, Edmund Curll published an English translation of a Latin medical work, *A Treatise of the Use of Flogging in Venereal Affairs.* By the 1730s, the respectable *Gentleman's Magazine* was including some essays and letters on the art of flogging, and, when John Cleland proffered up his tale of *Fanny Hill, or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* (1748–49), he included a scene of mutual flagellation between Fanny and Mr. Barvile. The flagellation mania significantly increased in the late eighteenth century (along with a new interest in amorous strangulation)—just at the time the marquis de Sade was producing his works associating torture and murder with sexual arousal, which would earn him the distinction of having his name assigned to the genre.[34] The pornography of sadism entered its heyday in the nineteenth century, when "the English vice" became the central convention of English pornography. In such works as *The Rodiad* (c. 1820) and *The Merry Order of St. Bridget* (1868), various combinations of sexes and (often ambiguous, due to cross-dressing and role-playing) genders participated in the flagellation mania (see Figures 4 and 5).[35] From its earliest

[32] See Roger Thompson, *Unfit for Modest Ears: A Study of Pornographic, Obscene, and Bawdy Works Written or Published in England in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century* (Totowa, N.J., 1979); David Foxon, *Libertine Literature in England 1660–1745*, reprinted with revisions from *The Book Collector* (1963) (London, 1964); *The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500–1800*, Lynn Hunt, ed. (New York, 1993); Walter Kendrick, *The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture* (New York, 1988). David O. Frantz, who tries to date English "pornography" to the Renaissance, admits that English examples were rare in contrast to Italian Renaissance pornography and that bawdy remained dominant; see Frantz, *"Festum Voluptatis": A Study of Renaissance Erotica* (Columbus, Ohio, 1989), esp. chap. 6.

[33] Peter Wagner, *Eros Revived: Erotica of the Enlightenment in England and America* (London, 1988), 7.

[34] Wagner, *Eros Revived*, chap. 3. Pisanus Fraxi [Henry Spencer Ashbee], the pseudonymous Victorian bibliographer of pornography, tried to blame the growing English popularity of "sadomasochistic" pornography on the Frenchman's evil influence: "It is obvious that modern authors have allowed themselves to be influenced by the harmful, blood-thirsty and unnatural doctrines of the Marquis de Sade, and have imitated the cynicism, cruelty and the unspeakable lasciviousness which are a characteristic feature of his works, and which, it must be admitted, he handled with masterly skill"; quoted in Ivan Bloch, *Sexual Life in England Past and Present* (London, 1958), 445. Such an explanation fails to account for either the incipient interest in flagellation that preceded the marquis's writings or the receptivity of an English readership to de Sade's sexual tastes, and neglects as well to register the influence on de Sade of some English literature, notably the sentimental works of Richardson and the Gothic fiction of Matthew "Monk" Lewis.

[35] On the nineteenth-century literature in general and its gender ambiguity in particular, see Steven Marcus, *The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England* (1966; New York, 1985), esp. chap. 6. Also see Ian Gibson, *The English Vice: Beating, Sex and Shame in Victorian England and After* (London, 1978); and Antony E. Simpson, "Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent: Legal Innovation and Its Effect on Prosecutions for Rape in Eighteenth-Century London," *Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment*, G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, eds. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988), 181–205. The American erotic novel *Mary Velnet* (1816) featured a nude woman tortured on a rack, while *Venus in Boston* (1849) depicted a Negro procuress stripping and whipping a young maiden; see Reynolds, *Beneath the American Renaissance*, 221. Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was little indigenous American pornography: the Americans largely contented themselves with importing and sometimes reprinting English and, to a lesser degree, Continental European erotica; see Wagner, *Eros Revived*, chap. 9. For brief discussions of American pornography

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FIGURE 4. The pornography of pain: a lady flagellant flourishes her birch in the frontis illustration of *The Romance of Chastisement; or, Revelations of the School and Bedroom: By an Expert* (Boston, 1876). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

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FIGURE 5. The pornography of pain: "St. Edmund, Bishop of Canterbury, while studying at Paris, was tormented by a very beautiful young woman: summoning her to his study, he administered such a Flagellation that her body was covered with weals." William M. Cooper [James Glass Bertram], *Flagellation and the Flagellants: A History of the Rod in All Countries from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (London, 1877), plate 9, opposite p. 134. Courtesy of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

appearance, the pornography of pain was highly voyeuristic in nature, dependent not only on the implied spectatorship of the reader/viewer but also on the express spectatorship of internal witnesses to the sexual infliction of pain. The spectacle of suffering—which had first emerged from moral philosophy, found its full articulation in sentimental literature and art, then assumed increasingly sadistic forms in popular sensationalism—became the dominant convention of sexual pornography by the early nineteenth century.

Steven Marcus's loosely psychoanalytic explanation of the vogue of sadomasochistic pornography attributes different scenarios to distinct sexual problems and pathologies. The typical scenario of the large, mannish woman flagellating a man wearing a skirt Marcus explains as "a kind of last-ditch compromise with and

before 1860, see Reynolds, *Beneath the American Renaissance*, 211–24; and Timothy J. Gilfoyle, *City of Eros: New York City, Prostitution, and the Commercialization of Sex, 1790–1920* (New York, 1992), chaps. 6–7.

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defense against homosexuality."[36] But the scenario of the large and powerful male Turk flogging and raping a helpless female virgin, which Marcus identifies as the dominant representation of "male [hetero]sexuality" in nineteenth and twentieth-century pornography, he attributes to the last-ditch expression of an increasingly outmoded form of aggressive manhood.[37] From a broader and more historical perspective, the key to both these pornographic expressions is changing attitudes toward pain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. If pornography is best defined as the representation of sexual behavior *with a deliberate violation of moral and social taboos*, then the growing violence of pornography in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is attributable to the new shock value of pain within a culture redefining it as forbidden and therefore obscene.

DURING THIS PERIOD, the cultural meaning of pain was undergoing a significant transition centered on the emergence of a new pornography of pain: a heightened awareness of the close relationship between the revulsion and the excitement aroused by pain. A widening range of intellectual and literary expressions revealed a powerful fascination with pain and a growing predilection for scenarios of suffering that were not necessarily constrained by the eighteenth-century sentimental convention of spectatorial sympathy. Throughout the eighteenth century, humanitarian reform had played a major causal role in this cultural reconstruction of pain, identifying a range of formerly unquestioned social practices as unacceptable cruelties and demanding that virtuous people, men and women of sensibility, endeavor to put a stop to such practices. In so doing, humanitarian reformers contributed to the new repugnance and disgust in the face of pain and quickly became mired in the same moral problems of representing the scenario of suffering that had plagued sentimental literature. Anglo-American humanitarianism first appeared in a culture of *sensation*, which assigned great importance to the role of the senses, and developed within a culture of *sensationalism*, which tended to treat pain as alluring, exciting, and ultimately obscene. The emergent

[36] Marcus's argument here is circular: he suggests that the audience for such works was "clearly limited . . . to those men to whom this perversion appealed"; *Other Victorians*, 253, 260. Such a position fails to account for the overwhelming dominance of flagellation literature in nineteenth-century English pornography. Marcus inadvertently places himself in a historical tradition of identifying flagellation as the peculiar taste of such various subgroups as Puritan clergymen, nuns and monks (especially Capuchins), prostitutes, old men, and even stepmothers; for a historical discussion of these shifting subgroups, see Thompson, *Unfit for Modest Ears*, chaps. 4, 5, 8; for a nineteenth-century example of such identifications, see William M. Cooper [James Glass Bertram]'s slyly prurient *Flagellation and the Flagellants: A History of the Rod in All Countries from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (London, 1877). Other efforts to explain the nineteenth-century vogue of sadism point to the influence of public school disciplinary practices; see Gibson, *English Vice*, chaps. 2–3 (Gibson also attempts a psychoanalytic explanation of flagellomania in chap. 8); and Ronald Pearsall, *The Worm in the Bud: The World of Victorian Sexuality* (London, 1969), chap. 7.

[37] Marcus, *Other Victorians*, 211–12. I agree with Marcus's suggestion that the increasing attention to sadistic heterosexuality in late eighteenth and nineteenth-century pornography may be attributable in part to the emergent middle-class ideal of romantic love: cruel sex may have entered obscene literature in part because of the new normative requirement of tender sex within the companionate marriage. On this point, see Wagner, *Eros Revived*, conclusion; and Jean H. Hagstrum, *Sex and Sensibility: Ideal and Erotic Love from Milton to Mozart* (Chicago, 1980).

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pornography of pain became a troubling moral dilemma within the literature of humanitarian reform.

Anglo-American humanitarian reformers were deeply concerned about pain and opposed to its willful infliction in a wide range of social practices. Among the earliest beneficiaries of the new vogue for compassion were animals, as humanitarians began to call for an end to animal abuse, including such blood sports as cock fighting and cock throwing, bull and bear baiting, and stag hunting.[38] The early modern "spectacle of suffering," the public infliction of pain or death on the bodies of criminal offenders, came under critique and was gradually replaced with the penitentiary system.[39] The brutal treatment of the insane was challenged by a new generation of asylum keepers who worked to replace the physical coercions and heroic medical procedures of traditional "terrific" mental healing with "moral treatment" based on the humanitarian conviction that the insane were not immune to physical suffering but were entitled to the same benevolent sympathy as the rest of humanity: practitioners of the new moral therapy were expected to exhibit "a sympathising distress at moral pain, a strong desire to remove it."[40] The violent punitive practices of the armed services (English reformers focused on the army, Americans on the navy) came under growing criticism on the grounds that flogging was "a disreputable, cowardly, unmanly, unfeeling, brutal, inhuman and bloody mode of punishment."[41] The corporal

[38] See Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*; Myra C. Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America* (Albany, N.Y., 1984); Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*; Robert W. Malcolmson, *Popular Recreations in English Society 1700–1850* (Cambridge, 1973), esp. chaps. 3 and 7; Richard D. French, *Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society* (Princeton, N.J., 1975); *Vivisection in Historical Perspective*, Nicolaas A. Rupke, ed. (London, 1987).

[39] See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan, trans. (New York, 1977); Pieter Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression; From a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience* (Cambridge, 1984); Michael Ignatieff, *A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary and the Industrial Revolution, 1750–1850* (New York, 1978); J. M. Beattie, *Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800* (Princeton, N.J., 1986); Martin J. Wiener, *Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830–1914* (Cambridge, 1990), chap. 3; David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (Boston, 1971); Michael Meranze, *Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution and the Transformation of Authority in Philadelphia, 1760–1835* (Chapel Hill, forthcoming, 1996); David Brion Davis, "The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787–1861," in Davis, *From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American Culture* (New York, 1986), 17–40; Louis P. Masur, *Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776–1865* (New York, 1989).

[40] Anne Digby, *Madness, Morality and Medicine: A Study of the York Retreat, 1796–1914* (Cambridge, 1985); *Madhouses, Mad-Doctors, and Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era*, Andrew Scull, ed. (Philadelphia, 1981); Scull, "Humanitarianism or Control? Some Observations on the Historiography of Anglo-American Psychiatry," in *Humanitarianism or Control? A Symposium on Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Social Reform in Britain and America*, Martin J. Wiener, ed., *Rice University Studies*, 67 (Winter 1981): 21–41; Mary Ann Jimenez, *Changing Faces of Madness: Early American Attitudes and Treatment of the Insane* (Hanover, N.H., 1987); Gerald N. Grob, *Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875* (New York, 1973); Rothman, *Discovery of the Asylum*; Nancy Tomes, *A Generous Confidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride and the Art of Asylum-Keeping, 1840–1883* (Cambridge, 1984). The term "terrific" was applied to older therapies, as contrasted with the "mild means" of moral treatment, by Samuel Tuke, grandson of the founder of the York Retreat: see his *Description of the Retreat, an Institution near York for Insane Persons of the Society of Friends*, Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine, intro. (London, 1964), 148. The passage on "sympathising distress" is in J. C. Bucknill and D. H. Tuke, *A Manual of Psychological Medicine* (1858), quoted in Digby, *Madness, Morality and Medicine*, 61. Traditional treatment of the mentally ill was probably harsher in England than in early America: see Jimenez, *Changing Faces of Madness*; and Grob, *Mental Institutions in America*, chap. 1.

[41] The quoted passage is from an anti-flogging petition to Parliament in 1834; quoted in J. R. Dinwiddy, "The Early Nineteenth-Century Campaign against Flogging in the Army," *English Historical*

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punishment of children began to fall into disfavor among liberal Lockeans and Romantics.[42] War, dueling, prize fighting, even "football" (a term covering a wide range of games in which serious wounds, broken bones, and occasional deaths occurred) were all objects of reform concern.[43]

The literature of humanitarian reform targeted illicit cruelty by offering graphic treatments of its practice. When Richard Henry Dana, Jr., devoted a chapter of *Two Years before the Mast* (1840) to the floggings of two fellow seamen on board the brig *Pilgrim*, and when Harriet Beecher Stowe accepted her Sunday-morning vision of the fatal flogging of Uncle Tom as the starting point for her epic antislavery novel (1851–52), both authors were writing within a well-established reform convention. Throughout reform literature, a wide range of victims—including British soldiers, American sailors, schoolboys, convicts, the insane, and African slaves—were endlessly flogged: bound or chained, stripped to the waist, and whipped until the blood poured down and pieces of flesh flew, and the victims writhed with pain, cried out for relief, and sometimes fainted or died (see Figures 6 and 7). Within these representations, the victims' extreme pain was an important focal point: "While under the lash, the bleeding [slave] victim writhes in agony, convulsed with torture." British soldiers who were flogged reported that "the sensation experienced at each lash was as though the talons of a hawk were tearing the flesh off their bones."[44]

Review, 97 (April 1982): 317. Also see Myra C. Glenn, "The Naval Reform Campaign against Flogging: A Case Study in Changing Attitudes toward Corporal Punishment, 1830–1850," *American Quarterly*, 35 (Fall 1983): 408–25; Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment*, chaps. 2 and 5; Harold D. Langley, *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798–1862* (Urbana, Ill., 1967), chaps. 6–7.

[42] See J. H. Plumb, "The New World of Children in Eighteenth Century England," *Past and Present*, 67 (1975): 64–95; Jay Fliegelman, *Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800* (Cambridge, 1982); Richard H. Brodhead, *Cultures of Letters: Scenes of Reading and Writing in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chicago, 1993), chap. 1; Donald R. Raichle, "The Abolition of Corporal Punishment in New Jersey Schools," in *Corporal Punishment in American Education: Readings in History, Practice, and Alternatives*, Irwin A. Hyman and James H. Wise, eds. (Philadelphia, 1979), 62–88.

[43] Lewis Perry, *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973); Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States, from the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton, N.J., 1968); Donna T. Andrew, "The Code of Honour and Its Critics: The Opposition to Duelling in England, 1700–1850," *Social History*, 5 (October 1980): 409–34; Malcolmson, *Popular Recreations in English Society*, esp. chaps. 3 and 7; Spierenburg, *Broken Spell*, chap. 7; Elliott J. Gorn, *The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America* (Ithaca, 1986). Myra Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment*, explores the connections among a range of movements against the corporal punishment of children, sailors, prisoners, *et al.*, and reformist opposition to capital punishment, war, dueling, cruelty to animals, and slavery. Randall McGowen's work on England is particularly useful for understanding the larger transition "from a society that celebrated the public infliction of pain to a society whose members withdrew in horror from the spectacle of suffering"; see McGowen, "The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England," *Journal of Modern History*, 59 (December 1987): 651–79, quote on 653; and "Civilizing Punishment: The End of the Public Execution in England," *Journal of British Studies*, 33 (July 1994): 257–82. On the extreme sensitivity to personal suffering within American perfectionist reform, see George M. Fredrickson, *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union* (New York, 1965), chap. 6; and John L. Thomas, "Romantic Reform in America, 1815–1865," *American Quarterly*, 17 (Winter 1965): 656–81. For a discussion of the historical significance of the new "humanitarian narrative" of the body in pain, see Thomas W. Laqueur, "Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative," in *The New Cultural History*, Lynn Hunt, ed. (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 176–204.

[44] The Rev. Horace Moulton, in *American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses* [Theodore Dwight Weld, comp.] (New York, 1839), 20; Henry C. Wright, *Defensive War Proved to Be a Denial of Christianity and of the Government of God: With Illustrative Facts and Anecdotes* (London, 1846), 174.

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FIGURE 6. The humanitarian spectacle of pain: a white man flogs a half-naked slave woman. The African-American spectators evince the proper response of sentimental sympathy and distress at her suffering, while the single white spectator betrays callous indifference to, if not barbaric pleasure in, her exposure and pain. *The Anti-Slavery Record* I, no. 10 (October 1835): 109. Courtesy of the Newberry Library.

Beyond flagellation, reformers often selected out cases of unusual cruelty to illustrate the evils of the institution in question. English opponents of the slave trade, for example, cited use of thumbscrews, roasting in an iron coffin, and burning alive to depict the torments of enslaved Africans.[45] The index of Theodore Dwight Weld's compilation *American Slavery as It Is* (1839) clearly demonstrates that project's focus on torture: A is for Arbitrary power, cruelty of, B is for Branding with hot iron, C is for Chopping of slaves piecemeal, D is for Dislocation of bones, E is for Ear-cropping. A naval reformer focused his critique not on common disciplinary flogging but on the case of sailor Henry Burr on the American ship *Caravan*, who was first beaten and flogged by the captain and mate, then pricked all over his body with a sail needle until he died of his injuries, in what was designated "a torture worthy of the inquisition."[46] This analogy

[45] See John Newton, *Thoughts upon the African Slave Trade* (London, 1788), 17; Thomas Cooper, *Letters on the Slave Trade* (Manchester, 1787), 18; John Wesley, *Thoughts upon Slavery*, 3d edn. (London, 1774), 14. On Wesley's enlistment of images of sadistic torture, see Davis, *Problem of Slavery*, 359.

[46] *American Slavery as It Is*, 210, 211, 212, 213; William McNally, *Evils and Abuses in the Naval and Merchant Service, Exposed: With Proposals for Their Remedy and Redress* (Boston, 1839), 140. Also see

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FIGURE 7. The humanitarian spectacle of pain: a naval flogging. Henry Howe, *Life and Death on the Ocean: A Collection of Extraordinary Adventures, in the Form of Personal Narratives . . . with Thrilling Relations of Experiences and of Sufferings* (Cincinnati, 1855), between pp. 272–73. Howe excerpted and abridged this account of a naval flogging from Herman Melville's novel *White Jacket, or the World in a Man-of-War* (1850). Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

employed a common device of likening the broad range of violent practices deplored by humanitarians to outdated or non-Anglo-American modes of torture. The public whipping post and even the tying of calves for transport to market were likened to the rack; slave quarters in the American South were identified with "the dungeons of the Popish Inquisition"; capital punishment was compared with Inquisitorial live burnings and drawings asunder, Chinese flayings, boiling to death, or the torture of the wheel.[47]

Richard Henry Dana, Jr., "Cruelty to Seamen," *American Jurist* (October 1839), rpt. edn., *Cruelty to Seamen* (Berkeley, Calif., 1937).

[47] Benjamin Rush, "An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals, and upon Society," in Rush, *Essays, Literary, Moral & Philosophical* (Philadelphia, 1798), 163; R. Fletcher, *A Few Notes on Cruelty to Animals; On the Inadequacy of Penal Law; On General Hospitals for Animals; &c.* (London, 1846), 25; [George Bourne], *Picture of Slavery in the United States of America* (Middletown, Conn., 1834), 151. On analogies for capital punishment, see G. W. Quinby, *The Gallows, the Prison, and the Poor-house: A Plea for Humanity; Showing the Demands of Christianity in Behalf of the Criminal and*

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One argument against such punishments focused on their ill effects on the victim, who was said to be debased and hardened by corporal punishment, which destroyed his self-respect and made him more recklessly vicious than ever. "FLOGGING, in many instances, destroys the *self-respect* and *manly dignity* of the child or pupil on whom it is inflicted—without which it is *impossible* to have a *sensible* and *good* child," argued school reformer Lyman Cobb. Another argument addressed the pernicious influence of corporal punishment on the practitioner, hardening and debasing him as well as his victim, transforming him into a tyrant or worse. In a discussion of schoolboy flogging, George B. Emerson reported that "the effect is almost necessarily bad on the individual who inflicts the pain. It excites a horrible feeling in him,—a feeling which we might conceive to belong to evil spirits." In *Two Years before the Mast,* Captain Frank Thompson "danced about the deck" during the brutal flogging of two sailors; to explain why he ordered the punishment, he shouted, "It's because I like to do it—because I like to do it! It suits me!"[48]

But the broadest area of concern among humanitarian reformers lay with the effects of corporal punishments on spectators. Benjamin Rush addressed this problem systematically in "An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals, and upon Society" (1787). "By an immutable law of our nature," he wrote in good sentimental fashion, "distress of all kinds, when *seen,* produces sympathy, and a disposition to relieve it." When the suffering in question cannot be alleviated, however, as in the case of public execution, sympathy proves abortive, its powers are weakened, and spectators are thus trained to contemplate misery without emotion or sympathy.[49] Rush's argument quickly became a commonplace in the literature of humanitarian reform. According to Thomas Eddy (the Quaker merchant known as the "John Howard of America"), "The hearts of the people were made callous by the sight of stocks, whipping posts, pillories in every shire town or considerable village." One witness after another in *American Slavery as It Is* testified to the evil effects of watching frequent slave floggings: "[M]y own heart was becoming so hardened that I could witness with comparative indifference, the female writhe under the lash, and her shrieks and cries for mercy ceased to pierce my heart with that keenness, or give me that anguish which they first caused." According to Lyman Cobb, "Children should not witness the butchering or slaughtering of animals" because "it *hardens* their fine and originally kind feelings."[50]

Perishing Classes (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1856); Wendell Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures, and Letters,* 2d series (Boston, 1894), 109; Charles Spear, "Boiling to Death," in *The Prisoners' Friend: A Monthly Magazine, Devoted to Criminal Reform, Philosophy, Science, Literature, and Art,* vol. 5 (October 1852): 67.

[48] Lyman Cobb, *The Evil Tendencies of Corporal Punishment as a Means of Moral Discipline in Families and Schools, Examined and Discussed* (New York, 1847), 69; on the effects of discipline on the victim, also see Rush, "Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments," 139. Emerson is quoted from Alonzo Potter and George B. Emerson, *The School and the Schoolmaster: A Manual for the Use of Teachers, Employers, Trustees, Inspectors, &c., &c., of Common Schools* (Boston, 1843), 503. Richard Henry Dana, Jr., *Two Years before the Mast* (1840; New York, 1964), 99. Cruelty to animals, according to one reformer, "bears with it a double curse in the misery that it causes to the sufferer, and in the fearful passions which it raises in him by whom it is inflicted"; James Marshall, *A Short Prize Essay on Cruelty to Animals . . .* (London, 1838), 20.

[49] Rush, "Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments," 141–42.

[50] Eddy is quoted in Orlando F. Lewis, *The Development of American Prisons and Prison Customs,*

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But the repeated sight of suffering did more than simply deaden the spectator's sensibility, according to a number of reformers. Eventually, it aroused a positive taste for cruelty. In Rush's scheme, those spectators already hardened by vice or too young or ignorant to connect the punishments with the crimes that had prompted them would regard public punishments as arbitrary acts of cruelty and would want to "exercise the same arbitrary cruelty over the feelings and lives of their fellow creatures" by committing their own acts of violence and murder. According to the journal the *Moral Advocate*, a soldier's first engagement "dulled" his initial instinctive horror of war, until he eventually derived "enjoyment from the most horrid scenes of carnage." "Cruelty [in this instance, to animals]," warned one reformer, "like all other vices, is progressive and ingenious; it calls continually for stronger gratifications, and is driven upon refined methods of satisfying its cravings." Even though "human sufferings are never beheld, for the first time, but with aversion, terror, and disgust," frequent public executions, argued Edward Livingston, made capital punishment "a spectacle, which must frequently be repeated to satisfy the ferocious taste it has formed." He condemned in the strongest possible terms "this atrocious passion for witnessing human agonies, and beholding the slaughter of human beings." One contributor to *American Slavery as It Is* offered a horrific picture of this escalating love of cruelty in creole women who ordered the flogging of their slaves: "Their sensibility changed to fury must needs feed itself for a while on the hideous spectacle; they must, as if to revive themselves, hear the piercing shrieks, and see the flow of fresh blood; there are some of them who, in their frantic rage, pinch and bite their victims." As these passages reveal, the "taste" for cruelty in its spectators was viewed as a "progressive vice," a "craving" or "hunger" that, like substance addiction (Weld invoked the metaphor of "intoxication"), only grew more powerful as it was fed.[51]

Was the scenario of suffering as represented in humanitarian reform literature "pornographic"? Not by a rigorous application of Peter Wagner's definition, which requires that pornography realistically represent sexual or genital behavior.[52] But reform literature did eroticize pain, constructing it as sexual in nature. The eroticization of suffering in humanitarian reform sometimes took the form of overtly sexual references: to the "indecent" nudity and sexual abuse of idiot or insane women, to the sexual coercion and rape of slave women ("The South,"

1776–1845, Donald H. Goff, intro. (1922; Montclair, N.J., 1967), 9; Philemon Bliss, *American Slavery as It Is*, 10; Cobb, *Evil Tendencies of Corporal Punishment*, 84.

[51] Rush, "Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments," 145; the *Moral Advocate: A Monthly Publication on War, Duelling, Capital Punishment, and Prison Discipline* (1821–1824) is quoted in Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment*, 49; Thomas Young, *An Essay on Humanity to Animals* (London, 1798), 42; Edward Livingston, *Remarks on the Expediency of Abolishing the Punishment of Death* (Philadelphia, 1831), 10; *American Slavery as It Is*, 59. Weld wrote, "It is one of the most common caprices of human nature, for the heart to become by habit, not only totally insensible to certain forms of cruelty, which at first gave it inexpressible pain, but even to find its chief amusement in such cruelties, till utterly intoxicated by their stimulation"; *American Slavery as It Is*, 125. Also see Thomas Clarkson, *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, particularly the African* (1786; Georgetown, Ky., 1816), 108.

[52] Ronald G. Walters has observed that antislavery writings "have little merit as pornography"; "The Erotic South: Civilization and Sexuality in American Abolitionism," *American Quarterly*, 25 (May 1973): 181.

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proclaimed Wendell Phillips, "is one great brothel, where half a million of women are flogged to prostitution"), to the rape of war victims, and to the genital mutilation and torture of both male and female slaves.[53] More commonly, the humanitarian eroticization of pain took indirect form in references to the illicit excitement generated by the infliction of pain: the "emotions of a doubtful character" awakened in the flogger; the similarly doubtful sense of pleasure reported by some flogging victims; and the "ferocious taste," "atrocious passion," or "craving" aroused in spectators to the scenario of suffering.[54] As Myra Glenn has observed, "By associating whipping with uncontrolled emotion and bestiality, reformers tacitly explored the connection between corporal punishment and illicit sexuality."[55] Their treatment of scenarios of suffering, if not narrowly pornographic in nature, assumed that the spectacle of pain was a source of illicit excitement, prurience, and obscenity—the power to evoke revulsion and disgust.

THE HUMANITARIAN EMPHASIS on the moral dangers of watching cruelty placed reformers in a difficult position. Typically, they represented human (and animal)

[53] See, for example, the following: on the sexual exposure and abuse of the insane, Dorothea L. Dix, "Memorial: To the Legislature of Massachusetts" (1843), in *On Behalf of the Insane Poor: Selected Reports* (New York, 1971), 5, 8; and Dix, "Memorial: To the Honorable the Legislature of the State of New York" (1844), in *On Behalf of the Insane Poor*, 3–4; on the sexual coercion of slave women, *Speech of Wendell Phillips, at the Melodeon, Thursday Evening, Jan. 27, 1853* (n.p., n.d.), 7; and Newton, *Thoughts upon the African Slave Trade*, 17; on the rape of war victims, *Turkish Barbarity: An Affecting Narrative of the Unparalleled Sufferings of Mrs. Sophia Mazro, a Greek Lady of Missolonghi* (Providence, R.I. [1828]), 19, 22, 26; and William Ladd, "Address Delivered at the Tenth Anniversary of the Massachusetts Peace Society, December 25, 1825" (Boston, 1826), note "F"; on the genital torture and mutilation of slaves, *American Slavery as It Is*, 86; Wesley, *Thoughts upon Slavery*, 14; [Thomas Clarkson], *An Abstract of the Evidence Delivered before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, in the Years 1790 and 1791, on the Part of the Petitioner for the Abolition of the Slave Trade* (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1855), 78. Ronald Walters argues that the abolitionist treatment of slavery as an institution founded on "absolute, irresponsible power on one side, and entire subjection on the other" (Charles K. Whipple, 1858) was frequently cast in sexual terms—not surprisingly, he argues, in view of the attention of contemporary pornography to scenarios of dominance and submission. "For abolitionists the distance was not great from lust for power to mere lust," and the literature of antislavery was filled with references to the licentiousness of the South, to scenes of rape, sexual coercion, and debauchery; "Erotic South," 178, 186, 180. On the abolitionist attention to the sexual vulnerability of slave women, see Karen Sánchez-Eppler, *Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), chaps. 1, 3.

[54] Educational reformer Cyrus Peirce confessed to "emotions of a doubtful character" aroused by flogging, quoted in Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment*, 21; the same source offers several stories of the pleasure of some flogging victims, 47; the last references to "ferocious taste" etc. are cited above, n. 51.

[55] Glenn, *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment*, 46. I would, however, question Glenn's assumption (also present in Marcus, *Other Victorians*; see note 36 above) that "an underlying fear of homosexuality probably heightened anxiety about this connection [between corporal punishment and illicit sexuality]" (46). In view of the interchangeability of the sexes in both humanitarian and pornographic scenarios of suffering (men abuse men, women abuse women, men abuse women, and women abuse men), this special scholarly attention to presumed anxieties about homosexuality suggests some particular, essential connection between homosexuality and sadomasochism that is assumed rather than argued or demonstrated. A further unexamined implication of this view may be that the infliction of pain by men on women (a common scenario of suffering in both humanitarian and pornographic literature) is somehow more natural, or at least less unnatural, than the infliction of pain by men on men—presumably because the man-over-woman scenario conforms to the patriarchal distribution of social power.

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suffering as a "horrible picture," "appalling spectacle," or "horrible scene."[56] And they often rested their claim to moral authority on their status as eyewitnesses to the sufferings they addressed. Weld's subtitle for *American Slavery as It Is* was *Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses*—many of whom laid careful emphasis on "the scenes that I have witnessed." George Bourne offered his *Picture of Slavery in the United States of America*, "as I saw it for nearly seven years in Virginia." Dorothea Dix told one state legislature after another that "*I tell what I have seen*" of the sufferings of the insane.[57]

Was it possible, then, that the reformers' own sensibilities had been blunted or, worse, that their spectatorship had generated in them a positive taste for cruelty? As though in defense against such a charge, reformers filled their writings with close descriptions of their own immediate emotional response to the spectacle of suffering, to demonstrate that their sensibilities remained undamaged. The sensitivity to pain to which they thus laid claim proved less a matter of sentimental sympathy than of Gothic horror, revulsion, and disgust. "To see a woman, who, after having had her husband and children butchered before her eyes, herself violated, her nose and lips cut off, and then sent forth to wander friendless, houseless, and half naked, is indeed dreadful!" reported Samuel Gridley Howe from insurrectionary Greece. Lyman Cobb wrote, "I have often seen both parents and teachers flog their children or pupils until my whole soul was *shocked* and *disgusted*"; Richard Henry Dana, Jr., testified that he felt "sick and almost faint" at the sight of his fellow seamen being whipped.[58] Other humanitarians reported that they "never could look on but a moment" at the spectacle of suffering or that they shut their eyes "as the last dreadful act was going on."[59] Their spectatorship, they thus suggested, had been too short-lived to blunt their feelings, and its voluntary termination demonstrated their freedom from any "ferocious taste." One reformer went so far as to claim that he had never actually witnessed the evil he condemned: "What can be a more horrid spectacle than a fellow being hung between heaven and earth, struggling in the last agonies of life, with the giant grasp of death? It must be horrible. I have never witnessed an execution. I never will, if I can avoid it." Others simply prayed that they might never have to witness such a terrible scene (a public execution, a chained madwoman) again.[60] And

[56] Thomas Clarkson, *The Cries of Africa, to the Inhabitants of Europe, or, a Survey of That Bloody Commerce Called the Slave-Trade* (London, 1822), 49; *Turkish Barbarity*, 35; Lydia Maria Child, *Anti-Slavery Catechism* (Newburyport, 1836), 9.

[57] Nehemiah Caulkins, *American Slavery as It Is*, 11; [Bourne], *Picture of Slavery*, 80; Dix, Massachusetts Memorial, 3.

[58] *Turkish Barbarity*, 25–26; Cobb, *Evil Tendencies of Corporal Punishment*, 21; Dana, *Two Years before the Mast*, 97.

[59] Moulton, *American Slavery as It Is*, 20; [William Makepeace Thackeray], "Going to See a Man Hanged," *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country*, 20 (August 1840), quoted in David D. Cooper, *The Lesson of the Scaffold: The Public Execution Controversy in Victorian England* (Athens, Ohio, 1974), 9.

[60] A. C. Thomas, *A Lecture on Capital Punishment: Delivered in the First Universalist Church, Philadelphia, on the Evening of June 20, 1830* (Philadelphia, 1830), 19. After attending a double execution at the Tombs in New York City, a police officer reported, "It was the most sickening sight that I ever beheld and God grant that I may never have an occasion to witness another execution"; quoted in "Crime, Poverty and the Streets of New York City: The Diary of William H. Bell, 1850–51," Sean Wilentz, ed., *History Workshop*, 7 (Spring 1979): 148. Dorothea Dix similarly exclaimed, "grant I may never look upon another such scene!" as that of the insane young woman she found chained to the wall of the poorhouse at Westford, Massachusetts; see Dix, Massachusetts Memorial, 16.

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


FIGURE 8. The humanitarian reader as imaginative witness to the spectacle of suffering: the text of this juvenile temperance volume commanded young readers, "Look at that hard-hearted man [the violent drunkard]. He is holding his little boy by the hair with one hand, while the other is raised to give him a blow." Dr. Charles Jewett, *The Youth's Temperance Lecturer* (Boston, 1841), 20. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

some reported that even the memory of what they had seen—in this case, the suffering of African slaves—"now chills my blood with horror."[61]

In attempting to exculpate themselves of any guilt attaching to their own spectatorship at the scenario of suffering, humanitarian reformers were, however, addressing only part of the moral dilemma that confronted them. Their presentations of suffering as a "horrible scene" deliberately recreated for readers' consumption their own immediate experiences of witnessing terrible cruelty. (See Figure 8.) Indeed, humanitarian reformers frequently commanded readers to act as imaginative witnesses to the spectacle of suffering: "Behold one [slave] covered with stripes, into which melted wax is poured—another tied down to a block or a stake—a third suspended in the air by his thumbs."[62] Did such graphic represen-

[61] "Captain Riley's Narrative," quoted in Lydia Maria Child, *An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Americans Called Africans* (Boston, 1833), 74.

[62] [Benjamin Rush], *An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America, upon Slave-Keeping* (Philadelphia, 1773), 26. For other examples of the visual imperative, see Clarkson, *Cries of Africa*, 39; Dorothea L. Dix, "Memorial Soliciting Enlarged and Improved Accommodations for the Insane of the State of Tennessee, by the Establishment of a New Hospital" (1847), in *On Behalf of the Insane Poor*, 29; Heman Humphrey, *Parallel between Intemperance and the Slave-Trade* (New York, 1828), 5, 8; Wright,

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tations of the spectacle of suffering subject readers to the moral risks of blunted sensibilities and sadistic tastes? Could the "atrocious passion for witnessing human agonies" be aroused through the printed word? Humanitarian defensiveness on this point was abundantly evident in reformers' repeated and formulaic denials of any intention to "harrow up" the distressing emotions of readers. "I have given many details of the miseries and horrors of war," explained American nonresistant Henry Wright, "not to gratify a morbid appetite, or to harrow up the feelings of the reader, but solely to illustrate principles and practices that are inseparable from all war." Similarly, Charles Spear wrote, "We have not presented these scenes to harrow up the mind of the reader, but rather to show the influence of public executions upon the criminal, and the multitudes who attend such scenes."[63]

Humanitarians offered a variety of narrative strategies designed to distance themselves from any imputations of sensationalistic pandering. Prominent among these was the strategic omission, which typically asserted that "the scene [in this case, the torture of cats] was too horrible for description." "For my reader's sake," explained one opponent of the slave trade, "I suppress the recital of particulars [concerning the punishment of slave insurrectionaries]."[64] Another reformer used asterisks to denote certain "circumstances too horrible to be given to the world" concerning a murderous Jamaican planter.[65] A common variant of this convention pointed to the unspeakableness of the horror of extreme pain and suffering: "What pencil can paint, what language can describe, the horrors of Borodino, Moscow, Berezina and Waterloo?" asked peace reformer William Ladd.[66]

Such strategic (and self-conscious) omissions of scenes "too horrid and indecent to mention"[67] in humanitarian reform literature bore a close relationship to the practice later known as bowdlerizing, the selective expurgation of texts

Defensive War, iii; John Woolman, "Considerations on Keeping Negroes: Part Second," in *The Journal and Major Essays of John Woolman*, Phillips P. Moulton, ed. (New York, 1971), 232.

[63] Wright, *Defensive War*, iii; Charles Spear, *Essays on the Punishment of Death* (Boston, 1844), 49. For other examples of this formula, see Dix, Tennessee Memorial, 28; Weld, *American Slavery as It Is*, 86; Samuel Gridley Howe, *An Essay on Separate and Congregate Systems of Prison Discipline: Being a Report Made to the Boston Prison Discipline Society* (Boston, 1846), 56–57; William Ladd, *An Address, Delivered at Portland, February 6, 1824, before the Peace Society of Maine* (Portland, 1824), 4. An opponent of cruelty to animals apologetically assured his readers "that the atrocities detailed in this little volume, are neither gratuitously multiplied in number, nor exaggerated in degree"; Egerton Smith, *The Elysium of Animals: A Dream* (London, 1836), vii.

[64] Fletcher, *Few Notes*, 18; Newton, *Thoughts upon the African Slave Trade*, 17. For other examples of this convention, see Dix, Tennessee Memorial, 23; and "Memorial of D. L. Dix, Praying a Grant of Land for the Relief and Support of the Indigent Curable and Incurable Insane in the United States" (1848), in *On Behalf of the Insane Poor*, 8; Charles Spear, *Prisoners' Friend* (March 1853): 322; [Clarkson], *Abstract of the Evidence*, 112.

[65] [Clarkson], *Abstract of the Evidence*, 78. This passage concerned the testimony of two witnesses before the House of Commons: "The rest of the conduct of this planter, as described by Captain Ross, was, after a debate, cancelled by the Committee of the House of Commons who took the evidence, as containing circumstances too horrible to be given to the world; and, therefore, the reader will find their places supplied by asterisks, in the evidence at large"; 78.

[66] Ladd, Massachusetts Address, 9–10. Also see Humphrey, *Parallel between Intemperance and the Slave-Trade*, 5.

[67] [Clarkson], *Abstract of the Evidence*, 82. Clarkson was referring to testimony concerning the conduct of a clergyman's wife at Port Royal, who had tied up a woman slave and "abused" her with cayenne pepper "in a way too horrid and indecent to mention."

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in the interest of decency, emerging during the same period. Scattered incidents of this practice (which was called "castrating" or "gelding" until those terms themselves were politely avoided) occurred in the eighteenth century. Then, in 1807, Dr. Thomas Bowdler—a former prison reformer, who had grown disgusted with the failure of his cause—published his expurgated *Family Shakespeare.* (Noah Webster would follow suit in 1833 with an expurgated Bible.) The heightened concern for refinement at work in the practice of bowdlerization was a by-product of various developments including the growth of evangelical religion (especially Methodism, in England), the emerging concern for safeguarding the special virtue of womanhood in an industrializing society, and an elitist concern for the dangers of exposing improper material to the new mass readership. But it was the cult of sensibility that contributed most to the heightened concern for delicacy: delicate minds had to be protected from too much evil, according to sentimentalists, lest excessive exposure to evil harden them, rendering them incapable of being shocked, insensitive to evil, and indelicate.[68]

In humanitarian reform literature, the self-conscious omission of certain material served primarily to highlight its prurient nature, by calling attention to the inescapable conviction that dreadful pain was obscene pain. Significantly, the strategy of omission was sometimes used in gambit-fashion to introduce the very kind of material it purported to set aside. Thomas Clarkson once used an asterisk to point readers in the direction of the disgusting details he was claiming to suppress.[69] Other reformers similarly relegated to footnotes or appendices their most horrific descriptions of spectacles of suffering: as one explained, "At the suggestion of some judicious friends, the appalling description of the *Knacker's Yard,* illustrated by the masterly sketch of *Cruikshank,* has been transferred to the Appendix at the end of the volume."[70] Most commonly, reformers' apologies, demurrals, and denials of sensationalism were simply followed by shockingly vivid

[68] See Noel Perrin, *Dr. Bowdler's Legacy: A History of Expurgated Books in England and America* (New York, 1969).

[69] He first assured his readers, "Horrible as this account may appear, we assert, in the most solemn manner, that we have omitted to mention many circumstances*, which would render it still more afflicting." Then, he used the footnote denoted by the asterisk to point the reader in the appropriate direction: "*See the evidence before the English parliament, in the cases where the slaves have been afflicted with contagious disorders, particularly the flux, when, says one of the witnesses, 'the floor of their prison was covered with blood and mucus, like a slaughter-house.' " Clarkson, *Cries of Africa,* 27. Significantly, asterisks were used in eighteenth-century sexual censorship to indicate expurgated material; see Peter Sabor, "The Censor Censured: Expurgating *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,*" in *'Tis Nature's Fault: Unauthorized Sexuality during the Enlightenment,* Robert Purks Maccubbin, ed. (Cambridge, 1987), 192–201. Sabor argues that such a practice "pruriently draws attention to deleted material" and that the asterisks "invite readers to greater flights of sexual fantasy," in some cases, than the deleted words themselves might have done; 197.

[70] Smith, *Elysium of Animals,* vii. William Ladd in his Massachusetts Address offered few gory details of war in the main body of his text but appended four pages of notes labeled "A" through "F" that told tales of wounded soldiers burning alive in field hospitals, starving soldiers resorting to cannibalism, and acts of rape and arson. Edward Livingston offered a graphic description of the Russian punishment by knout in a lengthy footnote to *Remarks on the Expediency of Abolishing the Punishment of Death,* 25–26; Lyman Cobb allocated to a footnote his close description of the fatal flogging of a British soldier at Hounslow barracks, in *Evil Tendencies of Corporal Punishment,* 61–62. One animal reformer used a footnote to detail the abuse of horses in animal pounds; see Rev. John Toogood, *The Book of Nature: A Discourse on Some of Those Instances of the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, Which Are within the Reach of Common Observation; To Which Is Added, The Duty of Mercy, and Sin of Cruelty to Brutes, Taken Chiefly from Dr. Primatt's Dissertation* (Boston, 1802), 42.

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representations of human suffering. Having proclaimed his desire not "to harrow your feelings with stories of cruelty," Dr. David Nelson in *American Slavery as It Is* went on to tell the story of a slave girl whose hand was thrust into boiling water in punishment for a minor offense. Having reported that "the first shock [of seeing an abused madman caged near the public road] was too painful to be described," Samuel Gridley Howe proceeded to offer a vivid description of the man's sufferings.[71]

HUMANITARIAN REFORMERS WERE CAUGHT in a contradiction largely of their own making. To arouse popular opposition to the evil practices they sought to eradicate, they deemed it necessary to display those practices in all their horror: "civilized" virtue required a shocked spectatorial sympathy in response to pain scenarios both real and willfully imagined. But, by their own line of argument, viewing the spectacle of suffering could inflict terrible moral damage on the spectator, turning him or her into a "savage" with an "atrocious passion" for cruelty. Their awareness of this moral dilemma is clear, but time and again, they stressed to readers that "we must not allow our nerves to be more tender than our consciences." "Do you turn with inexpressible disgust from these details? It is worse to witness the reality. Is your refinement shocked by such statements? There is but one remedy—prevent the possibility of such monstrous abuses by providing hospitals and asylums."[72] Humanitarian reform was a major cultural vehicle for the growing unacceptability of pain; it was also, inescapably, an expression and even a demonstration of the new obscenity of pain. Apologize though they might, the reformers were caught up in the same cultural linkages of revulsion with desire that fueled a wide range of popular literary explorations of pain.

To understand reform literature as deliberate obscenity aimed at titillating its readers, however, is to miss the point. The reformers' purpose was not to exploit the obscenity of pain but to expose it, in order to redefine a wide range of previously accepted social practices as cruel and unacceptable. One purpose of the reformers' close descriptions of their own horror, revulsion, and disgust in the face of suffering was to instruct readers in the appropriate response to pain. When Lydia Maria Child reported that "executions always excite a universal shudder among the innocent, the humane, and the wise-hearted" and when peace reformer William Ladd indicated that slavery "is viewed with horror and disgust, by every virtuous member of society," they were firmly pointing their readers toward the appropriate emotional response to the spectacle of suffering.[73]

In crafting their graphic representations of the spectacle of suffering, humanitarian reformers were not tapping into a timeless human appetite for sadomasochistic expression so much as participating in the production of a new cultural linkage of violence and sex, a linkage whose primary purpose was to establish the obscenity of pain. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Richard von

[71] *American Slavery as It Is*, 86; S. G. Howe, *Insanity in Massachusetts* (Boston, 1843), 8.
[72] Child, *Appeal in Favor of That Class*, 7; Dix, New York Memorial, 9.
[73] Lydia Maria Child, *Letters from New York*, 3d edn. (New York, 1845), 224; Ladd, Massachusetts Address, 6.

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Krafft-Ebing formally introduced the terms "sadism" and "masochism" into the psychopathological lexicon, labeling them "the fundamental forms of psychosexual perversion, which may make their appearance at any point in the domain of sexual aberration." In dozens of case studies, he documented his subjects' fantasies and ritual enactments of pain scenarios that replicated those of humanitarian reform: scenes of judicial torture (by bastinado and knout), schoolboy floggings, the slaughter and abuse of domestic animals, the physical abuse of mental patients ("brutal, uneducated female warders beating me mercilessly"), and the flagellation of slaves. One of Krafft-Ebing's subjects confessed that his first experience of sexual excitement at puberty was prompted by reading *Uncle Tom's Cabin*; a generation later, Sigmund Freud reported that Stowe's novel was cited by many of his patients (whom he labeled hysterics and obsessional neurotics) as the original stimulus for their common fantasy that "a child is being beaten."[74] The cultural power of this fully psychopathologized understanding of the sex-pain connection was registered by those English humanitarians who, in this same period, cited Continental sexology in identifying as "flagellomania" any effort to restore the judicial practice of corporal punishment.[75]

By the turn of the century, psychopathologists and humanitarians agreed: the linking of sex with pain, whether in the fantasies of sadists and masochists or in the formal legal effort to resurrect judicial flogging, was a by-product of diseased and perverted minds. But the historical emergence of the pornography of pain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and its wide-ranging presence in a variety of popular literary genres point to the historical inadequacy of attributing the phenomenon solely to sexual psychopathology, whether individual or collective. As Michel Foucault observed, "Sadism is not a name finally given to a practice as old as Eros; it is a massive cultural fact which appeared precisely at the end of the eighteenth century."[76]

[74] Richard von Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis, with Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Forensic Study*, Franklin S. Klaf, trans., from 12th German edn. (New York, 1965), 143. For case studies documenting these various scenarios, see for example: judicial torture, Case 80; schoolboy floggings, Cases 42, 57, 60, 143; animal slaughter and abuse, Cases 45, 47, 57, 62, 134; abuse of a mental asylum inmate, Case 84; slave whippings, Cases 57 (the reader of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*), 70, 80, 84. Sigmund Freud, "'A Child Is Being Beaten': A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions," *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, *Clinical Papers and Papers on Technique*, Ernest Jones, ed., Joan Riviere, trans. (London, 1949), 173 (I am grateful to Michael Meranze for calling this reference to my attention). In a related development, an openly pornographic tale of antebellum Southern life (focused on floggings, rapes, and general social violence on the plantation), entitled *The Memoirs of Dolly Morton*, was printed in Paris in 1899; see Wagner, *Eros Revived*, 302. Freud offers the historically useful suggestion that reading about flagellation had replaced the social witnessing of punishment as the formative "stimulus" of this fantasy, since "children were no longer beaten in the higher forms at school"; "Child Is Being Beaten," 173.

[75] In a footnote to his essay "Facts about Flogging," Joseph Collinson wrote, "Psychopathically regarded, this cry is simply a manifestation (unconscious, perhaps, but not the less real on that account) of what has been termed 'flagellomania.' Those who have studied pathology, as expounded by Continental thinkers, know that the use of the rod, as at present inflicted, is evidence that flagellomania is a real and widespread disease." Collinson, *Humanitarian Essays*, Henry S. Salt, ed. (London, 1910), 6–7. Another essay in this volume quoted Havelock Ellis to support the author-editor's position that the humanitarian "hatred of flogging in every shape and form may be partly due to a recoil from such sensual craving for the infliction of pain on others"; see Henry S. Salt, "The Ethics of Corporal Punishment," 6 (each essay is paginated independently).

[76] Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, Richard Howard, trans. (New York, 1965), 210.

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



FIGURE 9. The obscenity of privatized pain: "Here! step up to this window that looks into the 'black room,' or room where the whipping is done. There, surrounded by half a dozen fiends in human shape; naked and upon his knees, is the poor [prisoner]. A powerful brute stands over him, grinning like a fiend incarnate. In his brawny hand he holds that merciless instrument of torture, the cat-o'-nine tails; rising upon his toes, he brings the hard-twisted, bullet-tipped thongs *down* upon the poor victim's bare back, each blow counting nine lashes, eating into the tender flesh, and drawing forth the shrieks of pain we heard." [J. A. Banka], *An Illustrated History and Description of State Prison Life, By One Who Has Been There* (Toledo, 1871), 96. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

Both *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and the case studies cited by Krafft-Ebing and Freud should be understood as episodes in a long-term historical transformation in the cultural significance of pain. The eighteenth-century cult of sensibility had proclaimed pain unacceptable but simultaneously discovered it to be alluring, "delicious." Gothic fiction, the canonical literature of the Romantic agony, and popular sensationalism had reinforced the close connection between revulsion and desire in the face of pain. Late eighteenth and especially nineteenth-century pornography transformed the sentimental scenario of suffering into an overtly voyeuristic attention to a fully sexualized cruelty. Similar, though muted, themes were at work in the literature of humanitarian reform, with its many graphic representations of terrible cruelty and suffering, embedded in a tangle of apologies, explanations, indirections, and bowdleristic omissions—all of which revealed the reformers' unhappy realization of their own inescapable participation in the pornography of pain. In rapid and overlapping stages, pain had become questionable, intolerable, disgusting, and obscene.

The pornography of pain played a significant role in directing some humani-

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Plate XX. WHIPPING IMPLEMENTS.



The figures in the upper half of this plate represent the Prison-Rod and Whipping-Post. The Rattan, Birch, and Loose Garment belong to ladies' boarding schools in the last century. The Rule and Spatula (or "Jonathan") were used in boys' schools. The holes in the spatula raised blisters.

Beneath are the modern Jesuit discipline with the Whipping-Post or Hurdle in Wandsworth House of Correction. On either side are Knouts of leather and of twisted cord.

FIGURE 10: A still life of "Whipping Implements" (judicial and schoolroom), from William M. Cooper [James Bertram Glass], *Flagellation and the Flagellants*, plate 20, opposite p. 478. Courtesy of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

tarian activity toward the privatization, as opposed to the eradication, of pain practices. As John Stuart Mill observed in 1836, "One of the effects of civilization (not to say one of the ingredients in it), is, that the spectacle, and even the very idea, of pain, is kept more and more *out of sight* of those classes who enjoy in their

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fulness the benefits of civilization."[77] In both England and the United States, the movement to abolish capital punishment was effectively rechanneled by the mid-nineteenth century into the privatization of execution. Penitentiaries replaced the public torments of the scaffold with their own methods of corporal punishment and restraint (some traditional, some cruelly innovative), and the directors of the Massachusetts State Prison, for example, defended the expense of their institution on the grounds that "scenes of barbarity . . . have been removed from the public eye." Nineteenth-century mental hospitals quickly reverted to the practice of heroic medical procedures as well as corporal constraints (often applied as punishments).[78] But, in the social setting of the new institutions for deviance, such practices remained largely, in Mill's phrase, out of sight of the respectable and civilized classes. As Randall McGowen has observed, the real concern expressed by the movement to privatize execution "was as much to separate oneself from the violence associated with punishment as it was to curtail the amount of violence employed in punishment."[79]

This new social distance between the humanitarian and the sight of punishment served, finally, to enhance the pornography of pain, as evidenced most notably in the sensationalist and lurid literature of the asylum exposé—works by alleged former inmates of prisons and mental hospitals, who served up horrific tales of the terrible tortures practiced behind asylum walls (see Figure 9).[80] Hidden pain was forbidden pain, and forbidden pain was increasingly represented in print as obscene. The pornography of pain emerging in Anglo-American culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries points to the imaginative consequences of the "civilizing process," which was putting into question a range of traditional cultural practices centered on the willful infliction of pain. Historically, just as the spectacle of punishment was coming under humanitarian attack, an imaginative literature appeared that established a new cultural linkage between pain and sexual obscenity or taboo. The traditional social policy of pain was yielding to a modern pornography of pain; the social theater of public punishment gave way to a solitary fantasy theater, which staged private, interior scenarios of cruelty; legitimate spectatorship was replaced by furtive voyeurism, culminating in the private fantasies and obsessions of Krafft-Ebing's and Freud's guilt-racked cases (see Figure 10). The humanitarian sensibility fostered an imaginative cultural underground of the illicit and forbidden, accessible through the expanding cultural practice of solitary reading, at the center of which was a flogging scene.

[77] John Stuart Mill, "Civilization," in *Essays on Politics and Culture*, Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed. (New York, 1962), 57. Mill is quoted in Randall McGowen, "A Powerful Sympathy: Terror, the Prison, and Humanitarian Reform in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Journal of British Studies*, 25 (July 1986): 332, emphasis added.

[78] On the nineteenth-century privatization of punishments, see McGowen, "Civilizing Punishment"; Masur, *Rites of Execution*, chap. 5 (the Massachusetts prison directors are quoted on 88–89); Michael Meranze, "A Criminal Is Being Beaten: The Politics of Punishment and the History of the Body," unpublished paper; Jimenez, *Changing Faces of Madness*. For a discussion of the historical relationship between privatization and the "civilizing process," see Spierenburg, *Broken Spell*, chap. 1.

[79] McGowen, "Civilizing Punishment," 280.

[80] Karen Halttunen, "Gothic Mystery and the Birth of the Asylum, 1780–1860," paper delivered at the American Studies Association meeting, New Orleans, November 1990.

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Rape, Race, and Colonial Culture: The Sexual Politics of Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony, South Africa

PAMELA SCULLY

ON APRIL 2, 1850, A RAPE OCCURRED in the rural district of George, about two hundred miles from Cape Town, the capital of the British colony of the Cape, South Africa. Anna Simpson, wife of a laborer, told the local justice of the peace that Damon Booysen, age eighteen, had raped her "about a month" after he had started working for her husband. Anna Simpson stated that one day when her husband had gone to town, Booysen came to her house. "He asked me to go with him I refused; suddenly he seized me from behind and threw me to the ground." Booysen threatened to stab Anna Simpson and then raped her. On her husband's return from Mossel Bay, Anna Simpson told him of the rape.[1] Booysen was brought to the town of George for a preliminary examination at the office of the clerk of the peace, and on April 4 Booysen confessed. "It is true that I committed the crime . . . true that I forced Annie Simpson. I was half drunk. I fully accomplished my lust."[2]

This article is drawn from Pamela Scully, "Liberating the Family? Gender, Labor, and Sexuality in the Rural Western Cape, South Africa, 1823–1853" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1993). The research was conducted in 1991–1992 and assisted by grants from the Joint Committee on African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Rockefeller Foundation. I also received funding from the Ford Foundation through the Center for African and Afro-American Studies at the University of Michigan, and from the Center for the Education of Women, and the Rackham Graduate School, at the University of Michigan. A faculty grant from Kenyon College helped fund the writing of the article. I am grateful for the support of the department of history at Kenyon College. Thanks also to Vivian Conger, Frederick Cooper, Clifton Crais, Roderick Phillips, Sean Redding, and Angela Woollacott for their help with this article.

[1] Archival references are mainly to the Cape Archives (hereafter, CA) or the African Studies Library, University of Cape Town. CA, Colonial Office (hereafter, CO) 599, Preliminary Examination held at Schoonberg Lange Kloof, before the justice of the peace, George Division, April 2, 1850, enclosure in letter from Justice William Menzies to Governor Harry Smith, September 27, 1850. Anna Simpson's name is spelled differently in each of the documents, ranging from Anna to Ann to Annie. I use the name cited in the legal document of the Circuit Court trial.

In 1830, George had a population of 8,022. Of that number, 5,962 were listed as "free persons" and 2,060 as slaves. Twenty years later, the district occupied the same area of 4,032 square miles with a white population of 7,964 and a now undifferentiated "Colored" population of 7,369. CA, *Cape Almanack for 1830,* 77. African Studies Library, Cape of Good Hope, "Return of the Population and of the Marriages, Births and Deaths," *Blue Book 1850*: 308–09. George Simpson lived on the farm Brak River and presumably had sufficient money to hire another laborer to help him work on the farm. It is unclear if Simpson was sharecropping or if he was a wage laborer on the farm.

[2] CA, CO 599, Declaration of Damon Booysen to the clerk of the peace, George, April 4, 1850, enclosure in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

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At the Supreme Court's circuit court trial on September 16, 1850, the presiding judge, Justice William Menzies, reported that at the preliminary examination "the prisoner fully confessed having committed the crime . . . and . . . he neither cross examined the witnesses nor stated anything in mitigation of his guilt." Menzies therefore found Booysen guilty and sentenced him to death.[3] Nowhere in the records is any mention made of the race of Damon Booysen. However, remarks by the judge, Booysen's name, his mother and friends' names, and his occupation as a day laborer working for another laborer in the poorest section of rural society suggest that, in terms of the racial and social taxonomies of the mid-nineteenth-century Cape, he probably identified himself and was identified in the district of George as a man of color.[4] In 1850, Damon Booysen had good reason to expect that his life was about to end.

At the end of September, however, Justice Menzies wrote to the governor of the Cape Colony saying that he, Menzies, had made a terrible mistake in sentencing Booysen to death. The victim, a woman Menzies had thought was white, had turned out to be of a different racial identity. A deputation of "eight or ten most respectable Inhabitants [read white] of George" had called on the judge and told him that "the woman and her husband are Bastard coloured persons, and that instead of her being a respectable woman, her character for chastity was very indifferent and that it was strongly suspected that she had on several occasions previously voluntarily had connection with the Prisoner."[5] In light of this development, the judge agreed with the deputation urging the governor to commute Booysen's death sentence to a term of imprisonment with hard labor. The last records available of the case show that the death sentence was indeed commuted. It is important to note that, while the governor instituted an inquiry into the respectability of Anna Simpson in order to determine the severity of punishment required, the inquiry investigated only her status as a respectable woman; the charge of Anna Simpson being "black" was now undisputed.[6]

HISTORIANS OF COLONIAL LIFE have tended to analyze sexual violence primarily as a metaphor for or index of tension within colonial societies rather than examining

[3] CA, CO 599, Justice Menzies to Governor Harry Smith enclosing the "Report in Writing of All the Proceedings of the Trial of Damon Booysen, at Circuit Court Held at George on 16 September 1850 for Rape of Anna Simpson, Guilty, to Be Hanged," September 27, 1850.

[4] Damon was a name common to people of Khoi and slave descent in the Western Cape. For example, see CA, Magisterial Records of Stellenbosch (hereafter, 1/STB), 2/37, No. 11, Documents in the Trial of Damon and Piet Arries for Theft of Sheep; Cory Library, Methodist Missionary Archives, 15 099, Register of Baptisms (in church in Stellenbosch catering to freed people), Damon Salmon baptized, March 10, 1844. Booysen's mother's name was Maria Platjes, another name connoting some heritage from the indigenous people of the Western Cape. See Statements in Inquiry, Statement by Maria Platjes, October 16, 1850, enclosure in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1950. Booysen identified his friend J. Botha as "a man of color." CA, CO 599, Petition of Damon Booysen, made in George Jail, September 21, 1850, enclosure in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

[5] CA, CO 599, Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

[6] CA, CO 599, John Montagu, secretary of government, to Judge Menzies, October 21, 1850, enclosing letter from J. G. Aspeling, resident magistrate of George, to secretary to government, "containing the result of the inquiry respecting Ann Simpson," October 17, 1850.

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rape as a fact of violence.[7] This is a curious feature of the historiography: that authors have in general been more concerned with the elusive myths concerning white women as victims of black rapists than with the ways in which colonialism created conditions that authorized the pervasive rape of black women by white men.[8] Indeed, there are relatively few studies that examine cases in which black women were raped either by black or white men.[9] This is surprising, given that the Booysen case is but one of many rape cases found in the archives of colonial and racially structured societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Studies of rape in postemancipation societies are rare, and African history still awaits an extended study of women's experiences of rape in colonial culture. This article represents an initial attempt at such a study by examining the multiple meanings and experiences of rape in one colonial society. We still have much to learn both about black women's experiences of rape and the ways in which colonialism involved complicated linkages between representations of sexuality and of race. We need to unite the previously disparate historiographic concerns with rape as a metaphor, or as an index of social tensions, with a study that takes rape seriously as an act of violence by men against women. We must give attention to the ways in which multiple narratives about the meaning of rape in colonial societies helped to solidify and, at the same time, to complicate the meanings of and relationships between race, sexuality, class, and honor.

Studies on rape scares throughout the British Empire and Commonwealth have

[7] For a critique of analyzing sexual violence purely metaphorically, see Ann Laura Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality in Colonial Asia," in *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era*, Micaela di Leonardo, ed. (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), 51–101; Jenny Sharpe, "The Unspeakable Limits of Rape: Colonial Violence and Counter-Insurgency," *Genders*, 10 (Spring 1991): 25–46. For a study of rape, race, and gender in contemporary sexual violence cases, see Sherene Razack, "What Is to Be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race, and Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence," *Signs*, 19 (Summer 1994): 894–923.

[8] For example, see Norman Etherington, "Natal's Black Rape Scare of the 1870s," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15 (1988): 36–53; Amirah Inglis, *The White Women's Protection Ordinance: Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Papua* (New York, 1975); Vron Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (London, 1992).

[9] The exceptions lie in the literature on slavery and emancipation. Historians have argued that, at the Cape, the rape of slave women by their owners operated both as a field of sexual and social power and, intentionally or not, as a means of reproducing the Cape slave population. See John Edwin Mason, Jr., " 'Fit for Freedom': The Slaves, Slavery, and Emancipation in the Cape Colony, South Africa, 1806 to 1842," 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1992), 2: chap. 3, 202–25, who discusses rape as a form of patriarchal control; and Patricia van der Spuy, "A Collection of Discrete Essays with the Common Theme of Gender and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope with a Focus on the 1820s" (M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992). For an early study of slavery and sexuality at the Cape, see Robert Ross, "Oppression, Sexuality and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope," *Historical Reflections*, 6 (1979): 421–33. For the American South, see Victoria Bynum, *Unruly Women: The Politics of Social and Sexual Control in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), 109, 117–18; Laura F. Edwards, "Sexual Violence, Gender, Reconstruction and the Extension of Patriarchy in Granville County, North Carolina," *North Carolina Historical Review*, 68 (July 1991): 237–60; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, 1988), 325; Deborah Gray White, *Ar'n't I a Woman? Female Slaves in the Plantation South* (New York, 1985). Histories of lynching in the South have also provided compelling studies regarding the implications of the reinscription of older discourses about the need to protect white women from rape by black men. See Hazel V. Carby, " 'On the Threshold of Woman's Era': Lynching, Empire, and Sexuality in Black Feminist Theory," *Critical Enquiry*, 12 (Autumn 1985): 262–77, 268; and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, " 'The Mind That Burns in Each Body': Women, Rape, and Racial Violence," in *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality*, A. Snitow, C. Stansell, and S. Thompson, eds. (New York, 1983).

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contributed to our understanding of sexuality as a key site of colonial anxieties. Authors have shown that rumors within settler communities about the rape of white women by black men surfaced in periods of crisis about the efficacy of colonial rule and helped frame relations between colonizers and colonized, particularly in the arena of domestic wage work.[10] Rape became a powerful means of discussing anti-colonial revolts such as the 1857 Indian Mutiny or the 1865 Morant Bay uprising in Jamaica.[11] The myth of the black rapist who through overexposure to civilization came to desire white women also embodied a more generalized anxiety and ambivalence about the appropriate limits of the civilizing mission. As Ann Stoler has suggested, colonialism rested on a contradiction: a desire to make the "native" adopt the habits and practices of the colonizer but not to a degree that destabilized the boundaries between colonized and colonizer.[12] Colonial slave societies such as the Cape involved charged notions of how far to incorporate indigenous societies and how to mark the boundaries between men and women, settlers and natives, slaveholders and slaves.

The nineteenth-century Cape offers a compelling case study of the many and competing sites for the elaboration of colonial identities. The Cape was the only settler-dominated slave colony in the early nineteenth century to be conquered by the British.[13] The cultural understandings of Dutch settlers competed both with slave and African knowledge but also with British and metropolitan concepts of race, sexuality, equality, and the means by which to secure the transformation of a slave society to one based on principles of free wage labor. For women and men who had been slaves, laborers, or slaveholders, and for those settlers who had arrived from Britain in the 1820s, the world after 1838 floated adrift from the legal and social markers of slavery. In this context, sexual violence, race, and cultural practice took on ever more important and nuanced meanings as various actors sought to redefine their social landscape in an era of free wage labor and discourses of freedom. The Booysen case and other narratives of rape that I will be examining suggest the centrality of sexuality to the constitution of colonial identities and expose implicit assumptions about race, gender, and class that frequently guided colonial rule. I analyze the ways in which communities and individuals received and interpreted rape cases, that is, the cultural narratives constructed about any given case; the degree of power accorded rape as a metaphor for a general crisis; and the ways in which the categories of race, gender,

[10] Historians of domestic service in Africa have suggested that the debates within settler societies about whether to employ black men or women as servants drew on a slew of stereotypes about black men as sexually licentious or about black women as competitors with white women for white men's favors. See Karen Tranberg Hansen, *Distant Companions: Servants and Employers in Zambia, 1900–1985* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1992), chap. 6, 170; and Charles van Onselen, "The Witches of Suburbia: Domestic Service on the Witwatersrand, 1890–1914," in *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886–1914*, Vol. 2, *New Nineveh* (London, 1982).

[11] Ware, *Beyond the Pale*, chap. 1, 38, 40.

[12] Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge." For an analysis of colonial categorization, see Ann Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (1989): 134–61; Etherington, "Rape Scare," 44; also Inglis, *White Women's Protection Ordinance*, 5–9.

[13] Clifton C. Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770–1865* (Cambridge, 1992), 87.

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and sexuality informed and were themselves constituted through discussions about morality, law, and the social order.

THE EVENTS DESCRIBED took place some twelve years after the Abolition Act ended slavery in the Cape, Mauritius, and the British West Indies. The Dutch East India Company had ruled the Cape from 1652 until the last decade of the eighteenth century. For a brief period thereafter, the British and then the Batavians ruled the colony. The British took over permanently in 1806, slowly introducing legislation that abolished bonded labor. But the legal freedom gained by the indigenous Khoi population by Ordinance 50 of 1828 and by slaves with the emancipation of 1838 did not usher in great economic and social opportunity. Freed people, Khoi, and other members of the free black community continued to work mostly in farm employment, although a few became market gardeners or joined the small but growing artisanal class in the villages of the Western Cape.[14]

Emancipation at the Cape freed slaves into the category "free black," which encompassed all people of color native to the Western Cape: "Hottentots" (the colonial term for the Khoi) and "Bushmen" (the colonial term for the San), "Bastards" (white father, Khoi mother) and "Bastard Hottentots" (slave father, Khoi mother), as well as Africans taken from slave ships by the British. By the time of emancipation, the slave population of the Western Cape was predominantly creole, including descendants of slaves brought from the west and east coasts of Africa, Madagascar, India, and the Dutch East Indies, and children born of a slave mother and a free father. The close cultural and social relations between Khoisan and slaves, which had been fostered in part by the decimation through colonial violence and disease of much of the Khoi population in the early eighteenth century, and the incorporation of the Khoisan into the Cape colonial economy, also contributed to the heterogeneous culture of the rural poor in the mid-nineteenth century. The introduction of "prize negroes," who had been "rescued" from other nations' slave ships by the British and brought to the Cape from 1808 to 1815 and then again in the 1830s to remedy the labor shortage in the Western Cape, also served to increase the polyglot nature of the rural poor of the Western Cape. This diversity of geographical and cultural origins affected the emergence of an official racial terminology to cover all of these groups. Thus while the category of "free black" continued to be used into the 1840s in government correspondence regarding labor legislation, from 1837 the statistical *Blue Books* began listing people of Khoi and San descent, free blacks, "prize negroes," and freed people under the category "Colored."[15]

[14] The Khoi were predominantly pastoralists, who from the late seventeenth century were subjected to increasingly coercive measures to force them to labor for whites. See Richard Elphick, *Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1985). For a discussion of Cape slavery, see Nigel Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge, 1985). On the economy of the postemancipation rural Western Cape, see John Carel Marincowitz, "Rural Production and Labour in the Rural Western Cape, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts, 1838–1888" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1985).

[15] Mason, " 'Fit for Freedom,' " 589. Mason also cites *De Zuid Afrikaan,* December 7, 1838, as using the term "gekleurde." This is a translation of the English verb for coloured. In later Afrikaans usage,

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The rearrangement of previously distinct racial status groups into a new racial classification had multiple origins. Into the nineteenth century, freed people seem to have continued to construct ethnic sensibilities distinguishing between people of Khoi, Mozambican, and slave descent.[16] However, such identities were not mutually exclusive; and, through the experiences of slavery and freedom, a wider rural culture of the poor emerged in the postemancipation Cape.[17] Recent historiography has suggested that identification with a "coloured" ethnic identity arose from both the imposed ascriptions of governmental discourse and the self-identification of some members of the freed population. It is difficult to pinpoint when in the nineteenth century, and to what extent, the rural poor began to define themselves as coloured. But, as a number of authors have shown, coloured identity emerged among members of the freed population in the rural areas, as well as from "members of the skilled and educated" class, who, in the 1880s, began to validate the term coloured, using it as a platform for political action.[18] In part, the use of the category coloured also arose from what Eva Saks has called, in the context of the postbellum American South, a new "property in race."[19] At the Cape, the possession of legal or customary title to whiteness also became more important to farmers who could no longer claim the right to domination through their status as slaveholders. The struggles by Dutch and British settlers to realign domination and status along the axis of a putative white superiority thus influenced their articulation of a racial sensibility about "colouredness."

If the use of the term coloured became increasingly widespread from the mid-nineteenth century, it was not necessarily accompanied by great certainty regarding exactly who fell under that designation. The "recognition" of "colouredness" depended on an almost unconscious invocation of "common sense" derived from local association with the norms of domination, status, and physical appearance on which so much racial consciousness depends. Dutch settlers seem to have been much more certain than British officials of their ability to determine the racial origins or status group to which a person belonged: in the Booysen case, for example, it was the local white inhabitants of George who confidently asserted that Anna Simpson was a "Bastard coloured"—a term probably synonymous in

the noun "kleurling" predominated, describing a person who "possessed" the "property" of "colouredness."

[16] Mohammed Adhikari argues that the "distinction between ex-slaves and Khoisan remained fairly clear-cut for the generation that had experienced bondage." Adhikari, "The Sons of Ham: The Making of Coloured Identity," *South African Historical Journal*, 27 (1992): 95–112, 109.

[17] See Mason, " 'Fit for Freedom' "; and Scully, "Liberating the Family?"

[18] For an early mention of the term coloured by freed people, see CA, Clerk of the Legislative Council, 6, No. 46, "Petition of the Colored Inhabitants of the Caledon Missionary Institution," August 11, 1834. For an analysis of the emergence of coloured identity in the Western Cape, see Ian Goldin, "The Reconstitution of Coloured Identity in the Western Cape," in *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa*, Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds. (London, 1987), 156–82, 160. Mohammed Adhikari suggests that coloured identity "crystallized in the 1880s." "Sons of Ham," 99. Also see Vivian Bickford-Smith, "A 'Special Tradition of Multiracialism'? Segregation in Cape Town in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape*, Wilmot G. James and Mary Simons, eds. (Cape Town, 1989).

[19] Eva Saks, "Representing Miscegenation Law," *Raritan*, 7 (1988): 39–69.

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colloquial speech with "Bastard Hottentot." The ambiguity of the term suggests the shifting meanings of racial categories as well as the way in which local claims to knowledge about a person's background helped secure racial identity. Ironically, while British bureaucrats invoked race as a category free of moral or cultural assumptions, it was often their invocation of racial categories that exposed the cultural construction of race as a category of social life. The term "coloured" was generally employed by settlers and bureaucrats with much more certainty in terms of including who was *not* a part of the "coloured population." "Colouredness" most clearly marked people in the Western Cape who did not fit the category "white." The "coloured" category evolved from the mid-nineteenth century in part to enable whites to distinguish the people of "colour" native to the Western Cape, who had absorbed many of the cultural practices of the colonizers, from the increasing influx of Africans from Xhosaland and other parts of the Eastern Cape. Thus many whites' relationships with people they saw as coloured rested on a profound ambivalence. Whites behaved as if they recognized the freed people of the Western Cape as having at least a cultural kinship with whites, but at the same time they preserved the notion of whiteness as untainted by relationships with slaves, Khoi, and other Africans. This ambivalence is but one of the strands that complicated the outcome of the Booysen case.[20]

While various authors have analyzed the malleability of the category "coloured," and the contestations around that term from the mid-nineteenth century, historians of South Africa have paid insufficient attention to the mutually constitutive relationships between sexuality, race, and gender identities. We need to explore the ways in which such identities emerged out of continuing reinterpretations by different actors about the meanings of and relationships between those categories. In the Booysen case, for example, Justice Menzies' ascription of "coloured" identity to Anna Simpson, and the meanings that collected around that identity in the context of her rape, can only be understood by analyzing the multilayered colonial and metropolitan histories in which sexuality, race, gender, and class became referents for one another, in addition to being discrete categories of everyday life and of historical analysis. Paradoxically, while the process of classifying an individual's racial identity arose out of a complex identification of class, sexual, and racial markers, once that person had been identified as belonging to a given group, the ambiguity of how to deal with that individual often evaporated in the face of the logic of colonial categorization. Once Anna Simpson's race had been proclaimed with certainty by members of the settler elite of George, Judge Menzies confidently proceeded along a different route of sentencing in accordance with the logic of how to deal with the rape of a black woman. Slippery conceptual and social identities could result in unambiguous social and political consequences.

[20] A striking example of this continued ambivalence is found in a classic text on freed people and their descendants at the Cape. J. S. Marais appealed to his fellow white Afrikaners to reach out to the "coloured" population. He stated that it "is arguable that the Bantu do not belong with us . . . But the Coloured do not appear to differ from us in anything except their poverty, and that they share with our large army of poor whites." Johannes Stephanus Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652–1937* (New York, 1939), 281.

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BRITISH SLAVE EMANCIPATION in the 1830s freed slaves in both the West Indies and the Cape into a world in which at least some colonial officials and missionaries believed in the possibility of "civilizing" each individual, a world that stressed, at least in theory, the equality of men before the law. No laws existed at the Cape prohibiting interracial marriage and sexual relations such as were found in the postemancipation legislation of the American South.[21] This difference arose partly because Cape slave emancipation occurred in an era when competing definitions of race derived as much from culture as from biology but also because of the legacy of Dutch colonialism, which tended toward a hazy elaboration of racial difference.[22] The Booysen case is enlightening because it uncovers the legal suppositions, even in this optimistic moment, about how equality before the law could be mediated by race and, more particularly, overdetermined by the intersection of properties of femaleness and blackness.

The nineteenth-century Cape offers an interesting, and sometimes baffling, conjuncture of different legal systems jostling for authority. The legal system was premised on Roman Dutch law, and juries were predominantly made up of settlers who drew on local Roman Dutch legal customs, while lawyers and judges were trained in Britain. The two legal systems were not so much antithetical as placed at opposite ends of a continuum. Roman Dutch law placed the individual more firmly within a community than did English law, which treated people as individuals before the law. Roman Dutch law continued to be the dominant legal system at the Cape through the nineteenth century, even though new laws brought the Cape increasingly in line with English legal tenets. The British retained Roman Dutch law in part because it was deeply entrenched at the Cape but also because the total elimination of Roman Dutch law would have entailed more effort and expense than the British were willing to invest in this far-flung colony. The establishment of the Supreme Court in 1828 and the reorganization of the judiciary involved the introduction of English legal procedures, including the use of preliminary examinations and indictments, the establishment of juries to try serious criminal cases, and the use of English rules of evidence.[23] Abolished in the reshuffle were the centuries-old offices of *landdrost* (replaced by magistrates) and the citizen boards called *heemraden*, which had controlled district government. The British also eliminated the judicial responsibilities of the local field cornets, who fulfilled some policing and administrative functions. Field cornets, often farmers themselves, who were notoriously biased in favor of settlers.

The discrepancy between the written laws and the cultural assumptions that informed judges and juries led to a tension between the letter and the spirit of the law in evaluation and sentencing. While legal precedent did not operate very forcibly in Roman Dutch law, which was guided more by the original writings on

[21] See Saks, "Representing Miscegenation Law," for an excellent discussion of the U.S. legal framework.

[22] William F. Freund states that, into the early 1800s at the Cape, "[l]egal distinctions between races were not clearly formulated or systematically applied." Freund, "The Cape under the Transitional Governments, 1795–1814," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, eds., *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840*, 2d edn. (Cape Town, 1989), 334. For a comparison of Dutch and British racial and sexual practices and laws, see Jean Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia* (Madison, Wis., 1983).

[23] Albie Sachs, *Justice in South Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), 38.

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legal issues, judges and lawyers trained in Britain nonetheless used precedent as a way of arguing for or against certain kinds of punishment. More important, since the Charter of Justice explicitly dictated that Roman Dutch law be accommodated to English law, judges and lawyers were given much leeway in bringing their own interpretations to the adjudication of cases. British legal and cultural perceptions especially influenced crimes concerning sexuality and race. These categories became highly charged in British imperial life in part because of the proliferation of concerns about sexuality in Britain itself during the Victorian era but also because sex in the colonies was a political act with repercussions on which children would be included in the category of colonized and which in settler society. "Colonial control was predicated on identifying who was 'white,' who was 'native,' and which children could become citizens rather than subjects, designating who were legitimate progeny and who were not."[24]

In Cape Roman Dutch law, rape was understood to be "both the *forcible ravishing* and the *forcible carrying off* of a woman or maid *against her will*."[25] In the colonies, rape constituted an illegal act of reproduction.[26] While it is difficult to chart the changing Cape laws relating to rape, at least up to 1845 a man could only be convicted of rape if the prosecution could show that ejaculation had occurred: "that there was emission as well as penetration."[27] The significance of ejaculation in determining rape made the prosecution of rape more difficult at the Cape than in England, where, after 1828, rape victims no longer had to demonstrate that the rapist had ejaculated.[28] The discrepancy between the colony and the metropole suggests the ways in which racial hierarchy depended on the control of sexual relations: illegal reproduction, particularly when it involved a black man and a white woman, threatened the foundations of colonial life.

Rape law in the nineteenth-century Cape allowed for the death penalty in cases of great severity, such as the rape of "a girl still unmarriageable" (not yet menstruating), married women, and rape by men in positions of authority—the latter characteristic possibly serving as a marker for whiteness.[29] In Cape Dutch settler society, women's honor referred as much to the men of the family as to the women themselves. Notions of honor and status crucially determined rape cases, influencing whether the rape was reported, how it was evaluated, and the degree of punishment dealt to the rapist. The terms "married women" and girls "not yet of marriageable age" may be read as cultural markers for women who deserved the full protection of the law. By being married, women signified publicly that they held to the Christian moral and religious principles of colonial society, and those young girls who had not yet menstruated had the potential to be respectable

[24] Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge," 53.

[25] Johannes van der Linden, *Institutes of Holland, or Manual of Law, Practice, and Mercantile Law . . .*, 5th edn. (Cape Town, 1906), 232.

[26] Cape of Good Hope, Menzies, *Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope, as Reported by the Late Hon. William Menzies, Esquire*, 3 vols., 1828–1849, James Buchanan, ed. (Cape Town, 1903), 1: 143. Menzies remarks that marriage is for the purpose of having children.

[27] William Porter, "On the Judicial System," in Porter, *The Porter Speeches* (Cape Town, 1886), 478. Speech made on December 15, 1845.

[28] Anna Clark, *Women's Silence, Men's Violence: Sexual Assault in England 1770–1845* (New York, 1987), 60.

[29] Van der Linden, *Institutes of Holland*, 232.

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married women. By contrast, young unmarried women latently violated the sexual code of colonial society: since they were already of marriageable age, their single state refused, if only symbolically, the married condition. Yet this does not seem a totally convincing explanation for the absence of young women legally under the protection of their father, and thus bound to his honor, from categories of women whose rape was punishable by death. The absence of the death sentence in cases of the rape of an unmarried woman may have operated as a loophole to dismiss the significance of rape of working-class women and, possibly and more specifically, black women, who were less likely to be legally married than their settler counterparts. Colonial officials, settlers, and indigenous people at the Cape understood (though they did not necessarily agree with the fact) that race functioned silently as a salient colonial category dividing beneficiaries of colonial rule from people more explicitly subject to it. Until the mid to late nineteenth century, most young women not formally married in the Christian church would have been slaves, free blacks, and other women of color. For most of the period of Dutch rule, slave men and women had not been permitted to marry; and, even after the British passed legislation authorizing slave marriages in the 1820s, few legally recognized slave marriages occurred. In 1839, the British passed an Order in Council promoting marriages among freed people, but it was only in the late nineteenth century that formal Christian marriage became widespread among people of color in the Western Cape.[30] Thus, in referring to married women, Cape interpretations of Roman Dutch law probably meant settler women, or at least women of a certain socioeconomic status.

Perhaps marriage functioned in this instance as a potential social marker, dividing women deserving respect and status from the undeserving.[31] Although one can only surmise that such social plots functioned in the legislation regarding rape in the Cape Colony, they very clearly operated at the level of judicial interpretation. Cultural definitions and redefinitions of rape and sexuality in the mid-nineteenth-century Western Cape gained prominence because the legal system was embedded both in the cultural assumptions of Roman Dutch law and the various cultural perceptions of rape and sexuality that judges, lawyers, and juries brought to their interpretations and deliberations. Dutch-speaking white men constituted the majority of juries in the earlier part of the period under review, but by the 1850s rural juries also included a number of men with English backgrounds. Only in 1874 did coloured men sit on these juries.[32]

In deliberations regarding the severity of rape and the appropriate punishment, both juries and judges at the Cape, like their peers in England and in the American South, fell back on "common-sense" notions of female honor and sexuality derived from local colonial constructions of women's and men's sexuality under slavery and from the elaboration, both in colonial and metropol-

[30] See Scully, "Liberating the Family?" chap. 6.

[31] In those cases in which marriage did not work as a racial signifier, race was exposed as the final factor operating in sentences for rape cases. Thus when a black man raped an unmarried white woman in 1837, he still received the death sentence. CA, 1/STB 2/36, No. 15, Documents in the case of Regina vs. Adam, alias Willem Patience, for rape, January 5, 1838.

[32] In Cape Town, juries were made up of both white and colored men. Sachs, *Justice in South Africa*, 59–70.

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itan arenas, of ideologies of female domesticity and chastity.[33] The Supreme Court judges interpreted the law through a perspective on sexuality that viewed male sexuality as a result of "'uncontrollable' passions" and enticement by women. They saw the existence of a woman's sexual history outside of marriage as evidence that the woman was a "strumpet," in the words of one judge.[34] In 1851, Judge Sydney Bell dismissed rape charges against a man charged with raping a woman in George, stating that

> perusal . . . of the preliminary examination, previous to the trial, had given me the impression that neither Rape, nor an attempt to commit Rape had been committed, and as the appearance of the female in the witness box confirmed this impression (she appeared in a transition between losing the bashfulness of youth & gaining the effrontery of prostitution) I cross examined her myself.[35]

For a woman to reveal that she had had previous sexual experience was sufficient to dismiss the charges. In a case of rape at Genadendal mission station in 1855, Wilhelmina Johannes lost her suit since, according to the clerk of the peace, she testified that "had the Prisoner before he committed the Rape civilly asked her consent to have connexion with her, she would have allowed him."[36] Johannes claimed rights over her own body—and asserted her right to accept or reject a man's advances. In this respect, she violated the sexual code that judges demanded of single women: they must reject all sexual advances as a matter of principle. Johannes' charge of rape was further undermined in the opinion of the clerk of the peace by her statement that she had had sex with other men before.[37]

Justice Menzies, the Scottish Supreme Court judge who adjudicated the Booysen case, was a most articulate defender and proponent of an interpretation of rape premised on an emerging discourse about the uneasy yet seemingly unproblematic connections between sexuality, race, and respectability. Menzies also faithfully upheld Roman Dutch law.[38] He combined his loyalty to legal tenets with a noticeably jaundiced interpretation of the morality of working-class women. In the 1840s, a period that also saw the tenure of the liberal attorney general William Porter, officials continued to advocate the notion of equality before the law, and Menzies appears to have been a lone voice in legal circles at this time. George Napier, governor of the colony in the 1840s, regarded Menzies as somewhat dim and pedantic and does not appear to have shared Menzies' views

[33] Edna Bradlow, "Women at the Cape in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *South African Historical Journal*, 19 (1987): 51–75. Victoria Bynum has suggested that a similar confluence of factors operated in the determinations of sentencing in rape cases in the American South during the same period. Bynum, *Unruly Women*, 109; see also Edwards, "Sexual Violence," 243.

[34] CA, CO 686, Justice Sydney Bell to Governor Sir George Grey, October 2, 1856.

[35] CA, CO 686, Bell to Grey, October 2, 1856.

[36] CA, Magisterial Records of Swellendam (hereafter, 1/SWM), 16/36, clerk of the peace, Swellendam, to attorney general, March 1, 1855. On the case, see CA, Magisterial Records of Caledon (hereafter, 1/CAL), 1/1/3, Preliminary Examination in the case of Johannes Stompies for rape, February 12, 1855. For another reference to the case, see CA, Cape Supreme Court (hereafter, CSC) 1/2/1/54, Records in the Criminal Cases Tried at the Circuit Court for the Division of Caledon on 3 March 1855, Printed Indictments.

[37] CA, 1/SWM, 16/36, clerk of the peace, Swellendam, to attorney general, March 1, 1855. For an example of a similar assessment of a woman's previous sexual history, see Clark, *Women's Silence*, 33, the case of Mary Hunt, a prostitute who charged a man with rape.

[38] Sachs, *Justice in South Africa*, 41.

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on the gender and class limits of equality. In 1843, seven years before the Booysen trial, Governor Napier asked Menzies to give his opinion on whether the Cape Colony should follow the metropole, which had abolished the death penalty for rape cases in 1841. Menzies suggested that the Cape should not, saying that the motion had passed in both houses only because the juries had

> of late years shown such an aversion to the infliction of the Punishment of death for such cases of Rape as were brought for trial before them, as, in violation of their oaths as Jurymen, to acquit all persons tried before them for that crime . . . rather than by convictions to put them to the hazard of suffering a Capital Punishment.

Menzies stated that, given

> the number of chaste & virtuous women in England who would prefer death to being dishonored—and the intense horror which every rightminded man . . . must regard even the idea of . . . Rape being committed on any woman nearly or dearly related to or connected with him . . . the conclusion must be that their conduct

was attributable to the feeling that the cases brought before them were not serious or "in other words that the injury inflicted on the women in the cases . . . had not been to those women of the same character, class, or station in life, to punish capitally those by whom the crime had been committed."[39] He then suggested how one might decide on the appropriate punishment for a man convicted of rape. Menzies believed that the key issue was the "degree of injury which has been occasioned to the woman." In this regard, he followed the precepts of Roman Dutch law, which, as we have seen, allowed for the death penalty in aggravated circumstances. Yet Menzies evaluated this injury through his own assumptions of what constituted such circumstances and insisted that class provided an evidentiary and experiential category whereby a woman's honor could be ascertained, an argument with which Governor Napier apparently did not concur.

Menzies stated that "the degree of injury" could only be determined by the victim's feelings of "self-abasement" as a result of the crime and by "her degradation in the opinions of the class with which she associates." He argued that "it is certain that women in the lowest ranks on whom rape has been committed suffer much less injury from degradation in the opinions of their associates, than would be occasioned to women in a higher rank of life." And, he concluded, "the injury occasioned to them by their being ravished is not so great as to make it expedient to endeavour to prevent its occurrence by taking the life of the offender." At this point, the governor appears to have written in the margin, "I cannot agree in this Doctrine. Why, because a woman is poor, she is not to be as securely protected as a rich one, I do not understand."[40] In talking of women "of the lowest ranks," Menzies spoke in the language of class but invoked also the colonial knowledge of the dovetailing of race and class in the Western Cape in which Africans and "coloureds" occupied the lowest rungs of society. Menzies thus managed to exclude most African and freed women from the circle

[39] CA, CO 521, No. 16, Justice Menzies to Governor Napier, February 10, 1843.

[40] CA, CO 521, No. 16, written in margin of Menzies to Napier, February 10, 1843. I cannot be certain of the author of the comments, but the initials appear to be GN: that is, George Napier.

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of honor while permitting the possibility that class might triumph over race in those cases in which freed women had moved into respectability.

Menzies did allow that, at the Cape,

> there is a very large proportion of virtuous women in this Colony, principally of pure or nearly pure European Blood but including also in it women of mixed Blood, many of whom would prefer death to being dishonored,—on all of whom the commission of Rape on their person would inflict the most poignant & permanent mental anguish & grief [In the margin, Governor Napier wrote, "I dare say there are."] & whom in many cases, especially if committed by a colored man, it would so degrade in the estimation of their associates, as to drive them from the Society of those with whom they had associated, & mar all their prospects of happiness in life.[41]

In a colony as sparsely populated as the Cape, where men had to travel and leave their wives alone on farms and where, Menzies believed,

> a large proportion of the male population of this colony consists of half-civilized & uneducated persons of colour whose passions & appetites are under no restraint except what arises from fear of punishment . . . I am of opinion that the fear of Punishment of death at present affords to . . . virtuous females of this colony, particularly in the Country districts, their only protection against violence of Lust.

Again, Napier wrote, "I am not prepared to concur in this sweeping clause."[42]

The 1850s, however, witnessed a move away from the liberal humanitarianism of the immediate postemancipation period. While representative government in 1854 introduced a qualified, non-racial male franchise, settlers pursued a conservative legislative agenda with lasting implications for the political economy of the Cape and, later, South Africa as a whole. Legislation passed in this decade criminalized "laziness," desertion, and collective action on the part of workers (who were understood to be mainly black or coloured), expanded the powers of field cornets, and introduced Divisional Councils (dominated by settlers), which controlled access to land. These measures all limited the equality before the law implied by emancipation. A sign of the shift in public life is demonstrated in the Booysen case. While Governor Napier had frowned on Menzies' sentiments in the 1840s, Governor Harry Smith in 1850 followed Menzies' interpretation in the case.

THROUGHOUT THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, black women in the Western Cape took men to court for rape.[43] The law at least allowed for the possibility that black

[41] CA, CO 521, No. 16, Menzies to Napier, February 10, 1843.

[42] CA, CO 521, No. 16, Menzies to Napier, February 10, 1843.

[43] For examples of such cases, see CA, 1/STB 2/34, Documents in the Trial of Jan Hermanus (Khoi) for Rape of Anna (Khoi), March 4, 1834; CA, CSC 1/2/1/15, No. 7, Circuit Court for the District of Swellendam, Case of Jacob Oranje (Bastard Hottentot) for Attempted Rape of Silvia, a Slave, January 19, 1835; CA, 1/STB 2/35, Documents in the Trial of Andries Bantom, for Rape of Jannetje, March 19, 1835; CA, Magisterial Records of Worcester (1/WOC), 3/9, Preliminary Examination in case of Pass Platjes for rape of Dina Koeberg, February 6, 1843; CA, 1/WOC 3/9, Preliminary Examination in case of Mentor Klouters for rape of Rozet, February 16, 1843; CA, 1/STB 22/43, Statement of Silvia, March 18, 1847; CA, 1/STB 4/1/1/5, No. 157, Criminal Record Book, James Mitchel for assaulting Steentje, July 21, 1851; CA, 1/CAL 1/1/3, Preliminary Examination in case of Jacob Orrie for rape of Elizabeth August, January 16, 1855; CA, CSC 1/1/1/17, Calendar of the Names of Parties . . . John Treble, for Rape of Lena Bastiaan, November 1, 1858.

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women could be raped: no legal statutes precluded black women from bringing such a charge. The majority of the rape cases are available only in the abstracts of cases that came before the Cape Supreme Court. These tell us the name of the accused and the victim, the places where they resided, and a brief history of the alleged crime. When we do encounter the voices of poor rural women, it is through linguistic, colonial, and gendered translations. We can only guess at the many nuances of the witnesses and victims' original declarations that were lost in translation. They probably spoke in creole Dutch, which was interpreted by a court translator (who would be more familiar with High Dutch) into English and then transcribed by a clerk. The few initial preliminary examinations, located in the criminal records of the resident magistrates, provide at least some information on the women and men involved in rape cases. More often, however, the records on rape are very brief and leave the historian considerable latitude in interpretation. The analysis below is thus offered as one that seems the most plausible given both the evidence and our knowledge of Cape history in the mid-nineteenth century.

No systematic analysis of rape in the nineteenth-century Cape has yet been undertaken, and the outline below only sketches broad trends derived from different archives covering the period 1831 to 1865.[44] The paucity of studies of rape in other colonial societies makes comparison difficult, but comparison is possible between the Cape and Yorkshire in the nineteenth century: both sets of records involve a metropolitan area, London versus Cape Town, and a more rural area, Yorkshire, versus the rural districts near Cape Town. Comparison with figures provided by Anna Clark with reference to rape cases from the North-East Assize circuit (Yorkshire) in England in the first three decades of the nineteenth century suggest that the majority of women bringing men to court for rape both at the Cape and in Yorkshire were members of the working class. The Yorkshire and Cape profiles of victims are even more similar if one adds Clark's figures of domestics and farm servants together, which total 68 percent, as compared to 77 percent at the Cape. The higher proportion of domestic servants and laborers at the Cape is probably due to the less differentiated labor and social structure in the colony than that present in England at this time.[45]

[44] These figures are very difficult to gauge correctly. My records from each archive overlap in terms of period, but not all the records cover the entire period 1831 to 1865. In addition, it is not clear if rapes listed in one archive are also cross-listed, in different form, in another. The sources used for the following discussion include records of proceedings in criminal trials from the archives of the Stellenbosch, Swellendam, Worcester, and Cape Town magisterial districts. The Cape Town criminal records include cases from Paarl, Stellenbosch, and other country locales close to the town. I also draw on records from the Cape Supreme Court circuit court and the reports of the high sheriff on cases to be tried in the Supreme Court.

[45] In Yorkshire, 53 percent of the victims who brought charges were domestic servants and nurses. Fifteen percent were farm servants and "wives and daughters of the same," while 16 percent were women of the skilled working class. Another 16 percent were dressmakers or the wives and daughters of farmers, shopkeepers, and overseers. Clark, *Women's Silence*, appendix 1, table 4, 137. Edwards' study of rape in North Carolina does not break down the figures for rape along lines of class alone, so I am unable to offer a comparison with that postemancipation setting. I have had to collapse the Cape categories of domestic servant and laborer since it was not possible in most cases to be more precise than to say that the woman was working in some sort of unskilled work. Only two of the cases involved slave women (both of whom were raped by laborers), while six involved women who were identified as the wives of sawyers, coachmen, or fishermen. Only three cases involved the rape of farmers' daughters.

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At the Cape, race played a part in determining who was most likely to appear in court as a victim of rape and who was most likely to be charged with the crime. The majority of the women involved in the cases of rape or attempted rape were black or coloured. Black and coloured men also overwhelmingly made up the number of men charged.[46] This class and racial profile of rape victims arose in part because of the dovetailing of race and class status in the nineteenth-century Cape, although a stratum of white laborers is evident in the records.[47] Despite inadequate precision and different ways of categorizing information, the censuses of 1865 and 1875 reveal that coloured women "predominated among those who can unequivocally be designated pauper and working-class women." Coloured women were also prevalent among "the lowest unskilled but 'respectable' group of working-class women—washerwomen and laundresses."[48] White women do appear as rape victims, but it is striking that these victims were largely members of the working class, being domestic servants, laborers, or wives of laborers.[49] Working-class women were most likely to be victims of assault defined as rape since they often worked late at night and had to walk long distances by themselves.[50] For example, one evening in 1835, a laborer named Andries Bantom raped "Jannetje," the daughter of an ex-slave, at Klein Drakenstein outside Stellenbosch, when she was sent by her "mother Philida with some curtains which she had washed" to a Mrs. Mellet, who resided nearby. Bantom was convicted and received thirty-six lashes and twelve months' hard labor.[51] In 1843, Mentor Klouters raped "Rozet," a fellow worker on a farm in the Worcester district, when she was working in a garden "fully a mile from the house." Rozet's mother testified that her daughter was a virgin at the time of the rape, probably the reason why Klouters initially received a sentence of death.[52]

[46] Of the sixty-seven rapes in which the women were identified, forty-three of these cases involved black women, while in twelve cases white women were the victims. The remaining twelve cases constitute those in which the race of the woman was difficult to gauge. For men, sixty-five out of ninety cases of rape involved black or colored men. Only twelve white men were brought to trial on rape or attempted rape charges. In the remaining thirteen cases, I was unable to ascribe a racial identity to the defendant. In all these cases, however, it must stressed that the tally of rapes is very tentative and that very imprecise markers such as name and occupation were used to determine the race of the woman since race was rarely indicated on the forms. Edwards' analysis of rape in Granville county shows that about half of the twenty-four cases involved black women. Edwards, "Sexual Violence," 242.

[47] The immigration of children under the auspices of the Children's Friends Society in the 1830s added to the white laboring population, as did those sailors who decided to remain at the Cape.

[48] Bradlow, "Women at the Cape," 68, 69.

[49] For example on July 30, 1861, Ellen Pearson, wife of William Pearson, bricklayer, was raped by one Jessie Ruth, a laborer, at Bennetsville in the division of Paarl. Ruth was found guilty and given two years' hard labor. CA, CSC 1/1/1/18, Calendar of the Names of Parties . . . against Whom Bills of Indictment Will Be Presented to the Grand Jury, Criminal Session of Supreme Court, November 1, 1861. Edwards finds a similar pattern. "Sexual Violence," 242.

[50] Anna Clark suggests that poor women in England were similarly preyed upon by men who saw women walking alone as legitimate quarry. *Women's Silence*, 38.

[51] CA, 1/STB 2/35, Documents in the Trial of Andries Bantom, in Service of Stephanus Mellet, Agriculturist, in Klein Drakenstein, March 19, 1835.

[52] CA, CO 521, No. 105, Justice Menzies to Governor Napier, enclosing Report on the Proceedings & Evidence at the Trial of Mentor Klouters, at the Circuit Court at Worcester on November 13, 1843, November 18, 1843. Klouters' sentence was subsequently commuted. For another example of such vulnerability, see 1/STB 22/43, Statement of Silvia to Justice of the Peace, Johan Adam Mader, March 18, 1847.

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Like domestic abuse, rape was more clearly articulated as such in the mid-nineteenth century when it occurred outside the family and domestic circle. The fact that women of the middle and farming classes are mainly absent in the records as victims of rape in the Western Cape may have arisen from the way that rape was popularly and legally defined in the nineteenth century. Sexual attention forced by a man upon a woman was most likely to be defined as rape if the man was not the husband or a close friend of the woman.[53] Women were more likely to have success bringing a charge of rape, and were possibly themselves more likely to have defined sexual abuse as rape, if it involved someone outside their immediate family. White women in the towns lived increasingly circumscribed lives: they did not often leave their houses unaccompanied.[54] The men most likely to victimize them, such as husbands, male relatives, and their peers, were protected from prosecution by their positions in society. In addition, social pressure from families not to appear in court and dishonor the family and the use of civil measures such as bringing men to court for seduction might be reasons why so few women of the middle classes appeared in the records as victims of rape.[55]

Women of the working classes appear to have been much more willing to charge men with rape or attempted rape. Under slavery, slaveholders had literally owned women's bodies; and, in the postemancipation setting, freed women may have sought to emphasize their ownership and control of their persons. The consolidation of the tradition of legal appeal during amelioration in the 1820s and 1830s, and apprenticeship from 1834 to 1838, provided impetus in the postemancipation period for rural women's actions against what they perceived as infringements of their rights.[56] In 1836, Anna, a woman defined as Khoi in the record, in the service

[53] I found no cases of incestual rape within white middle-class or farming families in the records. I found only a handful of cases relating to incest, and they involved only men of the laboring or skilled working class. For example, CA, CSC 1/1/1/20, Calendar of the Names of Parties . . . against Whom Bills of Indictment Will Be Presented to the Grand Jury, Criminal Session of Supreme Court, November 1, 1865; CA, CSC 1/1/1/21, Calendar of the Names of Parties . . . against Whom Bills of Indictment Will Be Presented to the Grand Jury, Criminal Session of Supreme Court, January 15, 1867.

[54] For the history of Victorian gender ideology at the Cape, see Bradlow, "Women at the Cape," who suggests that among rural Dutch families, women were not encouraged even to engage in charity work. The records of the Dutch Reformed Church in Stellenbosch, however, do indicate that settler women were prominent in the missionary activities of the Stellenbosch Missionary Society. See CA, Archives of the Dutch Reformed Church, P 31 1/3, Diary of P. D. Luckhoff, of the Stellenbosch Missionary Society, December 4, 1838.

[55] It is virtually impossible to determine if any of these civil cases originated in rape, but it does suggest that women's honor was crucial in determining eligibility for marriage. Thus bringing a man to court on a charge of rape, in a situation where the victim was on trial as much as the accused, might very well have acted as a deterrent. CA, CSC 2/1/1/5, No. 49, Maria Johanna Stadler Assisted by Her Father Dekker Adam Stadler vs. Edward Tedlie, . . . Defendant, October 12, 1828; CSC 2/1/1/16, No. 21, Anne Elizabeth Steytler vs. Daniel Disandt, June 21, 1831; CSC 2/1/1/20, No. 16, Catharina Josina Joosten, a Minor Duly Assisted by Her Father Hendrik Pieter Joosten vs. Willem Grobbelaar, June 26, 1832; CSC 2/1/1/25, No. 28, Johanna Fredrica Carolina Godier Assisted by Her Mother the Widow Rebecca Catharina Godier, vs. George Titterton, August 8, 1833; CSC, 2/1/1/67, No. 19, Christina Beck a Minor Assisted by Her Father and Natural Guardian Adriaan Beck, Plaintiff, and Alfred Dolman, Defendant, June 3, 1851.

[56] CA 1/STB 22/19, Complaint to the Assistant Protector of Slaves, Stellenbosch, by Theresa, a slave, against a slave man for raping a fellow slave woman, January 26, 1833; CA, CSC 1/2/1/15, No. 7, Circuit Court for the District of Swellendam, Case of Jacob Oranje, for Attempted Rape of Silvia, trial held January 1, 1835. For discussion of the importance of amelioration, see Wayne Dooling,

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of a widow in Stellenbosch, complained that she had been attacked by Dienaar de Vries, a Khoi hawker. Anna stated that the Widow Van der Byl had ordered her to collect wood, and she left the house in order to do so at about 6 p.m. De Vries followed her onto the property of Pieter Edward Hamman and then approached her. Anna testified that she had told him she was not acquainted with him, to which "he replied that did not signify . . . that he had long been on the lookout for such a one as I was." Dienaar took her behind a bush and said he wanted "to have connection with me . . . I told him I could not allow it, that I had a husband . . . I was not used to remain in the bushes that I had a young child at home and that my mistress would be angry." De Vries took her to a threshing room, where, after "he threatened to knock out my brains" with a brick, he tried to rape her, being prevented from doing so when a laborer came into the room.[57]

In her testimony, Anna raised a number of reasons why she "could not allow" de Vries to have sex with her, invoking her status as a married woman, as mother of a child, and referring to the possible anger of her mistress should she, Anna, return late. Anna employed respectability as a way of staking her claim to the protection and understanding of the court; she also alluded to her position as a dutiful servant. Anna may have used these rhetorical strategies "to acquire status not as a mute, colonized object, but as a voiced individual with a socially condoned moral . . . life."[58] By mentioning her marital status in court, Anna alerted the magistrate to her status as a "respectable married woman," thus emphasizing her claim to honor and protection. By saying that she "was not used to remain in the bushes," Anna perhaps also sought to set herself off from contemporary stereotypes that portrayed Khoi women and men as living "wandering" lives and preferring the "bush" of barbarism to the community of civilization.[59] As a last resort, she also appealed to her and De Vries' shared experience as the lowest members of a colonial system that privileged the rights of masters over those of servants.

Anna invoked her "special status" as a married woman who did not live in the bush to try to obtain respect from both her rapist and the magistrate. She thus employed a variety of rhetorical strategies to prevent being raped and also in

"Slaves, Slaveholders and Amelioration in Graaff Reinet, 1823–1830" (Honors dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1989), chap. 2, 32; also John Mason, "Hendrik Albertus and his Ex-Slave Mey: A Drama in Three Acts," *Journal of African History*, 31 (1990): 423–45; John Mason, "The Slaves and Their Protectors: Reforming Resistance in a Slave Society, 1826–1834," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 17 (March 1991): 104–28. For a consideration of laborers' use of law in the late nineteenth century, see Pamela Scully, "Criminality and Conflict in Rural Stellenbosch, South Africa, 1870–1900" *Journal of African History*, 30 (1989): 289–300.

[57] CA, 1/STB 2/35, Documents in the Trial of Dienaar de Vries . . . for Intention to Commit Rape on Anna, December 15, 1836. On the back of the trial documents, it is written that Dienaar was a "Hottentot." Anna's last name is not provided.

[58] Moira Ferguson, *Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery, 1670–1834* (New York, 1992), 289.

[59] The dichotomy of the bush and the town as metaphors for barbarism and civilization played out both in British colonial rhetoric and in some indigenous symbolic systems. For archival references by Dutch farmers and officials to the Khoi, see, for example, CA, 1/STB 18/188, Statement by Widow Spykerman, August 5, 1836; CA, Government House (GH) 23/12, Opinion of the Attorney-General Regarding the Proposed Vagrancy Law, enclosed in Governor Napier to Lord Glenelg, secretary of state for colonies, June 22, 1838. For the British, see Clifton Crais, "The Vacant Land: The Mythology of British Expansion in the Eastern Cape, South Africa," *Journal of Social History*, 25 (1991): 255–75.

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subsequent testimony possibly to invoke a sympathetic response from the resident magistrate, but these tactics did not work: the judge acquitted Dienaar de Vries. While the records of rape cases in the rural Western Cape rarely tell us much about the motivations of the rapists or the reactions of the victims, this case suggests that one woman perceived unwanted sexual attention as an infringement of her rights and her body and rape as a heinous crime against her person.[60] Freed women might well have defined honor in terms of getting public redress for infringement on their persons. Honor and shame thus were configured differently for women of the former slaveholding class and women who had been slaves or dependent laborers but not in the way that Menzies envisioned. Freed women at the Cape saw rape as a violent act and attempted to seek redress for this crime.

While there seems to be a similarity between the experiences of rape among working women at the Cape and in Yorkshire in the nineteenth century, the profile of the men who were charged with rape suggests a divergence between Yorkshire and the colony. In Yorkshire, between 1800 and 1829, unskilled working men and farm laborers constituted 37 percent of the men charged with rape.[61] At the Cape, in contrast, out of the sixty-nine cases in which the occupation of the assailant is known, fully 81 percent of the alleged rapists were identified as laborers. The man most likely to be charged at the Cape was a working-class man, particularly a man performing unskilled labor. Black men were also much more likely to be charged with rape than were white men.[62] In Yorkshire, far more records exist of masters raping their servants or of men of the upper classes raping working-class women.[63] In general, the Cape records I looked at do not provide sufficient detail to make such fine definitions, but of the fifty cases in which I was able to identify the occupation of both the victim and the alleged assailant, 66 percent involved laborers, 1 percent involved laborers raping wives or daughters of skilled workers, and only one case involved a farmer who was alleged to have raped a servant, a case that never came to trial.[64] The majority of the cases in which white men were charged with rape involved laborers or sailors, that is, men of the working class who enjoyed little status in Cape society. Most of the rapes that came to court in the Western Cape in the mid-nineteenth century therefore were perpetrated by men of the laboring class against women of the same class; and, in those records in which we are given sufficient detail to make an analysis, it seems that the women knew the men concerned. In 1835, Willem, a so-called

[60] *See also the case of Wilhelmina Johannes mentioned above, as well as that of Rosie Dryden,* below.

[61] Clark, *Women's Silence,* appendix 1, table 4, 137.

[62] Of the seventy-seven cases in which the race of the assailant can be identified, 84 percent of the cases involved black men. The close correlation between the 81 percent of laborers charged with rape and the 84 percent of black men points again to the association between race and class status that continued through the nineteenth century. "By the early 1860s, there were around twenty-three thousand 'agricultural workers' in the western Cape. Of these, approximately three thousand, or nearly 13 percent, were 'European.' Only 10 percent, or 1,416 out of 13,712, farmers in the western Cape were 'coloured.'" Marincowitz, "Rural Production," 116.

[63] The Assize records show that 38 percent of rapes were committed by an acquaintance of the woman, 7 percent by a fellow laborer, and 20 percent by a master or someone connected with him. Clark, *Women's Silence,* appendix 2, table 7, 139.

[64] CA, 1/SWM 16/35, clerk of the peace, Swellendam, to the attorney general. A woman made a complaint against Charles Barry, but it was not followed up. Possibly, this is because six months elapsed between the alleged rape and the woman's complaint, February 15, 1855.

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Bastard Hottentot of Caledon district, attempted to rape a Khoi woman, Amelia Hartenbeeste. She stated in her testimony that on August 22, a Saturday night, at

about nine o'clock, Willem, a bastard Hottentot, in the service of the field cornet PAR Otto, came to the pondok where I reside at Caledon. I was in my bed . . . [H]e laid hold of me and said he would *druk it too*, that he would have me for his wife, that I had drank with him, and if I would not have him for a husband, he would murder me & that no other man would have me.[65]

Willem seems to have thought that Hartenbeeste's willingness to socialize with him in another context gave him the right to have sex with her when he chose.

THE RECORDS SUGGEST that black laborers and their employers shared some attitudes regarding the rape of black women and that a tenuous bridge of masculinity could be momentarily constructed around a joint perception of the sexual availability of women. In 1839, a laborer named Charles, who worked on the farm of Jacob de Villiers in Franschehoek, was charged with the rape of Rosie Dryden, a domestic servant from Cape Town. Dryden and her aunt and cousin had been visiting her relatives in "the interior" and stopped on their return to Cape Town at De Villiers' farm to visit their relatives employed there who were ill with the measles. De Villiers threw her off the farm, charging that she had brought the disease. As Rosie Dryden and her cousin were on their way to a neighboring farm where her aunt had found employment, Charles came up and asked where they were going. Rosie replied,

"to my Aunts at Mrs Roux"—when he told me "that my Aunt said I was not to come as she slept in the kitchen and there was no place for me, but that I should return to his master's and sleep in his room . . . I told him that I would not go back to his room . . . I said "I don't like to sleep with all black boys" he then said "why not" "It was not proper for girls to do so"—I said—and the smell in your room is too disagreeable."[66]

Charles tried to rape Rosie; but Savonie, her cousin, got help from two laborers, who brought Charles and the women back to De Villiers. When De Villiers had heard the story, Rosie Dryden reported that "he replied, if Charles had cut off [her] head, it would have served [her] right." Charles subsequently asked Rosie's forgiveness, but, finding his apology unacceptable, she proceeded to make a complaint against him at the local magistrate's office. According to Rosie Dryden, Charles said "he did not intend to murder me but to have connexion with my

[65] CA, 1/SWM 16/29, justice of the peace, Caledon, to clerk of the peace, Swellendam, enclosing Complaint of Khoi Woman Amelia Hartenbeeste against Willem, Khoi of Caledon Neighborhood for Assault with Intent to Rape, August 29, 1835, Preliminary Examination, August 27, 1835. As far as I can ascertain, the charge was not followed up. For other examples, see CA, 1/STB 2/35, Documents in Trial of Andries Bantom, in the Service of Stephanus Mellet, Agriculturist, in Klein Drakenstein, for Rape of Jannetje, November 14, 1835. Also see CA, 1/WOC 3/9, Preliminary Examination in the Case of Pass Platjes for Rape, February 6, 1843.

[66] Very little evidence exists about the thoughts of the men who were charged with rape. CA, 1/STB 2/36, No. 7, Documents in the Case of Charles, Laborer in Service of Jacob de Villiers, Fransche Hoek, District of Paarl Free Person of Colour for Rape on 4 May 1839 against Rosie Dryden, in Service of James Dunbar of Rondebosch, District of Wynberg, July 19, 1839.

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body—I replied he should ask his God to forgive him, and not ask me."[67] Charles and De Villiers apparently agreed that a woman had no right to refuse sex when a man demanded it, or at least that a working-class woman did not have that right: De Villiers clearly saw Dryden's charge of rape as inconsequential, while Charles perceived her objections as arising from his threat to kill her, not from objections to his attempted rape. Rosie Dryden did not say merely that she did not want to have sex with Charles but identified Charles' putative skin color and living habits as reasons why she had no wish to sleep with him. She identified him as "all black," thereby invoking the boundary between herself and a man who she perceived as outside the "coloured" category. In the early nineteenth century, both the slaveholding community and travelers had represented slaves of Mozambican descent as being inferior to Malay and Cape-born slaves, and this case suggests that some free black women shared this perception during the mid-nineteenth century.[68]

Very few insights into sexual exploitation or sexual relations between white farmers and their female employees or other women of the rural poor can be gleaned from the local records of Stellenbosch, Swellendam, or Worcester districts. This silence on the question of possible sexual relations across putative racial categories echoes the larger silence on these issues in the wider archival record. In the cases involving men whom I guessed would have been thought of as white, only two involved farmers, that is, men who would have had some social standing in the community, and even then it is difficult to measure whether they were wealthy farmers or farmers working on the share. These two cases were for rapes of white women.[69] The demographics of rape suggest that a black woman could more easily bring a black man to court for rape or attempted rape than she could a "respectable" white farmer: the archive does not easily reveal the sexual exploitation by farmers and men of social standing of working-class women. The annals of sexual exploitation at the Cape say more about the suppression involved in the creation of identities and histories than the elaboration of "facts." We hear more of the echoes of what might have been than we do a record of the past.[70]

Returning to the case of the rape of Anna Simpson, at first it seems astonishing that in 1850, a group of men, who were likely to have been white settlers, should petition the government on behalf of a lowly black laborer. After all, only twelve years before, the Cape had been a racially stratified slaveholding society dragged into an era of free wage labor through the influence of the anti-slavery movement in Britain and a resigned Colonial Office. The actions of settlers in the aftermath of emancipation only heighten the strangeness of this gesture of empathy: in

[67] CA, 1/STB 2/36, No. 7, July 19, 1839.

[68] See William Bird, *State of the Cape in 1822* (fasc. rpt. edn., Cape Town, 1966), 74, where he asserts, "The Africander slave girl would consider herself disgraced by connection with the Negro, or the production of a black infant."

[69] CA, CO 578, Chief Justice Sir John Wylde to Governor Sir Harry Smith, enclosing Report on the Proceedings in the Trial of Cornelis Volschenk for Rape of Anna Eliza de Vos, Daughter of Wouter Abraham de Vos, held at the Circuit Court, Swellendam, March 13, 1848, March 20, 1848; CA, CSC 1/1/1/20, Calendar of the Names of Parties . . . Criminal Session of the Supreme Court, May 1, 1866. Benjamin Smit Altree, tried on May 7, 1866, for rape.

[70] Clifton C. Crais, "Race, the State, and the Silence of History in the Making of Modern South Africa" (paper delivered to the African Studies Association Conference, November 1992).

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1834, farmers throughout the Cape called for a vagrancy act that would have forced freed people and other free blacks to work, subsequently helped draft stringent labor laws that severely impeded the rights of servants and favored those of employers, and complained incessantly to the Colonial Office about the unwillingness of freed people and other people of color to work on the farms. If anything, a reader of the Cape mid-nineteenth-century archival record might expect that white settlers would have been happy to see a black rural laborer lose his life on the gallows. However, in the light of what we have learned from the case involving Rosie Dryden, perhaps it is not surprising that in 1850 white men of George could find commonality with a black laborer over the rape of a rural working-class woman. In fact, additional incidents occurred in the aftermath of emancipation in 1838 in which white men petitioned the government on behalf of black men accused of rape. In 1852, seventy-four men of George again petitioned the governor to commute the death sentence of Kobus Goliath, stating that Kobus had had no intention of killing the woman he had raped and that the "offence did not seem to be premeditated, and that the complainant was not deprived of her life."[71] As in the case of Anna Simpson (once her racial status had been "clarified"), the woman raped was free black.

The memorials predominantly or exclusively by white men on behalf of black men accused of rape indeed have one feature in common: that the woman who had been raped was black, or at least was perceived as being so in the white community. The petitioners for Damon Booysen insisted on labeling Anna Simpson and her husband "Bastard coloured." The fact that the petitioners perceived Anna Simpson to be a "Bastard coloured," that is, not "white," was part of their support for Damon Booysen, and it turned out to be a pillar on which Judge Menzies was to rest his appeal for clemency. By designating the couple as coloured, the petitioners in effect cast the first slur on the character of Anna Simpson. When black men raped white women, they were not as likely to receive such a warm defense by white men. Willem Patience, a Khoi laborer in the service of a farmer in the Stellenbosch district, received the death sentence in 1838 for raping the daughter of a farmer in the same district.[72] In contrast, while a white farmer, Cornelis Volschenk, was convicted of raping a farmer's daughter and sentenced to death on March 13, 1848, the governor commuted the sentence to ten years' hard labor—the jury and others having written a memorial in his support.[73] The rape of a white farmer's daughter involved all the elements that

[71] CA, CO 615, secretary to government to Governor Smith enclosing Report of Proceedings in Case of Kobus Goliath for Rape with Intent to Commit Murder, February 28, 1852. I find myself falling into the same situation as the judge. Since racial designations were not written into trial proceedings very often, one has to make guesses according to the names. Goliath was a typical slave surname, and as such I am presuming the man to have been free black, or coloured, or at least to have been considered such in the community. CA, CO 615, Memorial of Undersigned Inhabitants at George, undated. Signatories included names such as W. Elliot, Robert Mollison, J. C. Truter (a distinguished Cape settler family), J. M. Johnson, and J. W. Cooper. See also CA, CO 503, No. 118, Justice Menzies to Governor Napier, commenting on the Case of Jacob Magerman for Rape, November 15, 1841.

[72] CA, 1/STB 2/36, No. 15, Documents in the Case of Regina vs. Adam, alias Willem Patience, for Rape, January 5, 1838.

[73] CA, CO 578, Wylde to Smith enclosing Report on the Proceedings in the Trial of Cornelis Volschenk for Rape . . . held at the Circuit Court, Swellendam, March 13, 1841, March 20, 1848.

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Menzies was to argue constituted a case of aggravated rape—loss of status, feelings of shame, and great "injury"—yet, ultimately, the race of the rapist also helped determine sentencing.

One way of understanding the Booysen case is through attention to the narratives, or the "sexual stories" that white men told themselves in the aftermath of emancipation.[74] Hanna Rosen has suggested that in the Reconstruction American South, white men, both ex-slaveholders and poor whites, perceived relations of power operating through a complex racial and sexual economy premised on the subordination and sexual availability of black women. They sought to shape the understandings and social definitions of rape in a way that excluded any sexual activities on their part as rape.[75] White male domination in the postemancipation Cape operated around a similar linkage of racial and sexual domination, which saw black women's bodies as the property of men, more specifically, the property of white men. Possibly, white men in the rural areas perceived the rationalization of their sexual abuse of black women as especially important in maintaining a representation of white sexual dominance of black women, which had its formative roots in the sexual economy of slaveholding. While Roman Dutch law prohibited slave owners from "forcing a slave to obey any such commands which are contrary to law or morality," apparently the statute was never used to prosecute rape cases.[76]

It is unclear if white men regarded black women in particular or working-class women in general as more available for sexual exploitation. It is also unclear to what extent black men in the postemancipation Western Cape shared this sense of the right to have sexual relations with black and working-class women. Historians have pointed to widespread violence by slave men against slave women in the Cape Colony, citing the uneven sex ratio in which men competed for few women or a frustration of masculinity as reasons for this abuse.[77] Perhaps we might more fruitfully examine the silences that pertained to the sexual violence of white men against both white and black women and interrogate the constitution of the archives as productive of the historical subjects of the "violent slave man" and the "sexual slave woman." The criminal records produce and reproduce the "fact" of violence and degeneracy within freed families and the "fact" of harmony and support within settler families.

One can read the response of the petitioners in the Booysen case as a defensive reaction. These white men's sense of identity had in part derived from their power over others: with the ending of slavery, the power over the bodies of black men was

[74] See Hall, " 'The Mind That Burns in Each Body.' "

[75] Hanna Rosen, "Sexual Violence in the Era of Reconstruction" (paper presented to Postemancipation Conference, University of Michigan, April 1990). For other observations on this definition of rape, see Edwards, "Sexual Violence."

[76] "Statement of the Laws of the Colony of the Cape Regarding Slavery," cited in Mason, " 'Fit for Freedom,' " 210. Some disagreement exists on the nature of sexual violence under Cape slavery. Patricia van der Spuy argues that "many slaveholders did not take the right of sexual possession for granted." John Mason suggests instead that, for most slave women, relationships with slave masters were premised not on consent but abuse. The weight of power in Cape slave society in favor of the masters makes the latter interpretation more likely. Van der Spuy, "Collection," 18; Mason, " 'Fit for Freedom,' " 210.

[77] For a critique of this historiography, see Van der Spuy, "Collection," chap. 2.

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symbolically and, in some senses, actually curtailed. If the bodies of black women were also no longer legally owned, the sexual economy that made all women subject to the power of men made black women a nearby and easy target for sexual abuse. One might say that the sexual story these petitioners told themselves was that while one arena of domination had been foreclosed, another still existed. The identity of the petitioners as white males in a colonial society in part depended on a denial that their abuse of black women constituted a crime punishable by death. This view therefore depended also on a denial of the possibility that black women had honor to lose. Although the petitioners' "rescue" of Damon Booysen perhaps illustrates a tenuous bridge of masculinity thrown across class and racial identities at one particular juncture, this bridge was itself a defense of a racially constructed sexual right to the bodies of black women. In the end, the petition by respectable white men on behalf of a disreputable black man should not be read as evidence that white men and a black man could overcome racial difference. Rather, the petitioners thereby defended and legitimated a racial interpretation of female sexuality that ultimately overrode any claims black women might have to respectability. The "respectable" white men of George came to the rescue of Damon Booysen not so much to save him as to save themselves.

And what of Judge Menzies' switch in the Booysen case? In light of his statement of 1843, we can appreciate why Menzies initially sentenced Booysen to death for the rape of a white woman in 1850. In his first reading of the case, Menzies saw an instance in which a virtuous white woman was raped by a man of a class Menzies had called "half-civilized . . . whose passions & appetites are under no restraint."[78] In addition, the woman had been left on her farm when her husband had to go to town, in precisely the kind of situation that Menzies saw as dangerous to virtuous wives at the Cape. He had believed "that for the due protection of the chastity and honor of respectable married women in this colony, it was necessary that the sentence of Death should be pronounced on the Prisoner."[79] After his meeting with the deputation from George, Menzies revised the premises on which he had evaluated the case. Now the case seemed of another sort, in which a licentious woman of "mixed" race—being of Khoi and white descent—had seduced a young man of eighteen, a man whose appetites were, after all, "under no restraint." Anna Simpson's sexual habits came under review and were found wanting. The fact that she was married did not serve as sufficient reason for maintaining the sentence of death, since, by the accounts of the "respectable" men of George, she was not respectable, nor was she white. While, in 1843, Menzies had alluded to the notion that women of "mixed race" might have a sense of virtue, in 1850 he ultimately relied on a racial determination in his assessment of the severity of the crime perpetrated against Anna Simpson.[80]

[78] CA, CO 521, No. 16, Justice Menzies to Governor Napier, February 26, 1843.
[79] CA, CO 599, Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.
[80] CA, CO 521, No. 16, Menzies to Napier, February 26, 1843. CA, CO 599, Declaration of Damon Booysen to the clerk of the peace, George, April 4, 1850, enclosure in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

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It is unclear what helped anchor her racial status as black, when the judge had been so sure she was white, but in part it seems her status was fixed by the other claims relating to her supposedly adulterous behavior. Damon Booysen's mother testified that she had on a previous occasion seen Anna Simpson "lay hold of my son by his private parts," and Damon stated in a memorial drawn up after the initial sentence that he had previously had sex with Anna.[81] Thus Anna Simpson's race was explained with reference to sexuality—the one category helped explain and construct the other. Yet, by other accounts, Anna Simpson was a respectable woman, and she was a married woman at a time when many of the rural poor were not. In addition, both she and her husband worked. Defined as a "Bastard coloured," however, probably a synonym for "Bastard Hottentot," the illegitimate child of a slave father and Khoi mother, Anna Simpson received the first strike against her claim on the full protection of the law.

The term "Bastard Hottentot" derived from the inability of a slave man to claim legal heirs, he being a man without honor, outside of the natal circle, devoid of social standing.[82] A slave's "bastard" child inherited this marginal status: beyond the pale of family and, in one respect, beyond the law. In addition, the ascribing of "Bastard coloured" or "Bastard Hottentot" status to Anna Simpson also made more feasible the innuendos about her sexual behavior—witness the resident magistrate of George who argued that he could draw no conclusions from the numerous depositions testifying to her morality since the speakers were "all related by marriage to Anna Simpson."[83] In a context in which he had to evaluate the sexuality of a black man and a black woman, the judge fell back on notions of black women's sexuality that had a long history in Cape colonial discourse, dating from at least the late eighteenth century. By the 1820s, Europeans increasingly fashioned a sexualized knowledge about Khoi and slave women. It was, after all, a Khoi woman who was paraded through Europe in the early 1800s, shown off at balls, named the "Hottentot Venus," and made an object of elite and intellectual discussion.[84] European men saw slave women, too, as particularly "licentious" and prone to sexual promiscuity, a representation with echoes across the white slaveholding societies of the Atlantic world.[85]

Menzies' interpretation of the punishment required for the rape of Anna Simpson reveals, at least in this instance, that when race, class, sexuality, and gender were put up against one another, a woman's sexuality was determined by her race: class and culture could not "rescue" her. The referential relationship between racial and sexual stereotypes served to categorize Anna Simpson in a

[81] Jan Botha, the man who Booysen claimed as a witness to his having had sex previously with Anna Simpson, denied this. CA, CO 599, Statement by Jan Botha, Statement by Maria Platjes, Statements in Inquiry into Case of Damon Booysen, October 16, 1850; Petition of Damon Booysen, George, September 21, 1850, enclosures in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

[82] Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), chap. 1.

[83] CA, CO 599, resident magistrate of George to secretary of government, October 17, 1850, enclosure in Menzies to Smith, September 27, 1850.

[84] See Sander Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), chap. 3.

[85] For the Cape, see CA, Accessions (A) 602, Notebook of S. E. Hudson, "Marriages"; also Mason, "'Fit for Freedom,'" 203. For the Caribbean, see Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society 1650–1838* (Bloomington, Ind., 1990), chap. 2.

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situation in which otherwise her race, her status, and her sexual life were far from apparent.

The Booysen case suggests how seemingly unambiguous categories and boundaries in Cape colonial life such as race unravel as discrete units of explanation on closer scrutiny, and it points to a number of paradoxes that solidified in colonial discourse in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As racial categorization based on the inevitability of biology became increasingly hegemonic in the British Empire and elsewhere, the very malleability of race—the *cultural* construction of race—continued to facilitate the successful deployment of racism in societies with discrete relations of power.[86] Ironically, while the race of Anna Simpson was invoked as *the* determining yardstick in ascertaining the appropriate punishment for rape, the judge's own remarks illustrate how malleable and subjective racial categories were: Menzies changed his interpretation of Anna Simpson's race to accord with the "common-sense" racial knowledge of "respectable" inhabitants of George. The petitioners and the judge thus participated in a broader colonial discourse in which words such as "virtuous" frequently were metonyms for "whiteness" and in which the relationship between and stability of categories such as respectability, race, and sexuality was far from self-evident.[87] Their decisions and actions were informed both by a metropolitan discourse about the uncontrolled sexuality of working-class women and by empire-wide representations of the hypersexuality of black women, whether under slavery or after. Their ultimate reliance on intertwined racial and sexual discourses underscores the powerful appeal of racial explanations and the ambivalence in British colonialism, and among its settler subjects in general, as to whether cultural practice alone could bring a person within the fold of European civilization.

[86] A person declared white in South Africa might well find herself or himself declared mulatto in the West Indies.

[87] For analysis of metonymy and racial discourse, see Crais, "Race, the State, and the Silence of History."

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Violence, Emancipation, and Democracy: The Countryside and the French Revolution

JOHN MARKOFF

AS HEADS OF STATE GATHERED IN PARIS in the summer of 1989 for the celebration of the French Revolution's bicentennial, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher faced a question in Parliament about her own imminent crossing of the English Channel. Comparing the changes brought about in her administration to those of France in the 1790s, she commented that "our revolution in the past 10 years . . . has been managed more quietly and very well." A Tory MP then advised her to consider the historical dimensions of British superiority: while visiting Paris, she ought to bear in mind the "virtually bloodless" character of the Glorious Revolution, whose tricentennial had been celebrated the previous year. An unnecessary admonition: Thatcher had already explained to interviewers for *Le monde* that the British had considerably preceded the French in institutionalizing a respect for human rights and had done so "calmly, without a bloodbath." Even the way the British commemorated their historical turning points was calmer.[1]

Although her remarks earned her a public history lesson from Christopher Hill,[2] it could hardly be said that the prime minister was out of touch with the current wisdom of students of French history. Two hundred years after the revolution, it was not only a political personality of the Right who doubted that plebeian violence had contributed to human advance. Many a historian was thinking the same thing. The revolution's effects are now widely seen as perverse (as in the claim that the revolution so damaged the French economy that it assured British economic dominance[3]) or nonexistent (as in the claim that the advances often attributed to the revolution were already being carried out by the reforming elites of the Old Regime[4]). Recent writing is particularly critical of the claim that revolutionary violence made much of a contribution to the history of

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[1] *The London Times* (July 12, 1989): 12; *Le monde* (July 12, 1989): 1, 4.

[2] "Mrs. Thatcher Set to Rights," *Guardian*, July 15, 1989.

[3] See François Crouzet, *De la supériorité de l'Angleterre sur la France: L'économique et l'imaginaire, XVII^e–XX^e siècles* (Paris, 1985), esp. 248–98; Pierre Chaunu, *Le grand déclassement: A propos d'une commémoration* (Paris, 1989), 265–84; and René Sédillot, *Le coût de la Révolution* (Paris, 1987).

[4] From Simon Schama's preface to *Citizens*: "The drastic social changes imputed to the Revolution seem less clear-cut or actually not apparent at all . . . [T]he modernization of French society and institutions seem to have been anticipated by the reform of the 'old regime.'" Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York, 1989), xiv.

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democracy. In line with the debunking just described, either the contribution to democracy is taken to be negative or, alternately, that contribution is attributed primarily to mutations in elite political culture rather than to mass action.[5]

Not that popular insurrection has been shunted aside as an arena for historical research; rather, the connection between plebeian actions and revolutionary outcomes has come to be seen as extremely complex in the recent literature. Where George Rudé's work had suggested that plebeian violence was a conceivably rational means to a morally defensible end, much recent writing has focused on violence as having its own logic: we are alerted by Brian Singer to the ritual characteristics of violent confrontations or led by Roger Chartier to see popular violence as a symptom of the incompleteness of what Norbert Elias called "the civilizing process."[6] And, where popular action is seen as purposive, an important theme in the recent literature has been "resistances to the revolution," to use a now common phrase that denotes the many ways in which people in villages and urban neighborhoods evaded revolutionary tax collectors and recruiting sergeants, rejected the symbols and personnel of the revolution's Constitutional Church, deserted from the revolution's armed forces, as well as engaged in armed and open counterrevolution.[7] So deeply has the recent literature been permeated by the notion of popular resistance, some writers are suggesting that historians should see overt counterrevolution as merely the most dramatic form taken by a profoundly widespread resistance to a visionary and brutal revolutionary elite.[8] It was an important advance to be able to see the disorderly actions of insurrectionary people as having a culture, as being part of, in Charles Tilly's fine phrase, a "repertoire of contention," just as it was an advance to rediscover the ways in which plebeians were injured by a revolution to which they sometimes responded with violence.[9]

In summary, much recent literature has focused on popular hostility to the

[5] For John Mueller, the revolution's contribution to the history of democracy was a "disastrous" bad example; and Jack A. Goldstone stresses the revolutionary violence "that systematically destroys the political space necessary for freedom and liberty to flourish." See Mueller, "Democracy and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery: Elections, Equality and the Minimal Human Being," *American Journal of Political Science*, 36 (1992): 994; Goldstone, "Révolutions dans l'histoire et histoire des révolutions," in *Revue française de sociologie*, 30 (1989): 421. For surveys of the recent stress on elite political culture, see Sarah Maza, "Politics, Culture and the Origins of the French Revolution," *Journal of Modern History*, 61 (1989): 704–23; and Jack Censer, "The Coming of a New Interpretation of the French Revolution," *Journal of Social History*, 21 (1987): 295–309.

[6] Brian Singer, "Violence in the French Revolution: Forms of Ingestion/Forms of Expulsion," in Ferenc Fehér, *The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), 150–73. To argue that violence is not fully explained as a means to an end outside itself, as Singer brilliantly does, is by no means the same as demonstrating that violence never has an instrumental aspect. The leap that identifies violence with the gratuitously anti-rational is an important element of Schama's rhetoric. If the revolution is violence and violence is senseless, a reader can easily draw the implied conclusion about all revolutionary action. See also Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (Durham, N.C., 1991), 193–94; Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (New York, 1982).

[7] The recent literature on resistance is voluminous beyond ready citation; there is a useful survey in Michel Vovelle, *La découverte de la politique: Géopolitique de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1993).

[8] The most compelling portrait along these lines is Donald Sutherland, *France 1789–1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York, 1986). Sutherland's preview of his argument: "The history of the entire period can be understood as the struggle against a counterrevolution that was not so much aristocratic as massive, extensive, durable and popular" (p. 10).

[9] Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 2.

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revolution, on the expressive and traditional aspects of popular violence, and on the dynamic role played by the revolution's elites in creating a modern society. Nonspecialists of the 1990s, coming to much of this recent literature, will probably readily find the French Revolution to be another buttress for the current multi-continental disillusion with revolutionary projects of any sort. Yet the prevailing picture, itself in part a corrective to an earlier oversimplification, will be a seriously misleading one. There *was* a peasant revolution that was emancipatory and egalitarian in its consequences, that did more than accept the reforms of elite powerholders, that pushed those powerholders far beyond their initial positions, that was not merely a ritualized expression of violence but exhibited choices of targets and tactics guided by reason. I refer to the struggle waged in the countryside against the lords. It is hard to see how there could have been much in the way of democratic advance in France without the full emancipation of the French countryside from the "odious remains of the tyranny of the powerful," as the Third Estate of Etampes put it in the spring of 1789.[10]

There is little dispute that this emancipation was achieved with a great deal of insurrectionary violence;[11] but if a revolutionary elite, steeped in the enlightened ideas of the late Old Regime, was fully committed to the reform of rural social relations and capable of organizing it through legislative action, such violence would have to be regarded as a tragically unnecessary sideshow. In spite of an opposition to feudalism from that revolutionary elite, however, an emancipation in the countryside was not achievable in the 1790s without this violence. This is to restate a proposition central to Georges Lefebvre's analysis of the part played by the people of the countryside in the revolution, elaborated in more detail by Anatoly Ado.[12] To demonstrate it, I shall be examining two bodies of evidence and glancing at a third: the grievances expressed at the onset of revolution, the targets and timing of insurrectionary events in the countryside, and then the legislative debates.

I have three main points. First, elite proposals for reorganizing the seigneurial rights, widely expressed in the spring of 1789, were real and significant but were also significantly limited. Second, the subsequent legislative action that alleviated peasant burdens was in large degree a response to rural violence. Third, a look at projects for reform of roughly comparable social relationships elsewhere on the European continent, at least into the middle of the nineteenth century, also suggests that popular violence or the fear of it was a major element of rural emancipation elsewhere.[13]

[10] J. Mavidal and E. Laurent, *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860* (*première série*) (Paris, 1879), 3: 285. (This series will be abbreviated *AP* in subsequent references.)

[11] Hilton Root has expressed some skepticism on this point. See Root, "The Case against Georges Lefebvre's Peasant Revolution," *History Workshop*, 28 (1989): 88–102; and the reply by Peter Jones in the same number.

[12] Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (New York, 1947), 127–45; Anatoly Ado, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie vo frantsii vo vremia velikoi burzhuaznoi revoliutsii kontsa XVIII veka* (Moscow, 1971).

[13] There were many other targets of rural insurrection besides the seigneurial regime that are not treated in this essay; there are also important regional differences in the types and timing of anti-seigneurial actions. On these matters, as well as more on the legislative context, see John Markoff, *The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the French Revolution* (University Park, Pa., forthcoming).

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IN THE 1780S, A FRENCH LORD could collect a variety of monetary and material payments from his peasants, could insist that nearby villagers grind their grain in the seigneurial mill, bake their bread in the seigneurial oven, press their grapes in the seigneurial wine press, could set the date of the grape harvest, could have local cases tried in his own court, could claim favored benches in church for his family and proudly point to the family tombs below the church floor, could take pleasures forbidden the peasants—hunting, raising rabbits or pigeons—in the pursuit of which pleasures the peasants' fields were sometimes devastated.[14]

How did the French respond to these privileges at the onset of revolution? To begin with the positions being staked out by the elites in the spring of 1789: the grievance lists that assemblies around France provided their deputies in the complex, multi-stage elections to the Estates General yield national data of unparalleled richness. Let us focus particularly on what are known as the general *cahiers* of the Third Estate, those documents adopted by assemblies in county-sized electoral districts whose deputies were to convene in Versailles, where they were to meet with the separately chosen deputies of the clergy and nobility. Roughly speaking, the assemblies adopting these Third Estate *cahiers* were dominated by the urban notables. The electoral rules, as modified in practice by local conflict and central confusion, meant that these Third Estate assemblies chose rather more than half of what became the National Assembly.

Table 1 displays the broad lines of proposals on those seigneurial rights that were commonly discussed.[15] While there is almost no support in the *cahiers* for retaining the seigneurial rights as they were at the time, proposals for uncompensated abolition are distinctly in the minority, and a small minority at that, for one important class of rights, the periodic dues. Contrasting the views expressed on serfdom, tolls, or compulsory labor, we can see that the urban notables were capable of taking a much tougher position on other aspects of the seigneurial regime. Not only is some sort of indemnification the favored position on periodic dues but uncompensated abolition is not even the second choice: a significant

[14] The search for a precise evaluation of the weight of the seigneurial regime has generated a large and complex literature because there were many different sorts of seigneurial rights, much variation from region to region and even *seigneurie* to *seigneurie*, difficulty in adequately measuring the total revenues of peasants and lords against which the place of the seigneurial rights is to be weighed, and many problems in making judgments about the role of seigneurialism in conferring power and honor as well as income. It is clear from this literature, however, that there were many French peasants on whom the lord's claims were heavy and many lords for whom these rights were a significant component of income; it is also evident from the grievance lists of 1789 that many a lord took the honor attached to some of the rights with the greatest seriousness, while others in France took with equal seriousness the associated dishonor. For one example of an attempted monetary evaluation of seigneurial revenues, see M. Leymairie, "Les redevances foncières seigneuriales en Haute-Auvergne," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 40 (1968): 299–380; the issue of honor and dishonor is treated in Markoff, *Abolition of Feudalism*.

[15] The figures presented are drawn from a quantitative content analysis of the *cahiers* carried out with Gilbert Shapiro. Our code distinguishes more than one thousand institutions under discussion and hundreds of actions demanded. We coded virtually all the extant general *cahiers* of the Third Estate and nobility as well as a sample of 748 of the parish *cahiers*. Since we did not code the clerical *cahiers*, there is a missing part of this picture. The procedures for counting demands in the *cahiers* are spelled out in detail in Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, *Revolutionary Demands: A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789* (Stanford, Calif., forthcoming); a briefer account may be found in John Markoff, Gilbert Shapiro, and Sasha Weitman, "Towards the Integration of Content Analysis with General Methodology," David Heise, ed., *Sociological Methodology* (San Francisco, 1974), 1–58.

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TABLE 1
Percentages of Third Estate *Cahiers* with Various Positions on Seigneurial Rights

*Right**	*Maintain*	*Reform*	*Abolish without compensation*	*Abolish with indemnification*	*(number of* cahiers *discussing right)*
PERIODIC DUES					
Cens (a cash payment)	7	32	4	57	(28)
Champart (a portion of the crop)	2	26	13	60	(61)
Cens et rentes (a cash payment)	3	35	0	59	(37)
Periodic dues in general	0	23	7	55	(30)
Miscellaneous periodic dues	0	36	7	9	(22)
SEIGNEURIAL MONOPOLIES					
Monopoly on ovens	2	8	56	29	(50)
Monopoly on milling	0	13	44	25	(70)
Monopoly on wine press	0	5	59	31	(44)
Monopolies in general	0	15	40	43	(103)
ASSESSMENTS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY					
Seigneurial tolls	0	9	53	27	(117)
Dues on fairs and markets	0	16	36	33	(45)
PROPERTY TRANSFER RIGHTS					
Dues on property transfers	0	39	37	12	(49)
Retrait (substitution of lord for purchaser of property)	4	25	44	0	(48)
JUSTICE					
Seigneurial courts in general	3	19	53	10	(90)
Seigneurial courts, miscellaneous	2	18	23	0	(56)
RECREATIONAL PRIVILEGES					
Hunting rights	2	39	14	2	(107)
Right to raise pigeons	0	18	38	0	(96)
Right to raise rabbits	0	13	51	0	(39)
Fishing rights	0	21	21	0	(24)
SYMBOLIC DEFERENCE					
Right to bear arms	0	5	24	0	(41)
SERFDOM					
Mainmorte (extreme restriction on property transfers)	0	17	56	30	(36)
Serfdom in general	0	4	69	15	(26)
OTHER					
Compulsory labor services	0	14	51	32	(109)
Miscellaneous rights	3	9	44	27	(79)
Regime in general	2	18	18	22	(91)

* RIGHTS DISCUSSED IN AT LEAST TWENTY DOCUMENTS

minority of Third Estate assemblies favors reform proposals. This is particularly interesting, since seigneurial rights generally tended not to attract reform proposals at all.[16]

We may compare these figures with those the deputies of the nobility carried to

[16] By contrast, taxation was an arena that attracted many reform proposals. By one measure, 16 percent of Third Estate grievances about seigneurial rights called for reform, compared to 39 percent

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Versailles on the one hand and those adopted by preliminary assemblies in the countryside on the other. While the most striking noble trait is an avoidance of discussing seigneurial rights, those *cahiers* with such discussions include a significant number that both demand the continuation of some seigneurial rights and lack any reform proposal. Twenty-one percent of noble *cahiers* made no mention of the seigneurial regime. Of those that do so, some 13 percent of the demands favor maintaining at least one seigneurial right substantially unaltered, as compared to 1 percent for the Third Estate. In the same vein, noble demands to abolish a seigneurial right without indemnification amount to some 10 percent of their grievances, which may be contrasted with 27 percent for the Third Estate.[17] The noble presence in the soon-to-be-created National Assembly included a significant body of representatives who carried *cahiers* that, by silence or open advocacy, were notably less disposed to the abolition of seigneurial rights than those carried by the delegates of the Third Estate. The distinctiveness of the *cahiers* of the urban notables on seigneurial rights is their emphasis on the indemnification option where periodic payments were concerned.

Among the elite, then, some notion of a gradual buy-out rather than simple abolition of seigneurial rights was in the air. It was the course that had been advocated in Pierre-François Boncerf's notorious pamphlet on "feudal rights," condemned by the Paris Parlement in 1776.[18] And, perhaps even more important, it was the course being followed in neighboring Savoy.[19] The *cahiers* show that the assemblies electing the Third Estate delegates were not prepared to stray far from Savoy's model. Those noble assemblies that cared or dared to express themselves at all sometimes did not want to go even that far. Delegates elected to the National Assembly by the assemblies that adopted these documents could not be expected easily to support the more radical option of abolition.

The indemnification option had many appealing aspects, and it may well have seemed more, rather than less, attractive, when those elected in the spring found themselves responsible for enacting legislation to deal with the financial crisis. To members of the Third Estate who were themselves *seigneurs*, a matter made much of by Alfred Cobban, indemnification was a way to eliminate seigneurialism and thereby march into the modern world at minimal personal cost (or even to gain if the indemnification terms were set high enough). Cobban sees the National Assembly as trying to limit change under an anti-feudal smoke screen.[20] But Cobban does not take note of a less personally interested motive: those concerned about the finances of the state were also likely to worry about the consequences of simply abolishing the king's own seigneurial dues at a time of crisis. This would be even more important for those who saw some sort of royal land sale as a step toward raising funds: abolition would plainly lower the value of royal properties whose purchasers would be counting on acquiring the associated seigneurial

when taxation was at issue. See John Markoff, "Peasants Protest: The Claims of Lord, Church and State in the *Cahiers de Doléances* of 1789," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32 (1990): 428–29.

[17] Markoff, "Peasants Protest," 428–29; Markoff, *Abolition of Feudalism*, chap. 2.

[18] Pierre-François Boncerf, *Les inconvéniens des droits féodaux* (London, 1776).

[19] Max Bruchet, *L'abolition des droits seigneuriaux en Savoie (1761–1793)* (Annecy, 1908).

[20] Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1965), 27, 43–48, 39.

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rights. It would also eliminate a minor source of state revenue.[21] For those advocating a state takeover of church landholdings to fill the empty fisc, the seigneurial rights of ecclesiastical institutions would also have to be taken into account.[22] For those interested in a compromise that might pacify the peasants without sparking the lords to rebel, the indemnification option could appear the moderate, reasonable, centrist position.[23] And, for those who simply wished to stall, the social impact of indemnification would depend on the rates—which could be set later.[24]

Far closer to the people of the countryside, the preliminary *cahiers* of the rural parishes are less enthusiastic than the Third Estate documents for indemnification, even for periodic dues, and correspondingly more prone to advocate an uncompensated abolition.[25] In contrast, for example, to the 60 percent of Third Estate *cahiers* proposing to indemnify the *champart* (an annual payment of a portion of the crop), the 21 percent of parish *cahiers* that do so appears meager.[26] It is in their support for indemnification that the Third Estate *cahiers* differ most sharply from the parish texts, a difference with great consequences for the subsequent relationship of revolutionary legislature and revolutionary village.[27] In

[21] George T. Matthews, *The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth-Century France* (New York, 1958), 175.

[22] As the legislative reconstruction of France proceeded, concern among the deputies for the continued collection of seigneurial rights on former royal or church property was evident. When the departmental and district administrations, to whom the supervision of "national property" was originally entrusted, proved lax in the collection of seigneurial rights, the National Assembly assigned this responsibility elsewhere. See Jean Noël Luc, "Le rachat des droits féodaux dans le département de la Charente-Inférieure (1789–1793)," in Albert Soboul, ed., *Contributions à l'histoire paysanne de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1977), 314–15.

[23] Merlin de Douai introduced his committee's report on the feudal rights to the National Assembly on February 8, 1790: "it is high time that we present the people a law whose justice will silence the selfish feudatory who has been screaming so indecently about spoliation for the past six months, a law whose wisdom may lead the peasant to return his duty, that peasant whom resentment over a long oppression could temporarily lead astray." *AP*, 11: 498–99.

[24] The National Assembly voted on which rights to indemnify in March 1790 but did not settle on the rates until May. The rates of indemnification discussed varied and, over time, became more favorable to the peasants. Boncerf's pamphlet of 1776 proposed fifty or sixty times their annual value, the duke d'Aiguillon suggested thirty times on August 4, 1789, and the rate established in May 1790 was twenty to twenty-five, depending on the particular right. See Boncerf, *Les inconvéniens*, 11; *AP*, 8: 344, *AP*, 15: 365–66.

[25] The extent to which rural France authentically speaks through the parish *cahiers* has been debated among historians for a long time. For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, "L'authenticité des cahiers de doléances," *Bulletin d'histoire de la Révolution française* (1990–91): 17–70.

[26] Markoff, "Peasants Protest," 433.

[27] The peasants rarely paid the indemnities. In some places, very few took advantage of the indemnificatory aspects of the new laws; in others, some people did, but these were largely not peasants. In Charente-Inférieure, merchants, legal professionals, administrators, and urban *seigneurs* were the main users of the elaborate indemnification procedures. Similarly in the *départements* studied in Brittany, Normandy, Franche-Comté, Champagne, and Limousin, indemnification seems hardly to have taken place at all. The *département* of Corrèze appears unusual in the extent of peasant utilization of the legal route (at least in the hill country—lowland Corrèze refused participation). See Luc, "Le rachat des droits féodaux," 332–33, 345; and J. N. Luc, *Paysans et droits féodaux en Charente-Inférieure pendant la Révolution française* (Paris, 1984), 125–59; André Ferradou, *Le rachat des droits féodaux en Haute-Vienne* (Limoges, 1939); Jean Millot, *L'abolition des droits seigneuriaux dans le département du Doubs et la région comtoise* (Besançon, 1941), 172–96; Georges Lefebvre, *Les paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution française* (Paris, 1972), 387–90; Philippe Goujard, "L'abolition de la féodalité dans le district de Neuchâtel (Seine-Inférieure)," in Soboul, ed., *Contributions à l'histoire paysanne*, 366–73; Donald Sutherland, *The Chouans: The Social Origins of Popular Counter-revolution in Upper Brittany, 1770–1796* (Oxford, 1982), 139–41; Jean-Jacques Clère, *Les paysans de la Haute-Marne et la Révolution*

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the debates and discussion around the drafting of *cahiers* and the election of deputies, village France had many opportunities to discover both the strength and the limits of the anti-seigneurial program of the urban elites.[28]

On "the eternally memorable night of August 4," as it was almost instantly known, and during the discussions of the following week, many dramas were taking place, but one of the most important was establishing the distinction between those rights to be abolished outright and those to be compensated. In the final decree of August 11, which announced the abolition of "the feudal regime," and in the detailed legislation of March and May 1790, it was clear that the National Assembly was prepared to move within the conceptual framework of the Third Estate *cahiers*, devoting considerable energy to the question of precisely which rights were to be in which group, working out the rates of indemnification, and developing a complex set of historical and legal arguments to justify the structure. These actions of the Assembly help explain why the targets of peasant violence were even more likely to be aspects of the seigneurial regime after that initial legislation than they had been up to that point. And without that peasant violence, in part a response to the legislators' actions, the further legislative actions would be difficult to understand. Although the August 11 decree spoke of the destruction of the feudal regime "in its entirety," many peasant obligations continued, pending indemnification. Until well into 1792, indeed, revolutionary legislation combined conceptually radical statements of the termination of one historical epoch with detailed prescriptions for the indefinite continuation of much of what peasants had always paid. The fusion of the two was effected rhetorically by Merlin de Douai, who argued that precisely because "the feudal regime is abolished," peasants were now morally as well as legally obliged to pay whatever was not abolished.[29]

In the dialogue between legislators and peasants, the relevant evidence on the legislative side is relatively unproblematic. We have the laws enacted, the debates on the floor of the legislatures, and a good number of letters and memoirs of the legislators to ponder. On the peasant side, however, we do not have an enumeration of the time, place, and nature of rural actions on a national scale. There are excellent and invaluable monographic studies of particular regions, forms of conflict, and time periods but nothing that approximates what is needed

française: Recherches sur les structures foncières de la communauté villageoise (1780–1825) (Paris, 1988), 189–91; Jean Boutier, *Campagnes en émoi: Révoltes et Révolution en bas-Limousin, 1789–1800* (Treignac, 1987), 146–51.

[28] A country lawyer representing his parish at the electoral assembly in Ploërmel recalled in his memoirs how he first gained and then lost the support of other rural delegates in the course of debating the *cahier*. An initial denunciation of privilege brought him considerable notice and made him a front runner for election to the Estates General; a later, judicious speech on behalf of indemnification as a compromise could not even be finished in the face of shouts, threats, and clenched fists. See Roger Dupuy, "Les émeutes anti-féodales de Haute-Bretagne (janvier 1790 et janvier 1791): Meneurs improvisés ou agitateurs politisés?" in Jean Nicolas, ed., *Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale, XVI^e–XIX^e siècles* (Paris, 1985), 452.

[29] *AP*, 11: 500.

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here.[30] Even the Herculean triumph of Anatoly Ado, invaluable in its documentation of the spatiotemporal aspects of anti-feudal action as well as conflicts over food supply, needs supplementation.[31] The archival exploration of rural conflict from 1661 through the spring of 1789 being carried out by the team directed by Jean Nicolas and Guy Lemarchand is an inspiring but also daunting model.[32] Rather than attempt to follow these models of archival exploration, I opted for the more limited task of assembling as complete a set of data as possible from already published accounts.[33] Such a data set carries with it the limitations and selection biases of historians of France; yet it also has the considerable virtue of being a far more modest undertaking than the multi-year, transatlantic archival search to be carried out by a research team requiring training and supervision. It is essential to recognize the biases. The collective research of historians is likely to under-report smaller incidents, is likely to over-count events that took place in the much-studied summer of 1789 relative to events in 1790 or 1791, is likely to under-count taxation conflicts compared to the anti-feudal events central to important historical interpretations, and is likely to over-count events in the rural zones around the cities that are pleasant to live in while doing research. (I recall Richard Cobb observing something to the effect that the Muse of History was no closer in Paris than in the Massif Central but that everything else was a lot closer.) But, as justification for such an enterprise, even a rough tracing of the flow of insurrection as it unfolds in time and space permits a fuller appreciation of the richness of rural political action and helps fill in an important context for the behavior of other parties to revolutionary struggles.

I put together a file on events in which people from the countryside, acting publicly as a group, directly engaged in the seizing or damaging of the resources of another party (including an attack on persons) or in defending themselves against another party's claims on them. Such a definition includes many forms of anti-seigneurial, anti-tithe, or anti-tax actions, a variety of subsistence-oriented events, invasions of land, labor conflicts, and even many panics (such as the Great Fear) induced by the belief that one is under attack. I identified some 4,700 such events from June 1788 through June 1793 and recorded what I could learn of the geographic location, the date the event commenced, the target and nature of the action.

Among the incidents identified from the summer of 1788 to the summer of

[30] For a few instances among many, see Boutier, *Campagnes en émoi*; Clère, *Paysans de la Haute-Marne*; Hubert C. Johnson, *The Midi in Revolution: A Study of Regional Political Diversity, 1789–93* (Princeton, N.J., 1986); Michel Vovelle, "Les campagnes à l'assaut des villes sous la révolution," in Vovelle, ed., *Ville et campagne au 18^e siècle: Chartres et la Beauce* (Paris, 1980), 227–76.

[31] Ado, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie vo frantsii.*

[32] Jean Nicolas, "Les émotions dans l'ordinateur: Premiers résultats d'une enquête collective" (paper presented at Université Paris VII, 1986); "Une jeunesse montée sur le plus grand ton d'insolence," in Robert Chagny, ed., *Aux origines provinciales de la Révolution* (Grenoble, 1990); Guy Lemarchand, "Troubles populaires aux XVIII^e siècle et conscience de classe: Une préface à la Révolution française," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, no. 279 (1990): 32–48.

[33] The sources for the data file on insurrection included reports to the revolutionary legislatures found in *Archives parlementaires* as well as the monographic research of later historians, more than one hundred of which were used. The ultimate sources for nineteenth and twentieth-century publications are usually administrators' reports, police and judicial records, and the letters or memoirs of witnesses (who were often victims).

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1793, there was considerable variation in the level of detail reported. Sometimes, all that was clear was that there had been some sort of clash; at other times, one could say that a group of peasants entered the lord's château, but one had no idea of what they did there; in still other instances, there was a rich account. The date could often be discovered; but, sometimes, I could date an event only roughly (for example, an anxious report to the National Assembly on food riots over the preceding few months). In general, the published literature on which I relied is clearer about when a conflict commenced than when it ended, to the degree, indeed, that I abandoned the attempt to analyze the duration of actions altogether. Nor were these sources usable for the reconstruction of sequences of action within a single event: I was far more likely to get a catalog of the various things the invaders did in the château, monastery, or tax office than any clear sense of the order in which they did those things; still less often did I arrive at a clear picture of the process that brought them to the château. Did they assemble elsewhere? Did they come from church or parish assembly? Had they been working in the fields or chatting in the tavern? Did they converge individually before the lord's dwelling? And what happened next? Did they disperse to their homes? Did they plan another attack? I often had only the vaguest indication of which members of the rural community participated. Were they landless laborers, sharecroppers, rural textile-workers, smallholders? Only rarely was there any indication of gender. I recorded the level of detail I did have concerning the character of the event and, in the case of dates, the approximate level of precision. Indications of the number of participants in an action were vague, when they existed at all. While I was sure that a "very large" group was at least twenty, I was often less sure if two hundred or two thousand was closer to the mark. Far more successful, however, was the discovery of the targets of the action: that one gathering stormed a monastery while another looted a household's grain was usually clear enough. Given these limitations, my analyses must focus on places, dates, targets, and tactics.

An examination of the targets of these actions, aggregating together all events from June 1788 through June 1793 that meet the criteria, offers a sense of the multifarious nature of rural mobilizations during the revolutionary crisis. The anti-seigneurial events formed a very large group—somewhat more than one third of all events found—and were quite widespread. Their diversity is depicted in Table 2, which shows the percentages of anti-seigneurial actions of various sorts. Note that the categories are not exclusive: a single event could involve a crowd that invades the lord's wine cellar and manhandles him prior to seizing his papers. Such an event would fall under several of the rubrics used in this table.[34] Some of

[34] If a group of country people invades the lord's château and menacingly insist that he feed them, is this primarily an invocation of a rule of hospitality, mockingly parodied in order to demonstrate that the lord's former dependents are now the enforcers of the rules? Or are these essentially hungry people seeking food? Is it an "anti-seigneurial" or a "subsistence" action? We cannot reconstruct the state of mind of the participants, but there were no doubt diverse motives within a group insisting that the lord feed them. Some (or all) of the participants may have had a mixture of motives. It is, in any event, improbable that we can discover the precise mix in any particular crowd. Nor are the attributions of motive by participants and observers necessarily more credible than those of historians. One should not take a frightened lord's testimony or the hastily penned letter of a local official as authoritative on such a matter—even when the reporter comments on motive. Rather than

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TABLE 2
Types of Anti-seigneurial Insurrection

Targets and Modes of Action	*Percentage of Anti-seigneurial Events*
a. VIOLENCE	
Violence against persons or property	54.2
Violence against persons	4.7
Violence against lord	3.1
Château penetrated and interior invaded, with varying degrees of damage	27.3
Château a target; interior penetrated or exterior damaged	52.5
Destruction of food sources, rather than seizure (killing pigeons, fish, or rabbits; destruction of lord's crop; destruction of lord's trees)	5.2
b. CLAIMS TO RIGHTS	
Coerced renunciation of rights	7.7
Searches, seizures, and demands for documents (at château or at notary's office)	16.3
c. SUBSISTENCE	
Search for food stores, seizure of goods in wine cellar, compelling lord to feed the invaders	7.1
d. RECREATIONAL PRIVILEGES	
Attacks on lord's right to hunt, raise pigeons or rabbits, or to maintain a fishpond (includes both acts or seizure and of destruction)	9.4
Hunting only	2.9
e. LORD-CHURCH NEXUS	4.3
f. DUES	
Collective and public statement of refusal to pay	10.2
Public refusals to pay, demands for restitution, attacks on scales	18.4
Coerced restitution only	9.1
g. LAND CONFLICT	
All land conflicts	10.7
Conflicts over ownership or use rights in woods	4.9
h. MONOPOLIES	0.5
i. AGENTS	3.9
j. KING AS LORD	0.7
k. SYMBOLICS	
Honorific symbols of seigneurial status (weather vanes, coats of arms, gallows, turrets, battlements)	11.9

the categories used are subcategories of others: to choose the first three figures as an example, more than half of all anti-seigneurial events involved some violence against persons or property, but a much smaller number involved personal violence, and a somewhat smaller number still, violence against the lord.

attempt to decide whether to regard such an event as essentially anti-seigneurial or essentially subsistence in character, I regard it as both.

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Peasants invaded the lord's fields, destroyed his crops, felled his trees, pastured communal animals on his property, destroyed his fences, and attempted to redraw the boundaries of communal and seigneurial property (often insisting that usurped land was being reclaimed). The lord's château could be broken into and, once entered, a variety of actions undertaken: furniture could be seized or damaged, the lord's archives could be ransacked in search of seigneurial titles or—particularly if the search was resisted—the documents could be set on fire. The invaders could demand food or drink, even, in a tense parody of some old norm of hospitality, compel the lord to have them served a feast right then and there.

There was also plenty of damage to be done outside the château. Lords were dragged outside and forced to make public renunciations of their rights, often recorded by a notary (himself sometimes under compulsion). The lord's amusements were the targets of some actions: his rabbits or pigeons killed (or sometimes seized for food) and their habitations destroyed, his fishpond emptied or fouled, his compulsory mill or oven destroyed. Sometimes, the focus was specifically the lord's collection of dues: he was forced to make restitution of dues, the scales used to measure his portion of the crops was smashed, or the community openly announced its solidarity in future nonpayment, sometimes backed by coercive measures taken (or at least threatened) against any who chose to continue paying. At times, the agents of the lord were the target: his judge, his notary, his rent collector, or his guard who had often engaged in a battle of wits with would-be poachers and violators of hunting rights; sometimes, the lord himself was beaten, an action usually (but not always) halted short of his death.

An important group of actions was the attacks on the lord-church nexus: the lord's family bench in the local church was sometimes dramatically torn out and unceremoniously dumped outside—and on occasion smashed or set on fire; more rarely but even more dramatically, the family tombs in the church were desecrated. As the revolution grew more radical, in one of the many inversions of the old order by which the revolution continually demonstrated its reality, the lord's (or later on, ex-lord's) dwelling might be searched for firearms or hidden counterrevolutionaries, just as lords had once joined the state in searching peasant homes for forbidden weapons or concealed criminals.

In all these ways, the lord's prerogatives were challenged, his material accumulations reclaimed, damaged, or desecrated, the legal basis of his authority seized from his archives as a text or from his mouth as a sworn renunciation, his connection with the sacred grounding of the community severed just as the family tomb or family bench was torn from the local church. Assaults also took place on the symbols of seigneurialism that made the lord more than another man. The weather vane was one likely target, as were turrets and battlements. Although the advance of the central state had long since rendered the fortress aspect of the medieval castle out of date, many a lord maintained reminders of a warrior identity in the form of architectural motifs of a decorative sort in his elegant lodgings, only to have these pretty turrets and graceful battlements attract the rage of peasant communities. Any display of the family coat of arms was a tempting

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target as well. With its turrets knocked down and its coat of arms destroyed, the château was just a house.

One interesting cluster of actions involves the destruction of food sources. Some peasant communities obtained meat by defying the lord's exclusive rights and hunting on his preserves; others appear to have killed the game and left the carcasses.[35] Some forced the lord to feed them, and others destroyed the lord's crop.[36] Some made use of the products of the lord's forests, and others appear to have primarily damaged the trees.[37] Some seized the creatures the lord was privileged to raise (pigeons, rabbits, fish), and others seem to have been primarily concerned to destroy dovecotes, warrens, and ponds (and their feathered, furry, or finny inhabitants).[38] It is striking that these acts of destruction are scarcely less numerous in the data than are seizures of food from the lord.

Perhaps such actions arose from the blind anger of those for whom adequate diets were uncertain, while among them lived lords who made provisioning a form of play. Perhaps they were an assertion of a claim to a social order in which peasants, like lords, could defend their productive labors against pests.[39] Perhaps they were an assertion of peasant dignity, of the right to define their own activities as valuable and the lords' game—and games—as nuisances (which merely eating the rabbits would not do).[40]

It is also worth pausing over the relatively small number of incidents in which seigneurial agents are targets. It is commonly asserted that the lord's agents, in acting as intermediaries—whether as dues collectors, judges, estate managers, or legal advisers—became, for the peasants, the personification of the ills inflicted by the seigneurial regime. These agents thereby absorbed blows that might otherwise have been directed at the more distant lord.[41] The evidence of the actual

[35] For instance, at the same time that neighboring villages in Cambrésis were breaking into local abbeys to seize grain, in early May 1789 a dozen communities around Oisy exterminated a lord's game. Georges Lefebvre, *Les paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution française* (Paris, 1972), 356.

[36] For example, on March 26, 1789, the holdings of the count de Gallifet near Draguignan were attacked by peasants who drove their livestock onto his sown fields, ruining them. Jules Viguier, *La convocation des Etats-Généraux en Provence* (Paris, 1896), 269–70.

[37] Local officials reported on November 25, 1790, that fruit trees of the abbey of Beaubec in Normandy were cut down, a rather late date for collecting fruit. See Philippe Goujard, *L'abolition de la "féodalité" dans le pays de Bray (1789–1793)* (Paris, 1979), 99.

[38] To take one large group of instances: in the spring of 1791, peasant communities around Uzerche, Tulle, and Brive fought what Jean Boutier calls "the war against the ponds," in which large numbers of peasants seized the lords' fish and, in the process, destroyed them, a point seen favorably by local urban radicals who regarded the ponds as environmentally damaging. See Boutier, *Campagnes en émoi*, 118–24.


[39] Keeping rabbits and pigeons and hunting were often, in principle, activities constrained by customary legal codes, a set of codes often violated, however. A typical rule might be that all lords in the province could have "closed" warrens (surrounded by walls or water-filled moats), but "open" warrens were only permitted to those with enough land so that neighbors' crops were not ravaged. See Marcel Garaud, *La révolution et la propriété foncière* (Paris, 1958), 92.

[40] In a similar vein, Jean-Pierre Hirsch distinguishes between those for whom hunting in the summer of 1789 was "a pleasure long forbidden," those who experienced "the sensation of at last achieving the dignity of bearing arms," and those "moved simply by hunger." See Hirsch, *La nuit du 4 août* (Paris, 1978), 234. Jean-Sylvain Bailly, first mayor of revolutionary Paris, believed that the "disastrous" outpouring of hunting that first summer spared the lands of "patriot princes" such as the duke of Orléans. If this claim could be confirmed, it also would assign hunger a reduced place as motive. See *Mémoires de Bailly* (Paris, 1821), 2: 244.

[41] See, for example, Saint-Jacob, *Les paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord*, 428–34; Cobban, *Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*, 47–49.

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FIGURE 1




insurrections (as well as the evidence of the parish *cahiers*)[42] suggests that, on a national scale, these intermediaries, these dwellers in the world between the lord and the peasant, were in fact of relatively minor concern to the country people. While the French peasants may not have loved the lord's agents, the agents did not constitute a major target of grievance or rebellion.[43] The peasants' target seems to have been a social institution and not, primarily, its human beneficia-

[42] See Markoff, *Abolition of Feudalism.*

[43] Indeed, in some places, the agents may have turned into the local leadership once the lord was pushed aside, as Jean-Pierre Jessenne found in the most detailed study to date of the revolution's transformation of village politics. In Artois, those whose power had been conferred by the lords before 1789 did well in the municipal elections of 1790, unless the local community was at legal loggerheads with the lord—a situation that identified the agent too closely, Jessenne contends, with his master. The lord's appointed *lieutenant* became the revolution's elected mayor. The 1790 elections were no fluke, for the same groups did well in 1791. While the 1792 upheaval brought in mid-size landowners, urbanites, and artisans, these newcomers continued the same policies locally; and the post-Thermidor era saw the triumphant and long-lived return of the village elite. Perhaps future research may reveal whether the success of the former seigneurial agents of Artois was duplicated elsewhere—especially in the zones of staunch early anti-seigneurial activism such as around Mâcon, in Franche-Comté, Dauphiné, and coastal Provence or in later anti-seigneurial epicenters such as Quercy, Périgord, and upper Brittany. At present, the *cahiers* data show how rare verbal attacks on these agents were. See Jessenne, *Pouvoir au village et Révolution: Artois 1760–1848* (Lille, 1987).

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FIGURE 2



Proportions of Rural Insurrection by Date

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ries.[44] The country people were not, as some of the literature has it, sidetracked by the lord's agents, nor were they blinded by the search for revenge on the lord himself. The pattern of violent action, like the pattern of expressed grievances, suggests that peasants had an abstract conception of a social system. Their actions were violent, to be sure, and often inherently violent, not merely by-products of resistance to peaceable protests—although resistance might well augment the violence. But to be angry does not mean that one is blinded by anger, and to be violent does not mean that one's actions are unreasoned.

Finally, there was a striking bit of by-play around the meaning of a wooden pole. Lords who had proudly demonstrated their claims to possess the rights of "high justice" often decorated their lawns with gallows,[45] whose lack of utility did not spare them destruction in some parishes and replacement by a different pole, by which rural communities indicated their own power and their newly seized freedoms. In early 1790, anti-seigneurial events in Périgord and Quercy began to include the installation of the trimmed trunk of a very straight tree, often decorated with anti-seigneurial mockery and warnings, in place of the front-lawn gallows. Sometimes, indeed, the new pole was itself conceived as a gallows, but now it was the peasants' gibbet rather than the lord's.[46]

In considering the relative frequency of the different ways of challenging the seigneurial regime, it must be remembered that the nature of these sources makes it certain that many incidents are not fully described and that, therefore, many of the figures for the percentage of events with particular characteristics err on the low side. One would think that, with regard to the scale of violence in particular, the reverse would be the case. The more frightening aspects of these events would be the most likely to be reported in the first place, and historians searching for the dramatic anecdote would be more likely to recover from their archival locations accounts of severe damage to property and persons than respectful petitioning. (If we accept Simon Schama's indictment of the historical profession as squeamish, however, there might be a powerful countervailing tendency.) If one is willing to lend credence to the data (or to regard them as likely to overstate violence), the results are fascinating. While more than half the incidents involved overt violence (injuries to persons or property) in contrast to public declarations, demands, or threats, almost all of the violence was property damage. While lords may have been terrified by these events—some were hurt or killed and many threatened—revenge on the person of the lord played a fairly small role.[47]

The aggregated statistics, however, conceal at least as much as they reveal. What is most obscured is that revolution is not so much a state as a process involving an ebb and flow of events and alterations in the nature of those events. Figure 1 shows the number of incidents in each month from June 1788 through June 1793 as well as something of the changing character of the events at the moment of peak

[44] For a similar judgment, see Jessenne, *Pouvoir au village*, 59.

[45] Even Voltaire had the right to display an elaborate gallows when he climbed his way to the proper status. See Fernand Caussy, *Voltaire, seigneur de village* (Paris, 1912), 3.

[46] Mona Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799* (Paris, 1976), 280–316.

[47] Schama recognizes how little violence there was in the countryside against the lord's person, as opposed to the emblems of his authority, but that does not lead him to a more complex analysis of violence. See Schama, *Citizens*, 434.

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intensity. For example, in March 1789, about two-thirds of the incidents involved subsistence issues.[48]

The anti-seigneurial activity is far from being a constant from beginning to end. It is dominant in the waves of revolt that peaked in February 1790, June 1790, June 1791, and April 1792; but earlier and later, the story is different. In March and July 1789 and again in November 1792, anti-seigneurial events share the spotlight with other sorts of actions, and earlier and later still they are even less salient.

This is evident from a different angle when comparing the rhythms of anti-seigneurial actions with other kinds of actions. Figure 2 displays the trajectories of eight kinds of events. Each graph charts the changing proportions of events falling into various rough categories. The upper left graph shows the anti-seigneurial actions to have a clear rise and fall. Rather than an indiscriminate rural violence, attacks on varying targets have varying histories. In the summer of 1788, there are hardly any anti-seigneurial events. Subsistence events are the opening wedge of rural insurrection. In late 1788, anti-seigneurial events assume increasing significance and climb through 1789, remaining high—apart from a dip late in 1791—until well into 1792, when they are eclipsed by other rural actions. It is worth pausing over this pattern. I suggest that in the course of the convocation of the Estates General, and then in the patterns of debate and legislation, the anti-seigneurial character of the new revolutionary elites is becoming apparent to the peasants. Although the deputies of the Third Estate were more gradualist than the countryside wished—note their support for indemnifying the lords—peasants had come to believe that rural action against seigneurial rights had a good chance of paying off.

Peasant action against seigneurial rights continued until substantial gains were made. To the frustration of many deputies in the various legislatures, many villagers did not consider as a substantial gain the ringing declaration of August 4, 1789, that the feudal regime was destroyed but would accept only significant alterations in what had to be paid to whom and in how disputes over such claims were to be resolved. The outright abolition of many seigneurial rights was not enough, in village France, if payments to the lords were to continue, pending an indemnification. The country people were fighting the claims of the lords, not an esoteric conception of "feudalism" defined by the National Assembly.[49] The significant achievements as far as the dues were concerned awaited piecemeal

[48] I remind the reader that these classifications are not exclusive ones. In early 1790, Figure 1 shows 87 percent of incidents having an anti-seigneurial character, while 27 percent have a religious aspect. This comes about because some of those anti-seigneurial events are attacks on ecclesiastical lords (usually monasteries).

[49] Régine Robin, "Fief et seigneurie dans le droit et l'idéologie juridique à la fin du XVIII[e] siècle," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 43 (1971): 554–602; Claude Mazauric, "Note sur l'emploi du 'régime féodal' et de 'féodalité' pendant la Révolution française," in his *Sur la Révolution française: Contributions à l'histoire de la révolution bourgeoise* (Paris, 1970), 119–34; Alain Guerreau, "Fief, féodalité, féodalisme: Enjeux sociaux et réflexion historienne," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 45 (1990): 134–66; Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, "La Révolution française—rupture ou continuité? Pour une conceptualisation plus nuancée," in Reichardt and Schmitt, eds., *Ancien Regime: Aufklärung und Revolution* (Munich, 1983), 4–71; Diego Veinturino, "La naissance de l'Ancien Régime," in Colin Lucas, ed., *The French Revolution and the Creation of a Modern Political Culture* (New York, 1987), 2: 11–40; John Markoff, "Burżuazja rewolucyjna definiuje system feudalny," in Andrzej Zybertowicz and Adam Czarnota, eds., *Interpretacje Wielkiej Transformacji: Geneza kapitalizmu jako geneza współczesności* (Warsaw, 1989), 357–89.

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enactments of the spring of 1792, which culminated in a new law in late August of that year (to be taken up below)—after which anti-seigneurial actions plummeted. The trajectory of anti-seigneurial actions shows that rural action was not merely a blind and angry reflex. There may have been anger, but the uprisings developed as the moment seemed opportune and faded as goals were achieved.

I WILL NOT RECOUNT HERE the story of how rural insurrection persuaded the deputies to whittle away at the initial detailed legislation of March 1790, except to pause at one crucial moment in early 1792.[50] The legislators, from the initial language of the night of August 4 onward, had spoken in self-congratulation of the radicalism of their abolition of the feudal regime, while French villagers, from late in 1789 on, were mounting wave after wave of insurrection. February through April of 1792 was the largest such wave after the summer of 1789; it was also the eve of war with Europe, and it was within this context that peasant action was especially efficacious.

Seigneurial rights had become a central element of interstate tension on the night of August 4. German princes, whose seigneurial claims in Alsace were guaranteed in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, hoped to find a powerful backer in the Holy Roman Empire. The landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the bishop of Spire, and the duke of Württemberg had already been at odds with the French government over the flurry of institutional innovation of the prerevolutionary period. For these princes, the new local and regional assemblies set up in 1787 raised the specter of popular sovereignty. The tax reform proposals of 1787 and 1788, the judicial reorganization of 1788 that threatened seigneurial courts, and the anti-feudal discourse in which public affairs were already being discussed were issues in Alsace even before the Estates General met.[51] August 4 raised these tensions, on the French side, from a problem to a national commitment. From a problem that pitted local privileges against monarchical reform and state centralization, this conflict was transmuted into a struggle of the new epoch being born against the lay and clerical lords who fought to keep humanity in chains.

What may have appeared at first as simply the conflicting claims of France and the empire appeared to some in the Assembly as a question of whether the sovereignty of the French people (which the legislators took themselves to embody) could be assigned limits under the treaties of past monarchs. Merlin de Douai, speaking for the Committee on Feudal Rights, found a legal principle to sustain the jurisdiction of the National Assembly: the social contract took precedence over all. Since the people of Alsace had never consented to the Treaty of Westphalia but had participated in the election of the deputies that enacted the

[50] The history of the revolutionary legislation is treated in Henri Doniol, *La Révolution française et la féodalité* (Paris, 1876); Emile Chénon, *Les démembrements de la propriété foncière avant et après la Révolution* (Paris, 1923); Philippe Sagnac, *La législation civile de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1898); Alphonse Aulard, *La Révolution française et le régime féodal* (Paris, 1919); Garaud, *La Révolution et la propriété foncière*; Peter M. Jones, *The Peasantry in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1988).

[51] Pierre Muret, "L'affaire des princes possessionés d'Alsace et les origines du conflit entre la Révolution et l'Empire," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 1 (1899–1900): 433–56, 566–92.

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August 4–11 decree, the "treaties of princes" were illegal.[52] By implication, all interstate treaties were illegitimate, and no European structure of authority, except France's, had the basis in popular consent that made it worthy of respect.[53] Here, as in other pronouncements on seigneurial rights, Merlin's sharp and absolute statement of principle was as radical as the totality of concrete measures was moderate. The Diplomatic Committee, appropriate to its mission, took a more diplomatic view and proposed compensating the princes, but the princes refused.[54] Because the empire was unwilling to back the princes, there was no immediate threat of military action, but the rhetorical linkage of anti-feudalism in France and hostility toward the European monarchies had been forged.[55]

As tensions between states increased, those in France who favored war convinced themselves that not only would the conscript armies of their enemies crumble when confronting a free people but that the subject peoples of Europe would rise in emulation of the liberated French. Maximin Isnard's inflammatory speech of late November 1791 linked French émigrés and German princes in a common concern with lost rights and warned that, "if foreign courts try to raise a war of kings against France, we will raise a war of peoples against kings."[56] When a Prussian radical told the Legislative Assembly in December 1791 that interstate conflict would prompt peasants in Germany and Bohemia to rise against their lords, he was only reaffirming what many were already prepared to hear.[57] Jacques-Pierre Brissot and his political associates persistently defined the war they advocated as a war against feudalism.[58] There were, to be sure, some who proposed cooling the rhetorical temperature. As war neared in February 1792, the Diplomatic Committee of the Legislative Assembly reiterated the conciliatory proposal of indemnifying the German princes, a proposal dismissed by Jean-Baptiste Mailhe for its weakness.[59] (If it was wrong to indemnify lords across the Rhine, did some of the listeners wonder why was it proper to do so on their side?) And Robespierre's attempted deflation of the yoking of liberation and European war is well known.[60] Nonetheless, the sense of national mission prevailed.

Until the approach of actual war, most of the legislation on the seigneurial regime still amounted to tinkering with the basic structure embodied in the declarations of August 4–11, 1789, as given detailed elaboration by the enactments of March and May 1790. As interstate tensions become more ominous, peasant insurrection began to suggest a dangerous failure of the existing scheme. When rural incidents mounted in February 1792—they were to reach the second largest insurrectionary peak of the revolution in April—Georges Couthon urged

[52] *AP*, 20: 81.
[53] T. C. W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London, 1986), 74–75.
[54] *AP*, 20: 84.
[55] Sydney Seymour Biro, *The German Policy of Revolutionary France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 1: 39–42. See also T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford, 1983), 59–69; Muret, "L'affaire des princes possessionés."
[56] *AP*, 35: 441–43.
[57] *AP*, 36: 79. The speaker, Anacharsis Cloots, might have been buoyed by thoughts of the recent peasant uprising, in August 1790, in Saxony. See Jerome Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1978), 337–38.
[58] For example, Louvet in December 1791 (*AP*, 36: 381).
[59] *AP*, 39: 89–90, *AP*, 39: 97.
[60] Maximilien Robespierre, *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1950), 8: 81.

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a new course in the Legislative Assembly. He reminded his fellow deputies of the great size of the French army. But he urged them to recall that sheer size was far less significant than the moral unity of army and nation. The benefits of the revolution, unfortunately, had not yet been fully received in the French countryside; village France had largely received fine words.

> Each of us has seen that ever-memorable night of August 4, 1789, when the Constituent Assembly . . . pronounced in a holy enthusiasm the abolition of the feudal regime . . . But these striking decisions were soon to present nothing more to the people than the idea of a beautiful dream, whose deceitful illusion left nothing but regrets. It was . . . on August 4, 1789, that a decree was joyously received in all parts of the empire that abolished . . . the feudal regime. Eight months later, a second decree preserved everything of value of this regime, so that far from having served the people, the Constituent Assembly could not even retain for them the consoling hope of being able to one day free themselves from the despotism of the former lords and the exaction of their agents.

Couthon alluded to the earlier work of abolishing the honorific aspects of the regime while insisting on indemnities for lucrative rights: "You will surely understand, gentlemen, that it was not exactly the honorific aspects of the feudal regime that weighed on the people." And he summed up: "We want [the people] to believe in the reign of liberty when they rest chained in dependence beneath their former lord."[61]

In the months that followed, a series of critical attacks occurred on the anti-seigneurial edifice as conceived by Merlin, and the war with Europe continued to be identified as a war about feudalism.[62] With the war came the overturning of the assumptions of the initial legislation, a process culminating in the August decrees of the Legislative Assembly.[63] By virtue of these new enactments, the burden of proof in disputes between peasant communities and lords was dramatically shifted. One of the most important aspects of the legislation that had initially spelled out what was to be abolished outright and what indemnified (and at what rates), starting with the spring of 1790, had been its allocation to the peasants of the burden of proof in the event of a dispute over the legitimacy of particular claims. A community had the right to challenge the lord's claim to payment pending indemnification, but that community was required to furnish evidence that the right in dispute had originated in an initial act of coercion, a formidable legal hurdle. The new enactments of August 1792 reversed this: it would now be up to the lords to demonstrate that a contested right had been initiated in an uncoerced contract. Even if a lord actually had some relevant documentation, how many would run the risk of attempting to make good such a claim in the threatening climate of the fall of 1792, a claim that would have to be pressed in a revolutionary court not likely to be very sympathetic?[64] Although the

[61] Georges Couthon, *Discours sur le rachat des droits seigneuriaux prononcé à la séance du mercredi 29 février 1792* (Paris, 1792), 2–3, 3, 7.

[62] *AP*, 39: 595, 41: 470–74, 42: 21, 45: 17–18, 119–23, 53: 473, 55: 70, 75, 101.

[63] *AP*, 45: 119–23.

[64] It seems a reasonable assumption that few peasant challengers availed themselves of the opportunity to mount a legal challenge under the earlier legislation and that fewer lords did so after August 1792. Withholding payments would seem to have been a more promising action for peasants in the earlier phase and despair the most likely response of the lords later on. But scholarly research

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legislature had not yet declared the entire seigneurial regime illegitimate in principle, the August legislation made it nearly impossible for the lords to make claims on peasants in practice. It is striking that anti-seigneurial actions in the countryside declined sharply in the fall; with the lords no longer able to collect, peasant attention turned elsewhere.[65]

Even after the new anti-seigneurial legislation of August 1792, anti-feudal language surrounding the war continued to outrun the law in France. The Convention continued to expound the fusion of anti-feudalism and the struggle against foreign kings. In November 1792, the Convention discussed "the principles," as Brissot put it, "under which France must grant her protection to all the peoples who ask it." Mailhe interjected that, whatever else these principles might be, they must include instructing other peoples "in the natural rights on which the destruction of feudal rights in France was based." And he went on to speak of a national mission: "Citizens, it is in France that feudal rights and their consequences unhappily were born; it is from France that enlightenment must come; it is the French who must raise the thick veil which, among all our neighbors, still conceals the fundamental rights of nature."[66]

Pierre-Joseph Cambon, urging, on behalf of the finance, war, and diplomatic committees, the policies to be pursued by French forces, advanced a famous slogan: "[The committees have asked first of all] what is the purpose of the war you have undertaken. It is surely the abolition of all privileges. War against the châteaux, peace to the cottages."[67] On December 15, 1792, the Convention decreed the abolition of seigneurial rights in French-controlled areas of Belgium and Germany with no mention of any provision for appeal.[68] Peasants outside of France were to be promised French support for insurrection: "show yourselves free men and we will guarantee you against their vengeance." Although the seigneurial regime was no longer a primary target of French peasant action, the wartime Convention could hardly ignore the turbulent countryside, particularly with the radical increase in the frequency and scale of rural mobilization in March 1793. One symptom of the gravity with which the rural situation was viewed is Bertrand Barère's speech of March 18. Advocating a complex package of proposals that combined repression with benefits for both the rural poor and the well-off, he urged the creation of a (not yet "the") "committee of public safety."[69] Three months later, the Convention proclaimed the entire seigneurial regime illegitimate.[70]

The wartime discussions of seigneurial rights were rooted in the war-promoting rhetoric of the Girondins, in statements of war aims, in policy declarations by

into the utilization (or presumed lack of it) of the judicial arena in peasant/lord conflict during the revolution is too inadequate to permit certainty.

[65] This is in accord with the notion of a peasantry engaged in aggressive actions for instrumental ends; but note that just before this sharp decline, there is a short, sharp rise in anti-seigneurial acts. In this latter group of actions, which are among the most destructive of property in the entire data series, we are probably seeing acts of vengeance against the now politically vulnerable former lords.

[66] *AP*, 53: 473.

[67] *AP*, 55: 70.

[68] *AP*, 55: 76.

[69] *AP*, 60: 290–94.

[70] *AP*, 66: 4, *AP*, 69: 98.

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generals in Belgium, in inspirational pep talks to the troops. The rhetorical climate was changing. If the sons of French villagers were to die in order to free German or Piedmontese villagers from feudal oppression, could the legislators stick to a definition of feudal rights so narrow that it appeared an utter fraud in rural France? Couthon's bitter observation in February 1792 that much of the anti-seigneurial legislation was "like that which the former lords would have dictated themselves" did no more than echo the claims of sharecroppers in the countryside around Gourdon as early as the fall of 1790.[71] If the Convention encouraged anti-feudal insurrection in France's neighbors, could it manage to prosecute anti-feudal peasants at home? Mailhe went beyond supporting the wartime proclamation of liberation of occupied territories from feudal rights and protecting peasants against their lords; on December 15, he proposed abolishing nobility itself where French arms triumphed. It seems but a matter of consistency for him to have advocated, ten days later, that legal proceedings against French peasants rebelling against seigneurialism be dropped.[72] (After the counterrevolutionary explosion in the western countryside of March 1793, in the name of what ideal were French peasants to be ordered into the vicious counterinsurgency campaign against other French peasants?)

The war made it impossible to maintain the disjunction between the sense of a radical rupture in history and a detailed specification that altered little of what peasants owed lords. In presenting the French armies as the agents of liberty in battle against the slave armies of the crowned tyrants, the legislators had to accept the victory of defiant French villagers who doggedly refused the coexistence of the narrow and the broad senses of the abolition of the feudal regime.[73] It took years of rural violence to push the revolutionary legislatures to make of the dismantling of feudalism a reality recognizable in the villages. And it is far from obvious that they would have done so without the wartime stresses.

WAS A MORE PEACEFUL TERMINATION of seigneurial rights, carefully controlled by a forward-looking elite, possible? The question demands speculation about the consequences of an elite-driven anti-seigneurial program pursued without the threat of effective peasant disruption. Such counter-factual speculation is fraught with hazards, but a failure to pose the question has its own hazard, namely, the ignoring of an important perspective on the rural revolts. Some parallel experiences are available to draw on in other European efforts to remove broadly similar rights.

Elite desires partially or wholly to dismantle anti-seigneurialism drew on many

[71] Couthon, *Discours*, 5. A puzzled National Assembly was told that the rural National Guards would not enforce decrees held to be fraudulent, that the new laws were not believed to be the work of the Assembly at all but of the former lords. *AP*, 21: 457.

[72] *AP*, 55: 72–73, *AP*, 56: 65, 74.

[73] The other European powers, when triumphant over French arms, sometimes showed an acceptance of the French definition of the international struggle as a war over feudalism by attempting to undo the emancipatory reforms, as in Hannover, Hesse-Cassel, or the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia. Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 362–70. The most interesting such restoration attempt was in the Austrian-occupied portion of northern France in 1793–1794. With the half-hearted support of the Austrian army, lords and ecclesiastics attempted to collect but were largely stymied by peasant evasion of payment. Lefebvre, *Paysans du Nord*, 551–55.

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sources apart from fears of rebellion: the conviction that agricultural productivity could be advanced, that state revenues would increase, that an emancipated peasantry was more reliable in wartime, that a "civilized" country required a juridical commitment to personal freedom, and that at least some seigneurial claims cost more to extract than they were worth even to the seigneurs. As discussed above, French elites did have an anti-seigneurial program at the onset of revolution, though one well short of what many French villagers would accept. Were there rural emancipations pushed by similar elite reformers in which fear of rural plebeians was minimal?

Jerome Blum's comparative survey of the formal emancipations of continental Europe's rural populations shows that almost everywhere emancipation was a protracted process.[74] Three states preceded France. Savoy's duke freed his own serfs in 1762 and went beyond the later similar act of Louis XVI by decreeing an indemnified redemption for other peasants. In 1772, the indemnification terms were altered in favor of the peasants, but the incapacity of the country people to buy their freedom caused the process to drag on until the French army entered two decades later and ordered an immediate and unindemnified abolition.[75] Baden's initial proclamation dates from 1783, but seigneurial claims did not definitively end until 1848.[76] After a series of false starts as early as 1702, Denmark proclaimed an effective abolition in 1788 but did not complete the process until 1861.[77]

Emancipations hardly proceeded any more rapidly in those many instances in which reform began in the wake of the revolution. Emancipation decrees were issued in Prussia, Württemberg, Mecklenberg, Bavaria, and Hesse between 1807 and 1820, but the processes were not completed until the revolutionary wave of 1848. Still other emancipatory processes did not even commence until the pressures of the agitated early 1830s (Hannover and Saxony), and others awaited the still more intense pressures of 1848 (Austria, Saxe-Weimar and Anhalt-Dessau-Köthen). Austrian officials were keenly affected by a Galician revolt in 1846.[78]

All of these emancipations outside France involved indemnifications. Many were limited to certain categories of peasants. Denmark's 1788 law, for example, did not free serfs between fourteen and thirty-six years old; its 1791 law denied landless farm workers the right to seek other employment.[79] Some of these indemnified emancipations required the consent of both lord and peasant, a measure that enabled those lords who wished to retain their rights to do so, at least until, as invariably happened, subsequent legislation removed the voluntary

[74] Given the variety of rights lords held over peasants, there is some ambiguity in defining just which measure should be taken as initiating effective emancipation. Does one date France's process from the decree of August 4–11, 1789, for example, or from the king's limited abolition of serfdom on his own holdings in 1779? The ambiguities of dating the end points of emancipation are even more hazardous: many emancipatory processes trailed off with monopoly rights or tolls or sometimes other claims still alive and well, for example. As a guide through these and other difficulties in comparative observation, I have largely relied on Blum.

[75] Max Bruchet, *L'abolition des droits seigneuriaux en Savoie (1761–1793)* (Annecy, 1908).

[76] Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 386.

[77] Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 219–20, 385–86. Unmarried male servants, for instance, could not leave their employer until 1840 and then only if they were over twenty-eight.

[78] Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 364.

[79] Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 384–85.

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element.[80] The rapidity of the French transition from a process in large part indemnificatory to one thoroughly abolitionist stands out as unique among all European cases that commenced before 1848.

Apart from Savoy, Baden, and Denmark, moreover, the initial impulse for all the pre-1815 cases was French. French arms sometimes brought varying degrees of rural emancipation, as in Belgium at the start of the long war, the Helvetic Republic, and various western German states in 1798, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, and various north German states in 1811; these actions in turn triggered preemptive emancipation by fearful neighbors, as in a number of German instances in 1807. Beyond the direct use of force, however, the knowledge of the dangers of revolution in which French peasants instructed the world certainly helped spur some reform even after Napoleon's armies went down to defeat.[81] And in 1848 itself, insurrectionary peasants may have more rapidly won concessions in German-speaking lands because many governments had learned from 1789–1793 the futility of half-measures in the countryside: thus the termination of several decades-long emancipatory processes and the commencement and rapid completion of others in 1848–1849. (In Hungary in 1848, the Diet appears to have been panicked into abolishing serfdom by a false report of 40,000 mobilized peasants.[82]) In other words, in Central and Western Europe through the mid-nineteenth century, there are many instances of elite-driven emancipations, but, if we credit Blum's survey, not a single one that came to completion without the presence of the French army, the specter of popular insurrection, or both.

This glance to the east strengthens the view that without the determined, violent, and frightening popular battle, French peasants would still have been responsible for seigneurial obligations at the midpoint of the nineteenth century—at the very least. The Third Estate's delegates did carry indemnificatory proposals to the Estates General, where they joined with nobles, some of whom represented more conservative constituencies. Considering the role of popular uprising in promoting the initial decrees of August 4–11, 1789, one might well wonder if emancipation would have taken place at all without further pressure from the peasants.[83] Even the positions expressed in the general *cahiers* of the spring of 1789 were surely taken with an awareness of the riots rising in the French countryside; the assemblies, moreover, though dominated by urban notables, had a significant number of village delegates. The positions taken in the Third Estate *cahiers* already reflect rural pressures.

[80] Blum, *End of the Old Order*, 406.

[81] This is not to deny that, at points, elites made fearful by the French example may well have delayed or aborted emancipation processes. In Austria, for example, the French Revolution further energized a conservative current that was already successfully combating the reforms of Joseph II. See Ernest Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials: Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1969).

[82] G. Spira, "La dernière génération des serfs de Hongrie: L'exemple du comitat de Pest," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 23 (1968): 366–67.

[83] Readers might object, following Figure 1, that the great peak of rural unrest immediately preceding the August decrees was not primarily anti-seigneurial. True enough, but the crescendo of rural violence of the second half of July surely concentrated the legislators' minds on taking some action to pacify the countryside.

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THE YEARS OF DISRUPTIVE INSURRECTION of the French countryside in revolution are a part of the modern history of democracy, despite the view expressed in much of the recent literature that emancipation from the chains of the past was largely the work of highly educated elites, that plebeian violence only helped to emphasize the illiberal leanings of those elites, and that much rural mobilization was directed against the revolutionary regime rather than in tacit alliance with it. Democracy is a highly charged and profoundly contested notion,[84] but essential to virtually all conceptions is some sense of "self-rule," not a state of affairs one could readily imagine extending to those in relations of dependence on others. This has been a continuing and potent rationale for the exclusion from public life and full political rights of many—of the poor, servants, and women at various points during the revolution, of a variety of groups at other times and in other places, of the continuing exclusion of children from active citizenship everywhere. A rural world of lords and peasants is a world of very limited democratic possibilities: the attack on seigneurial rights was therefore an important component of creating the possibility of a democratic future.

A case can be made that the essential ingredient in this attack was a revolution in thought, largely promoted by the revolutionary elite and enunciated as early as the summer of 1789. François Furet remarked, on the conceptual achievement of the National Assembly,

> the decrees of August 4 to August 11 number among the founding texts of modern France. They destroyed aristocratic society from top to bottom, along with its structure of dependencies and privileges. For this structure they substituted the modern, autonomous individual, free to do whatever was not prohibited by law. August 4 wiped the slate clean by eliminating whatever remained of intrasocial powers between the individual and the social body as a whole.[85]

We ought to question the real extent of these individual rights. Women were hardly emancipated from structures of dependence by August 4–11, to take one very important example.[86] Conflict over the definition of who is seen as autonomous and free, in fact, has been a central but not always noticed feature of democracy for the past two centuries. Even if we may not wish to take the next step to equate a conception with the actual experience of social relationships, we may, nevertheless, agree on the radicalism of a conception of a society in which all dependence and privilege have given way before autonomous individuals. But is the National Assembly to be credited with the destruction of rural structures of dependence because it issued a text in which it credited itself? We may wonder, first of all, whether the National Assembly, which added a considerable dose of noble conservatism to the clear but clearly limited anti-feudal program of the Third Estate, would have even gone as far as it did in early August without the

[84] Robert R. Palmer, "Notes on the Use of the Word 'Democracy,' 1789–1799," *Political Science Quarterly*, 68 (1953): 203–26; Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtlich Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprach in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1972–84), Vol. 1, 821–99; John Dunn, *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* (Cambridge, 1993), 1–28.

[85] "Night of August 4," in François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 131.

[86] On this topic, see Carol Pateman, *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory* (Stanford, Calif., 1989).

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social explosion of July 1789. And we may ask whether this conceptual break would be easy to see as anything other than hypocrisy without the measures taken later, in 1792, to gain the support of peasants unwilling to settle for the removal of the symbols of deference without a far more dramatic change in material obligation. Even on the level of such symbolics, how quickly would the legislatures have acted, looking ahead from August 4–11, without the vast destruction of church benches, weather vanes, and coats of arms carried out by the country people?

The rural popular violence and the elite conceptual radicalism, moreover, were hard to separate, for each sustained the other. Not only did violent peasants push the legislature forward, but conceptually radical legislators showed peasants that if they pushed, they could win.

Does any of this argument indicate that the elite's own anti-feudal program, which I have not treated in any detail here, was an insignificant matter? Not at all. The people of the countryside rose against different targets at various times and places, and those in a position to write laws or command armed force responded in various ways. Consider two contrasting cases: overt rejection of the central institutions and symbols of the revolution in the west was met by savage violence on the part of the authorities; rejection of the revolutionary freeing of the grain trade (in which rural people were joined by urban popular forces) led to the spectacular, but only temporary, reimposition of controls. If the anti-seigneurial campaign, though difficult, was such a success, was it not in considerable part because revolutionary legislators had their own anti-feudal agenda?

Furthermore, insurrectionary peasants were responding to the elites just as the legislators were responding to rural disruption. Consider again the trajectory of peasant insurrection (see Figure 1): it was not, at first, predominantly anti-seigneurial, but it became so. As the elections to the Estates General approached, the struggle for the hearts and minds of the country people could not have failed to have made them aware of urban elite sympathies for significant alterations in the seigneurial regime; the night of August 4 was even more instructive. And, the data show, it is following August 4 that rural turbulence became predominantly focused on seigneurial rights. The debates in the spring over the contents of the *cahiers* and the legislative events of early August were demonstrations that an assault on the seigneurial regime might not quite be, as the French say, kicking in an open door, but it surely was not a stoutly defended oaken door, either. The dealings of villagers and legislators with each other over the rights of the lords radicalized both parties, but this is another story.

Let us speculate for a moment about a less violent revolution, in which a conceptually radical National Assembly abolishes feudalism but manages to obtain peasant compliance in paying what they have always paid, no doubt inspiring a host of programs by which all manner of states, following France, Savoy, Baden, and Denmark, discovered how to be modern without expropriating a landed upper class. We would have fewer documents that tell us of the terrors of the countryside in revolution. Yet it is hard to see how such a state of affairs would have advanced democracy. No doubt, for many, such an outcome would nevertheless be preferable to all the pain that occurred.

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The structures that made one man more than another, grounded in force, were abolished in principle by the National Assembly, helped along by rural violence against the visible signs of honor for the lords and the counterpart humiliations for the villagers. But the initial legislative program, more or less following the intentions voiced by the urban notables in the spring of 1789, was not accepted in much of rural France; it took years of battle in the countryside and the pressure of war with Europe for the legislators to translate their own sense of a break with a feudal past into terms recognizable in the villages. While the idea of a world of contractual relations among juridically equal persons may be an essential component that underlies evolving democratic practice, in which no one governs by age-old right and governors are accountable for their performances to citizenries, many in the French countryside plainly did not accept the claim that they had in some sense consented to their material obligations to their now former lords. Without the genuine end to those payments, there might as well be lords in village France, regardless of what the lawyers wrote in Paris. Merlin held early on that the Treaty of Westphalia to which the people had not consented could not obligate them to continue to pay lords across the Rhine; but the revolutionary legislatures tried for three years to act as though the same country people had consented to pay French lords. It took considerable violence to go beyond a gradual phase-out. Such violence had many consequences: the countermobilizations of the terrorized (the nineteenth-century Right and ultraright fed off French revolutionary terrors), the repressive measures of a revolutionary state eager to remove initiative from the village and the street, and the sufferings of the victims (whose complicity in the earlier sufferings of their own now-violent tormentors varied greatly). So the revolution, and its popular insurrections, opened the way for new forms of non-democratic and even anti-democratic politics. But they also made a more democratic social order possible. To the extent that over the past two centuries those in command in France had to take into consideration their accountability to the French people (rather than, like Louis XV, only their responsibilities before God),[87] the thousands of violent incidents of rural France in revolution made an essential contribution.

[87] Michel Antoine, *Le Conseil du Roi sous le règne de Louis XV* (Paris, 1970), 7–9.

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Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial Boundaries in Southern History: A Mississippi Example

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ON A SUMMER DAY IN VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI, in 1918, a car pulled up to the City Hall, followed by a crowd of people. Several men emerged from the car and pulled out after them Dave Cook, his upper body coated with tar and feathers. The men dragged Cook to the front of the building and hung around his neck a sign that read "I am disloyal to the United States government." The sign said, in effect, that Dave Cook, a white man and small farmer who lived on the outskirts of town, was a war slacker of some kind.[1]

As the jeering crowd grew, the car sped off, soon to return with another tarred and feathered victim—this time, a prominent physician, John A. Miller. Dave Cook was taken away, and his sign was hung on Dr. Miller. Finally, County Sheriff Frank Scott led Miller away to the "protection" of the jail, and Mayor J. J. Hayes sent the crowd, now swollen to 2,000, home with the plea that they "be satisfied with work already accomplished."[2]

Tar-and-feathering is a folk practice with deep European and American roots. In the antebellum South, it had been, according to Bertram Wyatt-Brown, an integral part of a system of honor. Among its other functions, honor served as one dividing line between whites (who had it) and blacks (who did not); ritual shaming with tar and feathers was one way to punish white violators of the code

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[1] Vicksburg *Daily Herald*, July 24, 1918; Vicksburg *Evening Press*, July 24, 1918. The incident is also documented in *Papers of the NAACP* (microform edition, Frederick, Md., 1981–), August Meier and John H. Bracey, editorial advisers, Part 7, Series A: Anti-Lynching Investigative Files, 1912–1953 (hereafter, *NAACP*), reel 14, frames 1–232; and it is discussed and described in Neil R. McMillen, *Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow* (Urbana, Ill., 1989), 31, 171, 304–05.

[2] *Daily Herald*, July 24, 1918; *Evening Press*, July 24, 1918. The newspaper reports do not make it absolutely clear that only one automobile was involved, but, as the account below will show, there is good reason to think that both victims were brought in the same taxi.

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of honor.[3] It is thus understandable why a Vicksburg crowd would use that traditional ritual to humiliate unpatriotic men. More difficult to understand is how Dr. Miller found himself subject to that humiliation. For Dr. Miller, unlike Dave Cook, was a black man.

It is the seeming contradiction in the use of a white man's ritual to punish an African American that marks this event as rich in multiple meanings, as an event that offers us what Cornel West has called a "methodological moment" for the analysis of racism.[4] At the center of this moment lies the "color line" separating white and black in the New South. In Vicksburg, the strains of war had torn apart some of the social fabric of race. Just months after Dr. John Miller was tarred and feathered and driven out of Vicksburg, a young black man named Lloyd Clay was brutally lynched on the city's streets. An analysis of these events shows how the coming of World War I placed unexpected strain on the color line and, at the same time, throws into relief the ways that the skeins of race, class, and gender were entangled in the cultural matrix of the early twentieth-century South.

White southerners then imagined "races" to be primordial—rigidly defined, biologically determined populations; the "color line" was simply the place where the two races met. There was, however, no possibility that a color line could be drawn literally—blacks in the South could not be locked out or driven away, because the South's economy was totally dependent on their labor, and no definition rooted in biology could successfully be used to assign every individual his or her proper place. It was not the presence of two races in the South that created a boundary between them, but the presence of a boundary that created two races. Like the levees that held back the Mississippi River, that boundary had to be constructed, but the materials at hand were symbolic, not physical. The line was drawn in law, where African Americans were segregated and denied full citizenship, in speech and gesture, in joke and story, in mocking laughter and brutal violence.[5]

To focus on the symbolic creation of the color line is to highlight the ways in which race was and is a culturally constructed system of meanings, rather than a class relationship or an expression of psychological forces. To write of race in this way is not to deny that class can be important—sometimes very important—in defining its contours.[6] As a hierarchical system under which blacks could be

[3] Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* (New York, 1982), esp. chaps. 14–16.

[4] Or, more expansively, a "*microinstitutional* (or localized) analysis of the mechanisms that promote and contest [white-supremacist] logics in the everyday lives of people." Cornel West, "Race and Social Theory," in *Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America* (New York, 1993), 268, emphasis in original.

[5] For a general discussion of the maintenance of boundaries among ethnic groups, and one that has informed the argument here, see Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London, 1969).

[6] In the vast theoretical literature on race and racism, some of the most useful general studies include Robert Miles, *Racism* (London, 1989); John Rex, *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*, 2d edn. (London, 1983); Pierre L. van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective*, 2d edn. (New York, 1978); Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (1977; Boulder, Colo., 1978); and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif., 1985). A collection of essays presenting a wide variety of points of view is the volume published by UNESCO, *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris, 1980). An older collection contains much still of value: Edgar T. Thompson, ed., *Race Relations and the Race Problem: A Definition and an Analysis* (Durham, N.C., 1939).

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economically exploited, race in the South functioned much like class, so much so that, in some forms of analysis, race *is* class, operating under another name. To be sure, few today endorse the simple form of economic determinism stressed by Oliver C. Cox, who argued that "race prejudice" is "propagated among the public by an exploiting class" to justify its exploitation of the stigmatized group.[7] Many, however, accept the far more nuanced arguments of historians, such as Barbara J. Fields, who treat race as an ideology originating in class relationships.[8] Even in these more subtle forms, however, most class analyses of the phenomenon of race have, in the words of David Roediger, "often been boiled down to the notion that class . . . is more real, more fundamental, more basic or more *important* than race, both in political terms and in terms of historical analysis."[9] They are often embarrassed by their attempts to account for the passionate loyalties elicited by racial and ethnic ties, loyalties that may cross class boundaries, that persist in both rich and poor countries throughout the world, and that lead at times to extreme violence.[10]

It is the passions so often evident in racial conflict that have directed other analysts toward its psychological wellsprings. In particular, the sexual obsessions so evident in much racist ideology and behavior have drawn the attention of historians of the South.[11] Yet psychological theories of race have their own weaknesses as forms of historical analysis. It is difficult to account for changes in any system that springs from psychological sources. And, as Pierre van den Berghe notes, while "there is unquestionably a psychopathology of racism . . . in racist societies most racists are not 'sick.' "[12]

Both class and psychological perspectives on race are valuable, but they remain, even in combination, incomplete. In focusing on the functions and, perhaps, the foundations of racism, both these modes of analysis divert our attention toward what race does and away from what it is. "Race" is a matter of culture; it is part of a system of meanings. With signs and symbols, groups of people divide themselves from "others" according to characteristics they conceive to be primordial and

[7] Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics* (1948; rpt. edn., New York, 1959), quote on 393.

[8] See, for example, Barbara J. Fields, "Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America," *New Left Review*, no. 181 (1990): 95–119; Fields, "Race and Ideology in American History," in J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson, eds., *Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward* (New York, 1982). For a similar argument by a British sociologist, see Miles, *Racism*, esp. 42.

[9] Roediger's criticism has been made by others; it is perhaps the more cogent in that Roediger is writing from within the Marxian tradition. David R. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London, 1991), quote on 7.

[10] The language of this last sentence in part paraphrases Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 105–06.

[11] Both Joel Williamson and Jacquelyn Hall have emphasized the sexual fears that called forth lynchings, and Hall has also stressed the sexual element in the sadistic voyeurism in many lynchings, which frequently involved castration of the victim and often included the hanging of the nude body, before or after killing, for display. Joel Williamson, *The Crucible of Race: Black/White Relations in the American South since Emancipation* (New York, 1984); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign against Lynching* (New York, 1979), 129–57. An earlier study influenced by Freudian theory is John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 3d edn. (1957; new pref., Madison, Wis., 1988), esp. 315–63. An attempt to synthesize Marxist and Freudian analyses of racism is Joel Kovel, *White Racism: A Psychohistory* (1970; rpt. edn., New York, 1984).

[12] Van den Berghe, *Race and Racism*, xx.

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thus unchangeable.[13] Economic advantage and psychological projection are two, but not the only two, contexts in which these cultural conceptions may arise and flourish.[14]

For the South in the age of segregation, one crucial context was the aftermath of emancipation. The Civil War and Reconstruction had wiped out the legal and even much of the economic basis for racial subordination. African-American political status was radically transformed; the former slaves were not only legally freed but also made citizens and, in the amended Constitution, guaranteed "equal protection of the law."[15] As racial subordination was reimposed in the long process of "redeeming" the South, racial boundaries had to be drawn in new ways. A taboo on sexual contact between black men and white women became central to that boundary.[16] Southern whites stripped away voting rights and other public attributes of equal citizenship. Racial subordination also was continually recreated in the routine actions of the everyday world. In that world, racial etiquette and violence served to mark a new color line.[17]

One of the striking and, to many white southerners, disturbing aspects of emancipation had been the breakdown of the etiquette of racial slavery.[18] As one white woman (writing in 1901) recalled about the period immediately following the Civil War, it was only when she discovered that a Negro could be "rude to me and my father not resent it" that she had realized how "the world had indeed turned upside down."[19] After Reconstruction, etiquette became central to the

[13] The argument here is particularly influenced by the formulation of "cultural systems" by Clifford Geertz, especially in "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," and "Religion as a Cultural System," in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), 3–30, 87–125. In an earlier essay, Lewis Copeland presents a similar kind of analysis: Copeland, "The Negro as a Contrast Conception," in Thompson, *Race Relations*, 152–80. It should be noted that such "primordial" differences can also be conceptualized as "tribal," "ethnic," or in other ways.

[14] In some ways, Barbara J. Fields treats ideology as something close to what I am calling here a "cultural system" when she defines ideology as "the descriptive vocabulary of day-to-day existence, through which people make rough sense of the social reality that they live and create from day to day" and argues that ideologies are perpetuated by "ritual repetition of the appropriate social behaviour" ("Slavery, Race and Ideology," 111, 114). Fields, however, insists that in its origins and in the strength of its persistence, "racialist" ideology must be understood as arising from a more fundamental realm of class relations. The perspective in the present essay is in the largest sense Weberian, rather than Marxian or Freudian; a plea for such a perspective is made by George M. Fredrickson, "The Historiography of Postemancipation Southern Race Relations," in Fredrickson, *The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism, and Social Inequality* (Middletown, Conn., 1988), 154–60.

[15] This is a major theme in Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York, 1988).

[16] See Martha Hodes, "The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and Black Men in the South after the Civil War," in John C. Fout and Maura Shaw Tantillo, eds., *American Sexual Politics: Sex, Gender, and Race since the Civil War* (Chicago, 1993), 59–74.

[17] For a general treatment of this late nineteenth-century transformation, see Williamson, *Crucible of Race*.

[18] I have followed Erving Goffman's definition of etiquette: the "code which governs ceremonial rules and ceremonial expressions" that make up the "conventionalized means of communication by which the individual expresses his character or conveys his appreciation of the other participants"; see "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor," in Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior* (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), 47–96, quote on 54–55; see also Goffman, "On Face Work," in *ibid.*, 5–45. A growing interest in the history of etiquette among U.S. historians was sparked by the translation of Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners* (*The Civilizing Process*, Vol. 1) (New York, 1978). A recent study of the transformation of etiquette in the nineteenth-century urban North is John F. Kasson, *Rudeness and Civility: Manners in Nineteenth-Century Urban America* (New York, 1990).

[19] The specific event was that "a huge Negro soldier compelled me to take to the gutter, to escape

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marking of racial boundaries. While the laws of etiquette were largely informal and a part of "local knowledge," varying from place to place and time to time, a relatively consistent set of rules governed face-to-face behavior in meetings between blacks and whites throughout the South in the age of segregation.[20]

Racial rules concerning the etiquette of hats embodied the symbolism of racial subordination. A black man always had to remove his hat when speaking to a white. On meeting a white on a sidewalk or roadway, he had at least to touch his hat and preferably remove it. A white man, by contrast, would never remove his hat because of the presence of a black person. In particular, white men did not tip or remove their hats in the presence of or when speaking to black women, as they would always have done for white women.[21]

Other rules of etiquette similarly displayed and reinforced racial hierarchy. In Natchez, Mississippi, in the 1930s, black people could not enter or leave a white's house by the front door. So strong was this ceremonial rule, researchers observed, that whites would lock the back door, but not the front, when leaving home.[22] Blacks had to address whites by titles: "Boss," "Sir," "Mister," or "Missus"; whites would address blacks by first names only.[23] White people required titles because they had to be treated as representatives of the entire white race, whatever their personal worth; they were symbols as well as individuals. The use of a title also avoided any claim to familiarity, thus protecting the "ideal sphere" of honor around every white person. Whites denied blacks this sphere of honor, privacy, and protected space.[24]

The color line in the South did not separate only the high from the low. It was

coming in contact with him," and her father had told her, "My child, you must expect that and many things besides." Georgia Bryan Conrad, "Reminiscences of a Southern Woman," *Southern Workman* (July 1901): 410.

[20] For treatments of racial etiquette and examples of common rules, see Bertram Doyle, *The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South: A Study in Social Control* (Chicago, 1937), 142–59, in which Doyle lists rules provided by his black students in the 1930s; Dollard, *Caste and Class*, *passim*; Copeland, "Negro as a Contrast Conception"; McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 23–28. The phrase "local knowledge" comes from Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, 1983).

[21] As the existence of crowns for royalty suggest, the covering for the head, the most noble part of the body, is often an important symbol in human relations. For comparative examples, see Kasson, *Rudeness and Civility*, 143–46; Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land, Marquesas, 1774–1880* (Honolulu, 1980), 52, 89; Aleksandr Nikolaevich Engelgardt, *Letters from the Country, 1872–1887*, Cathy A. Frierson, trans. and ed. (New York, 1993), 188–89. More generally, since the racial boundary marked hierarchy as well as difference, racial etiquette shared characteristics with forms of etiquette designed to enforce hierarchy in places such as European courts and manors. See, for example, Orest Ranum, "Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630–1660," *Journal of Modern History*, 52 (1980): 426–51. For a general consideration of the symbolic uses of the body, see Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (1973; New York, 1982).

[22] Allison Davis, Mary R. Gardner, and Burleigh B. Gardner, *Deep South: A Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class* (Chicago, 1941), 22.

[23] If they did not know blacks by name, whites would use a "generic" first name: Bill, George, or Mary. McMillen cites the case of a white postmaster who actually defaced the titles "Mr." or "Mrs." when these were used on letters addressed to blacks: *Dark Journey*, 24.

[24] "Although differing in size in various directions and differing according to the person with whom one entertains relations, this sphere cannot be penetrated, unless the personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed. A sphere of this sort is placed around man by his 'honor.'" Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Kurt H. Wolff, ed. and trans. (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), 321, quoted in Goffman, "Deference and Demeanor," 62–63.

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also the boundary between the pure and the impure, and this, too, was marked in daily life by etiquette. Especially clear illustrations appear in rules followed by many retail stores.[25] Blacks could shop in retail stores—whites did not want to segregate themselves from black money. A black man could try on a hat in the store for fit. A black woman, however, could not. A white clerk might demonstrate it for her, but once a hat sat on a black woman's head, it could no longer be sold to a white woman. The issue was not that trying on a hat might make the black woman equal. Rather, contact would defile the hat and make it unfit for a white woman to wear. African Americans, that is, were not only "inferior" but also "unclean."[26]

The principle involved is the one illuminated in Mary Douglas's classic study, *Purity and Danger*.[27] Douglas argues that ideas of ritual pollution arise as a way to prevent violations of the symbolic order. Dirt, as she puts it, is "essentially disorder," or "matter out of place." Social order in particular may be symbolized, and disorder perhaps avoided, by attention to ritual purity and pollution: rules keep order.[28] Hierarchical social orders are often protected with rules involving ritual pollution. The upper group in the social order is conceived to be not merely higher but also purer, the lower orders as not merely lower but also unclean. Contact can defile the upper groups with the "dirt" of the lower, but the reverse cannot occur.[29]

The most important of all rules of purity involved sexual contact. As both the progenitors of whiteness and the special repositories of white purity, white women had to be protected from defilement through contact, however slight and indirect, whether from a plate, a touch, or a glance, with "unclean" black men and women. The home, as women's "place," especially needed protection, and "protecting" the purity of women enforced simultaneously the boundaries of gender in the white world and the boundaries of race. Sexual contact between black men and white women was an extraordinary symbolic threat precisely because it occurred at the point where systems of race and gender intersected in the southern cultural matrix. There is a close similarity here to the meaning, if not the complexities, of the rules governing purity and pollution in Hindu India.

[25] See Doyle, *Etiquette of Race Relations*, 153.

[26] An incident observed in Natchez in the 1930s illustrates the same point. A black woman returned a coat she had purchased because it did not fit. Perhaps because the current depression made black customers too valuable to alienate, the store manager accepted the coat back, thereby horrifying two white clerks. " 'This is perfectly terrible; I think it is awful,' " said one. " 'We can't put that coat back in stock.' " Another added, " 'I know it. Who wants a nigger coat? . . . Some little white girl will probably come in and buy it and not know it is a nigger coat.' " One of the clerks "hung it up very gingerly and didn't touch it any more than necessary." As the observers of the incident noted, "in spite of their widespread uses as nurses and servants, there remains a strong feeling that the color of the Negroes is abhorrent and that contact with them may be contaminating." Davis, *et al.*, *Deep South*, 15–16. For a similar example, in which a woman could not imagine renting a house to whites because blacks had lived there, see Copeland, "Negro as a Contrast Conception," 160.

[27] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London, 1966).

[28] Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 2, 35. The order does not necessarily involve hierarchy, since rules of pollution avoidance appear in some societies even when the social relations being symbolized are symmetrical, or when the symbolic order under consideration is natural or sacred rather than social.

[29] In the South, many such rules, functioning essentially to protect the symbolic purity of the white "race," were written into ordinances of segregation. Ordinances requiring segregated restaurants, toilets, and drinking fountains are obvious examples.

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There we find extremely elaborate rules governing eating and drinking; there, too, sexual contact between lower caste men and higher caste women was the ultimate defilement of the social order.[30]

A white informant in William Ferris's study of Mississippi folk culture reminisced nostalgically about racial etiquette in his father's era. "My daddy," he said, "liked a niggir as long as he stayed in a niggir's place . . . In his days coming up, when they paid them 'tention, the niggir respected the white man. He come to the back door and didn't come to the front door. And he took his hat off when he com in, and if he didn't, you'd ask him 'Niggir, don't you know how to take your hat off your head?' " But when "he got out of a niggir's place [daddy] put him back. And they always said 'yes sir' to him. If he didn't, he would wind up on the ground."[31] The informant's description illustrates well the role of violence in the culture of race. Etiquette maintained boundaries; when crossed, violence restored them.[32]

While to some extent any violent attack by whites against blacks served to enforce the color line, the most powerful symbolic acts of racial violence were the lynchings of African Americans by white mobs.[33] As several historians have recognized, many lynchings of blacks were highly ritualized punishments.[34] When they involved a large portion of the white community, lynchings displayed white solidarity. To intimidate and warn other blacks, lynchers sometimes paraded their victims, either before or after they were killed, in black areas. Many lynchings took place at the spot on which the alleged crime had taken place. Fire might be used to torture victims, but fire also helped to expiate the harm done to the ritual order—as we can see in those instances in which lynch mobs killed their victims in one place and burned their bodies in another—at the site of the crime, perhaps, or in a town square. The parts of a lynching victim's body might

[30] Several scholars of the caste system have pointed out the similarities between caste and racial systems; see, for example, Gerald Berreman, "Caste in India and the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1960): 120–27; George De Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma, *Japan's Invisible Race: Caste in Culture and Personality* (Berkeley, Calif., 1966). These scholars of Asian caste systems were, in part, responding to critiques of the race-caste analogy by Cox in his *Caste, Class, and Race*; Cox, in turn, was criticizing American scholars of race who had made the comparison in the 1930s, especially Dollard, *Caste and Class*, and Davis, *et al.*, *Deep South*.

[31] William Reynolds Ferris, Jr., "Black Folklore from the Mississippi Delta" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1969), 289. Ferris identified the informant as a "lower class" white.

[32] In the Indian caste system, too, violation of purity rules, especially concerning sexual contact between higher caste women and lower caste men, could bring terrible punishments to the men and women involved. See note 30, above.

[33] A lynching can be defined as an extra-legal execution, by a group of perpetrators, of one or more persons alleged to have committed a crime or violated important informal norms.

[34] The best brief summary of the ritualistic aspects of some lynchings is W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930* (Urbana, Ill., 1993), 36–45. Brundage's analysis points out that many lynchings were not public rituals. He divides lynchings into four basic categories: "mass mobs" involving a large part of the white community and displaying the ritual characteristics described below; "terrorist mobs," more secretive killings by small groups of "whitecappers" or other white organizations; "private mobs," usually involving only a few participants and operating in secret; and "posse" lynchings, in which the victim was killed while being pursued by legal, or at least quasi-legal, authorities. See also Williamson, *Crucible of Race*, 183–89; Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry*, 129–57; Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor*, 453–61; Trudier Harris, *Exorcising Blackness: Historical and Literary Lynching and Burning Rituals* (Bloomington, Ind., 1984); McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 238–45.

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afterward be treated as sacred objects, talismans that could bring good luck to the owners.

Blacks in the New South could be lynched for trivial violations of the racial code, but the full ritual display described here generally followed what whites perceived to be the most egregious violations of the boundaries of purity and hierarchy: rape of white women or murder.[35] Southern defenses of lynchings concentrated almost exclusively on the need to punish blacks for sexual violations of white women. As African Americans in the South always knew, however, most lynchings did not involve accusations of rape or attempted rape.[36] Murder was the most common accusation against a lynching victim. For accused murderers, highly ritualized lynchings were especially likely when the alleged murder victim was a law officer or woman.[37]

Etiquette and violence were central to the definition and enforcement of the meanings of race because those meanings were, in the words of Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "unstable and 'decentered' " and "constantly being transformed by political struggle."[38] Such long-term developments as the rise of an urban,

[35] According to Brundage, over 85 percent of Georgia's "mass mobs" were precipitated by charges of rape or attempted rape (48 percent) or murder (39 percent). (These percentages are of lynchings, not victims, and have been calculated from Brundage's listing of victims in *Lynching in the New South,* appendix A. As murder was more often the alleged offense when lynchings took multiple victims, the percentages would be somewhat different if calculated on the basis of victims, but the basic story would be the same. For Brundage's own discussion and accompanying charts, see his chap. 2.) "Terrorist" lynchings, which seldom involved ritual elements, were more likely to have their source in economic conflicts.

[36] This was pointed out as early as the 1890s by Ida Wells (later Wells-Barnett). See Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York, 1984), chap. 1; Mildred I. Thompson, *Ida B. Wells-Barnett: An Exploratory Study of an American Black Woman, 1893–1930* (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1990). The latter source reprints several of Wells-Barnett's anti-lynching publications. One well-known compilation of lynchings from 1882 to 1968 classified the causes of 4,752 lynchings (3,445 were of blacks). Of these, the alleged crimes were rape or attempted rape in 1,117 cases. Murder was the leading alleged offense (1,937 cases); a total of 85 cases resulted from "insult to white persons." "The Lynching Records at Tuskegee Institute," in Daniel T. Williams, comp., *Eight Negro Bibliographies* (New York, 1970). Recently, scholars have begun to refine this and other compilations, which relied in many cases on unverified newspaper reports. See Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*; George C. Wright, *Racial Violence in Kentucky, 1865–1940: Lynchings, Mob Rule, and "Legal Lynchings"* (Baton Rouge, La., 1990). E. M. Beck and Stewart E. Tolnay have compiled the most complete list of verified lynchings for their forthcoming book, *A Festival of Violence: The Social History of Black Lynching in the American South, 1882–1930.* I am grateful to Beck and Tolnay for sharing with me their lists for Mississippi and Georgia.

[37] In some cases, such as alleged killings of landlords by tenants, an economic motive for both the alleged murders and the lynchings is evident. But the murders and assaults that most often led to fully ritualized lynchings were attacks on women or on sheriffs and other officials who symbolized white hierarchy and white control of the community. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South,* 73–80. It should be noted that "legal" courtroom rituals could share many of the characteristics of lynchings. Anti-lynching reformers often observed that lynchings sometimes were prevented only by a judge's promise of a speedy trial, speedy conviction, and speedy execution. They complained correctly that such trials were legal lynchings. Allison Davis and his co-workers concluded their study of Natchez with an account of the legal executions of two black convicted murderers. As they put it, the convicted blacks "were, in a sense, scapegoats paying the penalty for those before them who had gone unpunished, and were serving as a warning to the entire Negro group." Davis, *et al., Deep South,* 326. See also Wright, *Racial Violence in Kentucky,* 215–50; McMillen, *Dark Journey,* 206–17.

[38] Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s* (New York, 1986), x. Omi and Winant's analysis is heavily influenced by the formulation of Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation and Societies: Structure in Dominance," in UNESCO, *Sociological Theories,* 305–45.

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African-American middle class and changes in the status and role of women undermined many of the premises of the South's racial system.

World War I brought new, immediate, and profound challenges to the culture of race in the South. The call for national solidarity in a war fought for "democracy" challenged the idea of a society divided by a color line. The beginnings of massive migration from the South by black workers threatened some (but not all) white economic interests. Perhaps most important of all, some African Americans responded to the opportunities that the war seemed to open by courageously challenging the color line itself. This essay explores, for a single place, some of the consequences of that moment of extraordinary struggle and instability, which in Vicksburg provoked a crisis not only between whites and blacks but within white society itself.

THE CITY OF VICKSBURG lies at the southern tip of the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta, the heart of the South's post–Civil War cotton production.[39] In 1917, the city's experience of Civil War and Reconstruction was still vividly remembered. Vicksburg had endured weeks of siege before surrendering on July 4, 1863—five decades later, still a day to mourn rather than celebrate. To the city's whites, Reconstruction was a mythic time of misrule by carpetbaggers and blacks—little more, in their eyes, than a continuation of Yankee occupation. A bloody revolt had ultimately restored southern white rule.[40]

Yet Vicksburg's early twentieth-century white leaders did not see themselves as nostalgic for the antebellum order, and they had not rejected modern civilization. From Reconstruction onward, the city's white elite had tried to tie Vicksburg by rail and water to national and international markets, and they did not hesitate to seek economic aid for that purpose from the federal government.[41] Vicksburg had ultimately lost out in the competition for the Delta's cotton trade to St. Louis, Memphis, and New Orleans. After jumping from about 4,000 in 1860 to over 12,000 in 1870, the city's population had only slowly increased to its 1910 level of 20,814. Still, even if Vicksburg remained small and provincial by the standards of Memphis or Atlanta, the city's commercial-civic elite shared with the leaders of those bigger places an "urban ethos." They wanted to be part of a New South, not an old one. They worshiped growth and progress and believed they could have these without sacrificing order and harmony.[42]

Like their urban counterparts elsewhere in the South, Vicksburg's leaders were conservative and paternalistic in their ideas about race. They accepted unthinkingly both segregation and the elimination of African Americans from the state's

[39] On the Delta, see especially Robert L. Brandfon, *Cotton Kingdom of the New South: A History of the Yazoo Mississippi Delta from Reconstruction to the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); and James C. Cobb, *The Most Southern Place on Earth: The Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity* (New York, 1992).

[40] William C. Harris, *The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi* (Baton Rouge, La., 1979), esp. 634–36, 645–49.

[41] For example, they eagerly sought federal help when it looked as if the Mississippi River would change its course and leave the city's port dry. See W. Harris, *Day of the Carpetbagger*, 281–84, 547–54; Virginia Calohan Harrell, *Vicksburg and the River* (Jackson, Miss., 1982), 71–73.

[42] Blaine A. Brownell, *The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920–1930* (Baton Rouge, La., 1975).

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John A. Miller in the year of his graduation from Williams College. From the Williams College *1896 Class Book*. Courtesy of Williams College Archives and Special Collections.

political life.[43] Still, they were willing for blacks to have a subordinate part in the march of progress. By the era of World War I, local white newspaper editors, though never challenging the essentials of white racial domination, condemned lynching and found room in their pages to praise black church leaders and black educational efforts.[44]

One of Vicksburg's African-American residents in the war years was Dr. John A. Miller. Forty-seven years old in 1918, Miller was born in Virginia, attended the preparatory school at Howard University, and earned degrees from Williams College in 1896 and the University of Michigan's Medical School in 1900. Why he

[43] This elimination had been enshrined in the state's constitution in 1890; see McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 38–48.

[44] *Evening Press*, June 4, 1917, July 26, 1918, May 17, 1918; *Daily Herald*, July 5, 1918. Lynchings had become rare in the immediate vicinity. Vicksburg was in Warren County, which had witnessed, according to the best available counts, eleven lynchings from 1885 to 1894, three from 1895 to 1904, and one each in 1907 and 1915. These numbers come from the research of Beck and Tolnay referred to in n. 36, above.

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went to Vicksburg is something of a mystery, perhaps simply because it was a city with a growing black population, including a significant middle class.[45]

John Miller at the turn of the century was probably the best-educated black man in Vicksburg; indeed, he may have been the best-educated person. Just what his social position was in the city's African-American community is impossible to say, but a 1908 survey of the community gives him barely more than a mention, suggesting that perhaps, even after years of residence, he was considered something of an outsider.[46]

During his nearly twenty years in the city, Miller later wrote, he "never meddled in the white man's affairs and did not dare murmur or complain at the many acts of lawlessness against my race." Except, that is, twice, in two telling exceptions. In 1909, Miller helped to prevent the appointment as a public school teacher of a black woman who was "a public woman for white men." In 1916, Miller unsuccessfully opposed the hiring of a black teacher who "was the proud mistress of a white man." Both times, Miller hired white lawyers to help lobby the school board, and in 1916 he collected an affidavit from "a reputable White Lady" to support his case.[47]

White Vicksburg residents may have seen Miller as a "good negro" who, in trying to punish miscegenation, was accommodating Jim Crow, Booker T. Washington style. To Miller and other middle-class blacks, however, this action was more protest than accommodation. The authors of a letter about the second case to white lawyer John Brunini explained that they were trying to "overcome the charges of Immorality that are thrown at the race from time to time.[48] Like middle-class blacks elsewhere in the South, they deeply resented white assumptions that all blacks were by nature too sexual and "immoral" to meet the Victorian standards that whites identified with civilization itself. Their knowledge that white men themselves hypocritically violated those standards with black women only compounded their resentment.[49] Some of Vicksburg's African

[45] Sketchy biographical information on Miller is available in *Who's Who in Colored America* (1928–29): 266; and in Williams College Reunion Book, 1933, 21–22. I am grateful to Lynne K. Fonteneau of the Williams College Archives and Special Collections for the latter reference.

[46] *The Leading Afro-Americans of Vicksburg, Miss., Their Enterprises, Churches, Schools, Lodges and Societies*, intro. W. E. Mollison (Vicksburg, 1908). On Mississippi's urban middle class, see McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 164–86.

[47] John A. Miller to Walter White, September 3, 1918, and Affidavit of Kate D. Hawkins, July 11, 1916, in *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 36–47, 3; Vicksburg *City Directory* for 1918. The woman in the 1916 case is identified in the affidavit, and she was indeed a teacher in a black public school in 1918. Due to the nature of the charge and lack of definitive proof, I have chosen not to identify her here. Miller presumably had allies in his interventions, but the only one named in these sources was William Harrison, a black pharmacist.

[48] The quotation is from a typescript letter to Brunini titled "Vicksburg, Miss. July 11–16," in Folder "Migration Study, Negro Migrants, Letters from 1916–17," Box 86, Series 6, National Urban League Records, Library of Congress. The writer of the letter is not identified, but the topic and date (identical to that on the affidavit mentioned) clearly identify it as connected with the teacher controversy.

[49] One of the middle-class black informants in John Dollard's classic study of the Delta town of Indianola, Mississippi, "resented the charge of the whites [that all Negroes were immoral] because he knew what they do among themselves, as well as with Negroes." Dollard pointed out that middle-class blacks adopted Victorian sexual standards also as a way of distinguishing themselves from lower-class blacks. Dollard, *Caste and Class*, 424. Daisy Miller, who grew up during these years in the African-American community in Greenville, a river town a hundred miles north of Vicksburg, described the "mansion" there on Blanton Street where "nice clean colored girls" were kept "for the

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Americans later told an investigator that discontent over the "immorality of school teachers" whose jobs were "in the hands of white trustees" was a contributing cause of black outmigration from the city.[50] In insisting that whites hire only respectable black teachers, Dr. Miller and other blacks were also insisting that respectability knew no color line.

African Americans such as John Miller recognized that American entry into the war might offer them new opportunities.[51] Mississippi's whites came with alarm to the same realization. Even before the declaration of war, a shortage of industrial labor touched off a massive movement of blacks to northern cities. Some white southerners, fearing the loss of their cheap labor supply, responded with a variety of repressive methods in a vain attempt to stem this tide.[52] For others, however, the Great Migration helped to reinforce the idea that their interests were best served by paternalistic protection of minimal African-American rights. If Mississippi wanted to keep its black work force, one Vicksburg leader wrote, it needed to protect "the hard working money-making darky" from "injustice by court agencies and robbery by parasites."[53] Lynchings in the state, which had averaged more than fourteen per year from 1900 to 1909 and eight per year from 1910 to 1915, fell to three in 1916 and 1917 combined.[54]

The declaration of war created new concerns for the South's whites. The draft, for example, raised the specter of millions of armed blacks; Mississippi's Senator James K. Vardaman proclaimed that he knew of "no greater menace to the South than this."[55] The sight of black men in official U.S. uniforms bothered many whites, and the idea that black soldiers might meet white women in France as social equals bothered some even more.[56] Each of these complaints—that black soldiers would have access to means of violence, to symbols of public honor, and to social relationships with white women—points to a threat to the symbolic underpinnings of the color line. In response, Vicksburg whites sometimes drove black soldiers off the streets and out of town, and white soldiers in the city beat up black women.[57]

entertainment of white men." Her father, himself a physician, forbade her to play with the children of these prostitutes and would whip her even for walking on Blanton Street. Daisy Miller Greene (Mrs. William Greene), *Oral History*, OH 75–21, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Greene, later a teacher in the Greenville schools, was interviewed in 1975.

[50] "Vicksburg," in Folder "Migration Study, Mississippi Summary," Box 86, Series 6, National Urban League Records, Library of Congress. The investigator went on to note, "Effort has been made to check the custom, but to no avail."

[51] See, for example, McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 302–04.

[52] The best account is James R. Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* (Chicago, 1989), part 1.

[53] Frank Andrews to Theodore Bilbo, June 26, 1917, typescript copy in Folder "Migration Study, Negro Migrants, Letters from 1916–17," Box 86, Series 6, National Urban League Records, Library of Congress. Andrews was writing on behalf of the executive committee for Mississippi of the Council of National Defense.

[54] These numbers are summarized from the database of Beck and Tolnay described above, n. 36.

[55] Quoted in Jane Lang Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917–18," *Labor History*, 10 (1969): 441.

[56] After the war, Governor Bilbo blamed the reception of Negro soldiers by a "certain class of white women in France" for some of the lynchings that had taken place; see *Evening Press*, August 2, 1919.

[57] McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 302–07; J. Miller to White, September 3, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 36–47. When Vicksburg blacks complained to the Board of Trade about the violence, this influential

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Such anxieties and conflicts were only part of a more complicated story, however. The war called for men and money, including black men and black money. The leading white businessmen, clergy, political leaders, and editors joined to foster and encourage black participation in the war effort. With every draft of African-American soldiers, the city organized an elaborate send-off ceremony. Both white and black speakers praised the civic contributions of newly enrolled black soldiers, who then paraded to the train station with bands blaring.[58] A local judge, in his "patriotic charge" to a grand jury, paid "tribute to the colored soldiers" and "stated that regardless of race prejudice or expressions that when the time came the negro soldiers would cover themselves with glory and would be found giving just as valiant service in the defense of their flag as their white brothers."[59] When Alice Dunbar Nelson visited the city to stimulate war-related volunteerism by African-American women, one white newspaper covering the appearance of this "Prominent Colored Woman" even referred to her as "Mrs." Nelson.[60]

Civic leaders also called on African Americans to buy war bonds and savings stamps. Vicksburg's War Stamp Savings Committee organized a sales campaign led by George Williamson, cashier of the city's largest bank. The committee and its many volunteers resorted to highly coercive tactics. Those who refused to pledge the amount determined by an "Allotment Committee" were risking the humiliation of a "yellow card" being put up in their name—a public display reserved for "pledge slackers."[61]

organization of white businessmen responded that blacks should not wear uniforms in Vicksburg. In addition, African-American women in Vicksburg were not allowed to volunteer for canteen work because white volunteers objected to their wearing the Red Cross uniform. Alice Dunbar Nelson to Hannah Jane Patterson, August 23, 1918, Box 512, Folder 131, Central Office File, Records of the Council of National Defense, Committee on Women's Defense Work, Record Group 61, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Md.

[58] *Evening Press*, July 17, 1918.

[59] *Evening Press*, July 8, 1918. White newspapers also took note of black soldiers serving in France. For other stories about black participation in the war, see *Evening Press*, June 6, 1917, April 8, 1918, June 22, 1918, February 13, 1919. For a general treatment of wartime mobilization of blacks, see Scheiber and Scheiber, "Wilson Administration."

[60] *Evening Press*, August 22, 1918. Nelson, an author and educator, and previously married to the late poet Paul Dunbar, came to Vicksburg as a representative of the Committee on Women's Defense Work of the Council of National Defense. Economic motives in the form of fear of lost labor also played a part here. The National Urban League's investigator noted that, since the outmigration of blacks had begun, white men in the town of Greenwood, on the edge of the Delta, "have been seen to tip their hats to colored ladies." "Greenwood," in Folder "Migration Study, Mississippi Summary," Box 86, Series 6, National Urban League Records, Library of Congress. It is also important to note that, just as they might acknowledge blacks for their loyalty, whites could suspect them of disloyalty. In nearby Holmes County, the Reverend C. H. Mason, the African-American founder and head of the Church of God, was arrested for "preaching pro-German sermons" to blacks and receiving mysterious coded messages from foreigners. Witnesses alleged that he preached that black men "did not have to go to war, or did not have to register," and local whites thought these subversive sermons explained why more than half of Holmes County registrants had failed to appear for induction. See *Evening Press*, April 1, 1918, as well as "Church of God in Christ, Reverend Charles H. Mason, 1917–1919," in Miscellaneous Files, War Department: General and Special Staffs—Military Intelligence Division, Record Group 165, National Archives and Records Service; microfilmed in *Federal Surveillance of Afro-Americans (1917–1925): The First World War, the Red Scare, and the Garvey Movement*, Theodore Kornweibel, ed. (Frederick, Md., 1986), reel 22, frames 1–61.

[61] *Evening Press*, June 26, 1918. When the campaign lagged, Chairman Williamson blamed those without "the proper amount of patriotism" and threatened to close (on whose authority is an

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The campaign climaxed on "War Savings Day," June 28, 1918. In the week leading up to the 28th, local police arrested and fined a British citizen for "acting in a discourteous manner" to members of the Stamp Committee, who had demanded "that he tell something about himself." They also charged a black man, Sam Gaithers, with "interfering with a government loan" for allegedly telling his nephew "that he did not have to buy any of the stamps if he didn't want to."[62] Chairman Williamson took out a full-page newspaper ad warning that if any citizens refused to do their duty, "the Government will see to it that their movements will be watched and their actions will be recorded in Washington."[63]

It was in this charged atmosphere that, sometime in the spring or early summer of 1918, John Hennessey of the War Savings Committee visited Dr. Miller and asked him to subscribe to war bonds. Undoubtedly to John Hennessey's surprise and chagrin, the Miller he called on was not the Washingtonian accommodationist he surely expected but the man who, with two friends, had just become a charter member of a new chapter of the NAACP.[64] According to his own description, Miller responded to Hennessey's request with complaints about poor treatment of blacks generally and bad schools and low pay for black teachers in particular. "After discussing these local conditions," Miller continued, "I asked Mr. Hennessee [*sic*] as a white man now what would you do if your patriotism at home was crushed as the white people of Vicksburg crush the Negroes . . . I added I want you to think over what I have said and come back and I will tell you how many bonds I am going to buy."[65] It would indeed be delightful to have a picture of Hennessey's face at this moment of catastrophic breakdown in the etiquette of race.

As later newspaper reports made clear, even before this meeting with Hennessey, Miller had begun to earn a reputation as a troublemaker. One paper reported that rumors of Miller's "disloyal" statements had been circulating for months.[66] According to another, among the "many disloyal statements" Miller had made in connection with the Liberty Loan and War Savings drives was his claim that "his race got only half a chance in this community anyhow."[67] This report apparently referred to a different incident: when Miller was asked for a contribution of $10

unanswered question) "every store and place of business in the city" until the full amount had been raised.

[62] *Evening Press*, June 25, 1918.

[63] *Evening Press*, June 27, 1918.

[64] McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 304. John Miller's correspondence refers only to "Mr. Hennessee," and the actual visitor could have been one of two lawyers, apparently brothers, who served on the War Savings Committee. I have used John in the text. There is no suggestion in the sources that white citizens of Vicksburg knew about the NAACP chapter, but two other African Americans, William P. Harrison, a pharmacist, and D. D. Foote, a dentist, were also members and probably escaped tar and feathering only because they were out of town on July 23. Harrison, who was later reclassified and drafted by Vicksburg's draft board, told the NAACP that "this Fight upon us" came about because "we used both our time and money to fight the wrongs done our people in that section." Harrison to John R. Shillady, September 25, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frame 117.

[65] J. Miller to Walter White, September 3, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 36–47. Miller wrote that he could "sell $1500 worth of bonds myself if Negroes are given a taste of better treatment." On the NAACP during the war, see David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1869–1919* (New York, 1993), 501–80.

[66] *Daily Herald*, July 24, 1918.

[67] *Evening Press*, July 24, 1918.

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to the Red Cross, he had given only $5, he wrote, because he "had only half [his] rights."[68]

We do not know how Hennessey replied to Miller, but the plain fact was that he and other white citizens of Vicksburg were faced with a dilemma. The war had thrown the color line into confusion, as signified by events as various as parades in the streets and appeals to black patriotism. With the line between black and white no longer so obviously the line between citizen and non-citizen, the white elite had begun to approach some black residents as if they had typical patriotic feelings and normal patriotic duties.[69] Miller had accepted their unintended invitation to act like a citizen. It was they, and not he, who had first stepped over proper racial boundaries. It is telling that the Stamp Committee did not immediately call out a mob or even visit Miller more discreetly. Instead, a member of the committee telephoned him and insisted that he buy the extraordinary amount of $1,000 in war bonds—borrowing from a bank to do so, if necessary. Another call came on June 28—War Savings Day—insisting again that Miller subscribe to $1,000 in bonds and threatening to arrest him for sedition if he refused. As Miller later learned from a white friend, the War Savings Committee was trying to trap him "into saying I had advised Negroes not to buy Govt. securities."[70] The Vicksburg elite was going to extraordinary lengths to discredit him, not simply as an uppity black man but as a disloyal American.

It may have been in part Miller's own position in Vicksburg that made him both a challenger of racial boundaries and a target of those who would reinforce those boundaries. As a professional black man, highly educated in elite northern institutions, a native southerner yet perhaps always something of an outsider in Vicksburg, he was himself an embodiment of the impossibility of clearly defining racial boundaries. However, the events that bracketed the July 23 tar-and-feather attack on Miller demonstrate that the confounding of racial issues with the problem of "loyalty" went well beyond the case of one man. Dave Cook, the first tar-and-feather victim on July 23, was a white man. Those who attacked him claimed that he had said "he would see the United States government in hell" before he would allow any of his sons to be drafted. But a key reason for the attack was clearly that Cook had lived openly with a black woman; his sons were mulattos.[71] The following night (July 24), the "flying squadron," as the newspapers referred to the leaders of the tar-and-feather episode, appeared at the homes of Ethel Barrett and Ellen Brooks, two poor black women, and poured tar on them. Mob members explained that "neither of the negro women would work,


[68] J. Miller to Walter White, September 3, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frame 36–47.

[69] Roediger argues that even for white workers in the antebellum North, blacks were seen not only as "noncitizens" but as "anticitizens." *Wages of Whiteness*, 57.

[70] John A. Miller to John Shillady, October 29, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 160–62. This white informant was Joseph Short, the clerk of the U.S. Court in the city. Miller later claimed that he did finally did agree to take $150 worth of bonds.

[71] *Daily Herald*, July 24, 1918. Less plausibly, Cook was also accused of saying "there would be no race distinction after the war is won by Germany and the negro and white children will be sent to the same schools." *Daily Herald*, July 25, 1918. Cook also told one reporter that he suspected the attack was motivated by men who were angry that he had refused to sell them his farm. There is no way to confirm his suspicion, but if true, it illustrates the ways in which cultural and economic issues and motives are intertwined. *Evening Press*, July 26, 1918.

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Vicksburg's City Hall, photographed shortly after its construction in 1903. Courtesy of the Old Courthouse Museum, Vicksburg.

[that they] were living at the expense of the community." The "squadron" promised to clean out Vicksburg until it was "One Hundred Per Cent American"—and un-American types included "all loafers and idlers, whether white or black, male or female." The men planned to "specialize on both white men and negro women who have been living together, with a view of breaking up this practice entirely."[72] By July 1918, not just criticism of war-related policies but also violation of racial norms in marriage and the refusal of black women to "work" according to standards set by white men were signs of something less than "One Hundred Per Cent Americanism."

John Miller believed that the city's white leadership had provoked the July 23 events and accused Stamp Savings Committee chairman George Williamson of giving a "direct or indirect" order to attack him. The incident, he declared, could not be blamed simply on the "mob spirit."[73] The response of the white elite,

[72] *Daily Herald*, July 25, 1918; see also *Evening Press*, July 25, 1918.
[73] J. Miller to Shillady, August 8, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 22–29 (quotation frame 23).

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however, suggests a more complex picture and points toward a significant division between the whites.

The day after the attack on Cook and Miller, Williamson, Mayor Hayes, and several others published a statement "deeply deplor[ing] the unfortunate incident that took place yesterday afternoon, when a few of our citizens tarred and feathered a WHITE man and a NEGRO, for disloyal acts and utterances." The signers went on to urge "all good citizens, white and black, to avoid every utterance and every act that might lead to a repetition of the outbreak of yesterday" and to assure all "citizens, white and black, that loyalty and proper living will be as highly approved and heartily defended as disloyalty is condemned."[74] Perhaps these gentlemen were simply turning their heads while other people did their dirty work. But when the two black women were attacked on the night of July 24—immediately after this statement appeared—elite responses went well beyond denunciation.

One editor branded that second assault "one of the most cowardly that could possibly have been committed," and a reporter suggested the real motive behind the attack: one of the women had refused to work for one of the mob's leaders. It soon became clear that Ethel Barrett was a hard-working laundress, and, perhaps most embarrassing for city leaders, both women had husbands serving in the army. The whole incident, one reporter wrote, had "humiliated" the city.[75] A public meeting on July 26 explicitly condemned the attack on the women, and within a week seven men, now labeled "whitecappers," were prosecuted in the city court at the behest of a "citizens committee" and fined for assault.[76]

Of the seven men who had been convicted and fined, five can be identified in local records. Four were partners in the Home Taxi Company in 1918. One of these had been a chauffeur a few years before. Another of the four had been an employee in the maintenance division of the local electric company, and the fifth identifiable participant was a maintenance supervisor in that company. Those identified as "mob leaders," then, consisted of a small group of men who knew each other well. By no means at the bottom of the white occupational hierarchy, they were nonetheless far removed from the world of the business elite in the city, and at least one of them had only recently risen from a relatively menial service occupation. In labeling these attackers "whitecappers," elite leaders thereby identified them with the kind of attacks by white small farmers on rural blacks that had plagued parts of Mississippi earlier in the century. Whitecappers had operated in areas in which whites and blacks competed to rent good land, and whitecappers often were intent on driving away African Americans completely. Their activities were anathema to white planters and planter-merchants who

[74] *Evening Press*, July 24, 1918; *Daily Herald*, July 25, 1918. The signers also included two judges, the secretary of the Board of Trade, two bank presidents and three other bank officers, and two prominent businessmen. Occupational identifications were made with the Vicksburg *City Directory* for 1918.

[75] *Evening Press*, July 25 and 26, 1918; *Daily Herald*, July 27 and 31, 1918. The change in tone in the reports is also notable; the original report of the attack on Miller and Clay had referred to the "patriotic" members of the crowd; the women's attackers were simply "mob leaders."

[76] *Evening Press*, July 26 and 27, 1918; *Daily Herald*, July 26, 31, 1918. The meeting on the 26th was attended by most of the same men who had published the statement condemning the violence against Cook and Miller, as well as other leading businessmen and lawyers.

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depended on black labor.[77] Opposed to this traditional rural culture of violence, Vicksburg's elite was defending what Joel Williamson has termed the "conservative," paternalistic racism of the South's cultural elites.[78]

Miller's punishment is itself ironic evidence of the contradictions within white racist culture that had been exposed and to some extent created by the war. His was a ritual of shaming and not, as in lynching, of death. As such, the attack on Miller implied that white Vicksburg had invited him into the circle of honor, as a patriotic American. It was perhaps the shock of recognition that they had done so, as much as Miller's own actions, that confounded Vicksburg's white leaders, for they, as well as he, had bent if not broken the hierarchical boundaries of race. The city's elite had then allowed lesser white men to punish Miller in a way that violated the ideals of "civilization" and democracy for which the war was supposedly being fought. Only three days after the attack, both Vicksburg newspapers gave front-page coverage to President Woodrow Wilson's denunciation of the lynching of a German immigrant in Illinois, which put "lynchers squarely on the side of Germany."[79] By prosecuting and punishing the crowd leaders for their attacks on the women, Vicksburg's white leaders were addressing their dilemma. The court action allowed the city's elite to vindicate the "honor" of Vicksburg without entirely repudiating the punishment of the black physician who had insisted on his own right to honor.[80]

[77] William F. Holmes, "Whitecapping: Agrarian Violence in Mississippi, 1902–1906," *Journal of Southern History*, 35 (1969): 165–85; Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 19–28. Brundage, who labels whitecappers as "terrorist mobs," argues that economic motives often mixed with efforts to preserve traditional moral standards in whitecap attacks, an argument that seems to fit much of the Vicksburg incident.

[78] Williamson, *Crucible of Race*, esp. 259–84.

[79] *Evening Press*, July 26, 1918; *Daily Herald*, July 27, 1918. While Wilson's statement did not touch on race as an issue, it was partly a response to intense pressure brought to bear on Wilson from black leaders in the North and even members of his own administration to condemn racial violence; see Scheiber and Scheiber, "Wilson Administration," 456–57.

[80] Almost immediately after that attack on the women, the police chief and mayor claimed that the incident was unrelated to the earlier attacks on Miller and Cook; in fact, the evidence strongly suggests the contrary. Miller told the NAACP that he had been taken to City Hall by, among others, "public auto driver Patterson," almost certainly the same Frank Patterson, of the Home Taxi Company, prosecuted for the attack on the women. Miller also mentioned three other names in his correspondence as involved in his own incident: Doc Eades, a Vicksburg policeman, Mike Morrisey, son of a "whiskey man of Vicksburg," and "a poor white Fergurson," as well as others unidentified. See Miller to Walter F. White, September 3, 1918, *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 36–47.

None of the men—Eades, Morrisey, Fergurson—were prosecuted for the attack on the women. However, other evidence suggests an intriguing connection between John Miller and Orphie R. Hoxie, an employee of Home Taxi who was among those convicting of assaulting the women. In 1916, Father J. J. Heinhauer, a white priest who served as pastor of a black Catholic congregation in Vicksburg, wrote a letter to the head of the school board of trustees, William H. Bruser, in support of Miller's effort to prevent the hiring of an "immoral" black woman as a teacher. Heinhauer named two white men who, he claimed, had been "living with" the woman; one of these was "Orphie Hoxie." It is possible that Hoxie felt some sort of personal grievance against Miller in connection with the 1916 controversy and, unrecognized by Miller, helped to tar and feather him. At the very least, the evidence indicates that one of the men planning to "break up the practice" of white men living with black women was himself guilty of regularly having sexual relations with a black woman, a fact "known to every colored man or women [*sic*] all over town." See J. J. Heinhauer to Mr. Bruser, June 10, 1916, *NAACP*, reel 14, frame 2.

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THE WAR HAD REDRAWN THE BOUNDARIES of inclusiveness, disturbed the color line, and provoked a violent white response in Vicksburg. More than the war itself had created a fear of disorder among whites, however. A white man had violated the color line in marriage. Two poor black women had insisted on some measure of control over their own work. Attacks on them, while occasioned by the war, grew out of anxieties that went beyond the immediate events of the war years. These anxieties, centered on concerns about home and work, and therefore about gender and class, increased in the aftermath of the war. As a result, a young black man would suffer a terrible death.

To be sure, some of these postwar anxieties stemmed from the way war had disturbed racial boundaries. Editors and letter writers openly fretted about "the high tension which seemingly exists . . . about the returning negro soldiers," and cautioned readers to ignore "absurd" stories that the "soldiers who went overseas would come back and expect to marry your sisters."[81] Perhaps out of concern about the continuing migration of blacks to the North, local editors also endorsed the "laudable intentions" of a "colored meeting" at the courthouse that condemned lynchings and called for improved wages for black laborers.[82]

As threatening as returning black soldiers, to judge from the attention it received in the newspapers, was the labor strife that erupted in 1919 throughout the United States. Many connected these labor troubles to the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia, who in the popular imagination soon replaced the Huns as a danger to civilization. Newspaper headlines warned how "Bolshevists Would Contaminate World" or were "Threatening Civilization."[83] Strikes in Seattle and Minneapolis, and even crime in New York City, were interpreted as extensions of this worldwide threat: "Seattle Thinks that Bolshevism Grips the City"; "Practical Bolshevism in New York, Unprecedented Reign of Crime and Loot."[84]

Yet the popular media was preoccupied with an apparent upheaval in the proper relations of men and women. This preoccupation seems to have been tied less to the impending ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, giving women the right to vote, than to threats simultaneously more specific and more pervasive.[85] On the same day that the Vicksburg *Evening Post* reported the "Bolshevik" threat in Seattle, another front-page story—based on information received over a "special leased wire"—gave the latest details on the

[81] *Evening Press*, March 22, 1919. Similarly, when an Indiana newspaper ran a cartoon showing a white man ordering a crippled black soldier off a sidewalk with the comment that "you cain't vote in this state," a Vicksburg editor angrily denounced it, even while admitting that some people "feared that the returning negro soldier might cause some friction on his return." The editor went on to state that "so far as we have heard there has not been a single instance of the sort." *Evening Press*, April 12, 1919.

[82] *Evening Press*, April 19, 1919. See McMillen, *Dark Journey*, 302–07, for a discussion of Mississippi blacks' responses to the war.

[83] *Evening Press*, February 5, 1919; *Daily Herald*, March 26, 1919.

[84] *Evening Press*, February 7, 1919; *Daily Herald*, April 8, 1919.

[85] While Mississippi was one of the states that rejected the amendment, the issue generated little newspaper controversy. Many Mississippians, including former Senator James K. Vardaman, nationally known as a staunch champion of white supremacy, supported women's right to vote; see William F. Holmes, *The White Chief: James Kimble Vardaman* (Baton Rouge, La., 1970). At the same time, controversy over the amendment throughout the South in this period may well have played a part in heightening tension over gender issues; see Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, *New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Woman Suffrage Movement in the Southern States* (New York, 1993), esp. 20–37.

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trial of a Mrs. Abbott in Atlanta for the murder of her husband.[86] Throughout the spring of 1919, similar stories dominated the front pages: a murderess in Selma, Alabama; a "shocking murder" in nearby Indianola, in which a "travelling man" was shot down by a white woman while her husband watched; the arrest of a Vicksburg stenographer, charged with poisoning her husband.[87] When a convention of police chiefs met in New Orleans, "women crooks" shared attention with the "spread of Bolshevism" as leading topics of discussion.[88]

The Bolshevik scare entered into this volatile brew of class and gender anxieties because the Bolsheviks threatened to tear apart the sexual as well as the class order. Newspapers titillated readers with allegations that Lenin presided over "Daily Orgies of Indulgence . . . at Bolsheviki Headquarters" and reported that the Bolsheviks were "nationalizing" Russian women and had "declared war on family life." Men were sharing women between them, "and consideration for one another's mother or sister is forbidden. All must be treated alike. The most terrible thing is that the women themselves have accepted their 'nationalization' and very little protest is made."[89]

On April 17, 1919, the Rev. Charles Criswell, a "militant pastor," explained to his congregation the connections between sexual scandals and the Bolshevik menace. The world, according to Criswell, was "on the edge of a volcano," and the twin warnings of the impending explosion were "bolshevism and infidelity." "Making the world safe for democracy is incidental to making every home safe. The world cannot be safe as long as there is an unprotected country in it, any more than any city can be safe if there is an unprotected home in it."[90]

Two days later, the Vicksburg *Evening Post* reported that a "Midnight Visitor"—a black man—had "invaded" two homes, frightened ladies, and "attacked" Mrs. F. A. Arnold.[91] Over the next four weeks, more break-ins by "black prowlers" were reported. Several men were arrested as suspects, but identifications were uncertain and the "epidemic" did not stop.[92] By May 14, white emotions were at a fever pitch when the *Post*'s headline screamed "Negro Attempts Rape of Young

[86] *Evening Press*, February 7, 1919.

[87] *Evening Press*, April 25 and 26, 1919.

[88] *Daily Herald*, April 15, 1919. Other stories that suggest anxieties about gender can be found in *Evening Press*, March 8, 1919, March 27, 1919, May 5, 1919.

[89] *Evening Press*, March 28, 1919, April 9, 1919. The latter story was reprinted from the London *Daily Express*.

[90] *Evening Press*, April 17, 1919. Another indication of this convergence of anxieties over sexual upheaval and labor unrest is the extensive coverage given to a strike of female telephone operators in Illinois. This strike was one of a series by telephone operators in 1919, concentrated in New England but also occurring in the Midwest and the South. The historian of the union has pointed out that striking operators frightened some people not only because they were labor militants but also because they were "new" women—"flappers"—who flaunted their independence in matters of decorum as well as work. See *Evening Press*, April 29, 1919 and following; Stephen H. Norwood, *Labor's Flaming Youth: Telephone Operators and Worker Militancy, 1878–1923* (Urbana, Ill., 1990), esp. 1–20.

[91] *Evening Press*, April 19, 1919.

[92] *Evening Press*, April 23 and 24, May 7, 8, and 9, 1919. Based on the descriptions contained in some of the reports, it seems likely that some, if not all, of the reported break-ins were imagined by frightened residents. Two of the men arrested, Fred Coleman and Phillip Haynes, apparently came under suspicion merely because they were "well known as 'sissy niggers,' affecting a high-pitched voice and effeminate manners. The arrest of these two seems to have been based on nothing more substantial than the sense that they, too, confounded the settled boundaries of race and gender, but I found no further information on them.

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Working Girl." Bloodhounds had tracked the criminal, the paper reported, and authorities had arrested a young black man, Lloyd Clay.[93] The city's sheriff hustled Clay off to jail, hoping for a quick identification by Mattie Hudson, the alleged victim. Then the city could order a quick trial and conviction and hope to avoid a mob scene. The sheriff was no doubt disappointed when Hudson not once but twice failed to identify Clay in a line-up.[94]

If Lloyd Clay began to breathe more easily, his relief did not last long. Too many people in Vicksburg were wrought up, and hundreds of whites, convinced of Clay's guilt, gathered before the jail, determined to seize him and administer their own brand of justice. By the evening of May 14, the crowd had swelled to perhaps a thousand, and many of its members were drunk. Shortly before 8:00 p.m., they stormed the jail and seized Clay. Some of the men in the crowd dragged their victim out to the street while others went for Mattie Hudson. Clay strongly denied his guilt. Though at first "loathe to identify him," Hudson finally told the crowd "that he was the guilty one." In terror, Clay cried out, "I'm the man. Give me a pistol and I'll blow my brains out." Such a relatively painless death, however, would not satisfy the mob. They stripped Clay, poured oil over his body, put a rope around him, and hanged him from a tree at the side of the street. As the rope pulled taut, "the sight of the nude body rising above the crowd increased the excitement." A fire set below his feet lapped at his legs. Without a cry, he "lifted his arms" and "placed his palms together in an attitude of prayer." Finally, many in the crowd began to fire their guns at him, and "even women were seen to shoot revolvers." In the wild firing, a white bystander was fatally struck with a bullet. The flesh of Lloyd Clay continued to burn—described in gory detail in local newspapers—after he was dead. Eventually, the body was cut down, and the crowd, in a "hubbub of gloating," rushed in to seize souvenirs.

Defenders of the lynching justified it as whites always had—it was a ritual necessary to restore the racial order. One female "sufferer" claimed that evidence from the bloodhounds and Mattie Hudson "was proof enough to the minds of most people of the identity of the brute. Could our fathers, husbands and brothers take a chance on this man's life?"[95] A white man called the tree on which Clay was hanged "a monument to the spirit of manhood of this community who will not tolerate crimes against their women folks."[96]

Yet this lynching, even more than the tar-and-feather attack of the year before, rather than reestablishing order and reinforcing white solidarity, ultimately served to reveal and deepen class cleavages in white Vicksburg. A few days after Clay's murder, a group of the wealthiest and most influential men in the city met publicly to denounce it. In a remarkable inversion of black/white imagery, they resolved that the lynching had "cast an ineffaceable black shadow upon the fair name of our city" and made Vicksburg "the object of abuse and contempt of

[93] *Evening Press*, May 14, 1919.

[94] *Evening Press*, May 15, 1919. Unless otherwise noted, the detailed description of the events below comes from this source. This day's edition and other documents related to the lynching can be found in *NAACP*, reel 14, frames 261 and following.

[95] *Evening Press*, May 16, 1919. She also complained that the authorities had not done enough to prevent the long series of break-ins.

[96] *Evening Press*, May 16, 1919.

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people in every section of the civilized world." This language was put into a petition that circulated through the city and soon claimed the signatures of nearly 10 percent of the adult white male population; the petition called for swift and sure punishment for the lynch mob's leaders.[97]

Vicksburg's white elite repudiated the lynching in part because, in its disorder, it had failed as ritual. The crowd inflicted "unnecessary" torture and caused the death of a white bystander. The "fiendish gloating" of the crowd reminded one local commentator of the "Bolsheviki" themselves, and a reporter called the mob "an amateur organization," implying that it had lacked proper direction from community leaders.[98]

Much worse, many soon realized that Clay was almost certainly innocent. Even the strongest champions of southern bloodhounds could doubt that they had correctly tracked a single scent to a place as public as the railroad station. Mattie Hudson had "been loathe to identify" Clay, and she had made her uncertain identification literally in the face of a howling mob. Clay's brother, furthermore, soon claimed that Lloyd had spent the entire night of the crime with him. Four days after the lynching, the editor of the Vicksburg *Daily Herald* lamented that the "hideous and dehumanizing spectacle" had resulted in the death of an innocent man, "one wholly out of the class of the 'bad negro.' "[99]

Finally, in attempting to enforce the boundaries of race, the lynching had ignored the proper boundaries of gender. The mob lynched Clay at the doorstep of a home owned by prominent white women, one of whom was so offended that she asked the city to cut down the tree—that so-called "monument to the spirit of manhood"—where Clay had been hanged.[100] Many white women had witnessed the sadistic torture of the nude black man, with its obvious sexual connotations, and several had fired revolvers. When local commentators deplored the presence of women at the lynching, Mrs. Emily P. Shaw responded with a remarkable letter to the *Evening Post.* A witness herself to the lynching, she approved of it—a "just mob" "meting out justice." "The day has passed when a woman, 'to be a lady,' must stay behind closed doors. There are times when she should come forth and she is none the less a lady for doing so."[101] Emily Shaw in effect denied that white women like herself needed to be protected in their homes. Perhaps her letter raised questions in the minds of some of Vicksburg's white men about the circumstances of Lloyd Clay's alleged assault. The crucial break-in had come in the apartment of a single woman, working and living alone. How could such women, living without the "protection" of a man, ever be kept safe?[102] One woman, replying anonymously to Shaw, insisted that "there is an innate feeling in

[97] Neil McMillen, the most distinguished historian of Mississippi's race relations, has noted that, at this time, lynching "had little articulate opposition" from editorial writers, religious leaders, or government officials, and lynchers could expect complete immunity from punishment. The petition's language is thus doubly remarkable. McMillen, *Dark Journey,* 245–51.

[98] See letter from "Prof. J. H. Culkin," and other reports, *Evening Press,* May 16, 1919; see also McMillen, *Dark Journey,* 241.

[99] *Daily Herald,* May 18, 1919.

[100] *Evening Press,* May 15, 1919.

[101] *Evening Press,* May 17, 1919.

[102] Indeed, an unattached woman, working as a stenographer in the city, had been accused of poisoning her husband just weeks before. See trial of Mrs. Abbott, above.

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most women that causes them to experience horror at the thought of witnessing such a scene. If I were not sure that this were so with the large majority of women here, I would wish to shake the dust of this city from my feet forever." She vehemently denied that the mob had exhibited a "spirit of chivalry."[103]

These multiple doubts about the lynching led Vicksburg's white elite to repudiate the mob. The language of their condemnation—that the lynching had made Vicksburg "the object of abuse and contempt of people in every section of the civilized world"—suggests a provincial bourgeoisie struggling to identify itself with the standards of a wider world. The "civilized world" was the world of northern and European civilization, a civilization that a mighty war had just been fought to preserve. Now, as one letter writer put it, Vicksburg had been witness to a "victory for German ideals."[104] As the petition drawn up by the elite circulated in the next few days, Vicksburg's citizens were asked to identify themselves publicly with these values of civilization and thus to reject those of a presumably more primitive cultural ideal. The accumulation of names on the petition offers powerful evidence of the ways in which that cultural divide was also a class divide.

The signers included an array of the most prominent business and professional leaders in the city.[105] These included the mayor, the heads of every bank, prominent lawyers, the ministers of the major religious denominations, owners of important businesses, the supervisor at the main railroad, and the president of the Board of Trade. Yet the petition contained the names of many men who were not part of that leadership. The great majority of non-elite signers held clerical and similar white-collar jobs in the city. Most were employed by the elite signers. The signature of W. S. Jones, president of the Merchants National Bank, was closely followed by those of C. E. Downing and Preston Wailes, clerks at the bank. The signatures of W. Conway and T. H. Allein, clerks at Warner and Searles Clothing, followed that of C. L. Warner, the president of the company. The pattern is consistent through more than one hundred such signatures from white-collar workers. By contrast, only three identifiable blue-collar workers signed: one carpenter, one electrician, and one bicycle repairman. Undoubtedly, Vicksburg's white establishment had circulated the petition among themselves and in each of their businesses had persuaded their employees to sign as well. While it seems reasonable to think that clerical workers might feel intimidated when asked to sign such a petition, the signatures of contractors were not followed by those of carpenters, nor that of the owner of a boiler works by those of boilermakers.[106] The class divide was not simply a matter of income. It was also a matter of culture, since clerks, many of whom were no doubt educated and ambitious to rise in the world of business, chose to identify themselves with the business civilization of Vicksburg's elite.

[103] *Daily Herald*, May 22, 1919.

[104] Letter from "G. A. S.," *Daily Herald*, May 22, 1919. On the opposition of urban elites in Georgia to lynchings in the same era, see Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 159.

[105] As far as can be determined, the petition contains the names of white men only.

[106] Identifications were made in the Vicksburg *City Directory* for 1918 and for some cases, 1912.

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IN THE END, the system of race survived these shocks largely intact. John Miller left for Detroit shortly after the attack on him. The U.S. Department of Justice refused requests by the NAACP to investigate the attack. In Detroit, Miller took up his medical practice again, served on the board of a YMCA branch, and voted with the Republican Party. He died there in 1931.[107] In August 1918, Alice Dunbar Nelson wrote to her Washington office that since the tar-and-feather incident "the colored brass band will not lead the colored draftees to the station, seeing no cause for making music."[108] The determination of the "flying squadron" to enforce "One Hundred Per Cent Americanism" would be taken up in its own way by the revived Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s.[109]

Despite the efforts of Vicksburg's white elite, Lloyd Clay's killers were never brought to justice. When the grand jury met in July 1919, the presiding judge compared the mob to the "lawbreaker and agitator" who would bring about "Bolshevism and anarchy and ruin" and charged jury members to "bring Clay's slayers to court." But the grand jury was dominated by farmers and planters from the rural areas of Warren County and refused to return an indictment. Frank Andrew, foreman of the jury, secretary of the Vicksburg Board of Trade, and a signer of the anti-lynching petition the previous spring, resigned in protest, creating "a considerable sensation about the court house and throughout the city," but the resignation had no other effect; the judge ordered him not to mention publicly the names of any suspected lynchers.[110] The color line would survive, until a later generation, following an even bigger war, rose to challenge it anew.

[107] *Who's Who in Colored America* (1928–29): 266; Williams College Reunion Book, 1933, 21–22.

[108] Nelson to H. Patterson, August 23, 1918, Box 512, Folder 131, Central Office File, Records of the Council of National Defense, Committee on Women's Defense Work, R.G. 61, National Archives and Records Service. Nelson's trip to the South is discussed in William J. Breen, "Black Women and the Great War: Mobilization and Reform in the South," *Journal of Southern History*, 45 (1978): 421–40.

[109] For a treatment of the southern Ku Klux Klan that emphasizes the importance of gender ideologies in its formation and actions, see Nancy MacLean, *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (New York, 1994).

[110] *Evening Press*, July 7, 12, 1919. Occupations of grand jury members were found in the city directories or the 1910 manuscript U.S. Census of Population. The split in the grand jury points out some of the ways the culture of race differed in the rural and urban South besides along class lines.

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The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England

JOHN A. PHILLIPS and CHARLES WETHERELL

MANY TEXTBOOKS AND POPULAR HISTORIES still record England's Great Reform Act of 1832 as perhaps the central political event of the nineteenth century.[1] One actually claims that "the entry of the demos" into the political arena during the era of reform was "the culminating event" shaping modernity in the Western world.[2] Yet, despite the drama of "revolution avoided" as many portrayed it at the time, modern scholarship has tended to downplay or even dismiss 1832 for a variety of reasons. One of the newest scholarly accounts of the Reform Act contends that "when the dust had settled, the political landscape looked much as it had done before."[3] Similar judgments are commonplace among academic specialists who often stress the "modest" achievements of the act.[4] This lack of consensus has led recently to complaints about the absence of "a firmer overall model of the post-1832 electoral system" written in "a broad-brush style."[5] Answering those complaints, this essay applies a very broad brush to sketch a model of English electoral politics over the century from the accession of George III in 1760 to the end of open voting in 1872 and beyond. This model stresses the critical, indeed watershed, role of the Great Reform Act of 1832.[6] It demonstrates that

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[1] George Macaulay Trevelyan heralded the Reform Act as the point at which " 'the sovereignty of the people' had been established in fact, if not in law." Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After (1782–1901)* (1922; London, 1966), 242.

[2] Although stopping just short of 1832, Paul Johnson's account credited the emergence of a genuine two-party system to the events surrounding reform and, with the parties, the emergence of public opinion. He comes close to recognizing, though never does, that political parties served as the midwife in the birth of the modern. Johnson, *The Birth of the Modern: World Society, 1815–1830* (New York, 1991), 904.

[3] E. A. Smith, *Reform or Revolution? A Diary of Reform in England, 1830–2* (Stroud, 1992), 141.

[4] Breaking with older laudatory treatments, for example, William A. Speck's new textbook portrays the act's impact as quite modest. *A Concise History of Britain, 1707–1975* (Cambridge, 1993), 74. Two other careful, general assessments are John R. Dinwiddy, *From Luddism to the First Reform Bill: Reform in England, 1810–1832* (Oxford, 1986), 47–78; and Jonathan P. Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), 72–106.

[5] Frank O'Gorman, "The Electorate before and after 1832," *Parliamentary History*, 12 (1993): 181. See also O'Gorman, "Party Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century," *English Historical Review*, 102 (1987): 63–84.

[6] For the period prior to George III, see Nicholas Rogers, *Whigs and Cities: Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole and Pitt* (Oxford, 1989); and Clyve Jones, ed., *Britain in the First Age of Party: 1680–1750* (London, 1987). For the period after 1760, see John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the*

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England's frenzy over the Reform Bill in 1831, coupled with the effect of the bill itself upon its enactment in 1832, unleashed a wave of political modernization that the Whig Party eagerly harnessed and the Tory Party grudgingly, but no less effectively, embraced. Reform quickly destroyed the political system that had prevailed during the long reign of George III and replaced it with an essentially modern electoral system based on rigid partisanship and clearly articulated political principle.[7] Hardly "modest" in its consequences, the Reform Act could scarcely have caused a more drastic alteration in England's political fabric.[8]

The protracted process and occasionally violent events surrounding the Reform Bill's passage provided enough drama to generate lasting memories and considerable renown. As a result, England's struggle over constitutional reform is still a somewhat familiar tale.[9] The new administration of Charles Grey, the second earl Grey, wrestled for months with the many difficult issues raised by parliamentary reform before Lord John Russell introduced the Reform Bill in the House of Commons on March 1, 1831. A single-vote margin of victory on the bill's second reading foretold trouble, and its first defeat in the Commons came less than two months later. Determined to take the issue of reform to the electorate, Lord Grey had the king dissolve Parliament and then fought a general election with all the earmarks of a referendum. Given a chance to express their opinion, the nation's voters supported electoral reform unequivocally. The return of Grey's reformist Whig government with an overwhelming majority in the Commons permitted easy passage of the reintroduced Reform Bill through the lower house in the summer of 1831. But a reformist majority in the Commons could not prevent fatal opposition in the House of Lords. Defeat of the resurrected Reform Bill by the Lords in September provoked riots in several large cities and widespread fears (or hopes) of revolution. A slightly altered Reform Bill began a third journey through

Accession of George III (Cambridge, 1976); John Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform, 1640–1832* (Cambridge, 1972); Ian R. Christie, *Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: Reflections on the British Avoidance of Revolution* (Oxford, 1984); James Bradley, *Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism: Nonconformity in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1990); John A. Phillips, *Electoral Behavior in Unreformed England: Plumpers, Splitters, and Straights* (Princeton, N.J., 1982); Frank O'Gorman, *Voters, Patrons, and Parties: The Unreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian England, 1734–1832* (Oxford, 1989).

[7] Although drawing any sharp analytical distinction between pre-modern and modern behavior remains impossible, we define modern political behavior broadly, as being shaped by allegiance to parties, grounded in national as well as local issues, and characterized by rational debate. During the Reform Era, parties raised national issues, appealed to broad political principles, and provoked rational debate. Because such elements were largely missing from eighteenth-century English politics, and were present after the reform, we see the reform as a major modernizing influence on English politics. In addition to Rogers, *Whigs and Cities*, see Jones, *Britain in the First Age of Party*; John A. Phillips, *The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs: English Electoral Behaviour, 1818–1841* (Oxford, 1992); Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); and Alex Inkeles, *Exploring Individual Modernity* (New York, 1983).

[8] We agree with Angus Hawkins, who notes that the reform "redrew the lines of political configuration and, to that extent, was a watershed," but we take the "watershed" argument considerably further. Our evidence does not permit us to consider his contention that "the 1870s saw the formation of parties different in nature, because different in their essential constitutional function, from the parties of the 1830s," but it suggests that the popular role of England's political parties did not change radically after the Second Reform Act. Hawkins, " 'Parliamentary Government' and Victorian Political Parties, c.1830–c. 1880," *English Historical Review*, 104 (1989): 638–39.

[9] See, for example, Michael Brock, *The Great Reform Act* (London, 1973); and Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform, 1640–1832.*

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Parliament in December, only to suffer defeat again in the Lords the following May, creating a crisis of even more ominous proportions than the one weathered during the riotous days of the previous October. The king's reluctant threat to pack the House of Lords with enough supporters to ensure the bill's passage finally forced the issue to a successful conclusion, and the Reform Bill became the Reform Act with the king's unhappy assent, *in absentia*, on June 7, 1832.

But the familiar, stirring events of 1831–1832 are not the focus here; we seek to understand the impact of the reform, however and at whatever price achieved. Many of the basic aspects of the political system both before and after the reform have been known for some time. Long before the reform, an extraordinary number of Englishmen participated in politics by voting for members of Parliament. No fewer than 203 boroughs and all 40 counties sent representatives to the House of Commons. England's uniform county franchise gave nearly all males in possession of freehold property a vote, but only rarely did a contested election give county electors more than a theoretical voice. Thus most of the approximately 200,000 men who held the county franchise in 1831 did so only nominally. Towns, by contrast, experienced contested elections more frequently, although many borough electors also held only hypothetical franchises.[10] Extremely diverse and often very restrictive franchise requirements resulted in the borough electorate, potential or actual, remaining slightly smaller than its county equivalent, despite the large number of towns with seats in the House of Commons. A few towns permitted virtually every adult male to vote, but most enfranchised some considerably smaller subset, such as the freemen of the town, the inhabitant householders paying poor rates, or the few dozen members of the municipal corporation. The absence of electoral registers and peculiarities of the system such as plural voting create enormous obstacles to measuring the size of the unreformed electorate, but the best-informed estimates suggest that immediately before the Reform Bill more than 400,000 Englishmen held a franchise of some sort. England followed an unusual path in permitting such widespread political participation. Intense disagreement has marked discussions of the meaning of England's elections.[11] But, disagreements aside, and however the numbers are counted or discounted, political participation by masses of voters at general elections held every few years distinguished English politics from other European states during the era that began with the Triennial Act of 1694 and persisted until the reform nearly a century and a half later.

[10] Elections in both counties and towns could be contested without an actual poll of the voters and often remained entirely uncontested. Those elections that were pursued to a poll could last as long as two weeks. See Robert Worthington Smith, "Political Organization and Canvassing: Yorkshire Elections before the Great Reform Bill," *AHR*, 74 (June 1969): 1538–60; and E. A. Smith, "The Election Agent in English Politics, 1734–1782," *English Historical Review*, 84 (1969): 12–35.

[11] In what he himself calls a postmodernist reading of popular politics, James Vernon argues against the notion of genuine gains for the people of England in nineteenth-century political reforms. In his view, "at the founding moment of English liberty and democracy, it was the closure of democratic political forms, the stifling of radical libertarian tradition, that was most evident." Rather than steps forward, these changes symbolized "a disabling retreat" from the circumstances of the previous century, when "politics . . . were in no way the exclusive domain of the middle classes." Vernon, *Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c. 1815–1867* (Cambridge, 1993), 7, 3. We take the argument in a different direction by asking what the enfranchised, whoever they were, did with their franchises both before and after 1832.

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The Great Reform Act expanded the overall electorate to more than 650,000, a precise number after 1832 because of the imposition of a national system of registration. Enlargement of the electorate accompanied the complete or partial disfranchisement of more than eighty, mostly small, borough constituencies, the granting of representation for the first time to more than forty, mostly large, towns, and the allocation of more MPs to the counties. A new uniform borough franchise added men who occupied premises worth at least £10 per annum to the resident ancient-right voters in towns. The act also added £50 tenants in the counties to the freeholders. The reformed electorate not only outnumbered its predecessor, it also tended to vote more often and in greater proportion.[12]

THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE REFORM excite little controversy. While less agreement exists regarding the reasons for the bill's passage, common ground has been reached about its impact, once enacted. Most modern scholars have emphasized the persistence after 1832 of the worst traits of the old system, such as corrupt constituencies open to the highest bidder, undue influence exercised by local magnates or borough mongers, and generally unprincipled political behavior. The chief architect of the negative view of reform, Norman Gash, was irritated by the hyperbolic excesses of earlier, Whiggish historians and also wanted to diminish the accomplishments of the Whig Party in favor of the achievements of the Tories between 1866 and 1868 under Benjamin Disraeli and the earl of Derby. Gash stressed the failure of the Great Reform Act to deliver on its promises and highlighted many abuses of the unreformed system that survived into Victorian England, arguing finally that "it would be wrong to assume that the political scene in the succeeding generation differed essentially from that of the preceding one." Gash believed that even after 1832, "nearly every constituency had some form of corruption peculiar to itself."[13]

Gash's drastic diminution of the Reform Act soon became the orthodox view; unlike older textbooks, most academic accounts now argue that meaningful reforms were delayed until the Second Reform Act in 1867, or even later.[14] Admittedly, it is easy enough to discover in some places older forms of electioneering that had little to do with political parties, much less political principles. It is also possible to uncover outright corruption after 1832. Yet persistent flaws should not obscure the new political realities that emerged in that year. Not

[12] Considerable variation in electoral turnout continued to exist, but the system after 1832 contained both more men who were qualified to vote and more who actually voted. See Derek Beales, "The Electorate before and after 1832: The Right to Vote and the Opportunity," *Parliamentary History*, 11 (1992): 139–50; and the reply by O'Gorman, "Electorate before and after 1832," 171–83. For a full account of the registration process that created the new, larger electorate, see John Prest, *Politics in the Age of Cobden* (London, 1977).

[13] Norman Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation, 1830–1850* (London, 1953), xii, xi. See also Gash, *Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics, 1832–1852* (Oxford, 1965).

[14] Alan Beattie, *English Party Politics: 1660–1906* (London, 1970); Kenneth Wald, *Crosses on the Ballot: Patterns of British Voter Alignment since 1885* (Princeton, N.J., 1983); Edgar J. Feuchtwanger, *Disraeli, Democracy, and the Tory Party: Conservative Leadership and Organization after the Second Reform Bill* (Oxford, 1968); and John P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London, 1962), argue against the appearance of party voting as an electoral norm until the 1880s.

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mistaking form for substance, this analysis uses new data and techniques to create an improved perspective that reveals the reform's fundamental reorientation of English politics. After 1832, political principle defined in national terms by the parties at Westminster took the place of the local, factional, and idiosyncratic concerns that had dominated England's unreformed political system.

We also take issue with many of those who have questioned the significance of the reform by stressing the positive aspects of England's unreformed electoral system. Although most historians have accepted Gash's negative evaluation of post-reform politics, many have objected to his uncritical acceptance of older views of the unreformed electoral system as hopelessly corrupt and entirely devoid of meaning. Attacking the unreformed political system was a popular nineteenth-century academic pastime. Joseph Grego, the Porritts, and others painted a riveting picture of unrelieved corruption and venality in eighteenth-century electoral politics. Even Lewis Namier inadvertently reinforced negative images of the old order by dismissing both party politics and ideology from the halls of Westminster in his account of England in 1760.[15] Gash simply accepted these views of the *ancien régime*'s deficiencies when he rejected the then equally traditional view that the Reform Act rescued England from the horrors of the old system.

Subsequent assessments of the old order, however, have overturned the Grego-Porritt-Namier line and have rescued the voters of the long eighteenth century from the "enormous condescension of posterity."[16] These rescuers have identified much electoral vitality prior to 1832 and have shown that "even in the middle decades of the eighteenth century . . . [i]n the vast majority of constituencies, electoral life was never closed." Rather than finding a system containing only a "corrupt, narrow, and servile" electorate, the rescuers have argued that "the quality of political relationships in the constituencies was public, participatory, and partisan."[17] Such correctives have generated a more accurate picture of politics under the earlier Hanoverians; the unreformed system has long been unfairly maligned. A surprising degree of popular political activity flourished in many constituencies during the eighteenth century. The closing decades of that century, in particular, occasionally witnessed strenuous electoral battles based on political principle and a notable revival of partisan activity, albeit unpredictably and in fits and starts.[18] Nevertheless, this "old vitality" should not obscure the profound changes wrought either intentionally or unintentionally by the Reform Act, just as Gash's identification of persistent flaws should not lead us to underestimate its impact.[19]

[15] Joseph Grego, *A History of Parliamentary Election and Electioneering* (London, 1892); Edward Porritt and Annie G. Porritt, *The Unreformed House of Commons* (Cambridge, 1909); Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2d edn. (London, 1957).

[16] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), xx.

[17] O'Gorman, "Electorate before and after 1832," 172. See also O'Gorman, *Voters, Patrons, and Parties*; Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics*; Donald E. Ginter, ed., *Whig Organization in the General Election of 1790: Selections from the Blair Adam Papers* (Berkeley, Calif., 1967); Harry T. Dickinson, *Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1977); and Phillips, *Electoral Behavior in Unreformed England*.

[18] John A. Phillips, "Popular Politics in Unreformed England," *Journal of Modern History*, 52 (1980): 599–625. See also John Money, *Experience and Identity: Birmingham and the West Midlands, 1760–1800* (Montreal, 1977).

[19] John Derry, "The Old Vitality," *Times Literary Supplement*, October 30, 1992.

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Although both the negative reassessment of reformed England and the positive reassessment of the unreformed system have tended to downplay the 1832 reform, those, notably Gash, who emphasized the negative view achieved a more widespread and lasting impact. While the positive revisionists have restored some of the old regime's lost integrity, their limited success has not noticeably altered the generally negative view of 1832, particularly as reinforced by D. C. Moore, who extended Gash's analysis and apparently strengthened it by adding a rudimentary quantitative base.[20] Forty years later, interpretations continue to reflect Gash's view. Frank O'Gorman, for example, has argued that "to make undue claims for the Reform Act of 1832 entirely neglects . . . fundamental characteristics of political and electoral fluctuations between the first two Reform Acts."[21] James Vernon dismisses "the supposedly Great Reform Act of 1832," arguing instead that the political parties in Westminster were widely rejected in the nation in favor of local, idiosyncratic leaders, symbols, and loyalties. A strong proponent of the continuity-across-1832 school, Vernon provides an array of qualitative evidence of local political behavior to support his belief that "it is not . . . surprising to find the appeal of the eighteenth-century creed of electoral 'Independency' persisting well into the second half of the nineteenth century."[22]

Gary Cox's comprehensive analysis of the development of a "party-oriented electorate" between 1857 and 1868 is perhaps the clearest statement of the now prevailing view. While Cox does not attempt to render 1832 irrelevant and does present a far more nuanced assessment than others, he locates the critical change in the electoral system much later in the nineteenth century.[23] One of Cox's main weapons in the assault on the importance of the reform is the degree of "split voting" in the electorate from 1818 to 1880. Split voting was a peculiarity of the English system prior to 1885; most voters could divide their support between competing parties, since voters in the two-member constituencies that accounted for three-quarters of even the reformed Parliament's MPs had two votes to use in filling two seats.[24] The double-vote system permitted four distinct responses. The most obvious and politically defensible possibilities were either two votes for the two candidates of one party or a single vote (a partisan "plump") if one party fielded a solitary candidate and thus required partisan voters to discard their second votes. Alternatively, voters could either "split" by casting one vote for one

[20] David C. Moore, *The Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-Nineteenth Century English Political System* (Hassocks, 1976), 162–67; Patrick Joyce, *Work, Society, and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England* (Brighton, 1980), 210–11; and Colin E. Brent, "The Immediate Impact of the Second Reform Act on a Southern County Town: Voting Patterns in Lewes Borough in 1865 and 1868," *Southern History*, 2 (1980): 129–78. John R. Fisher has questioned Moore's conclusions in "Issues and Influence: Two By-Elections in South Nottinghamshire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *Historical Journal*, 24 (1981): 155–63; and "The Limits of Deference: Agricultural Communities in a Mid-Nineteenth Century Election Campaign," *Journal of British Studies*, 11 (1981): 90–105. See also Edwin Jaggard, "Cornwall Politics, 1826–1832: Another Face of Reform," *Journal of British Studies*, 22 (1983): 80–97.

[21] O'Gorman, "Electorate before and after 1832," 183.


[22] Vernon, *Politics and the People*, 99, 163–64.

[23] Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England* (Cambridge, 1987).

[24] Only 53 constituencies, most of them created in 1832, returned a single MP, while another 8 returned 3 or 4 MPs. The rest were double-member constituencies, hence the utility of split voting as a general indicator of partisanship.

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Figure 1
Percentage of Split Voting in Parliamentary Elections, 1818–1880: Cox's Complete Aggregate View



SOURCE: Cox Parliamentary Election Data, 1818–1880. See note 26.

candidate of each of the two parties or cast only one vote, a non-partisan "plump," despite the availability of two candidates for a particular party. Cox measured changes in the levels of "splitting" and to a lesser extent partisan "plumping," in order to evaluate the nature of partisanship in the electorate and the relationship between MPs and constituents.[25]

Figure 1, based on Cox's data, displays the average percentage of split votes at 896 separate contested elections in 198 constituencies involving some 2.9 million individual votes between 1818 and 1880. The Great Reform Act appears to have had little effect at all. Indeed, Figure 1 seems to identify a dual decline in the proportion of the electorate splitting their votes, the first beginning in 1818 and reaching its nadir in 1841, the second beginning in 1847 and ending in 1886. The first decline, which began well before the Great Reform Act, might be discounted as spasmodic and temporary.[26] In contrast, the second decline reveals to Cox

[25] Cox, *Efficient Secret*, 91–112.

[26] Gary Cox kindly provided us with his data on aggregate parliamentary election returns between 1832 and 1880 (hereafter cited as Cox Parliamentary Election Data), to which we made two minor adjustments. First, we calculated the proportion of split voting at each election using counts of votes

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TABLE 1
Levels of Split Voting in Parliamentary Elections, 1832–1880

Elections (*N* = 896)	*Level of Split Voting*		
	Low (%)	*Moderate* (%)	*High* (%)
Split Voting			
Mean	6.2	24.2	48.5
s	4.4	6.2	9.2
Share of Total	66.9	23.5	9.6
Votes			
1832–1865 (N = 1.4)	70.7	21.5	7.8
1832–1880 (N = 2.9)	83.0	12.9	4.1

SOURCE: Cox Parliamentary Election Data. See note 26.

meaningful change because it indicates "a permanent and large reduction in the split voting rate in the period 1857–68" that persisted for the remainder of the century.[27] Cox echoes Gash in suggesting that the Second Reform Act in 1867 was when the electorate discarded its earlier propensity for split voting and finally acquired genuine partisanship, a major component of a full-fledged party system.

However, Figure 1 seriously distorts post-reform English political reality. Table 1, which reconfigures the same data displayed in Figure 1, suggests the magnitude of that distortion. Based on a cluster analysis of the proportions of split voting in 896 elections, Table 1 reveals that split voting in all constituencies at all elections between 1832 and 1880 clustered around three means.[28] The largest cluster of elections, in which split voting averaged only 6.2 percent, contained fully two-thirds of all contests between 1832 and 1880. In other words, in two-thirds of all English contests after 1832, more than 90 percent of the electors voted a straight-party ticket. Another quarter of all elections after 1832 fell into a group in which split voting centered on a somewhat higher mean of 24.2 percent. This group still contained elections at which most (three-quarters) voters gave their

cast for all candidates rather than the often inaccurate contemporary reports. Hence, our Figure 1 looks slightly different than the one in *The Efficient Secret* (fig. 9.1, p. 104). Second, we adjusted partisan totals in elections between 1847 to 1852 to reflect the presence of Peelites. Contemporaneous political considerations affect any assessment of split voting after the collapse of the Tory Party in 1846, because an overly rigid definition of split voting would ignore contemporary political realities. When, for example, 42 percent of Liverpool voters in 1847 doubled for Edward Cardwell, a Tory, and Sir T. B. Birch, a Whig, they had not lost their political senses. This "split" vote by strictly party definitions was in our view a partisan vote, since Cardwell was a Peelite and therefore the most sensible candidate to be paired with the Whig against the two *genuine* Tory protectionists who also stood for Liverpool's seats. Cox omitted cases such as Liverpool in 1847 from his analysis. By contrast, we counted the hard cases because in our view the confusing fifteen years following the repeal of the Corn Laws may have created difficulties for these voters that bar easy analysis, but the system survived the challenge. Votes can be measured accordingly. See John B. Conacher, *The Peelites and the Party System, 1846–52* (Newton Abbot, 1972).

[27] Cox, *Efficient Secret*, 92.

[28] This grouping accounts for 86 percent of the variation in split voting across all 896 elections after 1832 in all 198 constituencies ($\eta^2 = 0.86$).

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support exclusively to one party or the other. With two-thirds of the elections characterized by minimal split voting (6.2 percent) and another quarter exhibiting only moderate splitting (24.2 percent), fewer than 10 percent of all elections across these fifty years exhibited truly high levels of split voting.[29] This last, very small, group of elections clustered on a mean of 48.5 percent.

Looked at another way, Table 1 suggests that the probability of voters in any constituency at any time after 1832 casting overwhelmingly partisan votes (and thus appearing in the low cluster) was about 2 in 3.[30] The likelihood of voters in any constituency at any time casting a moderate proportion of splits was about 1 in 4. Finally, and commensurately, the odds of voters anywhere casting high levels of splits was less than 1 in 10 for the entire period. Of course, the political experiences of specific constituencies varied, but the purpose of Table 1 as well as the remainder of our argument is to identify the central tendency rather than to highlight idiosyncratic experiences, however interesting. From the perspective of winning and losing elections, it may well be true that all politics are local. Yet from the larger perspective of how the system then worked, what was common about these local political events is more interesting than what was unique. And Table 1 indicates unmistakably that, idiosyncrasies aside, a shared experience dominated elections after 1832, an experience that has been invisible heretofore at least in part because of the tendency of historians to focus on the unique.

If we examine votes, and by implication, voters, rather than constituencies, a similar pattern emerges.[31] A shared experience again shines through the confusing fog of local circumstances. Table 1 shows that 83 percent of the 2.9 million votes cast at elections between 1832 and 1880 were partisan rather than nonpartisan, that is to say, not splits. If we limit the analysis to the years between 1832 and 1865, and thus eliminate any impact of the expansion of the electorate after the Second Reform Act, still fully 70.7 percent of all voters were partisans. Therefore, at most elections, in most constituencies after the reform, partisanship was the norm.[32] This could not be said about England before 1832. Reform had undoubtedly generated a new central tendency among the electorate: partisan-

[29] Most of the constituencies that ever contributed to the small group of elections with "high" levels of split voting did so only once or twice. Of the 198 constituencies in the sample, only 7 experienced three or four elections with high levels of split voting. The only 7 constituencies where split voting was not rare (though still uncommon) were Bury-St.-Edmunds, Lincoln, Macclesfield, Oldham, Shrewsbury, Sunderland, and Windsor. Oldham was one of the 5 towns Vernon examined in *Politics and the People*.


[30] The aggregate figures are for elections contested to the point of a poll. It is important to note, however, that between 1832 and 1847 fewer than half of the seats in Parliament were actually filled by polling the voters. These figures are based on a non-random sample of approximately 50 percent of all constituencies and elections; those constituencies who never polled their voters are not included. Cox contends, and we agree, that while the sample is not random, it is "broadly representative of the target population, all regions of the country having substantial representation in each yearly subsample." Cox, *Efficient Secret*, 98.

[31] The only general attempt to make sense of voting behavior over the nineteenth century using individual-level data is John R. Vincent's pioneering *Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted* (Cambridge, 1967).

[32] Interestingly enough, a relatively strong positive correlation ($r_s = 0.32$) exists between constituencies with high split-voting elections and the number of elections experienced altogether. At the same time, a negative correlation exists ($r_s = -0.21$) between the number of elections and low levels of split voting. These correlations suggest that the more elections constituencies had after 1832, the greater their chance of encountering substantial splitting in the electorate. This stands to reason since contested elections were just that, contested, and by definition brought with them a greater

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Figure 2
Percentage of Split Voting in Parliamentary Elections, 1832–1880: Most Elections



SOURCE: Cox Parliamentary Election Data, 1818–1880. See note 26.

ship. In this way, the reformed English electorate began to resemble other modern electorates despite the remaining stumbling block created by the persistence of the double-vote and two-member constituencies until 1885.[33]

The aggregate picture of the behavior of England's electorate after 1832 is of neither instability nor steadily declining split voting as Figure 1 suggests but rather of consistently low levels of split voting and widespread partisanship. Therefore, to visualize the behavior of most voters, at most elections, in most places after 1832, Figure 2 is a far more accurate guide. The nineteenth century here looks quite different from the two-pronged pattern of variation and decline in Figure 1, even though both accurately represent election results. The issue is how best to measure the behavior of *most* voters. By simply plotting the average level of split voting at the two-thirds of all elections contained in the low cluster reported in

chance of circumstances that might lead to a high level of splitting. The more opportunities electors were given to deviate from the norm, the more they did deviate.

[33] Twenty-four double-member constituencies actually survived the reforms of 1885, but that number pales in contrast to the 193 that survived 1832 and the 163 that survived the reform of 1867. J. P. D. Dunbabin, "Some Implications of the 1885 British Shift towards Single-Member Constituencies," *English Historical Review,* 109 (1994): 89–100.

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TABLE 2
Number of Electors and Elections, Phillips-Wetherell Sample, By Borough, 1761–1868

	Eighteenth Century 1761–1802		*Nineteenth Century 1818–1868*		*Totals 1761–1868*	
Borough	*Voters N*	*Elections N*	*Voters N*	*Elections N*	*Voters N*	*Elections N*
Beverley			2,780	10	3,021	10
Bristol	1,651	2	4,083	7	5,734	9
Colchester	1,253	3	442	7	1,695	10
Hull	1,468	3			1,468	3
Lewes	571	4	1,849	6	2,420	10
Liverpool	1,768	3			1,768	3
Maidstone	2,374	8	633	9	3,007	17
Newcastle	1,365	2			1,365	2
Northampton	2,612	5	1,162	9	3,774	14
Norwich	8,435	7			8,435	7
Shrewsbury			2,648	7	2,648	7
Southampton	731	2			731	2
Yarmouth			1,404	9	1,404	9
Totals						
N	22,228	39	15,001	64	37,229	103
%	59.7	37.9	40.3	62.1		

Table 1, Figure 2 demonstrates that the preponderant pattern of electoral behavior after 1832 was uniform, stable, and partisan, attributes not captured by Figure 1.

Yet this improved perspective leaves the period immediately before 1832 murky and the period before 1818 entirely invisible. A broader view is essential, but the kind of aggregate data available from reformed England simply does not exist for the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Therefore, this research taps individual pollbooks for comparable data to augment the sketchy aggregate figures available before 1832 and extend our view, albeit with gaps, back to the accession of George III in 1760. Collectively, these data, summarized in Table 2, permit a comparative perspective that makes abundantly clear the electoral instability of the old regime. Figure 3 displays the degree of split voting among 37,229 individual electors who cast 73,640 ballots in 103 elections in 13 boroughs from 1760 to 1841, along with Cox's aggregate data for 1818 to 1880.[34] It also

[34] We have used most of the data, hereafter cited as Phillips and Wetherell Parliamentary Pollbook Data, in other analyses of electoral behavior. See Phillips, *Electoral Behavior in Unreformed England*; *Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs*; John A. Phillips and Charles Wetherell, "The Great Reform Bill of 1832 and the Rise of Partisanship," *Journal of Modern History*, 63 (1991): 621–46; "Event History Analysis and English Electoral Behavior," in Joseph Smetts, ed., *History and Computing V* (Montpellier, 1992), 537–53; "Probability and Political Behavior: A Case Study of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835," *History and Computing*, 5 (1993): 135–53; and "Parliamentary Parties and Municipal Politics: 1835 and the Party System," in John A. Phillips, ed., *Computing Parliamentary History: George III to Victoria* (Edinburgh, 1994), 48–85.

New are the eighteenth-century materials for Bristol, Colchester, Hull, Liverpool, Newcastle, and Southampton, collected in conjunction with James Bradley, who used it in *Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism*, and the Beverley data (1860–1868), which William A. Speck provided. We excluded all by-elections, except the one in Beverley in 1860, because only two candidates stood for a single seat, and split voting was impossible. Prior to the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872,

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adjusts the perspective of Figures 1 and 2 by reporting the percentages on a scale of 100.

Two aspects of Figure 3 warrant note. The first is the relatively low level of split voting across the entire period after 1818 as measured by Cox's full sample. The absolute level of split voting displayed in Figure 1, with its maximum scale value of 30 percent, appears substantially diminished when reported on a scale that indicates the relative contribution of split voting. The already obvious differences between the patterns of Figures 1 and 2 stand out even more boldly since Figure 2 also reports results on a scale of 0–30. The second notable feature of Figure 3 is the extreme and also persistent decline in the level of split voting measured with individual-level data (the solid line), a decline that begins following the election of 1830 and continues until the individual-level data available for analysis are exhausted in 1841. The individual-level data could hardly indicate a more severe shift in behavior than the one indicated in 1831–1832. Splitting began a plunge after 1830 that coincided precisely with the massive mobilization of interest in the reform during 1831. The reduction after 1830 in the degree of individually measured split voting is so extreme that the solid line representing individual voters merges in Figure 3 with the broken line indicating the level of split voting at most elections, that is, the two-thirds of the elections in which the mean was 6.2 percent (Table 1).


The unquestionably higher degree of variation present before 1832, in sharp contrast to the period afterward, reveals the major change in electoral behavior wrought by the general politicization of the electorate that accompanied the introduction and passage of the Great Reform Bill. Split voting prior to the reform could easily exceed 65 percent (as it did in Lewes in 1790), but splitting could also

pollbooks recorded each voter's name, address, occupation, voting status, and, of course, votes, which allows voters to be linked across elections. See John Cannon, "Poll Books," *History*, 47 (1962): 166–69; Vincent, *Pollbooks*; John A. Phillips, "Poll Books and English Electoral Behavior," in John Sims, ed., *A Handlist of British Parliamentary Poll Books* (Leicester, 1984), i–xx; and Jeremy Gibson and Colin Rogers, *Poll Books, c1696–1872: A Directory of Holdings to Great Britain* (Birmingham, 1989). By creating composite, or panel, records containing all available information about each voter (constrained only by the number of elections in which he participated), one can analyze voting behavior at specific elections, across pairs of elections, and over each voter's entire electoral life. Such reconstructed electoral "lives," however, represent minimums. In the data covering the period from 1818 to 1841, for example, a voter recorded only in 1818 or 1826 could conceivably have been voting since 1790. Similarly, a single appearance in 1841 could represent the start of an equally long electoral life not visible because the data end in 1841. In this sense, then, the data are chronologically "left-censored" at 1818 and "right-censored" at 1841, but this constitutes no undue systematic bias. Although nominal record linkage continues to be a subject of discussion in longitudinal studies that rely on different classes of evidence, it now constitutes a well-established methodology in electoral research. For more a detailed explanation, see Phillips and Wetherell, "Probability and Political Behavior."

The pollbooks, all from boroughs, do not constitute a random sample, but they are exhaustive. No one else, to our knowledge, has linked individual-level data from pollbooks across elections. Moreover, the boroughs contained in the sample were all politically active and relatively open during the years before 1832 and are thus likely to reflect the most politically sophisticated behavior in England at the time. Any change in behavior in boroughs before 1832 and behavior in the country at large after 1832 almost certainly *understates* the change in the nation as a whole. England's county constituencies are entirely missing from the analysis of individual-level pollbooks both before and after the Reform Act. Counties cannot be included in a study of individual-level behavior across time because county constituencies virtually never contested a series of elections prior to 1832, and county pollbooks usually pose insurmountable obstacles to the positive identification of individual voters from election to election even in the period after 1832, when county contests were less rare.

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Figure 3
Percentage of Split Voting in Parliamentary Elections, 1761–1880: Composite View



SOURCES: Cox Parliamentary Election Data, 1818–1880; Phillips and Wetherell Parliamentary Pollbook Data, 1761–1868. See notes 26 and 34.

drop as low as 3 percent (as it did in Norwich in 1802).[35] In other words, extreme variation in split voting characterized unreformed England. Of course, some greater degree of variation is almost inevitable when individual-level data (in this case, voters, not boroughs) are used, and aggregate data are likely to reduce actual variation.[36] Even so, these figures contain a sufficient measurement of individual-level behavior both before and after 1832 to refute the common assumptions

[35] Measurements of split voting encounter idiosyncratic circumstances in the eighteenth century that sometimes impede unequivocal interpretation more severely than most measurements after 1832. Measured by the parliamentary parties, Lewes voters in 1780 and 1790 cast a large proportion of split votes, but, measured from the perspective of a local coalition of politically different candidates, far less splitting is evident. Maidstone, too, poses interpretational problems. One of the candidates in 1774 and 1780 can be justifiably labeled an Independent, a decision greatly affecting a measurement of the degree of split voting. In each case, the parliamentary parties have been used as the standard for partisan behavior. Phillips, *Electoral Behavior in Unreformed England*, 136–67, 323–26.

[36] For a discussion of variation in aggregate and individual-level data in general, see Daniel Scott Smith, "A Mean and Random Past: The Implications of Variance in History," *Historical Methods*, 17 (1984): 141–48. For other rare examples of individual-level analysis, see Jeremy C. Mitchell and James Cornford, "The Political Demography of Cambridge, 1832–68," *Albion*, 9 (1977): 242–72; and Michael Drake, "The Mid-Victorian Voter," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 1 (1971): 473–90.

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concerning the minimal impact of the reform on England's political system. Moreover, the behavior of so many individual voters in so many elections between 1761 and 1841 also strongly reinforces the conclusions that can be drawn from the more detailed examination of the aggregate view contained in Table 1 and Figure 2. Split voting declined precipitously and permanently, not in the decade prior to the Second Reform Act in 1867 but during the heated national debate over reform in 1831–1832. In sum, from the perspectives permitted both by the aggregate data from 1818 to 1880 and from individual-level data for constituencies from 1761 to 1841, it is evident that the proposed Whig reforms of 1830–1831 and their implementation in 1832 affected English electoral politics far more profoundly than historians have previously recognized.[37]

Figure 3 dramatically illustrates the impact of the reform, but a complete demonstration of the changes accompanying the reform requires a much more inclusive and robust analysis. Though powerfully suggestive, the preceding revision does not establish unequivocally the degree to which the reform served as a political watershed. Cross-sectional analyses of split voting, whether based on aggregate or individual-level returns, are simply inadequate for the task. While we can see the tendency of all voters to behave in a more politically coherent fashion at single elections after 1830, what individual voters did across elections is not evident from these figures. Even worse, increased political coherence at single elections may well have been unrelated to political behavior over the longer term. Partisan behavior at one election did not guarantee partisan behavior at subsequent elections; partisan behavior at one election does not mean partisan loyalty over time.

Analysts of twentieth-century elections have been much concerned with "floating" voters, who support a given party at one election and then shift to another party at the next. Measurements of split voting ignore the critical question of "floating" and long-term party loyalty. Only longitudinal, individual-level analyses can reveal the impact of the reform on the behavior of the electorate. In doing so, they reveal the changing nature of popular political reality in Victorian England. By changing the focus of the measurement to the longer term, we can demonstrate that, beginning with the reform, the great bulk of the electorate who cast partisan ballots remained loyal to their party choice for their entire electoral lives. Rather than just winning voters' short-term support, the reform permitted England's political parties to win long-term allegiance. Thus the reform modernized English electoral behavior by instituting not just partisanship at specific elections but partisan loyalty over the long term.

[37] Phillips concluded, for example, from the evidence of Great Yarmouth's voters at a by-election of 1848 that the changes of the 1830s may not have survived the 1840s. That conclusion was simply wrong; the changes wrought in 1831–1832 did last, despite everything that might have permitted a reversion to older patterns of behavior among the politically active. Great Yarmouth's voters were as much of an aberration in the reformed environment of 1848 as they were in the unreformed environment of 1818. Indeed, the greatest strength of this research is its widely inclusive evidentiary base; rather than drawing conclusions from examples such as Yarmouth, it measures the central tendency across England. Phillips, *Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs*, 300–01. In this broader analysis, Yarmouth appeared in the low cluster in Table 1 eight out of nine times and in the high cluster only once. In fact, Yarmouth's later nineteenth-century behavior mirrored its earlier, highly partisan pattern with only one exception.

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ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES underlying Cox's analysis of aggregate election returns, as well as our analysis of individual voting behavior, is the belief that political consistency is a critical measure of the stability and coherence of any electoral system. An example of the widely held contemporaneous perception of political consistency as a cardinal virtue appeared in the *Bristol Gazette*'s defense of Lord John Russell in 1835. Attempting to counter Conservative glee over Russell's defeat for Devonshire at the preceding general election, the *Gazette* reminded readers that Sir Robert Peel also had once been defeated in his bid for a seat in the Commons, "but unlike Lord John, Sir Robert carried with him the odium of having changed his principles and deserted his former line of conduct. The latter has preserved his consistency and his honour, and though defeated is not disgraced."[38] Partisan consistency provides an essential guideline for an assessment of any political system because consistency, both at one election and over time, was the norm (and still is, of course) among the politically aware. One did not change one's principles; one did not change one's party. Apostasy was a bad thing. Treason has always been a dirty word. How well unreformed and reformed political behavior matched this ideal, therefore, provides the critical indication of the impact of the Great Reform Act itself.

It is possible to infer individual consistency from low aggregate levels of split voting. Yet this is both logically and historically problematic because split voting is simply too low a standard of proof. Above all, it completely disregards the 60, 70, or even 80 percent of the electorate who did not split their votes but who may not have behaved consistently across elections, either. In addition, low levels of split voting could sometimes, possibly even frequently, be achieved through some form of corruption. Most damning, split voting could be eliminated at specific elections without creating reliable partisans. Voters could behave "properly" at one election, either in return for money or in response to a temporarily achieved unity, without becoming committed partisans. Split voting is not necessarily incompatible with partisan disloyalty; voters who stopped splitting could always switch sides from election to election, with equally dire consequences for the parties. In short, switching parties or "floating" is as antithetical to partisanship as splitting. Demonstrating the virtual elimination of splitting at particular elections does not demonstrate a decline in the arguably more important behavior, floating.

Consistent political behavior requires embracing a vision of how things should be and why. It requires principles and a will to act. Since the ritual of electoral politics remained largely unchanged through the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century (as Gash and O'Gorman have demonstrated) while electoral behavior changed radically, a powerful influence must be sought. That influence seems to have been the new view of principle and principled behavior that the parties in Westminster imposed on local politics after 1832. So many other electioneering influences remained unchanged across this entire period that, virtually by default, ideas, issues, and principles take center stage in this explanation.[39] Is it plausible that corruption suddenly had a different effect on

[38] *Bristol Gazette*, May 13, 1835.

[39] On the enhanced role of party in the nation after 1832, see Phillips, *Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs*, *passim*.

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voters in constituency after constituency across England after 1832? We think not; there certainly is no evidence suggesting that this might have been the case. Is it plausible that after 1832 other forms of undue influence began working for political consistency instead of against it? We think not; again because there is no evidence to support such a claim. We turn instead to the new focus on political principle by the parties and, above all, to their focus on political consistency. The editor of the *Bristol Gazette* did precisely that when he criticized Peel and appealed to the electorate for consistent behavior on the basis of the divergent principles articulated by the two national parties. The voters responded accordingly. Of course, evidence of behavior cannot *prove* that the voters believed in political consistency as fervently as the Bristol editor and the national parties wanted them to, but the voting choices of individuals over sequences of elections both before and after the reform strongly suggests that they did. Long-term political consistency after the reform stood in sharp contrast to the general electoral inconsistency common before 1832; and, under the circumstances, no explanation seems as plausible as party-induced principle.

The extreme increases in consistency that set reformed England apart only appeared with the intense debate over parliamentary reform in 1831 and the new focus on major political choices that the two major parties offered to the electorate. The Reform Act itself then further enhanced partisan loyalty across England, and with this partisanship came even greater consistency. Reform infused elections with a new sense of principle, and the electorate responded with a new degree of inter-election partisan loyalty, most voters following one party vote with another at successive elections. The Great Reform Bill fostered a Manichean political vision among England's rank-and-file voters, and this analysis of voting behavior rests on both the starkly defined choice facing the electorate and the expectation that, once made, the choice should be permanent. As their votes reveal, it was. The behavior of tens of thousands of voters seems to us incontestable evidence of the modernizing effects of Whig reforms, as new notions of the politics of principle and the politics of party crushed the older ideas, held by most Tories and some Whigs, of correct and natural political behavior based on place in society, property, and connections.

Electoral consistency after 1832 was achieved to some extent by the party organizations that suddenly existed in almost every constituency virtually year-round. Before the reform, effective political party organizations often had either not existed in many constituencies or had existed only sporadically for the purpose of fighting the ordinarily infrequent, parliamentary general elections. After the reform, the constant need to find potential supporters who were qualified to vote, to ensure their registration, to defend their registration against challenges by the other party, and to challenge the other party's attempts to register its own potential supporters meant that parties became permanent fixtures in constituencies, large and small. The expanded registration process introduced by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 gave the parties in many boroughs another constant series of tasks to perform.[40]

[40] Phillips and Wetherell, "Parliamentary Parties and Municipal Politics," 55–68.

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Of course, the parliamentary parties were hardly monolithic in the immediate aftermath of 1832. Whigs and Tories often cooperated in the 1830s to withstand pressures from extremists within their own parties or maverick coalitions.[41] Even though he headed a Whig government, Lord Melbourne often found Peel's Tory politics more compatible than those of his fellow Whig, Henry Brougham, first Lord Brougham and Vaux, not to mention Radicals such as J. A. Roebuck or Daniel O'Connell. It is equally evident that the parliamentary parties suffered from an instability and fluidity for some time after 1846 that made it difficult for anyone to know exactly where everyone stood on all issues. But provincial politicians, accustomed to using the very broadest brushes available, either whitewashed or blackened with tar the parties in local debates. What may have been only a Liberal coalition in Westminster in the 1830s looked like a Radical juggernaut to most provincial observers, pro or con. Melbourne knew that he was no Radical; Melbourne's friends knew that he was no Radical. But William Clement, a Radical reformer in Shrewsbury, did not know it; he simply failed to realize that Melbourne was not on his side on many issues. Clement did not even understand that R. A. Slaney, the MP for whom he had campaigned for years, was no Radical. Shrewsbury's Conservatives also tarred every one of their opponents with the same brush rather than making even obvious, occasionally glaring, distinctions. To them, and flying in the face of fact, Slaney was simply a "Destructive," indistinguishable from the rest of the scalawags who were not Conservatives (though even in provincial eyes O'Connell was by far the worst of a bad lot).[42] Fortunately, then, the nuances that make the parliamentary history of this period so complicated need not hinder greatly an assessment of political consistency in the provinces.[43] Ignorance may be bliss, but it is also unifying.

Increased political consistency, at least in part due to greater partisan clarity, distinguished the England that contained a surprising degree of popular political vitality well before the Great Reform Bill from the one that followed its passage. Widespread popular participation prior to the reform should not be allowed to obscure the existence of a very different system after 1832. Some voters in the late eighteenth century began to behave with more political consistency, and this consistency proliferated after 1780. Substantial numbers of voters were won to partisanship in some constituencies by debates over major political issues such as war and peace in the third decade of George III's reign. Discovering that they were Whigs or Tories, voters found their party loyalties enhanced at successive elections by a variety of issues, and they behaved accordingly. But however

[41] The most compelling argument about the nature of cross-party cooperation is Ian Newbould's *Whiggery and Reform, 1830–41: The Politics of Government* (Stanford, Calif., 1990), *passim*. See also Richard Brent, "New Whigs in Old Bottles," *Parliamentary History*, 11 (1992): 151–56.

[42] See Phillips, *Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs*, 150–57; and the *Salopian Journal*, December 30, 1835, and January 6, 1836.

[43] The debate on the nature of parliamentary politics in the Reform Era has seldom been more heated or more interesting. See, for example, Ellis Archer Wasson, *Whig Renaissance: Lord Althorp and the Whig Party, 1782–1845* (New York, 1987); Richard Brent, *Liberal Anglican Politics: Whiggery, Religion, and Reform, 1830–1841* (Oxford, 1987); Peter Mandler, *Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform: Whigs and Liberals, 1830–1852* (Oxford, 1990); Boyd Hilton, *The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795–1865* (Oxford, 1988); and Newbould, *Whiggery and Reform*.

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politically engaged some voters may have been in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, electoral behavior took a sharp turn in the 1830s. It did not happen in every place in the same way, at the same time, or in the same order of magnitude, but it did happen; on this point, there is no mistake. The partisan improvements evident in many places during the reigns of Georges III and IV (1760–1830) were left in the dust by the rapid and often extreme changes during the short reign of William IV (1830–1837).

The fundamental change in 1832 has been invisible because historians have not been able to ask questions about individual political choices over time. It is rare enough for historians to examine individual choices at one election systematically. Even rarer are analyses across elections; hence the failure to see what the reform actually did to the electorate. Comparisons of specific voting choices from one election to the next reveal a steep rise in partisanship after 1832. Longitudinal analyses of individual electoral choices for various constituencies from 1761 to 1868 confirm this view, and in no uncertain terms.

Matthew Ebrey, for example, a lathecleaver who lived in Castle Foregate, Shrewsbury, voted Whig in 1819, split his vote in 1826, and then began to vote for Conservative candidates in 1830, remaining loyal year in and year out for the rest of his parliamentary voting history. After the agitation caused by the debate over the Reform Bill in 1831, many other men matched Ebrey's party loyalty, even though some showed more complicated behavior. Comparing Ebrey's voting behavior at pairs of elections captures his propensity to vote Conservative after 1830, but it reflects neither the length of that propensity nor its relationship to the other political decisions that he made on occasion. Cross-sectional or pairs analyses cannot capture long and potentially complicated voting experiences. If instead Ebrey and all of his fellow voters are perceived as having one or more voting propensities or habits, whether partisan or non-partisan, of different durations, it is possible to assess the risk, or hazard, of changing habits (or propensities), a view analogous to the risk of dying.[44] The results of such a view are striking and exceptionally revealing. They also help counter the cautions of both J. P. D. Dunbabin, who once noted that 1868 is "probably about as far back as we can safely employ modern psephological techniques," and Derek Beales, who argued that "the imponderables" of nineteenth-century politics "are too great for statistical analyses."[45] Both cautions are important, but both go too far. With care,

[44] Survival and event-history methods, drawn from demography, where a driving concern is life expectancy and the principal analytical tool is the life table, and biostatistics, where a main focus is survival under different treatments and the analytical tools are survival and hazard functions, provide a wide variety of methods to analyze change over time. Historians have employed event-history methods sparingly, and almost exclusively in demographic research. See, for example, George Alter, *Family and the Female Life Course: The Women of Verviers, Belgium, 1849–1880* (Madison, Wis., 1988). In our analyses, we excluded eighteenth-century boroughs with fewer than four elections. The length of time between elections prohibited efforts to link voters across elections in Bristol, Colchester, Hull, Liverpool, Newcastle, and Southampton. Fully 65.7 percent of the 8,236 voters in these six boroughs voted only once; only 6.6 percent voted three times. Thus, although we were forced to exclude 8,236 (or 22.1 percent) of 37,229 cases, we still had the electoral histories of 29,234 men with 42,648 separate electoral propensities. For a more detailed explanation of the method, see Phillips and Wetherell, "Probability and Political Behavior."

[45] J. P. D. Dunbabin, "Parliamentary Elections in Great Britain, 1868–1900," *English Historical Review*, 81 (1966): 83; and Beales, "Electorate before and after 1832," 140.

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TABLE 3
Hazard Rates of Changing Voting Tendencies, By Period, 1761–1868

	Hazard Rates			
Time in Elections	*1761–1802*	*1818–1831*	*1832–1841*	*1860–1868*
1	0.45	0.41	0.18	0.19
2	0.41	0.29	0.10	0.08
N	21,701	9,221	8,760	2,786
Period	*Probabilities That Hazard Functions Are Significantly Different*			
1761–1802	—	0.54	0.00	0.00
1818–1831		—	0.00	0.00
1832–1841			—	0.84

SOURCE: Phillips and Wetherell Parliamentary Pollbook Data. See note 34.
NOTE: N indicates the number of voting propensities, not individual voters.

it is possible to use surviving evidence in ways that reveal what otherwise has remained invisible.

Table 3 displays the risks, or hazards (which can be read as simple probabilities), of switching partisan propensities after one and after two elections among 29,234 voters in nine boroughs between 1761 and 1868. One peculiar thing about hazard rates when used for an assessment of voting behavior should be noted. While they may range from 0 to 1, the number indicating the greatest inconsistency is neither 0 nor 1 but 0.50. A hazard rate of 0 would mean that every single voter remained in a given propensity. Conversely, a hazard rate of 1 would indicate a completely predictable electorate, in the sense that every voter would do something different at the next opportunity. A Tory, Whig, or splitter would inevitably change his propensity, whatever it was, at the next election. In this scenario, voters might not be politically consistent, but their behavior would be completely predictable. A hazard rate of 0.50, on the other hand, means that the probability of repeating a vote is exactly 50 percent, or random. A propensity begun might be continued, but it might just as easily be terminated. The odds are even.

Table 3 demonstrates that eighteenth-century electors behaved with notable randomness. After a single experience, the odds of a voter's changing his propensity were practically even (0.45). After a second experience, the odds of a voter changing his propensity had declined only slightly to 4 in 10. This strong behavioral pattern illustrates an electorate obviously in the sway neither of the church, nor of political parties, nor of any other persistently unifying influence. Apostasy was commonplace in the eighteenth century despite the increasingly partisan environments of many constituencies during the reign of George III. Partisanship might be won in the short run, but it did not last.

Voters at unreformed elections in the nineteenth century also tended to behave almost randomly after a single voting experience (0.41). Even after two voting experiences, the likelihood of changing propensities remained high, approximately 1 in 3. Prior to 1832, a man who voted in a particular way in parliamentary elections was only marginally more likely to duplicate that choice at the next

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election instead of casting a different kind of vote. Matthew Ebrey had much company in his early voting instability. A formal comparison of the behavior of voters in the eighteenth century with those of the unreformed nineteenth reveals what common sense would suggest, the differences in the hazard functions (that is, from the first to the last election experienced by the group) are not statistically different ($p = 0.54$). There is not much to choose between the behavior of the two groups of voters; political diversity rather than political consistency remained the norm as late as the reign of George IV.

In stark contrast, during the decade after 1832, the act of voting for most men was tantamount to declaring a permanent political commitment. The odds were less than 2 in 10 that a party voter would ever deviate from his initial political stance. Put another way, a single party vote after 1832 had a far greater effect in reducing the chances of a voter ever deviating from his party than two (or even three) party votes in the eighteenth century. And a single party vote after 1832 also had a greater effect than party votes between 1818 and 1831. Two voting experiences after 1832 reduced the chances of an elector ever choosing a different partisan course to merely 1 in 10. Though it hardly needs to be said, the behavior of voters between 1832 and 1841 differed significantly from both eighteenth-century and unreformed nineteenth-century voters when measured formally ($p < .00$). And while hazard rates for the 1832 cohort of voters were quite unlike those of their predecessors in either the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, the behavior of the 1832 cohort matched almost exactly the behavior of voters in the one late nineteenth-century town for which we have evidence, Beverley.

Gash believed that the reformed system exhibited little floating because "too many other forms of control" exerted pressures on the electorate.[46] If this were the case, however, floating should have characterized both the unreformed and reformed systems, given what we now know about the persistence of corruption after 1832 and the persistence of older electioneering practices well into the middle decades of the nineteenth century.[47] What Gash failed to recognize was that a system in which "many other forms of control" existed actually encouraged floating. At any given point, an elector might be vulnerable to one influence more than another, resulting in inconsistent behavior at the polls. Table 3 provides strong evidence that just such a system existed prior to reform and, more critically, that it died in 1832. Reform eliminated floating by substituting party loyalty for the congeries of influences that had existed before.

The alteration is clear enough at the level of all voters, but an even sharper delineation is created by refining the focus of the analysis to the three kinds of possible behaviors—voting Tory, voting Whig, or split voting.[48] Table 4 divides the

[46] Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel*, xix.

[47] Frank O'Gorman, "Comparing Rituals and Ceremonies: The Social Meaning of Elections in England, 1780–1860," *Past and Present*, 135 (1992): 79–115.

[48] The evidence of a profound change obvious when measuring all voters is corroborated by a similar comparison with almost identical results of three specific towns for which individual-level data exist in each of the three periods under review. Lewes, Maidstone, and Northampton happen to represent the three major unreformed borough types, although it is impossible to claim for them anything like representativeness. Lewes contained voters who qualified prior to 1832 through the ownership of property and the payment of taxes (scot and lot). Maidstone permitted all freemen of

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TABLE 4
Hazard Rates of Changing Voting Propensities, By Period and Vote, 1761–1841

Period	*Time in Elections*	*Hazard Rates*		
		Tories	*Whigs*	*Splitters*
1761–1802	1	0.40	0.38	0.62
	2	0.35	0.38	0.57
	N	8,701	7,107	5,893
1818–1831	1	0.39	0.26	0.63
	2	0.13	0.18	0.88
	N	3,319	3,012	2,890
1832–1841	1	0.10	0.13	0.60
	2	0.04	0.06	0.81
	N	3,904	3,591	1,265
1860–1868	1	0.11	0.21	0.51
	2	0.04	0.15	—
	N	1,394	1,155	237

SOURCE: Phillips and Wetherell Parliamentary Pollbook Data. See note 34.
NOTE: N indicates the number of voting propensities, not individual voters.

electorate into two sets of partisans and those who split their support between the parties. In the eighteenth century, those who chose a party initially were only marginally more likely to remain partisans over their voting careers than all voters; moreover, nothing distinguished Tories from Whigs. Hazard rates uniformly above 0.35 (or odds greater than 1 in 3) suggest that voters did not develop very strong partisan loyalties after voting experiences within partisan camps. For most of the electorate, voting was from the start a virtually random process that continued to be random even after a considerable time in the electorate. Splitters, of course, were always at most risk, and they were unlikely to behave in this politically schizophrenic fashion repeatedly. Most were won back to a partisan stance, although that stance was not likely to persist for long.

Measured in this more detailed fashion, the votes cast between 1818 and 1831 can be distinguished from those cast in the eighteenth century. Some measurable, albeit limited, change had begun prior to the reform. Casting a single Tory vote after 1818 rendered a voter no more likely than it had in the eighteenth century to cast another, but a single Whig vote after 1818 considerably reduced the likelihood of a voter's departure from that propensity (0.26). More notably, two votes cast for either party after 1818 substantially reduced the probability of a shift in parties afterward (Tory = 0.13, Whig = 0.18). As expected, splitters were always likely to switch to party voting, at least once, but after 1818, two consecutive splits resulted in an almost certain change (0.88) to partisanship. This increase in the probability that splitters would become partisans after 1818 reinforces the impression created by the greatly enhanced loyalty among voters who had cast two

the town to vote, before reform imposed a standard franchise. Northampton permitted virtually every adult male to vote except those receiving poor relief. In other ways, the three boroughs seem neither particularly normal nor particularly unusual. They reflect in microcosm what Table 3 suggests in macrocosm: 1832 transformed the nature of England's popular political experience.

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votes for either party during those years. Even so, after 1832, partisan behavior changed precipitately. Measured as a whole (Table 3), voters after 1832 stood less than a 20 percent chance of deviating from their initial voting choice at the next election. As Table 4 demonstrates, an initial Whig or Tory vote locked electors into virtually lifelong patterns. The chances of an initial Tory voter ever changing his party stood at only 10 percent; the likelihood of a Whig changing stood only marginally higher at 13 percent. Following the reform, random political behavior rapidly became a memory of another time. Voters after 1832 behaved much like the voters of Beverley a generation later, although the Liberals in Beverley in the 1860s seem to have shared the difficulties encountered by the Liberal Party nationally. In fact, the *only* similarity between reformed voting patterns and votes cast in the eighteenth century or earlier nineteenth century existed among the politically uncommitted. After the reform, much as before, splitters remained at great risk of a switch to a party vote at subsequent elections, although their numbers dwindled in succeeding elections.


Such a clear behavioral change on the part of so many of England's electors greatly reinforces the considerable qualitative evidence that suggests the powerfully politicizing impact of the Great Reform Act.[49] But the quantitative evidence alone that indicates such profound discontinuity between the pre and post-reform era cannot easily be reconciled with arguments for an essential continuity across 1832. The emergence with the reform of individual consistency, defined here as the best measure of genuine partisanship, argues compellingly for an electorate falling into a modern mold. But if doubts linger about the critical differences between the half-centuries on either side of 1832 even after the preceding demonstrations, Figure 4 presents another view that should alleviate them. It displays the cumulative proportions of voters persisting in electoral propensities through four elections for each of the four periods we have examined. In the eighteenth century, less than a quarter of the voters (24 percent) maintained a propensity for four elections. In the decade before the reform, that figure rose to slightly less than 40 percent; but, looked at from the other perspective, the majority of voters changed their propensities over four elections. The real change followed 1832, when individual electoral persistence essentially reversed the patterns of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Between 1832 and 1841, more than 70 percent of all voters maintained their electoral habits through four elections. Revealingly, the post-1832 pattern is virtually identical to that found in Beverley much later in the century; more than three-quarters of Beverley's voters persisted in the same propensity through the three elections we have studied. Voters before 1832 simply did not persist in their voting habits; voters after 1832 did.

We believe that the most plausible explanation for the new partisan persistence after 1832 was the introduction of modern political practices with the Reform Acts, notably parliamentary parties fighting national campaigns in terms of principle. National party platforms replaced local partisan or non-partisan concerns. More than merely a formal acceptance of reform as "a final and irrevocable settlement," Peel's "Tamworth Manifesto" of December 1834 recog-

[49] Phillips, *Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs*, *passim*.

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Figure 4
Cumulative Proportions Surviving in Electoral Propensities in Parliamentary Elections, 1761–1868



SOURCE: Phillips and Wetherell Parliamentary Pollbook Data, 1761–1868. See note 34.

nized, in the face of an impending general election, the new political reality imposed by the reform. Not simply "the first general exposition of Conservative principles," Tamworth reflected the new world of popular politics that had been created by the reform.[50] Tamworth was nothing less than a set of clear principles that voters could support or reject, a Tory admission of the need to have more than just vague "declarations of general principle" before the nation. Peel applied Tory principle "to some of the questions which have of late attracted the greater share of public interest and attention," so that the voters would know exactly what Tory principle meant in practice.[51]

The voters of Tamworth did not need Peel to tell them where he stood; they knew where he stood. They had returned him without opposition in 1832 and were prepared to do so again. Nor did Peel write the manifesto himself; the whole

[50] Ironically, Gash recognized the overwhelming importance of Tamworth and traced to it the birth of both the Conservative and Liberal parties. Norman Gash, "From the Origins to Sir Robert Peel," in Lord Butler, ed., *The Conservatives: A History from Their Origins to 1965* (London, 1977), 64.

[51] Norman Gash, ed., *The Age of Peel* (New York, 1968), 77. Peel went on to discuss in some detail municipal corporations, Dissenters, the pension list, and church reform. See also Richard W. Davis, "Toryism to Tamworth: The Triumph of Reform, 1827–1835," *Albion*, 12 (1980): 132–46.

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Cabinet contributed to this document for the people.[52] But the Cabinet writing it and the people reading it (both activities entirely counter to Peel's own deep personal aversion to popular interference in government) gave a very different tone to the whole political process. Now politics would relate more directly to questions of policy; now policy would revolve around great questions of principle; now principle could be considered by the political nation. Electioneering might continue in the form of the old system but without its substance, or, rather, without its lack of substance. Voters were asked to decide, and they did; they rejected Peel's principles and brought back a majority for reformers in January 1835 that forced Peel from office in April.

In a way, then, Figure 4 illustrates the death of localized politics and the birth of modern party voting. That death was captured rhetorically three years after Tamworth when John Wilson Croker complained to Peel that the problem with new Parliaments was "that there were no neutral or individual men." Croker reminded Peel that he had predicted often enough in 1832 that "the Reform Bill must tend to a system of delegation and dependence" among members of Parliament, but even Croker acknowledged "that no one ever expected to see it so soon, and so marked, as that there should not be one unpledged member in the new House."[53] The Commons had changed because the voters had changed. The voters had changed because the parties had changed. The parties had changed because 1832 reshaped the political foundations of the electoral process, far more than its architects had ever intended or expected.

The duke of Wellington recognized early the dramatically altered political landscape that the reform had produced. Writing to Croker, his fellow Tory, in 1833, Wellington noted that "[t]he mischief of the reform is that whereas democracy prevailed heretofore only in some places, it now prevails everywhere."[54] The rescuers of England's old order have reminded us of the accuracy of the first part of Wellington's comment: the unreformed system did contain places in which popular participation constituted a significant part of the political process. Our account has demonstrated the truth of the second part of Wellington's vision. The reform set in motion a new system not by its extension of the franchise, its elimination of "rotten boroughs," or most of its other intended improvements. The reform reshaped the political landscape unintentionally; it introduced a new political system by accidentally altering the relationship between elections, voters, and the parliamentary parties. Voters began generally to respond to party cues taken directly from debates and events in Westminster. Local affairs, even those of long standing, gave way to national issues and a politics of principle so powerful that it dominated the first Council elections of 1835, when party fervor and loyalty overcame the most complex and confusing elections ever staged

[52] Michael Bentley, *Politics without Democracy: Great Britain, 1815–1914; Perception and Preoccupation in British Government* (London, 1984), 98.

[53] John Wilson Croker to Sir Robert Peel, August 15, 1837, Croker, *The Croker Papers, 1808–1857*, Louis J. Jennings, ed., 3 vols. (London, 1885), 2: 317–19. Of course, this is just one man's opinion, and that of an onlooker, Croker having given up his Commons seat. Brougham argued at the same time, though certainly no more reliably, that the new MPs were *not* "thick and thin [party] men." Parry, *Rise and Fall of Liberal Government*, 99.

[54] Duke of Wellington to Croker, March 6, 1833, *The Croker Papers*, 2: 205–07.

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in England.[55] The Great Reform Act of 1832 was not "the logical outcome of the existing party system"; it was instead the foundation of a new party system that may have lasted longer than Victoria herself.[56]

THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS has identified the central tendency in English electoral behavior after 1832; voters became consistent partisans. Because this partisanship followed the new articulation of principle by the political parties in both national and local arenas, historians now face the task of discovering the relationships between stated principles, voter responses, and actual policy. Establishing cause and effect plausibly is difficult enough for historians under the best of circumstances, but the problems now are, paradoxically, both compounded and ameliorated by the need to examine interactions. And the key to the puzzle may be time itself, because longitudinal analysis can illuminate interactions that in turn clarify causation. A model of the political system that simultaneously considered individual electoral behavior, constituency behavior, and legislative behavior might begin to explain more clearly how the reformed political system actually worked. Longstanding confusion over the bewildering party developments of the 1840s, especially the repeal of the Corn Laws, might yield ground to such an approach.

More than two decades ago, W. O. Aydelotte tried to find a relationship between constituency interest and legislative behavior in the Parliament of 1841, which first openly confronted the question of whether England should continue to enforce the protectionist Corn Laws or embrace free-trade policies. Aydelotte found no clear links other than that counties tended to return Conservatives and large boroughs tended to return Liberals. He reluctantly concluded that, despite these general relationships, an MP's party affiliation was not closely related to his electoral success. Nor could an MP's voting record, even on specific measures such as the Corn Laws, political reform, or religion, be linked to whether he won or lost at the hustings. Since Aydelotte's tests yielded "almost entirely negative" results, few others ventured down the same path.[57] Most subsequent accounts have accepted Aydelotte's results or confirmed in other ways that an MP's behavior had little or nothing to do with the objective economic conditions of his constituency.[58] The nearly total absence of identifiable socioeconomic differences in the partisan segments of the electorate also supported Aydelotte's conclusions. Voters in post-reform England typically seem not to have recognized "class" except in a purely descriptive sense; individually or in the aggregate, voters in parliamentary elections did not normally vote in ways that can be related to socioeconomic status.[59] In such an environment, it is difficult to imagine MPs behaving

[55] Phillips and Wetherell, "Parliamentary Parties and Municipal Politics"; and "Probability and Political Behavior."

[56] O'Gorman, "Party Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century," 84.

[57] William O. Aydelotte, "Constituency Influence on the British House of Commons, 1841–1847," in Aydelotte, ed., *The History of Parliamentary Behavior* (Princeton, N.J., 1977), 244.

[58] For an earlier view, see George S. R. Kitson-Clark, "The Electorate and the Repeal of the Corn Laws," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, vol. 1 (London, 1951): 109–26.

[59] For some of the high points of the discussions, see Vincent, *Pollbooks*; Moore, *Politics of Deference*;

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differently.[60] If their constituents' votes were hardly influenced, much less determined, by economic considerations, why should the MPs' have been?

Moreover, difficulties in assessing the economic impact of the Corn Laws, even now, would appear to doom any attempt to measure the *actual* economic interests of any individual or constituency. Separating perception from reality would be too difficult. If Aydelotte failed to detect a relationship, then surely none existed. Yet questions of the sort Aydelotte asked have been recently asked again and answered very differently. Far more robust analytical techniques have uncovered evidence of the influence of electoral and economic changes in the composition of constituencies on the votes of MPs in the 1840s.[61] Distinct electoral and economic shifts in some constituencies after 1832 on occasion appear to have led electorates to reject MPs who backed protectionist policies in favor of MPs who endorsed free trade. The impact of constituents' economic interests on their MPs was simply hidden from Aydelotte's view by the complexity of the problem and the difficulties encountered in measuring the relationships. Aydelotte believed that "there has been much testimony to the growing strength of popular opinion after the reform legislation of 1832," but only now has it been possible to demonstrate the effect of that growing strength.[62] The critical difference between the old and new analysis, however, is not technique but rather perspective (although technique was important in permitting the new perspective). The new analysis assumes a longitudinal perspective that reveals changes Aydelotte could not see from his limited, cross-sectional view.

Recasting questions such as those Aydelotte posed in light of a politically modernized and partisan electorate responding to principles and possessing a vision of its future thus seems especially promising. Modernized voters have ideas about the proper ends of policy; they fight about means and ends at the hustings. They often lose, but they continue the struggle, over the long term if necessary, in order to achieve a result. Their positions remain the same if the issues do not change. Analyses of older structural conditions in light of newly focused voters might, therefore, be expected to fail, as Aydelotte's failed. If, instead, historians look at changing and future conditions over time in light of policies supported by the voters, genuine advances in understanding might be possible because time would allow historians to capture the dynamics of change. The development and character of nineteenth-century English political life could then be explained with new analytical vigor and inclusiveness.

Joyce, *Work, Society, and Politics*; P. F. Clarke, "The Electoral Sociology of Modern Britain," *History*, 57 (1972): 31–55; Craig Calhoun, *The Question of Class Struggle: Social Foundations of Popular Radicalism during the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago, 1982); and Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (Cambridge, 1983).

[60] The issue of class voting has been debated repeatedly, particularly as one moves toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. For additional examples, see Thomas J. Nossiter, *Influence, Opinion, and Political Idioms in Reformed England: Case Studies from the North-East, 1832–74* (New York, 1975); and J. P. D. Dunbabin, "British Elections in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century. a Regional Approach," *English Historical Review*, 95 (1980): 241–67.

[61] Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, "Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behavior: The Role of District Economic and Electoral Composition in the Repeal of the Corn Laws," in Phillips, *Computing Parliamentary History*, 86–118.

[62] Aydelotte, "Constituency Influence," 225–26.

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Review Article

Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History

RUSSELL A. KAZAL

ON WHAT TERMS have immigrants and their descendants come to live in the United States? For years, popular and scholarly discussion of this question revolved around the notion of "assimilation." The word, sometimes used interchangeably with "Americanization," implied that immigrants, especially European ones, would acquire what were defined as American ways. In an era of multiculturalism, however, "assimilation" has taken on an almost archaic ring. When diversity is a watchword, nothing seems so wrongheaded as identifying an American norm, let alone bringing all Americans into line with it. Assimilation in the sense of recasting newcomers in a uniform American mold remains out of fashion with historians and the general public alike.

But the scholarly concept of assimilation was never quite that simple. Over this century, discerning how immigrants assimilated to American society, sociologists and historians found, required a more nuanced portrait of that society. To know how newcomers came to fit in, one had to understand what it was they were fitting into. This developing understanding of assimilation, which reached its high-water mark in the early 1960s, came to see the process as occurring within a society made up of groups clustered around an Anglo-American core. Scholars disagreed on the type and degree of assimilation bringing immigrant ethnic groups together, or closer to the core. But, they agreed, such processes were at work.

When the notion of an Anglo-American core collapsed amid the turmoil of the 1960s, assimilation lost its allure, and students of European immigration retreated to a focus on one of the building blocks of the earlier accounts: the ethnic group. Social historians, in particular, tended to stress the persistence of such groups and, correspondingly, to neglect, deny, or minimize assimilation's role in eroding them. In narrowing their focus, these scholars also tended to lose sight of the larger society within which both ethnic groups and assimilatory processes fit. Historian David Gerber's comment that much of social history "concentrated on groups in isolation from one another, . . . or in conflict" had special resonance for

For their careful reading and critical comments, I would like to thank Deborah Gesensway, David Goldston, Kathryn Johnson, Michael Katz, Ewa Morawska, Catherine Gilbert Murdock, Liam Riordan, Andrew Walker, two anonymous readers for the *AHR*, and especially Gary Gerstle, whose advice and encouragement made this article possible. James M. Bergquist generously responded, on short notice, to a historiographic query. An earlier version of this essay was presented at a University of Pennsylvania graduate workshop of the Program for Assessing and Revitalizing the Social Sciences, funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

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immigration studies: "It was easy to get the notion . . . that our history is the story of vaguely related groups which inhabit the same space, fail to communicate, and often get in one another's way."[1]

The concept of an unchanging, monolithic, Anglo-American cultural core is dead. Shorn of that Anglo-conformist assumption, however, assimilation in recent years has drawn renewed scholarly interest. Since the early 1980s, historians in three distinct subspecialties have returned to looking at relations among European ethnic groups within a larger American society and, in turn, to processes of homogenization that have brought groups, or their members, together on common ground. The first group of historians, a circle of scholars of ethnicity, has proposed ways of understanding American society as one with room both for a multitude of ethnicities and for processes affecting them—including assimilation between groups. The second group, made up of labor historians exploring the rise of twentieth-century industrial unionism, in effect has described a kind of assimilation: the formation of a more unified working class out of an ethnically divided work force. Scholars of racial identity—the third group—have begun to trace another kind of trans-ethnic homogenization: the development of a common feeling of "whiteness" among European ethnics during this century and the last. Historians in all three specialties have explored Americanization, examining how newcomers have come to define themselves as "American." Here, something resembling an American "core" ideology has reemerged—but an ideology subject to change and contestation.

This article examines how historians have revisited assimilation—in fact, if not always in name—and places that reappraisal in the context of the history of assimilation as an idea. For by tracing assimilation's historiographical trajectory, we can better understand how recent work takes up issues that surrounded the concept before scholars largely abandoned it in the 1960s. The massiveness of the relevant literature requires that the essay focus on European newcomers and their descendants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but not that it ignore questions of race. Indeed, they are among the most interesting questions being asked by the reappraisers.

In seeking to trace how others have defined assimilation and Americanization, an author should offer his own definitions of those terms. I conceive of assimilation as referring to processes that result in greater homogeneity within a society.[2] Such processes may operate at different levels: among individuals, between groups—whether defined in ethnic, racial, or religious terms—or between groups and a dominant group in the society. They may operate within different arenas, with groups, for example, drawn together in terms of culture, or intermarriage, or shared political institutions, or shared elements of identity, such as class consciousness. And they may operate to varying degrees within and across different arenas.[3]

[1] David A. Gerber, *The Making of an American Pluralism: Buffalo, New York, 1825–60* (Urbana, Ill., 1989), xii.

[2] This is the definition given by Harold J. Abramson, "Assimilation and Pluralism," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Stephan Thernstrom, ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 150.

[3] I draw here on Milton M. Gordon's typology of varieties and degrees of assimilation; Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York, 1964), 69–71.

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This understanding of assimilation becomes more concrete when we consider the experience of European immigrants and their descendants in the United States. Here, the unit of analysis is commonly understood to be the immigrant ethnic group, whether defined as an interest group, a primordially rooted collectivity, or one sharing a sense of peoplehood, to note a few such definitions.[4] Such groups, differentiated by presumed national origin and religion, may themselves be seen as emerging from assimilatory processes of "ethnicization" that merged provincial Old World identities into "nationalities" in the New World.[5] Yet scholars most often have presumed the objects of "assimilation" to be already-formed ethnic groups and their members.[6] Given this background, I find it most useful to define assimilation in the immigrant context as referring to processes that generate homogeneity *beyond* the ethnic-group level. Such processes bring different immigrant ethnic groups, or their members, together in any number of arenas, creating common ground among them, or between them and a socially dominant group.[7] Thus understanding assimilation requires understanding how ethnic groups relate to one another within the larger society.[8]

Such processes of assimilation can occur in any society. "Americanization" is more limited; it implies that one becomes "American," in some sense, by adopting something that sets one off from non-Americans. Assimilation in America

[4] A recent analysis of ethnicity in immigration history discussed below briefly reviews the dominant conceptions, including that of ethnicity as "primordial," growing out of the work of Clifford Geertz and Harold Isaacs, and that of ethnic groups as interest groups, proposed by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer and also discussed below; Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 12 (Fall 1992): 4. The definition of an ethnic group as "a group with a shared feeling of peoplehood," keyed to a perception of a common ancestry and future, is from Gordon, *Assimilation*, 24, 29.

[5] For a recent discussion of ethnicization, see Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 9, 11–16, *passim*. John Higham sees this process of ethnic group formation as a "very successful, intermediate level of assimilation"; Higham, "Integrating America: The Problem of Assimilation in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 1 (Fall 1981): 9.

[6] For example, the classical conceptualization of assimilation, as Ewa Morawska describes it, foresaw "the progressive weakening and ultimate disappearance of the primordial traits and bonds of ethnicity as succeeding generations adopt the general society's unitary system of cultural values and become absorbed into economic, social, and political networks that are blind to ethnicity"; Morawska, "The Sociology and Historiography of Immigration," in *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed. (New York, 1990), 189.

[7] Some scholars would see such homogenizations as potentially creating new "ethnicities" in America, as with the "ethnogenesis" of the Appalachians. Such conceptions appear to rely on broader definitions of ethnicity that place less stress on a shared sense of far-reaching ancestry and more on a sense of common, and perhaps recent, historical origin; see Abramson, "Assimilation and Pluralism," 150–51. Potentially, this type of "ethnicity" could be taken to include most white ethnics understood as European Americans, as Richard D. Alba suggests, or even all Americans, sharing a national identity that, as Philip Gleason argues, "is *not* different in kind" from immigrant ethnic identity; Alba, *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America* (New Haven, Conn., 1990); Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," in Thernstrom, *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, 55 (italics in original). However, when discussing immigrant assimilation, I find such expansive conceptions of ethnicity less analytically useful than a more restrictive one of "ethnic group" as referring to groups with a shared sense of peoplehood tied, in some fashion, to specific Old World ancestries.

[8] That is to say, for any given conception of assimilation, one needs to know the setting: whether society is seen as a constellation of separate ethnic groups, or of groups clustered around a dominant "core" group, or of groups "melting" into larger categories of, for instance, class or race, or even a larger whole. The setting allows one to see the direction and degree of homogenization beyond the ethnic group level—to what, and how far, an individual or a group is assimilating.

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amounts to Americanization if it results in the acquisition of a distinct "American" culture, behavior, or set of values. The reality of such an overall American culture or ideology is hotly disputed. While leaving open whether it exists, I can offer a minimum definition of Americanization as that particular variant of assimilation by which newcomers or their descendants come to identify themselves as "American," however they understand that identity.[9] This version of Americanization can also be considered a form of American nationalism, in which immigrants join the "imagined community," in Benedict Anderson's sense, of Americans.[10]

This article lays out the history of the concept of assimilation beginning in the early twentieth century with the University of Chicago sociologists who formulated such approaches to assimilation as the "race relations cycle" and the disorganization-reorganization axis. Oscar Handlin later carried some of their ideas—and contradictions—into historical writing. His *Boston's Immigrants* showed that city's Irish adjusting to their new home as a group functioning within a pluralistic system, while, in *The Uprooted*, he offered a somewhat contradictory portrayal of Americanization as in part a journey toward individualism.

Then I will explore how scholars from the late 1930s to the early 1960s elaborated a more supple understanding of assimilation. Marcus Lee Hansen signaled a move away from seeing assimilation as a one-way ticket to modernity, suggesting that ethnicity might reemerge among the descendants of immigrants, while Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy helped to anchor assimilation more firmly in a pluralist setting by depicting American society as homogenizing the children of newcomers into separate communities of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Will Herberg used these ideas to argue that three religious melting pots were transmuting their third-generation congregants toward "an idealized 'Anglo-Saxon' model." Milton Gordon discerned a trend toward "structural pluralism," in which the three religious communities, racial minorities, and some ethnic remnants kept separate social networks yet increasingly were adopting Anglo-American cultural patterns.[11] In complicating the notion of assimilation, these scholars progressively qualified it, effectively clearing the way for its downfall. The collapse became visible in *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1963), an analysis of ethnicity in New York City by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. They also saw ethnic groups submerged in religious melting pots—in New York's future. But the future, they suggested, was a long way off. This declaration's historiographical equivalent appeared a year later in Rudolph Vecoli's critique of *The Uprooted*. The

[9] This definition of "Americanization" may include, but is much broader than, the use of the term to refer to coercive programs of forced assimilation aimed by nativists and, eventually, manufacturers at immigrants from the turn of the century through the early 1920s; on the latter use, see Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 39–41. Americanization as an acquired sense of identity with the "American" people bears some resemblance to Gordon's "identificational assimilation"; *Assimilation*, 70–71.

[10] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn. (London, 1991). The convergence suggested here between American nationalism and the adoption of an American identity can be seen, for example, in Gleason's use of "American identity" and "American nationality" interchangeably; "American Identity and Americanization," 31.

[11] Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 34; Gordon, *Assimilation*, 159, 130.

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peasants Vecoli studied, far from being transformed by immigration, used their heritage to adjust to America.

Such affirmations of ethnic persistence presaged the 1960s rise of identity politics and a turn away from assimilation, a turn that is the subject of the article's third section. The "New Social History" of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, particularly its cultural vein, tended to ignore or minimize assimilation. Historians such as Herbert Gutman, John Bodnar, and Paul Buhle instead stressed the strength of separate immigrant, or immigrant working-class, cultures.

Finally, I will explore how, since the early 1980s, historians have edged back toward questions of assimilation. Philip Gleason and John Higham, who stayed with the concept through the 1970s, foreshadowed elements of the new work with analyses of American identity that noted its changing and, at times, fragmented nature. More recently, scholars such as Kathleen Neils Conzen and David Gerber, who make ethnic groups their primary topic of study, have suggested viewing American society as a pluralism of constantly interacting and changing ethnicities. While rejecting the idea of "a hegemonic Anglo-American core culture,"[12] this model still provides room for the waning of particular ethnicities and the acquisition of "American" identities. Labor historians have taken a kind of assimilation seriously in pondering how an ethnically diverse working class gained enough cohesion in the twentieth century to unionize. For Lizabeth Cohen, the key lies in the creation of an "integrated working-class culture"; for James R. Barrett and Gary Gerstle, a major factor is the use ethnic workers made of "Americanist" language to draw themselves together.[13] Another kind of assimilation, the acceptance of European ethnics as "white," is implied by the work of David Roediger, Arnold Hirsch, and others probing the construction of racial identity. The trans-ethnic class consciousness explored by the labor historians seems at odds with the ethnic pluralism depicted by Conzen, Gerber, and others. Work on the rise of the "white" ethnic suggests that those approaches may not recognize sufficiently the role of race in marking boundaries in American life. I would invite these three groups of historians, who have separately revisited assimilation, to take the next step in understanding that process by conversing with one another.[14]

[12] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization"; Higham, "Integrating America"; Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 32.

[13] Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (Cambridge, 1990), 357; James R. Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880–1930," *Journal of American History*, 79 (December 1992): 996–1020; Gary Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914–1960* (Cambridge, 1989).

[14] David R. Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in the United States," in Roediger, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History* (London, 1994), 181–98; Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London, 1991); Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (Cambridge, 1983). My accounting of these three groups of historians as "reappraisers" of assimilation is by no means meant to be exhaustive. Similar trends may be at work among historians who focus on dimensions of experience other than those of class and race, such as gender, sexuality, and religion, to name a few potential arenas for forging trans-ethnic common ground. This article's invitation to dialogue is meant to extend not simply to the three groups I have identified but to all historians who find themselves taking up such questions of assimilation.

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BY THE 1920S, AMERICAN THINKING on assimilation could be characterized broadly in terms of three main stances Americans took toward immigrants. Milton Gordon, writing more than thirty years ago, described these three "central ideological tendencies" as "Anglo-conformity," "the melting pot," and "cultural pluralism." Ideas of Anglo-conformity "demanded the complete renunciation of the immigrant's ancestral culture in favor of the behavior and values of the Anglo-Saxon core group." Melting pot concepts foresaw "a biological merger of the Anglo-Saxon peoples with other immigrant groups and a blending of their respective cultures into a new indigenous American type." Theories of "cultural pluralism" advocated retaining "the communal life and significant portions of the culture of the later immigrant groups" within a common political framework. Although Gordon classed cultural pluralism as a kind of assimilation, many have seen it as an alternative, with the melting pot and Anglo-conformity standing for assimilation as such. The Anglo-conformist and melting pot stances predominated in colonial America and the nineteenth-century United States.[15] Cultural pluralism developed primarily in the twentieth century, elaborated by such intellectuals as Horace Kallen, who proposed an American "democracy of nationalities."[16] Americans have invoked these concepts as descriptions of past or present social reality, as predictions of the future, and as declarations of what they wanted that future to look like.[17]

Against this backdrop of assimilationist thought, sociologists at the University of Chicago developed, in the first four decades of this century, the most influential scholarly theories of how immigrants adjusted to American life. Yet their work remained curiously imprecise in respect to the three stances outlined above. As Stow Persons argues, while the Chicago scholars examined the assimilation of immigrants in America, they did not specify the nature of the society—melting pot, Anglo-centered, or pluralistic—to which immigrants were presumed to assimilate. The contribution of William Isaac Thomas, Robert Ezra Park, and other members of the Chicago School lay instead in several concepts bearing on immigrant adjustment: migration as a process of disorganization and reorganization, the "race relations cycle," symbiosis, and ecological succession. The first three, as Persons outlines in *Ethnic Studies at Chicago* (1987), had their roots in German sociology. German "conflict" theorists saw social order as originating in racial conquest; their ideas and those of Georg Simmel would reemerge at Chicago in the form of a focus on conflict, relationships of subordination, and relations among ethnic groups. Simmel's work and Ferdinand Toennies' theory of

[15] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 85, 86. Gleason notes that the term "assimilation" itself came into general use around 1900; Philip Gleason, "The Odd Couple: Pluralism and Assimilation," in Gleason, *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America* (Baltimore, Md., 1992), 49.

[16] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 86, 137, 140–57. Gordon noted attempts at pluralist models by some nineteenth-century ethnic leaders; 135 n. Kathleen Neils Conzen has explored such efforts among German-American intellectuals, including some who "took the complete step to a principled defense of permanent ethnic diversity"; see Conzen, "German-Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity," in *America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History*, Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., 2 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1985), 1: 141. Horace M. Kallen, "Democracy *versus* the Melting Pot," in *The Nation*, February 18 and 25, 1915; reprinted in Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples* (1924; rpt. edn., New York, 1970), 124; Kallen's quotation is cited in Gordon, *Assimilation*, 142.

[17] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 84.

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Gemeinschaft and *Gesellschaft* also formed the basis for a view of human development as a journey from a rural, face-to-face community to an urban, impersonal, and individualistic world.[18]

The theme of emigration as a process by which Old World peasants urbanized in the New World emerged most strongly in W. I. Thomas's and Florian Znaniecki's study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–20). It portrayed peasants in transit from relatively self-sufficient communities regulated by the "half-conscious" social rules of primary, or face-to-face, groups such as the family, to a social order—typified by the city—of greater individualization and individual self-control, based more in "rational co-operation."[19] This transition occurred along an axis of "disorganization" and "reorganization." In Poland, peasant communities had undergone "disorganization" as contacts with outsiders, migration to cities, and upward mobility eroded "the influence of existing social rules of behavior" on individual primary-group members.[20] The authors focused in particular on the peasant family. Traditionally, this institution included not just the "marriage-group" of husband, wife, and children but also blood relatives and in-laws to a certain degree: a "family group" knit together by a web of obligation, assistance, and control. Disorganization spelled the isolation of the marriage-group and an individualization whereby one counted socially more as oneself than as a family member.[21] A corresponding loss of familial controls encouraged personal "demoralization" in the form of desertion, murder, and juvenile delinquency. In the United States, Polish immigrants facing familial and communal disorganization supplemented what remained of their old primary-group organization with "reflective social activity," in the form of the mutual benefit society and the parish. Thus the journey to America involved not only a shift from "spontaneous" primary-group life to conscious social organization but also "the formation of a new Polish-American society."[22]

The development of this ethnic group in itself counted as a kind of "assimilation," in that the group as a whole was "slowly evolving from Polonism to Americanism," with members "continually acquiring more American attitudes."[23] Yet, ultimately, the very success of such societies in preparing immigrants for American conditions led to their demise, as Thomas wrote in *Old World Traits*

[18] Stow Persons, *Ethnic Studies at Chicago, 1905–45* (Urbana, Ill., 1987), 33–36. I first came to the Chicago sociologists' work on assimilation through Persons' insightful study, and I draw on him in my discussion of disorganization, the race relations cycle, and symbiosis. I have come to differ with him on some points in my readings of particular works, however, as is evident in the footnotes below.

[19] William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group*, 5 vols. (Boston, 1918–20), 4: x, vii, viii; 1: 2, 87–90, 72. Martin Bulmer provides a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the writing of *The Polish Peasant* in *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research* (Chicago, 1984), chap. 4.

[20] Thomas and Znaniecki, *Polish Peasant*, 4: x–xi, 13, 178, 74; 1: 98–99, 104–05; 4: 2 (quotation originally in italics).

[21] Thomas and Znaniecki, *Polish Peasant*, 1: 87, 89–96, 102, 98.

[22] Thomas and Znaniecki, *Polish Peasant*, 5: 165–71, xiii, 35–48, 41, 40, xi (quotation originally in italics).

[23] Thomas and Znaniecki, *Polish Peasant*, 5: xi, xvi. My reading of *The Polish Peasant* in this and the preceding paragraph generally concurs with that of Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 46–53. But I find Thomas and Znaniecki somewhat more willing to see the formation of a Polish-American ethnic group as a type of assimilation; compare Persons, 51, 53.

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Transplanted (1921). These groups were "constantly graduating their members into general American life," making group collapse and members' "[a]ssimilation . . . as inevitable as it is desirable."[24] This type of assimilation both involved a harmonizing of immigrant and "American" "attitudes and values" and implied, as Persons argues, "the emancipation of individuals from the uniformities of ethnic group experience."[25]

The "race relations cycle," which comprehended European as well as non-European ethnic groups, was a modified version of the "fundamental social process . . . of interaction" described by Robert Park and Ernest Burgess in their textbook *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921).[26] Interaction, in its "four typical forms" of competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation, brought individuals together into community. Through those processes, the community assumed "the form of a society."[27] One form grew out of another in a discernible progression. In one possible path, for example, contact between individuals or groups would lead to conflict (in which competition became conscious), which in turn created new social situations requiring adjustment through accommodation. The resulting social equilibrium still contained antagonisms, which could only be wholly dissolved through assimilation.[28] Park and Burgess defined assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life."[29]

When Park later recast the interaction process as the race relations cycle, he all

[24] Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller [orig. author, William I. Thomas], *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921), 308. Thomas's authorship of, at the least, the early manuscript of *Old World Traits* has been established; the names of Park and Miller replaced that of Thomas as author of the published book as a result of the sexual scandal that forced Thomas's departure from the Chicago faculty in 1918. Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 54, 54 n, 45–46.

[25] Thomas, *Old World Traits*, 265, 294, 296–97; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 54.

[26] Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2d edn. (Chicago, 1924), 280; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 60, 62. Persons describes the stages of the interaction process, calling it the "interaction cycle," and uses the term "ethnic cycle" for the race relations cycle. However, he notes that Park did not distinguish between "race" and what more recent scholars refer to as European "ethnicity," and that Park tended to identify race with nationality. Persons, 60–62, 82. While Park and Burgess could use the term "ethnic groups," they also cast the "struggles of the minor nationalities for self-determination" as "a phase of racial conflict." *Introduction*, 645, 646. Park elsewhere termed the Jews in Europe a "racial minority" and East European "nationalities" "fragments of the great Slavic race." Robert E. Park, "The Race Relations Cycle in Hawaii," and "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups," in Park, *Race and Culture* (New York, 1950), 194, 217.

[27] Park and Burgess, *Introduction*, 785, 341; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 60.

[28] Park and Burgess, *Introduction*, 507, 575, 509, 664–65. The example here represents one path interaction could take, given the definitions laid down by Park and Burgess. The interaction process as described in the book did not necessarily follow these stages in as clear-cut a fashion as this example implies. Nor did interaction seem to have a required ending in assimilation, although the authors called that stage interaction's "final perfect product." Park and Burgess stated, for example, that contact "inevitably initiates conflict, accommodation, *or* assimilation" (italics mine). Further, competition among individuals or groups might not involve contact, but it became "conscious and personal" in conflict. The stage of conflict, on the other hand, seemed certain to lead at least to that of accommodation; conflict, the authors declared, "invariably issues in a new accommodation." *Introduction*, 736, 507, 574, 575, 665. Persons' account of the interaction process, including his terming it the "interaction cycle," seems to me to imply a more clear-cut succession of stages than Park and Burgess suggested; compare Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 60–62.

[29] Park and Burgess, *Introduction*, 735; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 62.

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but decreed the ultimate inevitability of immigrant assimilation. Writing in 1926 on Asian immigration to the West Coast, he depicted this cycle of "contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation" as "apparently progressive and irreversible."[30] But, eventually, Park seemed to back away from a view of assimilation as preordained. In 1937, he conceded that the cycle could also end in a system of castes or one that included a permanent racial minority.[31] After 1930, he paid increasing attention to the idea of a symbiotic relationship between racial and ethnic groups as a state short of assimilation. In such a relationship, members of "different races and divergent cultures" lived within the same local economy and "in physical contiguity, but in more or less complete moral isolation" from one another.[32]

The concept of ecological succession served to unite elements of the race relations cycle, symbiosis, the disorganization-reorganization axis, and individual assimilation into one spatial framework. Burgess sketched out the idea in the early 1920s. He saw city growth as organized in terms of concentric zones. Traveling away from a central business district, one passed through a deteriorating "zone in transition," holding "immigrant colonies"; a "zone of workingmen's homes," an area of second, and generally second-generation, immigrant settlement; a "residential zone" of middle-class housing; and finally a suburban "commuters' zone." Each zone tended to extend its area by invading its outer neighbor in a process of "succession."[33] Chicago scholars such as Louis Wirth and Paul Frederick Cressey used this model to give assimilation a spatial dimension. In 1938, Cressey described "[i]mmigrant stocks" as following "a regular sequence of settlement" in Chicago that took them from a transitional-zone colony to a series of new districts. As it moved, a group grew less concentrated physically, less united culturally, and more accepting of "American standards of living." The final stage saw a "gradual dispersion through cosmopolitan residential districts," which marked "the disintegration of the group and the absorption of the individuals into the general American population."[34]

The Chicago theorists, as suggested above, did not clearly define the target society to which immigrants assimilated. As Persons points out, Park and Burgess

[30] Robert E. Park, "Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific," in Park, *Race and Culture*, 150, see also 151; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 68–69. Persons terms this article "the first full and explicit application of the interaction cycle theory to problems of race relations"; 68.

[31] Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 88; Park, "Race Relations Cycle in Hawaii," 194–95.

[32] Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 87; Robert E. Park, "Reflections on Communication and Culture," in Park, *Race and Culture*, 48–49. Park stated that symbiosis of this kind, in fact, had been to an extent "the situation of every immigrant people" that had sought a place in the economy of an established society while trying to maintain its own "cultural tradition." Still, he argued in the same article that "[i]nevitably," the immigrant would try to flee such isolation, and his consequent struggle for status would involve a kind of "acculturation" that sounds very much like assimilation. "Reflections on Communication and Culture," 49, 50, 48.

[33] Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago, 1925), 50–51, 56. This discussion draws on Olivier Zunz's account of the evolution of the concept of succession in *The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit, 1880–1920* (Chicago, 1982), 42–45. Zunz, who cites Burgess, Louis Wirth, and Paul Frederick Cressey, notes here that Burgess first defined this model of population succession. Thomas, however, earlier hinted at a type of succession involving immigrant Jews and Poles; Thomas, *Old World Traits*, 203–04, 212.

[34] Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago, 1928); Paul Frederick Cressey, "Population Succession in Chicago: 1898–1930," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44 (July 1938): 61.

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saw assimilation as a process by which groups shared attitudes and forged a common culture—implying a view of American society as a cultural melting pot. But they simultaneously defined assimilation as "the process by which the culture of . . . a country is transmitted to an adopted citizen,"[35] a potentially Anglo-conformist definition. Thomas succumbed to the same fuzziness when he described assimilation both as the "harmonizing" of immigrant and American cultures and as the individual's journey from the ethnic group to the larger society.[36] Park's later emphasis on symbiosis implied he might be open as well to the idea of ethnic groups persisting in a pluralist order, as did his definition in 1930 of "social assimilation" as "political," a process by which an "adopted citizen" acquired "the generally accepted social customs and political ideas and loyalties of a community or country." Yet Park explicitly rejected Kallen's brand of cultural pluralism. In Persons' words, the Chicago sociologists examined how ethnic groups lost their ethnicity by merging with the majority, without examining "the ultimate nature of that majority" and hence assimilation's "cultural content."[37] This presented a problematic legacy to scholars of assimilation, one that would come into full view in the work of Oscar Handlin.

Handlin emerged as a central figure in the school of immigration history that developed in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. His reputation rested on *Boston's Immigrants, 1790–1865: A Study in Acculturation* (1941), a case study, and his synthesis, *The Uprooted* (1951). Both contained a healthy dose of Chicago-style sociology.[38] Together, they displayed that sociology's contradictions, for they offered sometimes diametrically opposed accounts of assimilation.

Boston's Immigrants focused on the adjustment of newcomers, especially the Irish, to life in that nineteenth-century city. "Adjustment" was the book's key word: Handlin traced it in the physical, economic, and cultural realms. The narrative followed a route somewhat similar to the race relations cycle in depicting the Irish as refugees driven to America by economic change and famine who came into cultural conflict with native Bostonians and found a measure of accommodation on the basis of cooperation, "if not . . . social equality."[39] Yet this accommodation stopped short of assimilation. Much like Thomas and Znaniecki's Polish-American immigrants, the Irish in Boston had formed an ethnic group. But

[35] Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 84; Park and Burgess, *Introduction*, 735, 734. Persons argues that *Introduction* "implicitly rejected the expectation of Anglo-Americans that their cultural traits should predominate," at least with children of mixed marriages; Persons, 62; see *Introduction*, 737–38.

[36] Thomas, *Old World Traits*, 265–71, 296–97, 303–08; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 57, 54.

[37] Park, "Reflections on Communication and Culture," 49; Park, "Race Relations Cycle in Hawaii," 194; Robert E. Park, "Assimilation, Social," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds., 15 vols. (New York, 1930–35), 2: 281, 283; Robert E. Park, "Culture and Cultural Trends," in Park, *Race and Culture*, 30–31; Persons, *Ethnic Studies*, 87, 89, 146.

[38] Maldwyn A. Jones notes that in *Boston's Immigrants*, Handlin "took as his model the community studies produced by sociologists in the 1920's and 1930's," including those of Park and his students, as well as the "Middletown" studies of Muncie, Indiana, carried out by Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd. Jones also finds that *The Uprooted* "clearly owed a good deal" to *The Polish Peasant*. Jones, "Oscar Handlin," in *Pastmasters: Some Essays on American Historians*, Marcus Cunliffe and Robin W. Winks, eds. (New York, 1969), 245, 260. Thomas and Znaniecki's book was one of a handful of works Handlin cited by name in the acknowledgments of *The Uprooted*; Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People* (Boston, 1951), 309.

[39] Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, 1790–1865: A Study in Acculturation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), 221.

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unlike such groups as the Germans, the Irish did not melt into what Handlin painted as an Anglo-dominated majority, at least within the nineteenth century. Rather, they assumed a subordinate position in symbiosis with native residents and a constellation of better-assimilated immigrants.[40]

Boston's Immigrants went beyond Chicago ethnic studies by demonstrating that the persistence of the Irish ethnic group was due in part to Boston's "social *milieu*," especially its constricted economy. Flight from Ireland left these peasants bereft of training or capital in a city with little industry. Without opportunities, most were forced into "an unemployed resourceless proletariat" that found a permanent place only when entrepreneurs exploited their labor to bring industrialism to Boston. The resulting poverty encouraged "intemperance, crime, and prostitution"; Handlin did not find a breakdown of the family caused by individualization behind these ills.[41]

If the key word of *Boston's Immigrants* was "adjustment," that of *The Uprooted* was "alienation." *The Uprooted* retained a concern for the environment that immigrants entered, but it added a heavy overlay of disorganization-reorganization theory. The result was some ambiguity as to what constituted Americanization, a term Handlin preferred over "assimilation."[42]

For the Handlin of *The Uprooted*, "the history of immigration is a history of alienation and its consequences." In terms reminiscent of Thomas and Znaniecki, he told of how "the old equilibrium" that had sustained the peasant village and its system of family, marriage, and land fell apart, forcing its inhabitants to leave. Convinced that village ways no longer worked, the peasant began to act as an individual, starting with the journey to America. Once there, the factory cut "him" off from the soil that had "given meaning to his being." In his ghetto home, "the disorganizing pressure of the environment" bred pauperism and gambling; the individual had "grown uncertain as to his own proper role." As with Thomas and Znaniecki, "[r]eorganization would involve first the creation of new means of social action within which the man alone could locate himself." He read an ethnic newspaper or joined a mutual aid association. Such actions, on the one hand, were "steps in his Americanization." On the other, they "added up to . . . [an ethnic] society whole and coherent within the larger American society."[43]

Handlin offered a view of Americanization similar to the account in *The Polish Peasant* of an emerging Polish-American society. The creation of an ethnic group counted as Americanization, since "[b]ecoming an American meant . . . not the simple conformity to a previous pattern, but the adjustment to the needs of a new situation." At the same time, the very individualism that migration induced and that undermined ethnic institutions was in itself the essence of America. Immi-

[40] Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants*, 140, 221. "[T]hough the Irish acquired a secure place in the community," Handlin noted, "they remained distinct as a group." The "economic and physical adjustment" of the Germans, in contrast, "was relatively simple, so that within a short time they shared the ideas of the natives." While all immigrants had an awareness of ethnic group identity, group consciousness among non-Irish newcomers waned over time. Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants*, 221, 140, 156, 213. On assimilationist tendencies among non-Irish immigrant groups, see also 128, 150–53, 162–63, 166, 168–69, 182.

[41] Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants*, vii, 60, 24, 12, 9–10, 60, 124.

[42] See, for example, his uses of "Americanization" and "assimilation"; Handlin, *Uprooted*, 185, 274.

[43] Handlin, *Uprooted*, 4, 24, 9, 12, 61–62, 38, 79, 162, 169, 185.

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grants "were on the way toward being Americans almost before they stepped off the boat, because their own experience of displacement had already introduced them to what was essential in the situation of Americans." Such upheaval was also "in some degree the experience of all modern men." This second kind of Americanization resembled the assimilation Thomas and Znaniecki saw in the individual's flight from the ethnic group. Yet Handlin also argued that whether immigrants belonged in America hinged on the views of others, including many "Anglo-Saxon" citizens who considered ethnics to be outsiders.[44]

Unfortunately, these versions of Americanization tended to conflict with each other and did not entirely jibe with *Boston's Immigrants*. *The Uprooted*, in essence, implied three definitions of Americanization: adjustment to the new country via ethnic group formation, individualization (which was also modernization) and acceptance by "old-stock" Americans. The first two definitions might be reconciled by seeing individualism as following group formation, yet Handlin had peasants becoming individuals with the crossing. Handlin did not use the word "Americanization" when asking whether immigrants belonged in America; but if one takes acceptance as the third definition, it robs the first two of usefulness. Individualization had little to do with the symbiotic "acculturation" described in *Boston's Immigrants*, although Handlin may simply have changed his mind in the decade between the two books. Handlin's concepts of Americanization were inconsistent with each other in ways that echoed the inconsistencies of Chicago theory. Here, as in the work of Thomas and Park, vistas of inevitable individualism, where newcomers faded into an ill-defined America, clashed with views that allowed for symbiosis within a pluralist order. The latter approach, that of *Boston's Immigrants*, would prove more compelling to subsequent scholars.

THE CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION reached its apogee in the 1950s and early 1960s, undergoing an elaboration that, in some ways, proved its undoing. Sociologists and other scholars moved beyond Handlin's approaches to "Americanization," looking past the first two generations of newcomers to see patterns that had eluded him and the Chicago School. The patterns, identified by Marcus Lee Hansen and Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy and analyzed in greater detail by Will Herberg and Milton Gordon, suggested that ethnic consciousness, or a proxy, could reemerge after an assimilatory interlude and that assimilation might mute ethnicity without producing uniformity. In the short term, this work seemed to strengthen a view of American society as tending toward Anglo-conformity. But the twists it built into that tendency ultimately weakened the Anglo-conformist argument. This became evident in the work of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, work echoed in historical writing by Rudolph Vecoli.

The call to move away from seeing assimilation as a one-way process was sounded by Hansen in his 1937 address, "The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant." He introduced what he called "the principle of third generation interest." While the children of immigrants attempted to dispense with foreign

[44] Handlin, *Uprooted*, 186, 200, 305, 263–64, 274–75.

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ways, the next generation harbored a different impulse, expressed in the phrase, "what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember." Accepted as an American, the grandson, proud of his achievements, wondered about his hardy forefathers and began to delve into the history of his ethnic group.[45] Hansen did not see this ethnic consciousness—or, in his words, a common interest in "the heritage of blood"—as enduring. America would prove a melting pot in the long run, since it was "the ultimate fate of any national group to be amalgamated into the composite American race." Nevertheless, he had contributed the suggestion that ethnicity in a cultural sense might reappear as well as disappear.[46]

Within a decade, Kennedy sought to revise the melting pot idea itself. In a 1944 article, "Single or Triple Melting-Pot?" she argued that American ethnic groups appeared to be fusing along religious lines, rather than into one homogeneous mass. Kennedy studied marriage trends in New Haven between 1870 and 1940 and found that while the in-marriage rate among each of seven ethnic groups had fallen, those marrying "out" tended to pick spouses of their own religion. Roman Catholics—Irish, Italians, and Poles—intermarried mostly among themselves, as did New Haven's Protestants, listed as British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians. The city's Jews, too, married within their religion. Kennedy saw these trends as indicating that "assimilation through intermarriage is occurring along three vertical lines—Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant—and not . . . indiscriminately." Hence "future cleavages will be along religious lines rather than along nationality lines," suggesting a "'triple-melting-pot' theory of American assimilation."[47]

Will Herberg merged Kennedy's insights with Hansen's in his reflections on secularism in America, published in 1956 as *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*. Herberg sought to explain how contemporary Americans could display increasing religiosity and still live in "a framework of reality and value remote from the religious beliefs simultaneously professed." He argued that immigrants had always assimilated culturally to an "'Anglo-Saxon' prototype" but had never been expected to change their religion. Immigration restriction in the 1920s set the stage for a gradual decline in ethnic-group consciousness and the third generation's rise for "the great bulk of the immigrant community." That generation, following Hansen's principle, sought a sense of ancestral identity and found a permissible version in "the old ethnic religion." Once religion became "the primary context of self-identification and social location," religious association itself changed, falling into Kennedy's "fundamental tripartite division." "Men were Catholics,

[45] Marcus Lee Hansen, "The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant," Address to the Augustana Historical Society, Rock Island, Illinois, May 15, 1937; reprinted as Augustana College Library Occasional Paper, no. 16, with introductions by Peter Kivisto and Oscar Handlin (Rock Island, Ill., 1987), 15, 13–14, 16–17.

[46] Hansen, "Problem of the Third Generation," 19, 21, 24; Kivisto, introduction to Hansen, "Problem of the Third Generation," 7.

[47] Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870–1940," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49 (January 1944): 331, 332, 339. Kennedy bolstered this article with a follow-up study, "Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage in New Haven, 1870–1950," *American Journal of Sociology*, 58 (July 1952): 56–59. She has had her critics; see, for example, Ceri Peach, "Which Triple Melting Pot? A Re-examination of Ethnic Intermarriage in New Haven, 1900–1950," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 3 (January 1980): 1–16.

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Protestants, or Jews, categories based less on theological than on social distinctions."[48]

Although Herberg saw the religious community becoming "the over-all medium" for expressing ethnic concerns, he also held that each confessional melting pot was casting the same product, a "'new man' . . . along the same 'American' ideal type," that is, the Anglo-Saxon model. Influencing the three religions was the "'common faith' of American society," a "spiritual structure" of ideals and values that Herberg dubbed "the American Way of Life." This underlying faith, "the symbol by which Americans define themselves and establish their unity," took in beliefs in democracy, free enterprise, and a social equalitarianism entwined with high mobility. From the American Way's standpoint, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism were three "expressions of an over-all American religion, standing for essentially the same 'moral ideals' and 'spiritual values.'" In that the three faiths all promoted the American Way,[49] it would seem that Herberg believed they were assimilating their congregants to the Anglo-American model.

Herberg tended to ignore questions of class, and while he noted that the black church "as a segregated division of American Protestantism constitutes an anomaly of considerable importance" in his argument, he failed to account for the anomaly.[50] Both matters were taken up by Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life* (1964). This work laid out a model of American society that, for all its resemblance to Herberg's, was much more sophisticated. Gordon began by defining assimilation systematically. He imagined a hypothetical case of total assimilation, then broke the process down into seven steps, which furnished definitions of different kinds of assimilation. The most important were cultural assimilation, involving a change of cultural patterns to those of the host society; structural assimilation, the "[l]arge-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of [the] host society," on the level of primary interaction; and marital assimilation, or large-scale intermarriage. Structural assimilation was the key variant. The social interaction involved in it would lead inevitably to marital assimilation, which would bring all the other kinds of assimilation in tow.[51]

Cultural assimilation could take place without leading to structural assimilation, however, and this was what was happening in the United States. Gordon portrayed America as a national society holding a series of internally organized "subsocieties," each with a corresponding "subculture." Subsocieties based on ethnicity intersected with those based on social class to create "ethclass" subsocieties. The "core subsociety" was made up of white, middle-class Protestants, with their English-derived "core subculture." For the most part, the children of European immigrants had assimilated culturally to this group. Blacks were right behind, followed by Indians and Latin-American minorities. But Anglo-conformity had not happened structurally, except for early non-English immigrants. Racial, religious,

[48] Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, 14, 35, 40, 42, 43–45.

[49] Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, 47–48, 50, 94–96, 88, 91–92, 101, 96.

[50] Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, 129. One should note that, far from celebrating the American Way of Life, Herberg worried in his last chapter that the three historic faiths had been vitiated by their relation to it, resulting in a religiousness "without serious commitment, without real inner conviction, without genuine existential decision." Herberg, 285, 276.

[51] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 68–70, 71, 81, 80.

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and, to a lesser extent, ethnic groups had retained their own organizational networks, which tended to keep "primary group contacts" of their members "within the ethnic enclave." Lack of structural assimilation to Anglo-America stalled the remaining five kinds of assimilation.[52]

Structurally, then, American society consisted of "a number of 'pots,'" including Kennedy's three religious containers, which were "melting down the white nationality background communities" within them. Other pots held "racial groups which are not allowed to melt structurally" and "substantial remnants" of immigrants, along with some of their children. Given the success of cultural Anglo-conformity, what one saw in American society was "structural pluralism accompanied by an ever-decreasing degree of cultural pluralism."[53]

Assimilation in American Life remains one of the most carefully thought-out treatises on the subject. Of the selections reviewed so far, it gives the clearest picture of the society to which ethnic Americans were thought to assimilate, one structured in terms of subgroups. Indeed, the work capped a line of scholarship, stretching back to *Boston's Immigrants*, that strove to clarify the pluralist framework within which assimilatory processes operated. In this sense, it represented the peak of postwar writing on assimilation.[54] All the same, Gordon must have found the decade after the volume's publication unnerving. The rebellions of the 1960s in many ways represented a frontal assault on the white, middle-class Protestant cultural patterns he saw at assimilation's core. He might have caught a premonition of that upheaval in two works that appeared almost simultaneously with his: Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot*—published in 1963 just before Gordon's work—and Rudolph J. Vecoli's 1964 critique of Handlin and *The Uprooted*.

Beyond the Melting Pot was as much the end of one line of scholarship as the beginning of another. The book shared some basic themes with the work advanced by Kennedy, Herberg, and Gordon. Glazer and Moynihan concluded their study of New York City's ethnic groups with a portrait of a future in which religion and race determined "the major groups into which American society is evolving as the specifically national aspect of ethnicity declines." Those groups, not surprisingly, were Catholics, Jews, white Protestants, and blacks.[55]

Where the authors broke with Kennedy and Herberg, and clashed with Gordon, was in their insistence that the future would not arrive anytime soon. "Perhaps the

[52] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 37, 38, 47, 51, 72–74, 105–09, 126–29, 110, 114.

[53] Gordon, *Assimilation*, 130, 262.

[54] I see Herberg and Gordon as scholars of assimilation because they made that phenomenon their subject, even as they placed it in a framework of pluralism. John Higham portrays them as offering pluralist positions at a time when other scholars saw an inevitable assimilation of ethnic minorities into an American mainstream. Higham, "Ethnic Pluralism in Modern American Thought," in Higham, *Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America*, rev. edn. (Baltimore, Md., 1984), 226–27. Philip Gleason, in contrast, views Herberg as regarding "assimilationist forces as much stronger in American society" than those preserving cultural diversity. Gleason's portrayal of Gordon is closer to Higham's: Gordon's book implied "that pluralism was a much deeper and more meaningful reality in American society than assimilation," and it was "generally regarded as having discredited the 'assimilationist myth.'" Gleason makes these observations in the context of a larger argument that cultural pluralism, from the late 1930s through the 1960s, "resembled assimilation much more closely" than before or after that period. Gleason, "Odd Couple," 70, 74, 49, 56, 60.

[55] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 314.

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meaning of ethnic labels will yet be erased in America," they declared, but as of 1963, "it has not yet worked out this way in New York." America not only created but "continually recreated" ethnic groups, even after the third generation and the loss of distinctive customs and language.[56] These groups—not simply Catholic New Yorkers, for example, but Irish and Italian and Puerto Rican New Yorkers—were sustained through mechanisms of common economic interest, family ties, fellow feeling, and ethnic organizational life. But the authors' most intriguing arguments concerned Gordon's "core subsociety": the "Anglo-Saxon center." First, they held, the "center" had acquired the status of an ethnic group, leaving little to assimilate to, at least in New York. Second, they questioned the ability of the "center" to assimilate more than "its ethnic cousins," such as the Dutch. Something about American society—its "group-forming characteristics"—ensured that it "could not, or did not, assimilate the immigrant groups fully or in equal degree."[57]

In everything but its last few pages, *Beyond the Melting Pot* represented a full-blown attack, not only on the erosion of ethnicity but also on the idea of an Anglo-Saxon center that assimilated effectively. Yet, while the book dispensed with Herberg and Gordon's Anglo-conformist assumptions, Herberg had helped to pave the way for it, and Gordon offered it a degree of implicit support. As those authors and Kennedy elaborated their versions of assimilation, they offered progressively more fragmented pictures of American society. Kennedy split that society into three melting pots; Herberg, despite his depiction of Anglo-conformity, implied that a persistent ethnic consciousness underlay those pots; Gordon added yet more pots, limited Anglo-conformity to the cultural sphere, and implied that America was still a land of structural pluralism. All Glazer and Moynihan did, in a sense, was to take a vision of society that reached fullest expression in Gordon's work, insist it had not yet arrived, and imply that it might never do so.

Beyond the Melting Pot was followed, one year later, by its historiographical equivalent. Rudolph Vecoli's "*Contadini* in Chicago: A Critique of *The Uprooted*" attacked Handlin's classic in great part by arguing for the persistence of immigrants' Old Country ways. Examining southern Italians in their homeland, Vecoli found that Handlin's "idealized peasant village" did not exist in late nineteenth-century Italy and that the *contadini* in their hill towns were "pursuing family and self-interest" as economic individualists. These peasants customarily arrived in Chicago not as alienated newcomers but "as a group from a particular town," and they reconstructed those native towns in the city. Their aid societies were not American creations but transplanted versions of Italian institutions that did little to create Italian-American solidarity. And their Old World customs survived in festivals and the practice of magic. "The social character of the south Italian peasant did not undergo a sea change," Vecoli wrote, "and the very nature of their adjustments to American society was dictated by their 'Old World traits.' "[58]

[56] Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 12, 17.
[57] Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 17–19, 20, 291, 14.
[58] Rudolph J. Vecoli, "*Contadini* in Chicago: A Critique of *The Uprooted*," *Journal of American History*, 51 (December 1964): 404, 407–08, 412–13, 415–17.

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Glazer, Moynihan, and Vecoli were aiming at different targets. The first two authors cast doubt on two decades' worth of theorizing about the submergence of ethnic groups in religious ones. Vecoli's parting shot was meant to criticize a reliance on Chicago concepts: Handlin had been misled by the rigidity "of a sociological theory."[59] But all three insurgents made the same overall point: their professions had underestimated the staying power of ethnicity, whether expressed in the recreation of ethnic groups or the persistence of Old World cultures. Assimilation, they seemed to say, was an overrated concept. Historians would do them the favor of taking them seriously; over the next two decades, assimilation as a topic faded from view.

WHEN OLIVIER ZUNZ SURVEYED writing on ethnicity in 1985, he was struck by the "remarkable" neglect of assimilation by "the current generation of social historians."[60] That neglect had much to do with the political and cultural upheaval of the 1960s. The decade's stresses undermined key assumptions behind assimilation theory as it had developed over the previous twenty years. The Vietnam War and the domestic turmoil it helped to spark discredited "the Anglo-American establishment" and belief in the virtue of a uniform American Way of Life. The flowering of black separatism hastened the rise of movements that emphasized group identities, such as feminism and gay liberation. As Vecoli noted in 1985, "Black Pride" as a movement "legitimated the affirmation" of such identities, including, ultimately, white ethnic ones; an "ethnic revival" emerged in the early 1970s.[61] This eruption of cultural pluralism made a mockery of arguments such as Gordon's that saw cultural pluralism in decline.

The rise of the "New Social History" in many ways echoed these developments; together, they drowned out assimilation as a topic. As Zunz suggested, the postwar tendency to see American history as more about consensus than conflict had encouraged the study of processes, such as assimilation, that facilitated social unity. The lack of consensus manifested in the 1960s helped to shatter the "consensus school," weakening the rationale for examining assimilation. Social history shifted focus from social unity to social justice, as scholars pursued mobility studies and history "from the bottom up." Mobility, of course, was often invoked as an assimilative mechanism, and historians did carry out much research on immigrants, addressing them as actors and examining ethnicity's nature.[62] But, with some exceptions,[63] this work avoided the kind of generalizing about the

[59] Vecoli, "*Contadini* in Chicago," 417.

[60] Olivier Zunz, "American History and the Changing Meaning of Assimilation," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 4 (Spring 1985): 53.

[61] Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Return to the Melting Pot: Ethnicity in the United States in the Eighties," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 5 (Fall 1985): 11, 12.

[62] Zunz, "Changing Meaning of Assimilation," 53–54, 55–57.

[63] As discussed below, even in the 1970s, John Higham and Philip Gleason continued to explore that type of assimilation—that is, Americanization—involved in the adoption of an overarching American identity. Among social historians, Josef J. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City, 1890–1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), examined intermarriage among second-generation ethnics in Cleveland, in a style reminiscent of Kennedy's studies, while Ronald H. Bayor, *Neighbors in Conflict: The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929–1941* (Baltimore,

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structure of American society that Handlin, Kennedy, Herberg, and Gordon had engaged in, including their explorations of relations between ethnic groups and homogenizing processes above the ethnic-group level.[64] What eventually emerged was a pluralistic view of an America "fragmented into an endless number of autonomous communities." At the same time, labor and urban historians whose studies of class required looking at ethnic groups treated ethnicity as a "secondary attribute."[65]

The New Social History had quantitative practitioners and those more culturally oriented. One could argue that cultural approaches, with their focus on an actor's state of mind, might prove more amenable than statistical ones to the study of certain kinds of assimilation. Statistical indexes of assimilation exist, to be sure. But cultural analysis may be better at dealing with assimilation defined in terms of the acceptance of immigrants or shared values. Yet even historians who looked at working-class and immigrant culture tended to ignore, deny, or minimize assimilation. Three works by Herbert Gutman, John Bodnar, and Paul Buhle exemplify this trend.

In the title essay of *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America* (1976), Gutman argued that first-generation factory workers both before 1843 and after 1893 had brought similarly pre-modern work habits with them. Those habits caused manufacturers in the two periods similar headaches, although the workers

Md., 1978), looked at inter-ethnic relations, although his study had to do more with conflict than common ground. In addition, students of groups for which assimilation had proved a pressing concern may have found the topic one they could not help but address. Ewa Morawska points out that a consistent focus of the literature on Jewish immigrants has been the nature of the host society into which those newcomers integrated. Personal communication, January 19, 1995. A 1975 survey of American ethnic history that explored assimilation at length was co-authored by Leonard Dinnerstein, who, perhaps not coincidentally, has written extensively on the Jewish experience in America. Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers, *Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration and Assimilation* (New York, 1975). Scholars of the German-American experience dealt with a group whose ethnicity had undergone a "thorough submergence" that, as Conzen noted in 1983, did not fit historians' "models of pluralistic ethnic maintenance." Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Patterns of German-American History," in *Germans in America: Retrospect and Prospect; Tricentennial Lectures Delivered at the German Society of Pennsylvania in 1983*, Randall M. Miller, ed. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1984), 15. (I am indebted to James M. Bergquist for this reference.) Conzen herself addressed German-American assimilation in the 1970s, as did Frederick C. Luebke and La Vern J. Rippley; see Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Immigrants, Immigrant Neighborhoods, and Ethnic Identity: Historical Issues," *Journal of American History*, 66 (December 1979): 603–15; Frederick C. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I* (De Kalb, Ill., 1974); and La Vern J. Rippley, *The German-Americans* (Boston, 1976).

[64] Historians of social mobility such as Stephan Thernstrom did discuss assimilation and did not shrink from generalizing about American society. But the study of social mobility did not necessarily yield information about cultural or structural assimilation, in Gordon's terms, or about the relations among ethnic groups in the larger social order. Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880–1970* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), for example, appeared to measure assimilation in terms of how the mobility patterns of an immigrant group and its children compared to those of native-born whites of native parentage, or to all Bostonians. That the occupational gap between European ethnics and Yankees had narrowed by the mid-twentieth century certainly indicated a kind of assimilation. But this fact did not tell one whether ethnics and Yankees were drawing closer in terms of sharing institutions or intermarrying. Indeed, Thernstrom's conclusion that differences in achievement between Catholics and Jews were rooted partly in distinctive immigrant "habits and attitudes that were slow to disappear and that influenced the occupational trajectories of the two groups long into the future" sounded remarkably like Gutman's anti-assimilationist argument for the persistence of immigrant cultures. See Thernstrom, 143, 175.

[65] Zunz, "Changing Meaning of Assimilation," 57, 58–61.

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bearing them were predominantly native-born in the first period and immigrants in the second and came from "quite different premodern cultures." This suggested that both sets of workers had undergone the same kind of transition to industrial life, which yielded "common modes of thought and patterns of behavior," including recurring "[c]haracteristic European forms of 'pre-modern' . . . protest." But each group took the journey at a different time; thus their experiences were disconnected. "It was not possible for the grandchildren of the Lowell mill girls to understand that their Massachusetts literary ancestors shared a great deal with their contemporaries, the peasant Slavs in the Pennsylvania steel mills and coal fields."[66] These later immigrants themselves hardly constituted a monolithic group, as Gutman suggested in noting that "Slavic and Italian immigrants carried with them to industrial America subcultures quite different from that of village Jews." Gutman also traced the persistence of artisan work habits into the late nineteenth century to immigrants who retained their culture long after arrival. These newcomers inhabited "ethnic subcultures that varied greatly among particular groups," where "tenacious traditions" flourished.[67]

The essay was striking for what it failed to discuss. Where Handlin might have interpreted the transition to industrial work habits as evidence of Americanization—and Gutman did make several references to that word—the question of "becoming American" hardly arose in "Work, Culture, and Society," for Gutman was concerned not with the journey to "Americanness" as such but with the transition to an industrial proletariat. Evidence of this lay in the fact that those who already were old-stock "Americans" made the same transition. The resulting working class, however, even its immigrant component, remained divided among "diverse ethnic working-class subcultures," as Gutman noted of the mid-to-late nineteenth century.[68] Because he wished to show that immigrants had preserved Old Country ways (if only to plague American factory managers), he had to stress group persistence. Any assimilation past the first generation was not addressed, since his dynamic focused precisely on the series of first generations that had entered the factories.

Somewhat similarly, John Bodnar interpreted the immigrant experience in the century after 1830 as a confrontation with the "new economic order" of capitalism. His synthesis of immigration history, *The Transplanted*, though published in 1985, brought together the myriad case studies of the previous twenty years. The book aimed to refute Handlin's portrayal of immigrants as uprooted individuals and supersede Vecoli's view of newcomers organizing their lives around imported traditions.[69] To Bodnar, what gave their experience coherence was their struggle to sustain the institution of the family-household. Their homeland livelihoods threatened by manufactured goods and commercial agriculture, immigrants came to the United States, often temporarily, to salvage their

[66] Herbert G. Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815–1919," chap. in *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History* (New York, 1976), 19, 22–26, 18, 74–75, 55.

[67] Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society," 24, 41.

[68] Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society," 49.

[69] John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (1985; Bloomington, Ind., 1987), xvi.

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economic prospects. The family, the Old World center of economic and social life, aided their adjustment to urban capitalism in the New. Members found jobs through kinship ties and pooled resources in order to survive. They also forged a "culture of everyday life" that drew on folk thought and other "ethnic traditions," as well as such "present realities" as work, to explain their place in a world of family, job, and neighborhood. Most working-class immigrants inhabited this culture, while some better-off newcomers moved toward a new one of "acquisitiveness and personal gain" that Bodnar identified as middle class.[70]

On its face, Bodnar's work could be seen as reflecting a concern with a kind of assimilation, that is, immigrants' adjustment to capitalism in "capitalist America."[71] Yet a closer reading shows *The Transplanted* tends to minimize, deny, or neglect assimilation and Americanization—whether one accepts the book's, or this article's, definitions of those terms.

When Bodnar used the terms "Americanization" and "assimilation," he appeared to distinguish them from the larger process of immigrant adjustment and to deny that they had happened for the majority of immigrants and their children. The book tended to portray "Americanization" as a project middle-class immigrants and educational reformers directed at other, largely working-class, ethnics. When this project took the form of extended schooling, immigrant workers were "invariably resistant."[72] Similarly, Bodnar seemed to equate assimilation with a journey away from the culture of everyday life and into an acquisitive middle class that represented mainstream America. He argued that most immigrants and their children did not make that transition. Thus he faulted a version of "assimilation" that depicted ethnic communities as way stations where newcomers "acquired the necessary values and behavioral patterns to move inevitably into middle-class American society." He doubted that the mass of immigrants had taken this path toward "the lofty plateaus of the American mainstream," since the majority, and most of their children, remained at the lower end of the work force.[73] Bodnar similarly discounted "the possibility of rapid and widespread cultural attachment of newcomers to the thought and institutions of capitalist America." Most immigrants, who "ultimately would acquiesce" in urban capitalism, did so "on terms somewhat of their own making," including the culture of everyday life. This separated them from those who forsook that culture for "the single-minded culture of power, wealth, and personal gain" associated with the middle class—the culture, presumably, of "capitalist America."[74]

[70] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 72, 54–55, 23–30, 56, 38, 83, 72, 210, 209, 212, 213.

[71] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 184.

[72] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 143, 128, 190, 143, 193. For the implication that Americanization was a middle-class initiative, see also 118, 140–41, 204, 214. Interestingly, Bodnar did note at one point that turn-of-the-century Chicago butchers made "unionization . . . a process of Americanization," and cited James Barrett's dissertation; at another point, he referred to Irish-American nationalism as "a step in the assimilation of immigrant laborers into American working-class traditions"; Bodnar, 101, 101 n, 111. But Bodnar did not develop these ideas, which Barrett would use later in helping to renew discussions of assimilation.

[73] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 118, 169, 183, 170, 174.

[74] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 184, 205, 208–11, 213. Bodnar offered a more succinct version of this argument in a comment on Zunz's 1985 review essay, while acknowledging as correct Zunz's point that assimilation "has been largely ignored in recent historical scholarship"; John Bodnar, "Comment," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 4 (Spring 1985): 75–76, 73. Bodnar took a similar approach

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This conflation of mainstream and middle class points to the book's larger conflation of capitalism with "America." Bodnar titled one chapter "America on Immigrant Terms" but ended it stating that immigrants came to terms with "the new order of urban capitalism." Since America had no monopoly on urban capitalism, equating the two left nothing distinctly "American" toward which to assimilate. Americanization in this larger sense could not be his theme, nor was it in the minimal sense of ethnic peoples identifying themselves as "American." The potential to Americanize existed, since Bodnar hinted at one point that the "affirmation of a desire to become an American" was part of the culture of everyday life. Immigrants forging that culture could pick and choose among ideologies, and one of the choices, presumably, might be American nationalism. But Bodnar essentially left this point unaddressed. He noted in an aside that immigrants "were always very sensitive" to charges of being unpatriotic, but he nowhere explored the implications of that remark.[75]

The Transplanted also neglected assimilation, that is, homogenization above the ethnic-group level, for all but the small set of middle-class strivers who pursued mainstream capitalist ways.[76] Bodnar's effort to reach beyond a group-by-group analysis led him to focus below the ethnic-group level, to an everyday immigrant experience rooted in the family-household and the networks of kin and friends that tied it to the worlds of work, neighborhood, and worship. From this vantage point, Bodnar could survey the class tensions that divided ethnic communities.[77] Yet the narrative implied that ethnic-group boundaries mattered greatly. Immigrants lived in heavily working-class "urban-ethnic enclaves"; they tended not to marry out of the ethnic group, even in the second generation; they clustered by ethnicity in particular lines of work; ethnic as well as skill-level differences helped to frustrate labor solidarity; immigrant workers "quickly adopted" middle-class celebrations of ethnicity; and the culture of everyday life was informed by traditions that varied from group to group.[78]

to assimilation in his study of Steelton, Pennsylvania, *Immigration and Industrialization: Ethnicity in an American Mill Town, 1870–1940* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1977). Although this book did look to some extent at relations among ethnic groups, it portrayed cooperation across ethnic lines primarily as occurring within the "old stock" middle class and upper class, which had "minimized" internal ethnic differences to preserve class position and dominate the town. Newer immigrants, excluded from power and skilled jobs, constructed separate ethnic communities. Bodnar did briefly discuss the advent of the CIO in the late 1930s as a vehicle of inter-ethnic cooperation and an "emerging, working-class consciousness." Yet second-generation immigrants, who backed the union, appeared "unwilling to weaken their own ethnic ties," and Bodnar did little to explore the nature of their rising class consciousness (other than to ascribe it to a search for job security) or its assimilatory implications. *Immigration and Industrialization*, 144–55, 137, and *passim*.

[75] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 205, 209, xx, 112. The hint, if it was such, was worded ambiguously, as part of a string of negatives: the culture of everyday life "was not a simple extension of [the immigrants'] past, an embracement of the new order of capitalism, or simply an affirmation of a desire to become an American"; *Transplanted*, 209. Bodnar more recently has turned to the topic of American identity; see John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1992).

[76] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 208.

[77] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, xvii, 207, 71, 178, 148, 119–20.

[78] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 215, 76, 61–70, 93–96, 139, 209–10. Bodnar noted too that churches riven by class and ideological tensions also saw ethnic divisions and that ethnic intermediaries linked immigrant voters to urban machines; *Transplanted*, 150–55, 202–04.

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In describing such ethnic divisions while focusing below the ethnic-group level, Bodnar neglected to address how these groups interacted—with some exceptions, as in his brief discussion of Catholic education and his observation that the quest for household stability could help 1930s unions "temporarily transcend ethnic and skill differentials."[79] Nor did he discuss how ethnic groups related, as a set of groups, to mainstream America. This selectivity gave the impression of an America populated by a collection of ethnic groups that confronted capitalism *separately*, each within its own boundaries. That left little room for explorations of assimilation between ethnic groups, while the "culture of everyday life" marked a fairly deep divide between Americans of longer standing and the immigrant working class. Bodnar described how immigrants adjusted to capitalism, but his approach discouraged looking at how they might have assimilated to each other or to other workers, or come to see themselves as "American."

The potential liabilities of such a stance could be seen in Paul Buhle's essay "Jews and American Communism: The Cultural Question" (1980). Buhle argued that the American Left, particularly the interwar Communist Party, paid heavily for rejecting ethnic pluralism. Communists steeped in Yiddish culture had been eager to use this resource and had met with a promising reception from Yiddish-speaking workers. But the party discouraged ethnic organizing, which crippled the cultural work that was its "main attraction . . . to working class neighborhoods." Buhle undercut his argument by noting in an aside that "the assimilation process continued in an unrevolutionary America."[80] If workers were moving closer to the "American" mainstream, how could their attraction to a Yiddish-infused Communism be expected to persist? Did such assimilation mean the Yiddish activists had been wrong? To answer such questions required a closer look at "assimilation."

Gutman, Bodnar, and Buhle rightly stressed the degree to which the America they studied had held a host of ethnic enclaves that did not immediately dissolve into a larger American society. But in refusing to take "assimilation" or "Americanization" seriously, they begged important questions. What was the fate of these enclaves past the first two generations? What was the nature of the wider society in which the enclaves nestled, and what held it together? Was this America a pluralism solely of fragmentation, or could one speak of kinds of homogenization over time, whether labeled assimilation, the rise of class consciousness, or the growth of racial identity? In the 1980s, historians began to see the shortcomings in the dismissal of assimilation and initiated a cautious reappraisal of the concept.

HISTORIANS ONCE AGAIN TOOK UP THE TOPIC of assimilation, but they did not simply resurrect the concept as postwar scholars understood it. Too many assumptions about American society had changed to permit such a straightforward return; above all, few believed any longer in the unchanging cultural hegemony of an Anglo-Saxon "core." Rather, what emerged, fitfully in the early

[79] Bodnar, *Transplanted*, 194–95, 115.

[80] Paul Buhle, "Jews and American Communism: The Cultural Question," *Radical History Review*, 23 (Spring 1980): 29, 20–21, 28.

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1980s but with gathering strength by the decade's end, was a renewed interest in certain questions basic to the postwar assimilation studies. Historians who focused on immigrant groups began to ask how ethnic enclaves fit together and hence returned to a concern with the larger American social order and interaction among ethnic groups that would have been familiar to Gordon or Herberg. Labor historians examining class consciousness among ethnic workers started to look into homogenization along class lines, much as Kennedy had studied the homogenization of ethnic groups along the lines of religion. A growing interest in the question of racial identity among Americans of European origin led some scholars to explore Americanization as a process of claiming "whiteness," which suggested homogenization along color lines within a racially structured pluralism. Each foray marked a return to an interest both in assimilatory processes and in how European immigrants and their descendants came to see themselves as "Americans."

For a few historians, of course, those topics had never disappeared, even in the 1970s. John Higham and Philip Gleason, in particular, responded to that decade's ethnic politics by asking what held American society together.[81] Like Herberg, both stressed the unifying role of a common ideology, one that defined what it meant to be "American." In addressing American identity, Higham and Gleason touched on Americanization; but they endowed that identity with notes of change and contestation largely absent from Herberg's "American Way."

They also followed on a bevy of scholars in various fields—including postwar "consensus historians"[82]—who had described American identity in terms of adherence to a set of universalistic principles. As Gleason argued, World War II, and the ideological challenge of the Third Reich, fueled a "reaffirmation of American ideology as the basis of national identity."[83] This revival, which drew strength as well from the Cold War,[84] lasted into the 1960s.[85] Herberg's "American Way of Life" was one of several phrases invoked during these years to describe an American ideology encompassing beliefs in democracy, liberty, and equality, from Gunnar Myrdal's "American Creed" to Horace Kallen's "American Idea."[86]

[81] Higham, writing in the early 1970s, noted a need to rediscover "what values can bind together a more and more kaleidoscopic culture." John Higham, "Another American Dilemma," in Higham, *Send These to Me*, 248.

[82] For perceptive overviews of "consensus history," see Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988), chap. 11; and John Higham's own *History: Professional Scholarship in America*, rev. edn. (Baltimore, Md., 1989), 212–32.

[83] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 48, 47.

[84] Higham notes the influence of "the totalitarian challenge to democracy" on ethnic studies in the 1940s and 1950s; Higham, "Ethnic Pluralism," 221. The theme of ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union was particularly strong, for example, in Hans Kohn's 1957 interpretation of American ideology. Kohn urged a "union of the West" under American leadership which would constitute a "return to common roots." "In this return, American nationalism fulfills itself in the broader community of its North Atlantic origins." Not surprisingly, Kohn lauded NATO as a vehicle through which "the nations on the two shores of the North Atlantic" had started to realize their commonality; Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay* (New York, 1957), 223, 228, 221.

[85] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 47. Higham, however, sees the "ideological fervor of American intellectuals" as having waned over the 1950s. "Ethnic Pluralism," 225.

[86] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 51, 50; Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 2 vols. (New York, 1944); Horace Kallen, *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social*

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Gleason's own definition of American identity drew on Hans Kohn's evocation in 1957 of the United States as "the embodiment of an idea"; still valid was Kohn's "central insight that American nationality rests on a structure of ideas about freedom, equality, and self-government," an ideology both universalistic and practical. This endorsement of Kohn, a student of American nationalism, was telling, for it pointed up an equation of American identity with American nationality—terms that Gleason used interchangeably.[87] To Americanize, in the sense of feeling oneself to have become "American," could be seen as subscribing to a form of American nationalism.

In 1980, Gleason argued for the continued existence of an American identity—a "sense of peoplehood shared by all Americans"—based on commitment to such "universalist ideals." He followed that identity's career from the eighteenth century, tracing the changing salience of ethnicity in the debate over "what it means to be an American."[88] Despite its partly British roots, and the British-derived majority's "latent predisposition toward an ethnically defined concept of nationality," American identity was seen in the early republic "in abstract ideological terms much more than in ethnic terms" (although it did not extend to Indians or African Americans). This made becoming "American" an act of self-will, open to all of European background and accomplished by adopting the ideology. Cultural differences rooted in ethnicity became more salient with nineteenth-century immigration, as first anti-Catholic nativism and then a racialist "Anglo-Saxon version of American nationality" emerged.[89] Concern with ethnicity ebbed with immigration restriction in the 1920s. While the resurgent American ideology discussed above incorporated tolerance for ethnic diversity as a corollary value, it did not allow for a diversity "that divided Americans against each other in any serious way."[90] The mid-1960s saw a shift back toward a greater stress on ethnic difference, along with a weakening of the national ideology through a "passionate critique" growing out of the racial crisis and the Vietnam War—a critique Gleason found overdrawn.[91]

Higham, writing in 1981, examined how, in the late nineteenth century, white Americans began to see European assimilation as a "problem." He explored contradictions between the theory and reality of assimilation, particularly the capacity of white Americans for holding an abstract faith in the assimilation of remote peoples while feeling repulsion toward outsiders close at hand. This

Philosophy, with comments by Stanley H. Chapman, *et al.* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1956). The "cultural pluralism" Kallen championed in the 1950s was quite different from that he advocated when he introduced the term in the 1920s, as Gleason argues; "American Identity and Americanization," 50, 43; "Odd Couple," 57–58.

[87] Kohn, *American Nationalism*, 13; Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 32, 31.

[88] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 55, 56, 31.

[89] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 56, 32–34, 36, 39.

[90] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 47, 48, 50. World War II generated a need for national unity, Gleason noted elsewhere, but this was sought "on the common ground of ideological consensus"; tolerance for diversity was "a key element in the democratic ideology behind which all were supposed to rally." Hence the demand for unity was "usually couched in the language of pluralism and diversity instead of . . . assimilation or Americanization." This was the context within which the idea of "cultural pluralism" dwelled during and after the war. Gleason, "Odd Couple," 58, 59; see also 60, 62–63, 67.

[91] Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," 52, 55–57.

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contrast stemmed in part from a combination of localism and the national ideology, which viewed the United States as "an open and free society resting on universal, self-evident principles . . . dedicated to the separation of church and state and the elimination of all barriers to mobility and opportunity, a society of individuals rather than groups." The lack of a centralized state hindered "Anglo-Americans" from defining an exclusive identity. Decentralization also allowed ethnic groups, to some extent, to keep their distance. An ideological definition of America offered a "single canopy of beliefs" that made comprehensible this "otherwise loose-knit society."[92] The universalist ideology itself was, however, "profoundly split," in that America's white, Protestant majority entertained it while also viewing the country as its possession. When localism began to wane at the century's end, Americans became less willing to live with this division. The resulting Progressive impulse toward consistency eventually erupted in a nativism and anti-black racism that sought to ensure white Protestant hegemony. Yet Progressivism's "humanistic side" also asserted itself. The conflict between these two forces widened the rift in American ideology, mobilizing minorities and sparking pluralist thought.[93]

Both Higham and Gleason saw a return to assimilation, with Higham detecting among historians and sociologists by the late 1970s "a renewed appreciation of assimilation" as a powerful and desirable force.[94] Indeed, Americanization, understood as assimilation achieved through the adoption of an "American" identity, was a prominent theme for a number of the scholars discussed below. Yet they, even more than Gleason and Higham, tended to treat that identity as contested terrain, fought over by ethnics with their own definitions of Americanism.

Immigration historians revisited assimilation and Americanization by way of a renewed interest in the nature of American pluralism, that is, in the social order as an order of ethnic groups. Their pluralism amounted to more than a collection of tenacious ethnic communities. It had room for relations *between* ethnicities, for ethnicities dwindling into the world of native white Protestants, for immigrants who saw no contradiction in claiming both homeland and "American" identities, for ethnics who shaped the changing meaning of "American," and, in some cases, for a dash of American ideological glue to hold the order together.

Paradoxically enough, this interest in social orders stemmed in part from these historians' encounter with theories of deconstruction. Scholars who had spent the previous decade examining ethnicity realized it was a category like any other and deserved to be dissected. Werner Sollors asked whether ethnicity itself was an

[92] Higham, "Integrating America," 7, 9–13, 15, 13–14.

[93] Higham, "Integrating America," 15, 19, 20–22. Higham more recently posited that the ideology's egalitarian principles, in the form of "American universalism," helped to fuel twentieth-century movements for equality, before losing force amid the rise of ethnic separatism in the 1960s. John Higham, "Multiculturalism and Universalism: A History and Critique," *American Quarterly*, 45 (June 1993): 196–97, 200–01, 205–06. Higham's analysis of multiculturalism drew dissenting comments in the same issue from several scholars, including Gary Gerstle, "The Limits of American Universalism," 230–36, and Nancy A. Hewitt, "A Response to John Higham," 237–42.

[94] Higham, "Introduction," *Send These to Me*, xii. For Gleason, the return manifested itself as an affirmation of assimilation "understood as a social policy" promoting the identification of Americans of all backgrounds with "the traditional values of democratic universalism." Gleason, "Odd Couple," 82.

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invention. In the ensuing debate, historians such as Kathleen Neils Conzen and David Gerber staked out a position that saw ethnic group formation as a continuing process within a larger pluralism.

In the title essay of the collection *The Invention of Ethnicity* (1989), Sollors suggested that "ethnicity" could be viewed as one among many "widely shared, though intensely debated, collective fictions that are continually reinvented." Noting how postmodern theorists saw language itself as constituting the terms on which reality is socially constructed, he argued that historians should examine "the ability of ethnicity to present (or invent) itself as a 'natural' and timeless category." Sollors conceived of ethnicity as emerging from the workings of a larger system within which what was "ethnic" was defined by that which was "not-ethnic."[95]

Sollors' essay prompted a response from five historians. Conzen, Gerber, Vecoli, Ewa Morawska, and George E. Pozzetta wrote in 1992 that they agreed with Sollors in viewing ethnicity as "a cultural construction accomplished over historical time." But they did not see it as a collective fiction; ethnic consciousness was "grounded in real life context and social experience." Ethnicity was "a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts, and amplifies preexisting communal solidarities, cultural attributes, and historical memories." This process involved negotiation between a given immigrant group, other such groups, and "the dominant ethnoculture, in this case, the Anglo American." Thinking about ethnicity in this way had the virtue of forcing a focus on the relationships among these groups.[96]

The authors argued that antebellum Americans invented the category of "nationality"—that is, ethnicity—as a part of their own "self-conscious project of inventing a national identity." The category of ethnicity gave native-born Americans a way to define themselves as "Americans." They also used it to define newcomers as immigrant ethnic groups, but those newcomers already had been constructing their own sense of peoplehood in Ireland and Germany. Out of these processes came "a new pluralistic social order" that involved all Americans in "a continual renegotiation of identities."[97]

American pluralism so defined could encompass a number of processes aside from ethnic persistence. Ethnicities could disappear. The Scottish and English of antebellum Buffalo, for example, who lived among native white Protestants, sponsored saint's day banquets—a new ethnic tradition emerging "in the life of weak groups, which were faltering even as they were being invented." Likewise, ethnics could acquire a double identity that included an "American" self-definition. East Europeans who had identified with homeland localities developed, in turn-of-the-century America, "a translocal, national identity as Poles, Ukrainians," and so forth. The symbols of an Old Country "fatherland" aided this process. By the 1930s, however, "America" had emerged as a parallel ideological fatherland. Ethnic celebrations "rallied under two sets of national emblems: Old

[95] Werner Sollors, "Introduction: The Invention of Ethnicity," in *The Invention of Ethnicity*, Werner Sollors, ed. (New York, 1989), xi, x, xiv, xv.

[96] Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 4–5.

[97] Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 6, 9.

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Country and American," symbolizing, as with one slogan that "proclaimed *Polacy-Amerykanie* (Poles-American), the immigrants' double identity."[98]

The American identities so acquired were neither unchanging nor uninfluenced by immigrants. "[M]uch of ethnic cultures was incorporated into changing definitions of what was American and what it meant to be an American. Without corresponding to either the Anglo-conformity or Melting Pot models of assimilation, the interaction of mainstream ethnoculture and sidestream ethnoculture wrought major changes in both." The authors believed that this element of change overcame the mainstream's "Anglo-Saxon" aspects. "Rather than positing a hegemonic Anglo-American core culture," their conception held "the notion that what is distinctively American has been itself a product of this synergistic encounter of multiple peoples and cultures."[99]

This view of American society was reflected in other work by Gerber and Conzen, with Gerber stressing the development of ethnic groups within a pluralist order and Conzen focusing on the syncretic aspects of ethnic interaction. Gerber's study of antebellum Buffalo, *The Making of an American Pluralism* (1989), viewed the American city as "a hothouse environment" for the creation of a kind of social system that absorbed groups "pluralistically—as groups." He saw these groups, including native-born Americans as well as Germans and the Irish, as in the process of formation. Electoral politics both integrated ethnic groups into the political system and encouraged their development. The resulting pluralist order was enormously stable, containing conflict generated by immigration and capitalist development through "appeals to common interests in opportunity" and coalition politics that "brought together diverse and competing groups." Gerber acknowledged Handlin as a model, and, much like the Handlin of *Boston's Immigrants*, he stepped back to see "society whole" and found a symbiotic order. Within Gerber's pluralism, one could also make out a hint of Americanization—in the "rhetoric of opportunity" that helped to seal an inter-ethnic Republican coalition before the Civil War.[100]

Conzen, writing of late nineteenth-century Stearns County, Minnesota, found indications of what she termed "pluralisms of place." The county's German majority had neither "assimilated into Yankee society" nor kept itself "as an ethnic world apart." Rather, it had Germanized the local mainstream. The county's "local culture of thrift and non-ostentation, for example, . . . [was] initially molded in a German ethnic matrix, but quickly overflowed its bounds to define the county's values." Conzen called this process "the localization of an immigrant culture." By following "the immigrant story into the second generation and beyond," historians might find a pluralism that included many ethnically diverse yet locally dominant cultures. Further, those local cultures might also be found to have an influence on the larger public culture of America and thus indicate "the immigrant role in the shaping of values central to the nation

[98] Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 5, 19, 22, 23, 25–26.
[99] Conzen, *et al.*, "Invention of Ethnicity," 6, 32.
[100] Gerber, *Making of an American Pluralism*, 119, xii, xv, xiv, 325–26, 412, xiii, 405.

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itself."[101] Here, Conzen addressed a form of ethnic interaction that, on the local level, implied a kind of assimilation—one of Yankees to ethnic ways—and, on the national level, suggested both the existence of "American" values and their susceptibility to immigrant influence.

Perhaps the most ambitious pluralist model, and the one most obviously wedded to the concept of a unifying American ideology, came from political scientist Lawrence Fuchs. His book *The American Kaleidoscope* (1990) fused Americanization with ethnicization. Fuchs argued that European immigrants long had undergone "ethnic-Americanization," whereby ancestral loyalties were adapted to American circumstances, "even as immigrants and their children embrace[d] American political ideals" and institutions. A "voluntary pluralism" allowed individuals to "choose to be ethnic" and simultaneously claim an American identity by subscribing to "a unifying civic culture" based on a founding myth keyed to ideals of self-government, political equality, toleration of "private" matters, and economic opportunity. Before the 1960s, Americans of European origin had denied entry to voluntary pluralism to those of Indian, African, Asian, and Mexican ancestry by maintaining other, coercive pluralisms of a tribal, caste, and "sojourner" nature.[102] But with the recent dismantlement or erosion of such systems, these groups also began to "ethnic-Americanize." Increasingly, they rewarded the civic culture with loyalty, while that culture added ethnic diversity to its values. Fuchs discussed ethnic conflict and warned that, without efforts to combat poverty, the poorest Americans of color would remain "substantially outside of the civic culture." Overall, however, his portrait of contemporary, pluralistic America seemed remarkably sanguine.[103]

The writings of Conzen, Gerber, and Fuchs tended to work against conceptions of Anglo-conformity and stress those of pluralism—but not the disconnected variety of the New Social History.[104] These authors sketched variations on a group-based American social system, returning to Gordon's systematizing spirit,

[101] Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Mainstreams and Side Channels: The Localization of Immigrant Cultures," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 11 (Fall 1991): 13, 6, 15, 7.

[102] Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture* (Hanover, N.H., 1990), 20, 5, 482, 492, 77–79, 149.

[103] Fuchs, *American Kaleidoscope*, 109, 149, 187, 203, 224, 236, 269–71, 492, 363, 371, 372–80, 493. Fuchs' optimism marked a sharp contrast to the forebodings of other historians who saw American identity in ideological terms. His faith in the integrative potential of voluntary pluralism was such that he appeared to interpret the Black Power movement—which Higham saw as weakening American Universalism—as a necessary stage in the "ethnic-Americanization" of African Americans; Higham, "Multiculturalism," 205, 206; Fuchs, 184, 187. Such equanimity stood out in comparison to the worried tone of Higham's critique and, especially, to the anxiety shown in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s attack on multiculturalism, *The Disuniting of America* (New York, 1992). Schlesinger, who asserted his belief in a "national creed" that had made Americans into "one people," denounced an anti-assimilationist "cult of ethnicity" and worried that "when a vocal and visible minority pledges primary allegiance to their groups, whether ethnic, sexual, religious, or, in rare cases (communist, fascist), political, it presents a threat to the brittle bonds of national identity that hold this diverse and fractious society together." *Disuniting of America*, 13, 130, 112, 113.

[104] While Gleason gave the ideals that cemented American identity partially English roots, Fuchs seemed reluctant to follow suit for his founding myth. He did so, if at all, indirectly, in offhandedly citing Jefferson's observation that American principles were "based on 'a composition of the freest principles of the English Constitution, with others derived from natural right and natural reason.'" The myth had also changed since Jefferson's day, incorporating diversity as a value. Voluntary pluralism itself was a "new invention of Americans," launched "principally" in colonial Pennsylvania; Fuchs, *American Kaleidoscope*, 12, 5.

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though with different results. And their pluralisms, like his, had room for processes of homogenization above the ethnic-group level.

In truth, the distance between discussing pluralistic social orders and explicitly reappraising the concept of assimilation was not all that great, as Morawska demonstrated in a 1994 article, "In Defense of the Assimilation Model." She argued that elements of the "classical" model, defined as a Gordon-like series of stages running from acculturation to social integration to identification, could be used to describe the experience of particular ethnics at particular times and places. Morawska pointed to examples of integration into "the dominant group, the Anglo-Protestant middle class"; of the near disappearance of collective ethnic identity among Jews in small towns; and of the disappearance of individuals' ethnic identity. This approach was compatible with Conzen's pluralism, which allowed for different processes of immigrant adjustment—"even complete assimilation"—in different places. Morawska proposed renovating assimilation theory, not as "a universally applicable proposition" but as a historical one, as "one of a number of possible explanatory frameworks in which the immigrants' adaptation to the host (American) society can be accounted for."[105]

Labor historians in the 1980s were less interested in charting a profusion of ethnicities than in explaining class formation and consciousness. The twentieth-century labor movement itself posed an obvious problem. During World War I, unions enjoyed short-term success organizing among workers from diverse ethnic backgrounds. In the 1930s, the industrial union movement enlisted massive numbers of immigrants and their children. How had people so ethnically divided come to a collective sense of themselves as workers? To ask this question, as James R. Barrett, Lizabeth Cohen, and Gary Gerstle did, was to confront working-class formation as a kind of inter-ethnic assimilation.[106] For Barrett and Gerstle, that process also involved Americanization—the acquisition by ethnic workers of an identity they saw as "American."

The road to these studies was prepared in part by Roy Rosenzweig and Olivier Zunz. Both discerned a shift from a late nineteenth-century urban landscape defined by ethnic enclaves to an early twentieth-century one organized to a greater degree by class. Between 1880 and 1900, Zunz argued in *The Changing Face of Inequality* (1982), Detroit was made up "largely of cross-class ethnic communities," with larger groups, such as the Germans, dominating particular neighbor-

[105] Ewa Morawska, "In Defense of the Assimilation Model," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 13 (Winter 1994): 76, 77, 78–81, 81–82, 82–84; Conzen, "Mainstreams and Side Channels," 7. One should note that Morawska, like Higham, saw an at least partial trend back to assimilation in sociological and historical work on ethnicity. Scholars abandoned "the classical assimilation model of linear progression toward a common American amalgamate" because "it turned out to be much too simplistic," she wrote in 1990. The focus shifted first "toward stressing 'resilient ethnicity' in opposition to assimilation" and then toward "emphasizing ethnic resilience but acknowledging its coexistence with parallel assimilation processes." Morawska, "Sociology and Historiography of Immigration," 212–13.

[106] On World War I–era union drives among ethnics, see Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up," 1015, 1018. Peter Friedlander anticipated this work to some degree in his analysis of unionization in one Michigan plant, *The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936–1939: A Study in Class and Culture* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1975). Especially when generalizing to the world outside the plant, however, he stressed the persistence of ethnocultural subcultures, arguing that the large-scale entry of Poles and native white Protestants into the United Automobile Workers was reflected in a conservative political shift within the union. Friedlander, 93, 111–31, and *passim*.

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hoods. The bonds between an ethnic group's working and middle-class members in a given neighborhood were strengthened, and working-class solidarity thwarted, by the experience of social mobility within the ethnic community.[107] By 1920, however, as native white control over large-scale industry translated into control over the city's opportunity structure, such cross-class communities yielded to neighborhoods dominated by working-class members of a particular ethnic group. Newer immigrants, such as Poles, gathered in ethnic mill towns; older ones, such as the Irish, tended to live among native whites of the same social level.[108]

If Zunz saw working-class communities still separated by ethnicity in the 1920s, Rosenzweig found Worcester workers drawing away from their enclaves and closer to each other and the American "mainstream." This was evident in their changing patterns of leisure between 1870 and 1920, he argued in *Eight Hours for What We Will* (1983). Ethnic July 4th celebrations began to encounter competition from amusement parks, where the mix of patrons aided "the creation of a multiethnic working-class culture." The movie theaters of the 1920s challenged "the intense localism of the saloon," providing an arena for ethnic groups to mingle. Working-class viewers became "less suspicious of other workers" from different backgrounds and "attracted by the material promise of American life" on the screen. Such cultural shifts had deeper causes. But the friendships made, expectations raised, and "American" self-perceptions encouraged at the movies may have eased the way to union activism in the 1930s and 1940s.[109] Rosenzweig's "working-class culture" and his concluding discussion of workers' "new perception of themselves as 'Americans' " foreshadowed the work of Barrett, Cohen, and Gerstle.

While these accounts tended to stress the impact of outside forces on ethnic communities,[110] more recent studies have paid greater attention to worker agency, as in Barrett's "Americanization from the Bottom Up" (1992). Working-class ethnics, he argued, had done much to Americanize each other. Barrett sought to understand "how working-class formation took place in the midst of great ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity and change" between 1880 and 1930. In essence, he defined Americanization as class formation. Americanization "from the bottom up" was "the gradual acculturation of immigrants and their socialization in working-class environments and contexts." This process, "of necessity intereth-

[107] Zunz, *Changing Face of Inequality*, 139, 55, 87, 194, 219–20, 224.

[108] Zunz, *Changing Face of Inequality*, 4–5, 401, 327, 357–59. Zunz's portrayal of a shift from cross-class ethnic enclaves to working-class ones was at odds with accounts of nineteenth-century urbanization offered by some other historians, as he noted; Zunz, 41–42, 178. Scholars studying Philadelphia, for example, argued that industry "was more important than ethnicity in organizing the city's residential patterns" between 1850 and 1880, with workers having "more in common residentially with coindustrial workers than with those of common cultural background"; Theodore Hershberg, *et al.*, "A Tale of Three Cities: Blacks, Immigrants, and Opportunity in Philadelphia, 1850–1880, 1930, 1970," in *Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family, and Group Experience in the Nineteenth Century*, Theodore Hershberg, ed. (New York, 1981), 469. Zunz and Hershberg debated the Philadelphia findings in Zunz's "Comment" on *Philadelphia* and Hershberg's "Response," *Journal of Urban History*, 8 (August 1982): 463–71, 472–84.

[109] Zunz, *Changing Face of Inequality*, 402; Roy Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870–1920* (Cambridge, 1983), 5, 181–82, 219–20, 227, 215, 228.

[110] Rosenzweig did emphasize the degree to which ethnic workers put their own stamp on commercial leisure; see *Eight Hours*, 199–201.

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nic," could take the form of labor unions bringing immigrant workers together around common grievances. Organizers also used a rhetoric of "Americanism" that stressed civil liberties and tried to appropriate democratic vocabulary and symbols from wartime propaganda. While reminiscent of Gleason's American ideology, this Americanism was, nonetheless, "a contested ideal." The union version championing free speech and collective demands for rights likely differed from the employer variant. From such union campaigns, from fellow workers, and their own heritage, immigrants drew the elements for the multiple identities they fashioned.[111]

"Assimilation" as a term did not figure prominently in Cohen's 1990 study of industrial unionism in interwar Chicago, *Making a New Deal.* If defined as the creation of a trans-ethnic common ground, however, that process could hardly have received a more intriguing treatment. The book described how workers badly divided along racial and ethnic lines in the 1920s forged a common working-class culture in the 1930s. Their lives in the 1920s had been circumscribed by ethnicity and marked by political apathy and a reliance on ethnic communities and employers for welfare services. The 1930s, in contrast, saw workers supporting a Democratic administration, successfully organizing unions, looking to both government and unions for a social safety net, and holding a set of national affiliations, from radio fan to CIO unionist. Cohen ascribed this shift in part to the Depression, which ended most employers' welfare capitalist schemes and weakened ethnic institutions, forcing workers to look elsewhere for aid. They succeeded in uniting in large part because the rise of mass culture gave them "more in common culturally from which to forge alliances." The CIO also sought to create a union-centered "culture of unity" that would transcend racial, ethnic, and neighborhood lines. Workers were becoming "more like each other," and thus "more like other Americans," but the upshot was more "an integrated working-class culture than a classless American one." Ethnic identity did not vanish in this transition; rather, people recombined their multiple identities, and their "self-images as ethnic and working class became more compatible."[112]

Gerstle's book *Working-Class Americanism* (1989) similarly described how workers from different ethnic groups managed in the 1930s to organize a union and "fashion a class identity for themselves." Americanization campaigns and economic troubles in 1920s Woonsocket, Rhode Island, opened up the "insular ethnic worlds" of the city's French Canadians and Franco-Belgians, setting the conditions for that identity. But a key factor in its creation was their elaboration of a "language of Americanism" that used concepts and symbols from democratic ideals to American heroes to articulate labor's demands. This language fostered an "American identity" among ethnic workers—though one with different meanings for different groups—and "worked remarkably well in giving ideological and linguistic unity" to a divided working class. Its very malleability, however, meant control of it was tenuous. Ultimately, the state's "efforts to reappropriate

[111] Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up," 997–98, 1000, 1008, 1010–11, 1009, 1014, 997, 1011–12, 1017.

[112] Cohen, *Making a New Deal,* 362, 364–65, 333, 356–57, 6–7.

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Americanism in the 1940s . . . undermined working-class efforts to make capital-labor relations the true test of the nation's democratic character."[113]

Gerstle came the closest of all the labor historians to describing something like an American "core" culture or ideology, although he did not identify it as such. This core potentially lies in the language of Americanism itself, particularly its "democratic," "nationalist," and "traditionalist" dimensions.[114] One wonders what effect these dimensions may have had on workers' Americanism. To the extent that Americanism stemmed from "Americanization" campaigns, the reader might see in it traces of a kind of "old stock" cultural hegemony.[115] The language's hegemonic aspect seems most apparent in the fact that workers ultimately lost control of it to the state.

In tracing the rise of trans-ethnic class consciousness in twentieth-century America, the labor historians discussed here evinced a concern with processes of homogenization that harkened back to the assimilation studies of the 1940s and 1950s. One could argue that they revived the postwar conviction that ethnic groups were assimilating along certain lines, but they made those lines ones of class rather than confession. A portrayal of class homogenization as Americanization, however, reminds us of how exclusive a sense of "becoming American" could be, for that homogenization tended to stop at the color line.

The question of whether Americanization meant becoming part of a *white* working class points to another body of work bearing on assimilation: the burgeoning literature on the construction of "whiteness." The work of David Roediger, Arnold Hirsch, and, more recently, Gerstle raised the issue of whether European immigrants and their children became American by being redefined as "white." The question admits of two readings. First, did European ethnic workers, in acquiring "American" identities, become specifically *white* Americans, joining a relatively homogeneous "white" population rather than becoming Americans "in general"? Second, to what extent, in that population's eyes, has being American required being "white"?

The first reading runs against understandings of pluralism that stress the continual reconfiguration of separate European ethnicities. Some recent sociological research, however, finds a decline in ethnic differences among Americans of European origin. Richard Alba's study *Ethnic Identity* (1990) saw a growing "social integration among persons with European ancestry," evidenced especially

[113] Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism*, 1, 4, 8, 190, 195, 331.

[114] Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism*, 9–12. The "democratic" dimension, which focused on ideals, bore some relation to Higham's American Universalism, although its broader terms took in tensions between individual and equal rights, and free enterprise and industrial democracy. The "nationalist" aspect required admiration of such (Anglo-) American heroes as the Pilgrims and the Founding Fathers. The "traditionalist" dimension hearkened back to a mythic rural past of hardy, pious, and virtuous folk, when all Americans "were white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant." Gerstle noted that working-class Catholics could not embrace the "traditionalist" aspect, with its nativist overtones, until after World War II had rendered Protestant nativism untenable.

[115] Thomas Childers makes a similar point in tracing "pre-industrial" mentalities in the politics of Weimar Germany, not to vestigial pre-capitalist elites but to the language middle-class Germans used "to define themselves socially for political action." That language made occupation central to one's self-definition, and it tended to describe occupations in terms of "estates" rather than classes. Childers, "The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," *AHR*, 95 (April 1990): 357.

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by a rise in intermarriage among non-Hispanic whites across both ethnic and religious lines, a trend dating at least to the late 1940s. The persistence of ethnic labels among whites suggested the emergence of a "European-American" ethnic group alongside an "old-stock" "unhyphenated American identity." Here, identifying oneself as "Italian," for instance, meant claiming membership in the European-American group and a common past seen in terms of immigration, mobility, and sacrifice. The book suggested that as differences among European Americans faded, those between them, African Americans, and the largest Hispanic groups stood out even more.[116] One might see in this a trend toward a racially defined pluralism, with separate melting pots for European Americans and African Americans.

Alba's argument was not far from that of scholars who saw European ethnics claiming a specifically white identity. This might involve immigrants drawing together on the common ground of whiteness—in a European-American pot, perhaps—or asserting white identity in the belief that only whites counted as American.[117] As both formulations described a kind of trans-ethnic, racial homogenization, work on "white ethnicity" necessarily addressed assimilation.

That work, by scholars such as Roediger, Hirsch, and Gerstle, has begun to sketch a chronology of how particular European immigrant groups claimed whiteness. Roediger's book *The Wages of Whiteness* (1991) tackled the subject in regard to Irish immigrants, noting that before the Civil War, "it was by no means clear that the Irish were white." They claimed that status in part as a basis for equal citizenship with native-born Americans and a weapon in the struggle against blacks *and* native whites for jobs. Roediger more recently noted that immigrants "often were moved to equate whiteness with Americanism in order to turn arguments over immigration from the question of who was foreign to the question of who was white." But he also saw Irish-American whiteness in psychological terms, as a way for a population subjected to a new work discipline to deal with its anxieties and longings by projecting them onto blacks.[118]

The "New Immigrants" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appear to have recapitulated this progression from "not-yet-white ethnic" to white.[119] Higham long ago described the turn-of-the-century rise of a racialized nativism aimed at Jews, Italians, and Slavs. Nationwide, by 1910, workers of northwest European origin "called themselves 'white men' to distinguish them-

[116] Alba, *Ethnic Identity*, 291, 11–12, 14, 312, 314–15, 3, 9–13.

[117] David Roediger hints at such a distinction in "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 184, 187–90. That Americans of European background have historically equated Americanness exclusively with whiteness has been observed by black commentators from Malcolm X to Toni Morrison. See, for example, Malcolm X's statement, "Everything that came out of Europe, every blue-eyed thing, is already an American . . . being born here in America doesn't make you an American," cited in Fuchs, *American Kaleidoscope*, 175. Reflecting on what she termed the "Africanist presence" in American literature, Morrison argued that "[i]t is no accident and no mistake that immigrant populations (and much immigrant literature) understood their 'Americanness' as an opposition to the resident black population . . . Deep within the word 'American' is its association with race . . . American means white, and Africanist people struggle to make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after hyphen." Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 47.

[118] Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, 134, 136, 143–44, 149–50, 150–56; Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 189.

[119] The phrase is John Bukowczyk's, cited in Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 184.

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selves from the southern Europeans whom they worked beside."[120] How rapidly New Immigrants came to claim whiteness is not yet clear.[121] But Gerstle and Hirsch pointed to the 1940s as the crucial moment. World War II, which sparked a revival of American ideology, likewise, Gerstle argued, brought to popular consciousness a version of "cultural pluralism" that decreed "the absolute equality of all people regardless of their racial or cultural character." This ideology became a mainstay of the government's mobilization effort. For European ethnic workers, this semi-official celebration of diversity marked "the historic moment when they felt fully accepted as Americans." Yet, Gerstle suggested, their "embrace of America may well have intensified their prejudice against blacks, for many conceived of Americanization in racial terms: becoming American meant becoming white." And white status did not elevate unless it could be compared to a denigrated blackness. Hence European ethnic workers who saw discrimination against them lose force during the war frequently wished to reinforce the boundary between white and black. They did so partly through hate strikes and race riots aimed at barring African Americans from their neighborhoods. Hirsch, in his 1983 study of race and housing in Chicago, *Making the Second Ghetto,* argued that such attacks by mixed mobs of Irish, East European, and southern European ethnics were made in part in defense of their new-found whiteness. For these rioters, who championed "white" rather than "ethnic" rights, whiteness represented "their badge of rank and status in their adopted home."[122]

IN THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS, historians have revisited assimilation without fully resurrecting it, and with good reason. Before the mid-1960s, the concept often presupposed a rather static, Anglo-Saxon "core" American society to which one was presumed to assimilate. The individualization models offered by Chicago

[120] John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925,* 2d edn. (New York, 1981), 156, 172, 173. Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 184–85, gives further examples of the casting of southern and eastern European immigrants as nonwhite.

[121] Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 185, saw a pressing need for studies of how and why particular immigrant groups chose whiteness. Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London, 1990), 298, depicted late nineteenth-century European immigrants in the American West as drawn to a strain of white egalitarianism that cast whiteness as a symbol of producer solidarity against those who manipulated racially subordinate populations at white producers' expense. Similarly, Barrett's article, which covered the period between 1880 and 1930, suggested that Irish workers "Americanizing" East European laborers may have passed along their own anti-black and anti-Asian attitudes; Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up," 1001–02. However, at certain times and places, such as World War I–era Chicago and turn-of-the-century Louisiana, one could find New Immigrants who did not consider themselves "white"; Roediger, "Whiteness and Ethnicity," 186–87.

[122] Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism,* 289, 290; Gary Gerstle, "The Working Class Goes to War," *Mid-America,* 75 (October 1993): 313, 318; Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto,* 80–81, 186, 187. One wonders whether the war against Japan, as well as that against Germany, played a role in redefining whiteness. While World War II is often seen as a fight against racism, John W. Dower has argued that, to many on both sides, the conflict in the Pacific itself amounted to a race war. In American propaganda and the press, the war frequently pitted GIs against Japanese variously depicted as monkeys, primitives, children, and madmen—stereotypes previously deployed against blacks, Indians, and Chinese immigrants and recycled for the war effort; Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986), 4, 10, and *passim.* It is possible the war also allowed and encouraged European ethnics across the United States to see themselves, and be seen, as part of a nation of whites defending itself against a "yellow" menace.

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sociologists potentially shared this feature with the Anglo-conformity models of Herberg and Gordon. The collapse of the core in the 1960s allowed later historians room to develop more inclusive conceptions of American society. Those conceptions are reflected in three distinct ways of understanding the assimilation of European ethnics. Labor historians see a twentieth-century homogenization along class lines that may represent the emergence of an American working class and, to some scholars, a corresponding "American" identity. Historians of racial identity discern a merging of immigrants and their descendants into a common whiteness, perhaps also spelling their emergence as "Americans." But these accounts of assimilation do not necessarily dovetail, and they present a problem for historians of immigrant groups who see ethnicities constantly recreated within a larger American pluralism. How can one reconcile these visions? Should we take a leaf from the immigration scholars and see the 1930s and 1940s as an example of the variability of ethnic identity, with labor struggles submerging an attribute that came roaring back in the 1960s and 1970s? Or have Gerber and Conzen, in focusing on the nineteenth century, missed two profound, twentieth-century transformations? If so, how do these transformations—working-class homogenization and the rise of the "white ethnic"—fit with one another? My own provisional answer would be to see the emergence in the twentieth century of a pluralism following racial lines, one in which class formation took place in separate melting pots. More important, however, I would urge these three sets of historians to pursue an answer together, taking the next step in reappraising assimilation by talking with one another.

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Featured Reviews

SIDNEY TARROW. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. x, 251. Cloth $59.95, paper $17.95.

How do struggles for change develop? What role do formal organizations play in this process? Why do some people join protests, while others with identical interests remain on the sidelines? How do patterns of collective action change? And why do some struggles fade away quickly, while others evolve into "social movements," which are defined here as "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities" (pp. 3–4)?

Questions of this sort have been addressed in many specialized studies, but most of these focus on either a limited number of issues or events occurring in a specific time and place. This is probably a good thing, overall, because when broad overviews do appear, they often prove to be the work of authors whose reach exceeds their grasp. When a general study as impressive as this one comes along, therefore, it is a noteworthy event. Written by Sidney Tarrow, a political scientist known for his work on Italy, it provides enough in the way of insights and information to deserve a place of honor on many bookshelves, in that special section set aside for such influential earlier overviews as Eric Hobsbawm's *Primitive Rebels* (1959) and Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978)—a work to which Tarrow owes (and acknowledges) a particularly large debt.

At first glance, the most noteworthy thing about Tarrow's book is its boldness. He refers to events as far removed from each other chronologically and geographically as the Boston Tea Party (p. 41) and the rise of Solidarity (p. 131). He builds on, criticizes, and otherwise engages a wide variety of studies by leading scholars in a number of disciplines. And he tackles micro and macro issues ranging from the calculations of risk made by individuals to the role "cleavages within and among elites" play in altering "political opportunity structures" (pp. 85–86).

For all of its apparent boldness, however, Tarrow's book turns out to be less far-flung than it initially seems, and less ambitious in terms of argument than one might expect. This is because Tarrow tends to root his theoretical discussions in data relating to events that have taken place in the times and places with which he is most familiar (Europe and America since the 1760s), and to construct models that allow him to draw on findings put forth by those taking opposite sides in key debates. The former tendency proves problematic at times, because generalizing about the world on the basis of the modern Western experience can be dangerous. But the latter tendency, which leads him to seek middle roads between conflicting lines of interpretation, often leads to positive results.

The most successful parts of the study, in fact, are often those in which Tarrow successfully reformulates what appear to be either/or dilemmas in such a way that "a little of both" becomes the most attractive answer. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the value of this moderate approach. Much of the former is devoted to highlighting the varied roles (mediator, repressor, target) that states play in modern social movements, but a section on "The Seductions of Statism" in the latter provides a useful counterpoint to state-centered approaches.

Tarrow is thus at his best not when he is proposing radically new approaches to particular problems, but rather when he is giving full play to his considerable skill at creating effective syntheses, which lean heavily on studies by others and also make use of his own research. His analysis of protest outcomes (chap. 10) is a case in point. Building on excellent recent case studies of America such as Doug McAdam's *Freedom Summer* (1988) and Suzanne Staggenborg's *The Pro-Choice Movement* (1991), as well as on his own European investigations, Tarrow highlights the long-term impact that social movements can have on both societies and individual participants. He succeeds in navigating a safe course between the Scylla of romanticization and the Charybdis of cynicism, suggesting sensibly that "the most far-reaching impacts of cycles of protest" are often "found in slow and incremental changes in political culture" (p. 184), rather than in dramatic transformations such as revolutions.

It is precisely in his attempts to come to terms with "political" and especially "cultural" contexts, however, that Tarrow's approach proves least satisfying. This is in part because, although he clearly finds something attractive about recent approaches to protest that stress the importance of symbolism and cultural variation (pp. 118–23), he remains wedded to the idea that expressions of dissent should be understood largely in material terms (that is, as competition for resources) and that it is often useful

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to divide them up into a few fairly broad categories. More generally, he suggest that while, in order to bring the general features of protest into high relief, it may be helpful at times to provide thick descriptions of individual conflicts (as he does at one point, pp. 9–10), this kind of close attention to contextual and procedural details is not always necessary.

The tension between his interest in giving cultural specificity its due, on the one hand, and constructing general models, on the other, shows through in his very suggestive but ultimately somewhat fuzzy conceptualization of the role that "strategic framing" plays in determining how audiences come to understand protests. Tarrow argues that in contestations over the meaning of acts of dissent, it is crucial to focus on the behavior of "movement entrepreneurs"; that is, those people who are most skilled at "drawing existing reservoirs of grievance into social movement organizations" (p. 15) and most able to make effective selections from the "cultural toolkit of possible symbols" at their disposal (p. 122). The goal of such activists, Tarrow claims, is to develop strategies that mediate between the "understandings of the groups they appeal to, the sources of official culture and the militants of their own movement," while still reflecting "their own beliefs and aspirations" (p. 122). In doing so, they work to construct and generate support for a vision of their movement that legitimates it by making it appear part of a powerful "master frame" (such as, in America, the quest for "rights") that has broad appeal (p. 131).

Tarrow stresses, however, that structural and material factors always constrain the creativity of movement entrepreneurs. Except at those times when "elites are divided and realignments are occurring" (p. 150), or when "early risers" in a protest cycle have set precedents that inadvertently lowered some of the costs involved in militant action (p. 155), movement entrepreneurs have trouble finding the political space in which to operate effectively. In addition, Tarrow notes, modern activists have to contend with a media establishment that, while not necessarily always hostile to the goals of social movements, follows its own agenda when "framing" and representing struggles for change (pp. 127–28). One of the most interesting things about this conceptualization of protest "frames" is that it acknowledges the importance of cultural variables, but at the same time suggests that a general model can be used to map out the struggles that inevitably occur between "movement entrepreneurs" seeking legitimation, militant protesters pushing for ever riskier forms of confrontation, elites attempting to maintain the status quo, and the media establishment.

In his theorizing about forms of contention, Tarrow goes further in arguing that even those cultural variations that seem at first to defy reduction to general models, can in fact be understood in terms of universal patterns. One pattern he stresses is the shift between the early modern and modern periods from "segmentary" repertoires of contention to "modular" ones (pp. 33–45). When the former predominated, Tarrow claims, different social groups tended to rely on distinctive forms of collective action, there was little coordination among protesters in different regions, and clear links between grievances and tactics could often be found. As modular repertoires took hold, however, one began to find groups with different social bases and ideologies using similar tactics (petition drives, barricade construction, demonstrations) to pursue their goals. Thanks to concurrent changes in media technologies, one also found methods that proved powerful being adopted quickly by people in scattered areas. Tarrow combines this long-term vision of the evolution of repertoires of contention with an interest in short-term alternations (during specific movements) between "violent," "disruptive," and "conventional" forms of protest, each of which is seen as carrying with it distinctive risks and benefits.

There is a great deal of value in Tarrow's discussions of "strategic framing" and patterns of contention. Even for people such as myself who work on parts of the world other than Europe and America, his treatment of "movement entrepreneurs," "structures of opportunity," and the differences between "disruptive" and "conventional" protests provides much useful food for thought. To cite but one example, I was struck by how well his conceptualization of the role of "early risers" in protest cycles could be applied to various periods in Chinese history.

This said, his arguments are open to criticism on several grounds. To begin with, in presenting the European past as a "segmented" prologue to a "modular" present, in which multi-class and national or even international social movements have become the order of the day, pre-industrial protest patterns are not given the attention they deserve. This is particularly true in the case of struggles inspired by "belief" (pp. 37–38), a category that includes not only the kinds of riots analyzed so elegantly in classic essays by Natalie Zemon Davis (a scholar whose arguments Tarrow, despite a passing reference, does not pay the attention they deserve) but also the millenarian movements that swept across large parts of Europe at various times, and which sometimes brought together people from different walks of life. The evolutionary approach to repertoires adopted in this book may also lead some scholars to ask questions about the varying time-lines followed by the protesters of different countries. For example, what should we make of the fact that the "new" kinds of petition drives "seeking justice in the names of general moral claims" through public action, which Tarrow associates with the rise of modular repertoires in the West (p. 41), were commonplace in China (where they were sometimes backed up by riots or demonstrations) centuries before the occurrence of some phenomena Tarrow links to the rise of "modern social movements"?

More generally, Tarrow's concern with putting protests into conceptual boxes (albeit often quite elegant ones) can lead to various kinds of reductionism. Even seemingly simple expressions of dissatisfac-

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tion are often so messy and multifaceted, with so many different resonances for so many different people, and subject to representation through so many kinds of media institutions following so many separate agendas that thin descriptions hinging on straightforward classification schemas and framing struggles involving a few groups simply cannot capture their overall meaning.

Take, for example, his treatment of the "Goddess of Democracy" erected in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which Tarrow refers to as a "Statue of Liberty" deployed mainly to draw "the attention of the international media" (p. 121), which presumably interpreted it as a "conventional" (and imported) symbol of protest. This encapsulated description is not so much "wrong" as troublingly incomplete. It leaves out the fact that the sculpture's creators intentionally avoided using the word for "liberty" in the icon's name and gave it some distinctively Chinese features, in part precisely because they did not want it to be seen as a copy of a particular foreign work. It also glosses over the significance of the white color of the Goddess and its placement in Tiananmen Square, both of which were likely to remind some members of the Chinese audience of a large Mao statue that had figured prominently in a famous National Day celebration of the 1960s, and which had been made familiar to a new generation by ironic use of footage of that parade in a controversial and widely watched television documentary first shown in 1988. Yet another of the things Tarrow's description leaves out is that the construction and carriage of the piece undoubtedly reminded some Chinese of the way traditional representations of Guan Yin, a folk goddess of mercy, looked and were used. Of course, in the end, seeking in one case to legitimize and in the other to delegitimize the movement, American journalists and writers for the official Chinese press agreed that the icon should be treated as an imitation of New York's most famous statue, but it is worth noting that in doing so the latter stressed the "disruptive" quality of this piece's placement in a sacred space reserved for state-sanctioned monuments and gatherings, and insisted that there was nothing "conventional" about the protestor's Goddess.

This brief excursion into thick description is not meant to imply that Tarrow and other model builders should always present all the details relating to every protest they cite, nor is it intended to imply that generalizing about collective action is too fraught with peril to undertake. It is meant solely as a reminder that, even when sophisticated concepts and models are involved and the person engaging in analysis is as sensitive to nuance and as generally skillful as Tarrow, there is always a danger that complex acts will end up being oversimplified. We need to accept, as Tarrow does, that much of the "power in movement" comes from the symbolic dimensions of protest actions, but once we do this then the need to take great care in rooting expressions of dissent in their proper cultural and historical contexts ceases to be a luxury—it becomes a necessity.

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Pierre Péan. *Une jeunesse française: François Mitterand, 1934–1947.* Paris: Fayard. 1994. Pp. 615. 160 fr.

Éric Conan and Henry Rousso. *Vichy: Un passé qui ne passe pas.* Paris: Fayard. 1994. Pp. 327. 130 fr.

Both of these books are interesting and well worth reading, although their primary interest may derive more from the contemporary political scene in France than from their originality or sophistication as works of historical scholarship. Both books highlight the recurrent debate over the attitudes and behavior of the French people during World War II, Pierre Péan's biography of François Mitterrand, indirectly, by focusing on his subject's life from the Popular Front through the Liberation era, and Éric Conan and Henry Rousso, directly, in commenting on a series of recent scandals, trials, and political incidents related to the memory of Vichy. All of our authors are as much concerned with the hotly contested memory of the era—how the history of the period has been constructed, conveyed to later generations, used and sometimes abused by politicians and others—as they are with the history of Vichy per se.

Péan begins his biography by suggesting that Mitterrand, not unlike many other ambitious public figures, has crafted over the years a "selective curriculum vitae" (p. 12) that does not always square entirely with the historical record. The author then sets out to examine in some detail those points about which there has been some controversy concerning Mitterrand's convictions or behavior as a young man. According to the author, Mitterrand summarizes his youth in words to this effect: "In such troubled times, above all when one is young, it is very difficult to make choices. I came out of it relatively well. It is unfair to judge men for errors which are understandable in the circumstances of the time. Politicians are allowed no mistakes!" (p. 18). Although Péan states that he is only setting out the facts and leaving it to his readers to draw their own conclusions about Mitterrand, often he seems to share Mitterrand's own assessment. Between the lines there is an implicit call for forgiveness, for drawing a curtain over certain

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long-simmering quarrels, an appeal for understanding and sympathy for those people who made less heroic choices during World War II than to join the resistance against Germany and the Vichy regime in immediate response to Charles de Gaulle's famous appeal of June 18, 1940.

In describing Mitterrand's coming of age in what was probably the most exciting but difficult epoch in France's twentieth-century history, Péan's account provides little that could be described as startling, or as offering evidence for a substantially new interpretation of Mitterrand's life. Still, the author does give far more detail about Mitterrand's youth and his circle of friends and associates than was available in earlier biographies. Some of this detail helps the reader better appreciate the character of the subject, but some of it seems of marginal interest, threatening at times to muddy the waters rather than to clarify matters. The author is especially interested in what he calls Mitterrand's "Baggage," a chapter heading which he repeats five times throughout the book, including the first and last chapters. He uses this device to emphasis the importance in Mitterrand's life of individuals tied to him by family relations or friendship who were on the extreme right of the political spectrum, notably certain members of the notorious Cagoulard organization that was responsible for several bombings and political assassinations in the late 1930s.

In my opinion the most compelling part of the biography is the section that deals with Mitterrand's years as a student in the Latin Quarter during the 1930s. Here we are offered glimpses of the character and humanity of a man who has been portrayed more often in the guise of the consummate political animal. In addition to his insistence on Mitterrand's loyalty to his friends, a trait that is underlined repeatedly in the text, the author describes the young Mitterrand's competitiveness on the tennis court, his genuine love of literature, and his thirst to enjoy all that Paris has to offer a young man, from formal education (he was a serious student) to lively political debate to romance. Mitterrand fell in love for the first time in 1938, and the author uses the young man's infatuation with the girl of his dreams to emphasize that the future French president's life was not driven by politics during his days in Paris before the war. Péan makes clear that, rumors and allegations notwithstanding, Mitterrand was never involved with the Cagoulards, that despite his presence at the occasional political demonstration or rally, and the fact that (naturally enough given his family background and circle of friends) this was most often in the context of right-wing organizations, at this period in his life Mitterrand was in no sense a political activist. He was a young person, still attached to the religion of his youth and in frequent contact with his high school teachers back home, trying to find his way, sampling a varied menu of literature, entertainment, romance, and politics, with the latter item by no means the main course.

Given Péan's sympathetic and convincing portrait of Mitterrand in the 1930s, the reader may be surprised by an apparent shift of tone in the pages that cover the Vichy period. Where there was indulgence for possible slips of memory related to political affiliation in the 1930s, when it comes to the Vichy years, the author is much less charitable. Péan suggests that Mitterrand has been disingenuous, if not positively dishonest, in recalling his views and behavior under Vichy. The author seems excessively caught up in an attempt to pinpoint exactly when Mitterrand could be classified as a genuine resister. Starting with an obviously oversimplified quotation from Mitterrand's memoirs, "Upon my return to France [after escaping from the POW camp] I became a resister without any wrenching problem" (p. 171), the author asserts that Mitterrand was "Pétainiste," "Maréchaliste," and later "Giraudiste" longer than he has been willing to admit, and suggests that the "official" launching of the resistance movement of which he was one of the principal leaders was several months later than Mitterrand has claimed. For some reason Péan describes Mitterrand's making of false papers and working on escape networks for POWs in the spring of 1942, only months after his escape and return to France, as "parallel activity" rather than resistance. Péan also makes much ado about the date of the awarding of the Francisque to Mitterrand, although no new light is shed on the historical significance of that event.

Using the same evidence that Péan presents to his readers—and many of the extracts of letters, articles, and other documents he quotes are quite interesting—rather than finding a champion of Vichy's National Revolution, one might very well interpret the Vichy period of Mitterrand's life in a manner that would complement the author's conclusions about his behavior and attitudes in the 1930s. His eighteen months of captivity had exposed him to a somewhat broader range of political opinions and social perspectives than he had known before, but most of his friends and contacts were on the right of the political spectrum. Thus, it is not surprising that it was to those circles that he gravitated in seeking employment, and in his first steps toward resistance activity. That he returned from the POW camp still upset with the Third Republic and not hostile to Marshal Pétain did not mean that he was a staunch "Maréchaliste" or advocate of the Vichy Regime's "National Revolution." A quotation from April 1942, which seems to compare the SOL (core of the future *Milice*) favorably to the Légion, and the fact that Mitterrand submitted an article for publication in a patently anti-Semitic journal dedicated to propagating the ideas of Pétain's "National Revolution," are cited as proof of his adherence to the ideology of the Vichy regime. But Mitterrand's comments expressed no admiration for the content of the SOL's ideology, and, of course, he never joined the SOL. He simply stated that it was preferable to have a clear doctrine as did the SOL in contrast to the Légion with which he was disillusioned and from which he had just resigned. Mitterrand's concession that he "should perhaps have paid more

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attention" (p. 185) to the types of views expressed in *France, revue de l'Etat nouveau*, but that as a young man with literary aspirations he simply had a strong desire to see his work in print, does not deter the author from using the publication of an article that in no way champions the ideology of the National Revolution as proof of Mitterrand's "Pétainism."

Despite Péan's assertion, the "ideological coherence of his engagement" (p. 252) under the Vichy regime is simply not proven here. Probably deserving more emphasis is Mitterrand's insistence to a group of former POWs in March 1942, "Comrades, we must never get involved in partisan politics" (p. 181). The author's concession that in June 1942 Mitterrand had not "made a true decision about his life nor even a real political choice" (p. 198) seems to hold true through the liberation period when he first ran for office, not from a fixed ideological perspective (which he had simply not developed then), but with hopes of being elected in a "safe" political district. Nothing in this account fundamentally alters the well-known pattern of Mitterrand's slow evolution from right to left of the French political spectrum. In response to the controversy provoked by the publication of Péan's book, President Mitterrand would acknowledge publicly that, like many of the French POWs, he had believed for some months that Pétain and De Gaulle were working together secretly—a belief that he soon realized was unjustified—but no evidence is presented by Péan that justifies the claim that Mitterrand was at any time an ardent Pétainist or champion of the ideology of Vichy's National Revolution.

Although the author vows to privilege documents from the period over the memories of individuals long after the fact, the historian will notice that several of Péan's key arguments are based on recent interviews (occasionally the citations note that "certain extracts" of documents have been *read* to him) from sources that do not always inspire confidence. One might also question the "guilt by association" implied by featuring on the cover a photograph of Mitterrand with Pétain that was taken in October 1942 at an officious reception for several members of the POW aid group in which Mitterrand worked. The author himself notes that it would be "gratuitous extrapolation" (p. 220) to make too much of its significance, but no doubt the editors felt it would help book sales! The excessive detail about the behavior or attitudes of individuals who were only remotely connected to Mitterrand at times borders on the methodology of tabloid journalism. Finally, historians of the period will note that Péan's understanding of the recent historiography of Vichy is not impressive. Indeed, he caricatures this scholarship in terms of "rigid schemas" (p.277) and an alleged "demonization" of anyone who had anything to do with Vichy, when in fact the recent emphasis among specialists is on the complexity of the period and the dangers of oversimplification.

This issue of the use and abuse of the history of the Vichy era is the main concern of *Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas*, the other book considered here. Rousso and Conan state that their work is not an exhaustive, scientific study, but rather they offer two engaged citizens' reflections on current events, specifically on the manner in which the strident calls emphasizing an "obligation to remember" (*Le devoir de mémoire*) have led to an unfortunate deformation of fact and historical objectivity. In what is in effect an appendix to Rousso's *Le Syndrome de Vichy 1944–198 . . .* (1987), the two authors focus on a variety of scandals, political affairs, and trials of former collaborators to illustrate the manner in which the Vichy period has been portrayed recently in the French media. Included are discussions of the dispute over the proper manner to commemorate the deportation of the Jews rounded up at the Vélodrome de Hiver in July 1942, allegations that the French archives are hiding important documentation about Vichy from the public, the trial of the milician Paul Touvier, consideration of Mitterrand's Vichy experience, an examination of recent writings about the resistance, notably the dispute about the role of Jean Moulin (Communist "agent" or not), and finally a brief, and generally positive, portrayal of the way the history of Vichy is now taught in the French school system.

Conan and Rousso note the manner in which historians in recent years have portrayed Vichy and teachers are conveying it to their students, an approach that emphasizes the complexity of the period and attempts to "understand" rather than to "judge," in contrast to the behavior of the champions of the "duty of memory," whose perspective on the Vichy era is at once distorted, often simply wrong in terms of the historical record, and almost always highly judgmental. According to the authors, "the obligation to remember is an empty shell unless it is based upon knowledge" (p. 268). It is worthless if not firmly anchored by an "obligation to the truth." The authors complain that those calling for remembrance are often poorly qualified in terms of knowledge of the facts. Thus, the "wrong" lessons were given by the lawyers who tried the Touvier case. His actions in executing Jewish hostages at Rillieux, in retaliation for the death of Philippe Henriot, were in the context of the Milice's war against the Resistance and did not fit the legal definition of a crime against humanity as defined at Nuremburg. The repeated comparisons of Touvier's crimes to the actions of Klaus Barbie, responsible for the deportation of Jewish children from Izieu, were invalid because Barbie's action were representative of true crimes against humanity and reflected German initiative whereas the instigation of Touvier's actions was purely French. The authors regret that the text for the memorial at Izieu mentions "the complicity" of the government of Vichy (when Vichy had nothing to do with that particular incident) whereas the memorial for the Vél' d'Hiv, which might have been used symbolically to emphasize Vichy's heavy responsibility for anti-Semitic per-

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secution in France, speaks only of crimes against humanity committed "under" Vichy's authority. The authors argue that the deportations, the principal crimes against humanity, were of German instigation, whereas the "Jewish Statute," issued by Vichy in October 1940, was a more accurate reflection of the long tradition of French xenophobia, and would provide a better symbolic representation of specifically French responsibility under Vichy.

In several of their chapters Rousso and Conan point to an increasingly "Judeocentric" reading of the history of the Vichy period that they criticize as fundamentally anachronistic. Their point is not to deny the importance of Vichy's persecution of the Jews, but rather to suggest the danger of "rereading all of the history of the Occupation through the prism of anti-Semitism" (p. 269), when those living through the period were confronted with many other issues, and non-Jews were also subjected to persecution under Vichy. The authors also complain about the tendency of activist groups to place their parent's generation on trial for its behavior under Vichy. These groups, the vocal advocates of the "obligation to remember," often underestimate the significance of the purge at the liberation, suggesting that many implicated under Vichy escaped responsibility for their actions, and they occasionally criticize the "official historians" of trying to hide or cover up the truth, when in fact, Rousso and Conan argue, they want simple black-and-white explanations rather than the complexity serious scholarship demands. Continuing the pop-psychological line of Rousso's *Vichy Syndrome*, the authors suggest that the younger generation's "obsession" with Vichy, and their tendency to judge their parent's generation for their alleged failure to meet the challenge of fascism in the 1930s and under Vichy, may be a substitute for their fear or failure to confront honestly the problems of their own generation.

Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas is a very interesting book, but I have the impression that the authors may be jousting with windmills in their apparent desire to contest the influence of popular media on public opinion. When they say "Let's stop this infantile ritual that consists of becoming indignant every six months because a scoop reveals that the French collaborated or that Vichy was an accomplice in the 'Final Solution': we know it, we've said it, we teach it and commemorate it" (p. 285), they express the traditional frustration of the academic historian whose audience and influence rarely can compare to that of film, television, or popular press. I suspect that they have the story just about right in terms of the continuing debate over Vichy, but I doubt that they will have the last word. Ironically, the publication of Péan's book might have served as a final example for Rousso and Conan, had their book not been published at approximately the same time as his.

Following the schema that Conan and Rousso decry, the media seized on the supposed "scoops" and "revelations" about Mitterrand's past, following the release of Péan's book, to produce yet another "affaire Mitterrand." For several weeks newspapers were filled with indignant articles and letters to the editor in response to these shameful "discoveries" and allegations that Mitterrand, "the Pétainist resister," lacked moral fiber, was politically opportunistic, and was anti-Semitic. Eventually, President Mitterrand, politically besieged and physically ill near the end of his presidency, actually went on television to try to set the record straight about his experience during the Vichy era. In reference to his having ordered a wreath placed on Marshal Pétain's grave to commemorate the Battle of Verdun, Mitterrand insisted that he did not mean for his actions to contribute further to divisions among the French and he appealed for and end to the "permanent civil war" over France's often contested history. But unfortunately the President also stated (incorrectly) that Vichy's anti-Semitic legislation—which he said he had known nothing about—had been limited to foreign Jews, and he seemed to gloss over the significance of the actions of René Bousquet, symbol of Vichy police cooperation in the deportation of Jews from France. Wishing to explain how an honorable person like himself had been associated at one time with the Vichy regime, yet had made a genuine and complete commitment to the resistance, the president appeared to some of his critics to be offering a partial apologia for Vichy. Within a short time this "affair," having contributed little or nothing to the advancement of historical understanding, faded from the headlines. Yet, before passing from the scene, it had dramatically confirmed the justice of Conan and Rousso's choice of title. The ghosts of Vichy's past simply will not go away.

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THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation.* Honolulu: Hawaii University Press. 1994. Pp. xvi, 228. $34.00.

This is a highly original and important study. Ever since Benedict Anderson gave us some tantalizing glimpses into Thongchai Winichakul's Ph.D. thesis in his revised edition of *Imagined Communities* (1991), those interested in new approaches to nationalism have eagerly awaited its appearance. The book ex-

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ceeds this promise. Simply put, it is a study of the conditions that make it possible to view the history of a nation, here Thailand, as a given territorial entity—as a geo-body. The geo-body is a construct that is different from the actual historical entities that occupied the space of today's Thailand, not just in their geographical shape and extent but more importantly in the nature of their conceptions of space and sovereignty. The geo-body makes claims to areas, peoples, and cultures that are in fact historically *unverifiable* because these people did not associate sovereignty with territorial boundedness. The conditions that make possible the geo-body and its history are the new conditions of knowledge-production, in particular the discourse and technology of modern geography and map-making that displace, or rather, conquer premodern geographical discourse.

The book appears at the intellectual conjuncture of trends in critical theory and the new historiography of Asia. They are, on the one hand, studies of nationalism inspired by postmodernist and discourse analysis, the critique of linear, evolutionary history, and the revaluation of space in opposition to (historical) time. Within Asian studies, many of these ideas interweave in a paradigm identified loosely as postcolonialism, in which the modern nation-states in the ex-colonies are seen to be reproducing the colonizer's ideological structures of dominance, especially the Enlightenment discourse of modernity and the history of linear progress. Whatever the achievements of modernity, it has also appropriated historical cultures or systematically (mis)represented them according to its own terms and found them to be wanting. In large measure because of the prevalence of postcolonialism, critical cultural theory has possibly had a greater impact on historians of the non-Western world than on historians of Europe or America. Among works in Asian historiography that I would identify as postcolonial are the works of the South Asian Subaltern Studies group reviewed recently in an *AHR* forum (vol. 99, n. 5 [Dec. 1994]), Stefan Tanaka's *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (1993), and my own *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (1995), among others.

Although it refers to none of the above, Winichakul's book can be located in the same historical moment as these works. In these works, linear history in the Enlightenment mode is no longer seen as a transparent medium that merely reflects historical realities. Tanaka's book focused on the late-nineteenth-century Japanese production of *toyoshi* (literally, East Asian history), which enabled the new nation-state to both write its history as a civilized, modern nation and also as a culture that had its roots in a great Asiatic tradition that could challenge Western conceptions of superiority. This dualistic construct enabled Japanese pan-Asianism and facilitated Japanese intervention in Asia since Japan regarded itself as modern and "advanced," but was also "obliged" to help its "backward" Asiatic brethren. My study seeks to understand how linear, progressive history of the modern Chinese nation becomes a political force in the contests with and appropriation of historical and popular cultures by modernizing elites. The adoption of a modern vocabulary—in which new meanings were frequently smuggled into old words such as feudalism or revolution—often obscured political possibilities inherent in older usages of these words and, consequently, access to these political traditions and popular culture.

Although the adoption of the new history of the nation is a central concern of Winichakul's study, its distinctiveness derives from his deep and creative understanding of geography, cartography, and territoriality in the framing of this history as that of the geo-body. Winichakul refuses to view the ascendancy of modern geography as the triumph of truth over mythic knowledge of space. Premodern polities in Southeast Asia possessed both practical (although not scientific) and ritual geographies and, like modern geography, they constituted their object of knowledge for their own purposes. He seeks to demonstrate that there are extra-scientific procedures involved in geographical knowledge and that an interpretive process is involved in understanding a modern map. Thus, while in theory a map merely reflects the preexisting political boundaries of the nation, in reality the territorial nation exists first, and sometimes only, on the map. Where the territory is contested, the "truth" of geography is backed by military power. It is in this sense that geographical knowledge produces its object.

Through much of the nineteenth century, modern and premodern geographies were competing discourses about space. Winichakul charts the way in which Siam's most famous monarch of the nineteenth century and leader of the Westernizing forces, Mongkut, dramatized the triumph of modern science and geography by predicting a full solar eclipse at Wako in 1868. Ironically, Mongkut was able to do so as much by his knowledge of indigenous astrology as modern astronomy. Winichakul suggests that there was a certain conceptual and taxonomic overlap between indigenous and modern geography. Consequently, the new geography had to both differentiate itself from the older one and, at the same time, took advantage of this compatibility and ambiguity to "usurp those properties of indigenous knowledge."

Historically in the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, territorial boundaries as lines of demarcation were nonexistent. Rather, there were shifting boundaries and zones, occupied often by petty rulers and tributaries subject to the authority of two or more overlords. With the advent of imperialism and the idea of bounded territories—doubtless a result of the relationship between capitalism and geographical knowledge, which both enabled and necessitated global mastery—modern empires and nations scrambled to define their geo-bodies. England and France, with empires to the west and east of

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Siam respectively, in seeking to clarify (and expand) the extent of their territories, ended up denying local chiefs and overlords any sovereignty claims in these zones. Maps, after all, do not deal very well with a hierarchy of status claims over territory. As the new Siamese nation caught on to the European game, the European nations moved rapidly to use their traditional overlordship or cultural affinity with border polities to claim territorial sovereignty over them. Often the peoples of these areas did not realize the novelty of the new territorial conception. But when they were suddenly barred from visiting relatives or seeking their livelihood on the other side of the "national" boundary, its significance became all too clear.

The book suggests that the geo-body contributes to the fetishism of nationhood. The geo-body becomes naturalized and its soil endowed with primordial sentiment. Ultimately, the map itself becomes a "meta-sign" whereby it bears meanings of its own, without further reference to the territoriality of the nation. In this way, it creates meanings and values beyond its origin; and by associating the map with, say, Thai food or anticommunism, the geo-body is reempowered. The fetishistic power of the geo-body "significantly increases by means of its intercourse with other powerful discourses, especially by transferring traditional values to enrich its presence. Its life is diabolically generative" (p. 135). And perhaps its most diabolic power is its ability to generate its own history, as much in academia as in popular drama. Whereas in earlier histories there was no such thing as territorial loss, only a loss of tributary rights—indeed, this right was often gifted away—the new history of the geo-body re-views this as a profoundly consequential territorial loss that necessitates a wholly different form of control in the present. This history renders all those who have been at the peripheries, the margins, or, simply, outside the ambit of historical states in the region as the historical property of the nation-state and so to be directly controlled by it. The new history is the secret history of Bangkok expansionism.

Rich and immensely useful as this understanding of the geo-body is, Winichakul tends to present this territorial conception of the nation as established fact, even naturalized, and uncontested. And yet, in most nations around the world, there are also alternative conceptions of nationhood that, if they do not contest, certainly produce some tensions with the territorial conception. Race or ethnicity (or religion, say among Islamic nations) come readily to mind as instances of extraterritorial identities. In the last few pages, Winichakul addresses this issue, but all too fleetingly. He submits that the boundaries of (ethnic) Thainess are not coterminous with the boundaries of the geo-body and suggests that confrontation is imminent in this lack of fit. One thinks of the historically troubled presence of ethnic Chinese in all Southeast Asian nation-states. This is a presence that may be becoming more troubled because these ethnic Chinese have developed new business links with the People's Republic of China (PRC) while the nation-states to which they belong are becoming increasingly suspicious of the PRC. How does the geo-body deal with this alternative vision, both of Thai and Chinese nationhood within its boundaries? Does it uphold Thai ethnicity while rejecting Chinese ethnicity? Does the geo-body acquire its meaning simply from its territorial delimitation, or also from a racial conception at its core?

Additionally, in nations such as China, mapping is not the only means of incorporation into the nation. To be sure, the logic that Winichakul outlines works here to a considerable degree. Particularly evident is the new value assigned to territorial "loss" that was absent before the late nineteenth century. Indeed, lands gained by Russians and others before about 1860 were not registered as lost territories. But the incorporation of some of the border regions into China is also justified according to a different reasoning. The historical discourse of a civilizing mission also sustains the geo-body. For instance, the incorporation of Tibet is interpreted as the voluntary submission of an oppressed people to a more enlightened Chinese rule. Indeed, the historical autonomy of these border regions is affirmed by a juridical autonomy and concessions to minorities in the current political system. Thus, to some extent, the arbitrariness of the boundaries in these regions is implicitly acknowledged. Moreover, while the territorial principle is confirmed in the comparison between Taiwan and Singapore, it is the "blood tie" (*tongbao*) that is confirmed in the comparison between Taiwan and the Liuqiu islands. Singapore, dominated by ethnic Chinese, cannot be seen as Chinese territory, whereas the PRC, whose claims to Taiwan are well known, has no claims to the Liuqiu islands (that is, Okinawa), which were historically perhaps more important to the Chinese empire than Taiwan, but are inhabited by non-Han Chinese.

These criticisms are by no means intended as a rejection of the thesis but rather as elaborations and modifications, and perhaps also a reminder of the specificity of the Thai case, which was an independent state during the colonial era. This study's basic argument that much historiography is the history of the geo-body, a modern construct with no equivalents in past times, even if not completely new in terms of our general understanding of territoriality, is one of the most illuminating and usable formulations of the problem that I have encountered. Winichakul has taken us far beyond nationalist assumptions of the history of nation-states. What makes his study so special is that it is a work where theory illumines history equally as history informs theory.

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Reviews of Books

GENERAL

LEONARD W. LEVY. *Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie.* (A Borzoi Book.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1993. Pp. xi, 688. $35.00.

DAVID LAWTON. *Blasphemy.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 242. Cloth $39.95, paper $16.95.

The case of Salman Rushdie has benefited no one but the bodyguard and journalism industries, but it has also inspired several reconsiderations of the nature and history of blasphemy, including both of the books under review, one a revision and expansion of an earlier work brought up to date with the *Gay News* case of 1977 and the Rushdie case.

In 1981 Leonard W. Levy published *Treason against God: A History of the Offense of Blasphemy,* "an unfashionably Whiggish book" (p. xii) as he called it, treating the history of blasphemy from Moses to the early eighteenth century in terms of an absolute and ahistorical concept of freedom of expression and focusing after the Reformation entirely on English and English colonial societies. Standing in a progressive secularist tradition, Whiggish it was, and consistent with Levy's earlier work (for example, *The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment* [1986]) on civil liberties and threats to them, many of those threats from what today would be called the religious Right. Although Levy's classical and biblical accounts relied heavily on outdated scholarship and some of his conclusions, particularly about the Middle Ages, were challenged by E. D. Craun in 1983 and Carla Casagrande in 1987, Levy's *Treason against God* has remained the most substantial and ambitious survey of the history of blasphemy. It provides most of the historical background for David Lawton's study and forms the core of Levy's new book. Levy has cut 100 pages from *Treason against God* and added another 243 pages, taking his history from the early eighteenth century to the Rushdie dilemma.

The Lawton and Levy books are oddly complementary in matters of conceptualization, methodology, and execution. Levy writes from the Whiggish perspective of First Amendment freedoms, relies heavily on the details of legal history, and construes the social context of blasphemy exclusively from the perspective of legal and constitutional history. Lawton will have as little to do with all this as possible. His is a poststructuralist Whiggishness that deals with violence against difference, treating how idealized "communities held together by their enjoyment of difference" (p. 202) are ruptured by the intrusion of operative concepts of blasphemy. Along the way he offers extensive discussions of Sigmund Freud, Georges Bataille, and Roland Barthes's essay on wrestling, with an interesting disquisition on some of the political functions of Hulk Hogan that Barthes certainly had not foreseen. Both traditional and poststructural forms of Whiggishness agree that laws against blasphemy are bad things and that the Rushdie case is appalling, but their styles of saying so characterize two very different ways of doing history and belles lettres at the end of the twentieth century. They can most readily be compared in their treatments of the cases of Jesus, James Nayler, and Rushdie. Neither makes any excursion into the Arabic terms for blasphemy and how they may differ from the English.

Lawton, an accomplished scholar of medieval English literature, professes not to have written a history at all, but rather "a selective historical study of blasphemy as text" (p. 5), and highly elusive text at that. Precisely because of its elusiveness and relativity, blasphemy offers Lawton a number of occasions for shrewd and important insights: that accusations of blasphemy displace the dogmatic content of heretical beliefs; the association of blasphemy with obscenity, defamation, and sedition; and its contentious and relentlessly public character. Lawton is at his best in dealing with individual texts such as Rushdie's, and in all of his texts he sees the illegitimate uses of power on behalf of whatever orthodoxies the wielders of power choose to defend: "All cases known to me are either vexatious, or tyrannical, or they punish people who should have been helped" (p. 202). And Lawton has little patience with the discourses of those who have taken offense at blasphemy. They simply misunderstand the nature of community, and accordingly they inflict suffering on those whom they accuse of violating their limited and tyrannical sense of community.

For all of the history that is not in Lawton's book,

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there is plenty in Levy's. But much of it is old history—I found few works cited that are later than the mid–1970s—and dated. Although the book is arranged chronologically, Levy is at his best once he hits the late seventeenth century and handles case after case, publication after publication, context after context. He gives a more than adequate account of the modern history of the offense of blasphemy (religious and civil) and nicely emphasizes its new prominence in the thought and writing of sixteenth-century ecclesiastical reformers who were reluctant to apply the term "heresy" to matters of religious disagreement but no less eager to impose stiff penal sanctions on those with whom they disagreed.

In legal history from the seventeenth century to the present Levy is on solid and familiar ground, and in bringing his earlier account up to the present he traces the legal idea of blasphemy in both England and the United States in great detail. For earlier periods Levy is not as reliable, nor does he consider continental developments. He depends too much on translated materials and outdated scholarship, and he gets medieval Europe quite wrong. Ignoring the work of Craun and Casagrande, he subordinates medieval concerns with blasphemy to those of heresy, the development of which idea Levy seems not fully to understand although he cites the best general literature in English.

The complementarily of these books is expressed in one more aspect: the cover of Lawton's reproduces William Blake's watercolor illustration of Leviticus 24:16; that of Levy reproduces Andrès Serrano's *Piss Christ.* One fancies that in some blasphemous collusion on the part of the cover designers, they might have been reversed.

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Karen Armstrong. *A History of God: The 4000–Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.* (A Borzoi Book.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1993. Pp. xxiii, 460. $27.50.

This is a plucky book that attempts single-handedly and in documented form to disfranchise God from the credulous minds of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. What one has finally to assess in reviewing this book, however, is its possible contribution to the literature of the disenchanted. Because it is not scholarly in the strictest exegetical sense and thus contributes nothing to textual and tradition studies, and because by its own admission it pretends to no knowledge gained through mystical experience (although it does generalize about mystics and other religious experts), it must be considered as a contemporary contribution to our age-old devil's advocacy literature of debunking or, in the fashion of recent decades, deconstruction.

Karen Armstrong is perfectly straightforward or, in literary terms, autobiographically frank about her disillusionment with Abrahamic monotheism after her vocational experience as a nun. In fact, her writing has a disarming appearance of a victim's sincerity (especially among her newfound rationalist friends honored eloquently in chapter 11, entitled "Does God Have a Future?") and of academic expertise, as is demonstrated by her copious footnotes, maps of early Jewish, Christian, and Muslim historic and religious sites, and exhaustive suggested primary and secondary reading material.

At times highly learned scholars, to say nothing of believers, may wince or whine respectively at some of her facile generalizations and judgments about words, ideas, spiritual conditions, and persons who have spent their lives in one tradition or another trying to understand and be understood. Of special irritation to traditionalist Muslims, for example, would be her assertion: "It is not surprising that Muhammad found the revelations such an enormous strain: not only was he working through an entirely new political solution for his people, but he was composing one of the great spiritual and literary classics of all time" (p. 140). This is high praise for a fellow composer perhaps, but nonetheless reductionist in its familiar repetition of the old cornerstone of Jewish and Christian excising of God from the authorship of the Holy Qur'an.

Her book, in its generously broad sweep, may contribute in its own way, as does the oft-cited believer in mythic unity, Joseph Campbell, to the preservation of the amateur spirit as it maneuvers gamely through the Scylla of academic theological specialism and the Charybdis of resurgent fundamentalism in search of some haven of intellectual, if not religious, authenticity. And it does so, unlike Campbell's works, by indicating with some modesty that it is not "a history of the ineffable reality of God itself, which is beyond time and change, but a history of the way men and women have perceived him from Abraham to the present day" (p. xx).

Its hubristic title, however, recalls an effort by the late Jesuit Cardinal Jean Daniélou in the 1950s to promote the same deity to the clearly manifest ubiquitous mover of history in his *Essai sur le mystère de l'histoire,* translated into English as *The Lord of History* (1958). In that instance, the author, a recognized member of the guild of Patristic scholars, was indulging his desire to reach a wider audience with a popular apologetic book. By contrast, Armstrong, a sometime media figure in Britain and generalist author on big religious topics, has been drawn to enter the specialist lists with her laborious excising of God, who has, in her view, never existed as generally conceived and is only a linguistic fabrication of sadly yearning, self-deceived minds.

The effort in both cases is too obviously driven by bias to be convincing and could have been undertaken more persuasively, with less narcissism, as in Daniélou's case, through prayerful hiddenness, and in Armstrong's, by a simple farewell whisper of "no."

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Such would contribute more than does hundreds of pages of manipulated sources and ideological antagonisms to the once-serious debate, which recently has fallen on hard times, between belief and unbelief, auditory silence and probing constructs, reverence and denial. What has ensued in this instance is a mound of documentation spurred upward ponderously by an author convinced that bulk persuades.

"James Joyce got it right in *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*," Armstrong tells us in her oddly ingenuous introduction. It is thus that a Mephistophelian critic is inadvertently given an invitation to look at this author's enthusiasm and wonder about the motive for flashpoints of resurgent rationalism or unfulfilled zeal.

"In the beginning, human beings created a God who was the First Cause of all things, and ruler of Heaven and earth" (p. 4), Armstrong writes at the beginning of chapter 1. St. John's Gospel is corrected at last. Next to this sentence the Icarian lyric of Joyce's flight to aesthetically "forge in the smithy of (his) soul the uncreated conscience of (his) race" sounds modest indeed. Perhaps Armstrong does contribute, again inadvertently, to the much-needed remarking of the boundary, blurred so elegantly by T. S. Eliot, between the religious and the literary impulse.

"The mystics have long insisted that God is not another Being; they have claimed that he does not really exist and that it is better to call him nothing" (p. 396). Which mystics is Armstrong referring to? Who, when, why, how was this idea expressed? Is this resurgent iconoclasm? Is the author identifying with the neo-gnostic yearning for an impersonal, utterly non-human, non-incarnational, transcendent idea in which to believe? Or does generalizing deconstruction end simply in nothing? Yet this nothing may be prelude to the emergence of something, as seems to follow most dogmatic declarations of presumed nothingness.

Armstrong, albeit neither a clever devil nor a selfless angel, yearns beneath her mound of verbal debris "to create a vibrant new faith for the twenty-first century" (p. 399). But Goethe also got it right (*Faust* I, 1936–39) when he said through Mephistopheles: "Who would know and describe a living thing,/Seeks first to expel the spirit within,/Then he stands there, the parts held in his grasp,/Lost just the spiritual bond, alas!"

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MICHAEL ADAS, editor. *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order.* (Critical Perspectives on the Past.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 379. Cloth $49.95, paper $18.95.

This book is the first in a series prepared under the auspices of the American Historical Association to advance cross-cultural and global perspectives in the study and teaching of world history. The essays are meant to provide secondary and college teachers with comprehensive reviews of recent historiographical perspectives and research findings in the Islamic, modern European, and colonial eras. A considerable effort has been made to incorporate a global perspective and to avoid a Eurocentric view of the world. There is a chapter on the world economy before the rise of Europe, two chapters on the Islamic world, and several essays on European relations with the rest of the globe, including the Columbian discoveries, the slave trade, and colonialism. Due weight is given to movements of protest and resistance in colonized areas. There are several essays on European military history, the Industrial Revolution, and gender issues. The overall quality is exceptionally high. The essays give exemplary accounts of the new historiographical perspectives, provide excellent notes and bibliographies, and serve well the needs of nonspecialist readers.

There remain, nonetheless, important problems. The underlying issue of the book, although not fully explicit, is the rise of the West, "ending with the processes by which the nation-states of the West attained domination over all other civilizations and culture areas" (p. xi). The implied question is whether it is valid to see all world history as leading up to and perhaps culminating in the hegemony of Europe or whether this is a Euro-American prejudice that has to be overcome in the interest of creating a more genuinely balanced global history. Obviously the authors and sponsors are committed to broadening the concept of world history to include non-Europeans, and to recognizing how the "European drive for global hegemony . . . has been profoundly influenced by the responses of African, Asian, Latin American, or Oceanic peoples" (p. x). In a number of ways, however, the book shies away from a full confrontation with its own underlying concerns.

First, there are a number of critical omissions. We have too little on the origins of European hegemony in the early modern period. An article on Immanuel Wallerstein's thesis of the rise of the world-capitalist system, much commented on and criticized in other essays, and a more general review of the processes of European state formation, would have better illuminated the reasons for the emergence of European hegemony.

Moreover, although the book presents excellent materials on demographic trends, trade, industrialization, and gender relations, and gives due weight to the history of slavery, racism, and to movements of protest and resistance, it has scarcely anything on science, technologies, and on institutional, cultural, and sociocultural history. This is partly a reaction to the overemphasis of previous generations of historians on intellectual history, and partly a reaction to the use of cultural history to make a case for European superiority and to legitimize Western colonial domination. The neglect of scientific, technological, cultural, and religious issues may also be a reflection of

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contemporary historical processes in which all cultural issues are reduced to identity symbols. The neglect of science and technology gives an unreal quality to the history of the world economy, and the neglect of philosophical, political, and social values gives an equally unreal, dehumanized quality to the study of European industrialization and gender relations. If the implied purpose of the book is to overcome a latent sense that only European history matters, how will it do so without directly confronting the issue of whether there are distinctive European and other civilizational values and cultures that have an impact on world history?

To take one example, the rise of capitalism: although the Protestant ethic thesis is no longer accepted, a valid question remains as to whether capitalism depends on certain kinds of institutions, communities, values, and moral attitudes, and, if so, whether these are the same or different in different civilizations. Recent studies of the economic development of China and Japan, for example, raise important questions about the role of Chinese family cooperation, work ethic, and Confucian values, or of Japanese collective structures, hierarchy, and discipline. Are cultural themes such as free-market ideologies, instrumental rationality and efficiency, individualism, or democracy irrelevant concerns in the history of Euro-American development?

Finally, the book has no concept of the role of non-Western societies in world history. The article by Janet Abu-Lughod on "The World System in the Thirteenth Century" is unfortunately vague on precisely the question of the contribution of this earlier period to later historical developments. The Islamic world is represented in the book, but what is its relation to European developments? Third World peoples are represented as victims, protestors, and resistors to European colonialism, and are shown to be autonomous in the pursuit of their own objectives within the context of European hegemony, but world history remains Eurocentric because there is no concept of the contribution of non-European peoples to the global historical process apart from their anticipation of or reaction to European developments. We still tell the story in terms of Europe, but not, for example, in terms of global scientific, religious, or popular cultures, or in terms of the migration and mingling of peoples, or in terms of shared cultures and new identities. Our historiography has yet to develop a vision of the role of all the world's peoples in global history. Our perspective, however modified by liberal attitudes, guilt, self-criticism, and outreach, is still a history of the rise of the West.

This book, then, is a fine achievement, superb as a review and statement of the current historiography. It shows, too, that although we are prepared to be critical of the shortcomings of European history and historiography, we are not quite ready or able to integrate the history of non-Euro-American peoples into a truly global history.

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Gertrude Himmelfarb. *On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on Culture and Society.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp. xvi, 192. $23.00.

This book by Gertrude Himmelfarb consists of seven essays that began as lectures and occasional pieces; all have been published before. As is common in collections of this sort, the essays vary in subject matter and weight. "Where Have All the Footnotes Gone?", which the author describes as a *jeu d'esprit*, laments the decline of the footnote in scholarly publications. (The footnote, I must say, is not an endangered species in most of the books I read.) "From Marx to Hegel" celebrates the belated triumph of Hegel over Marx, which Himmelfarb illustrates with Václav Havel's statement to the U.S. Congress that "Consciousness precedes Being, and not the other way around, as the Marxists claim." (I hope those members of Congress who so enthusiastically applauded Havel are prepared to help prevent Eastern Europe's material realities from returning to overwhelm its spirit.) In "The Dark and Bloody Crossroads Where Nationalism and Religion Meet," she argues that "not all nationalities are worthy of respect and recognition." Good, healthy nationalisms are those "tempered by religion as well as the other resources of civilization" (pp. 119, 121). "Of Heroes, Villains, and Valets" provides some fragmentary reflections on the role of the individual in history and on the danger of reducing history to the study of long-term structural change. "Liberty: 'One Very Simple Principle'?" rehearses Himmelfarb's claim that there are two John Stuart Mills: the radical, irresponsible author of "On Liberty" and the more moderate, prudent ally of Alexis de Tocqueville and other sensible liberals. In this essay, the "bad" Mill is held partly accountable for the philosophical position that Himmelfarb most dislikes, the postmodern denial that there is any such thing as truth. Her critique of postmodernism is the central subject of the first and last essays, "On Looking into the Abyss" and "Postmodernist History," but in a sense it pervades the entire volume, which is, as the author tells us in her brief introduction, "dedicated to the proposition that there are such things as truth and reality and that there is a connection between them, as there is also a connection between the aesthetic sensibility and the moral imagination, between culture and society" (p. xii). Her enemies are those who seem to deny these fundamental values.

Himmelfarb is not a talented polemicist. To be sure, she has no trouble hitting such large and slow-moving targets as Martin Heidegger's politics, Paul de Man's youthful anti-Semitism, and Jacques Derrida's preposterous defense of de Man. Most of

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her opponents, however, will have little trouble evading her wrath. In part this is because she rarely feels it necessary to analyze or argue with them; it usually seems to be enough to state their views with sufficient scorn and outrage. Too often, these views are distorted beyond recognition. Her treatment of Richard Rorty, for example, is based on a crude caricature of his ideas, which may be deeply wrong, but are also far more interesting and substantially more difficult to dismiss than her account would suggest. This is a book of opinions, not arguments and analysis; it is a sermon for the choir, delivered to those who already have the faith.

Himmelfarb's own opinions are abundantly clear, but it is sometimes unclear who exactly holds the opinions she so vigorously attacks. Consider, for example, her discussion of the Holocaust, which, she tells us, "stands as a rebuke to historians, philosophers, and literary critics who, in their zeal for one or another of the intellectual fashions of our time, belittle or demean one of the greatest tragedies of all time" (p. xi). She excoriates those historians who see "not beasts but faceless bureaucrats, not corpses but statistics, not willful acts of brutality and murder but the banal routine of everyday life, not gas chambers and gulags but military-industrial-geopolitical complexes" (p. 18). But who are these historians? One searches her endnotes in vain for the names of scholars who belittle or demean the Holocaust, just as one searches in vain for references to the extraordinary new work being done by Richard Breitman, Christopher Browning, Jonathan Steinberg, and many others. It is unfortunate that in her zeal to make a polemical point, Himmelfarb misses the opportunity to introduce her many readers to those who have recently helped us to understand this central tragedy of our time.

A similar weakness undermines her attack on "Postmodernist History." A great many of the alleged postmodernists mentioned in the sixty-seven endnotes to this essay are not historians at all. Most of the writings by historians that she does cite are programmatic statements and methodological exhortations (some of which, in their strident tone and lack of substance, have a not entirely accidental resemblance to her own essay). As far as I can tell, not one book of postmodernist history is discussed. Postmodernists, one suspects, come as single spies, not in battalions: without Hayden White and a handful of others, the defenders of truth against postmodern subversion would have no enemies at all.

This book is handsomely produced and has been widely promoted. It will, however, persuade no one. Those whom Himmelfarb attacks will ignore her. Some of those who share her views may be glad to see them repeated one more time. But others will hope that she soon returns to writing those fine works of history that represent the most sustained and eloquent arguments in favor of the kind of history she thinks ought to be written.

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MICHAEL MANN. *The Sources of Social Power.* Volume 2, *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 826. Cloth $79.95, paper $24.95.

Sociologist Michael Mann uses this ambitious work to apply his theory that major historical developments are determined by the complex interaction of four sources of power: economic, military, ideological, and political. The field of inquiry is the long nineteenth century in England, Germany, France, and the United States, with periodic gestures toward Austria-Hungary and Russia thrown in (sometimes a bit hastily). Mann contends that, whereas eighteenth-century history had been primarily determined by military and economic forces, the nineteenth century was framed by political and economic forces, or the nation and the social classes. Even two forces, however, cannot describe the intricacy Mann seeks, for other factors—even the ideological, although on the wane since the decline of Christian churches—continued to play some role; tangential loyalties (as to localities) figured in; and some outright accident must be allowed for.

Mann covers the major political revolutions and the industrial revolution that open his period. He offers a masterful summary of the expansion of the state (*functional, bureaucratic, and fiscal*) that is worth the price of the book in its own right. He then turns to the rise of Germany in central Europe and its displacement of heterogeneous Austria; next to the industrial class struggle, first in England and then, in the most clearly comparative section, in all the major industrial nations; and then, briefly, to the complicating factor of agrarian politics. The book ends with the unraveling of the origins of World War I in terms of the theory of multiple power sources.

Mann's theoretical presentations are accessible, calling on a range of social scientists from Karl Marx and Max Weber onward. Whether they are ultimately persuasive is harder to decide. In a sense, the factors are sufficiently manifold that the historian may conclude that Mann is largely schematizing a familiar range of forces of the sort synthesizing historians use fairly routinely. And inevitably there must be quarrels with any such far-reaching approach. Ideology is oddly handled, with too little credit given to cultural forces and particularly to the power of bourgeois formulations. Although measurable developments such as literacy receive interesting treatment, the content of education is strangely downplayed.

This said, Mann's wide reading and sensible judgments (the theory itself is sensible in postulating multiple causes) produce some memorable sections. He takes stands on a host of debates, from the

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fashionable ideological explanation of the French Revolution (overdone, he correctly notes) to the German *Sonderweg* (not too useful as explanation, for every nation has special features) to why there has been no serious American socialism (simply the extreme of a standard class conflict situation with the state mixed in). His grasp of historiography and his service in reviewing it are admirable. The treatment of political developments—the state and nationalism—is extremely good, providing a useful overview for all sorts of historians (and particularly for Americanists), who will see their exception deftly handled as part of a standard nineteenth-century pattern. Breakdowns of the various forces at work in the state are also perceptive, including an ultimate assessment of Germany's lack of really unitary political control. Other sections seem a bit more routine: the treatment of Austria, the coverage of British labor, even the explanation of World War I.

Mann offers no dramatic overall argument, comparable, say, to Barrington Moore's more sweeping comparative approach (*The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* [1966]), although there is much (acknowledged) overlap with the work of Charles Tilly on "big processes" (*Big Structures, Large Process, Huge Comparisons* [1984]). The emphasis on power may serve as a useful reminder of some of the large forces at work in the modern world, although the absence of treatment of what Mann refers to as the more "intimate" (p. 34) aspects of life leaves a void. Women enter this account only through omission, as is explicitly recognized at one juncture. Perhaps the best interim judgment on Mann's approach (there are two volumes yet to come) follows from what I see as its inconsistent utility. Never ill informed, usually balanced, the structured treatment of history through four sources of power illuminates some passages of nineteenth-century Europe and the Atlantic world, particularly revolution and the basic evolution of the state treated thematically rather than in narrative fashion. But the same treatment seems unduly familiar at other points, perhaps where, as with class struggle or national wars or European expansion, we already agree that we must think in terms of power relationships.

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Bernard S. Silberman. *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 487. Cloth $65.00, paper $19.95.

Bernard S. Silberman's book discusses the evolution of rationalized government organizations during the nineteenth century. The topic has not received much scholarly attention, he suggests, mainly because students of government take it for granted that if the participants in an organization are enlightened, the organization will automatically become rationalized. Silberman's main point is that bureaucracy did not come into being because enlightened political leaders considered it desirable and actively sought to introduce it: "The rational-legal bureaucratic role may in fact be technically superior to any other form of administration, as [Max] Weber wrote, but it surely was not that understanding which led to its creation" (p. 425). How then did the evolution proceed? According to Silberman's hypothesis, it came about "through a process of ad hoc rational strategic responses of political and organizational leaders to persisting problems of incumbency" (p. 425).

How does Silberman support his hypothesis? By showing that rationalization did not produce the same structures in the four countries he discusses: France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. The basic experience that fostered rationalization was the same in all four, the "increase in uncertainty for political leaders in the nineteenth century" (p. 418). During the preceding centuries, European statesmen gradually became conscious of a distinction between state and society, leading in the nineteenth century to the general disappearance of inherited government offices. Administrative posts could no longer be legitimized as the property of their holders, and until some new basis for legitimacy could be found, the holders of administrative positions would be plagued by the uncertainty of their tenure.

French and Japanese political leaders suffered a relatively high degree of uncertainty; their counterparts in the United States and Britain also experienced uncertainty but not so much of it. Therefore, writes Silberman, France and Japan developed government organizations based primarily on rules that governed function and purpose, whereas the United States and Britain built systems designed to ensure the professional expertise and character of each servitor. This difference between the two varieties of bureaucracy shows that Weber was mistaken when he predicted that all governments would and should progress toward the same basic structure. In reality, argues Silberman, nineteenth-century political leaders inadvertently enclosed themselves in "cages of reason" as they strove to reduce the uncertainty of tenure.

Silberman's approach has several advantages. Most importantly, he rejects deterministic explanations for the rise of rationalized government organizations. For example, he denies that modern states are driven solely by industrial expansion toward organizational achievements that become inevitable if certain rules (and/or ideologies) are followed. Likewise, he distances himself from the notion that each modern government must take its form from inescapable imperatives imposed on it by traditional institutions. Silberman's bureaucrats were not merely driven by economic and/or historical forces; they made their own cages. He tries to depict modern organizations as dynamic developments, not static structures or mechanical devices.

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Another advantage of Silberman's approach is that it focuses attention not only on interaction within bureaucracies but also on how each state's educational establishment changed (or was changed) to meet the evolving bureaucracy's needs. He stresses the importance of the interaction between traditional educational institutions and modernizing government organizations.

The book is not without flaws. Although Silberman offers a meaningful correction to Weber's characterizations of modern organization, he does not free himself from the underlying assumption that informs them: that ostensibly rationalized organizations do in fact operate rationally. Silberman assumes that the social and the political constitute two separate areas of human experience, and that in the political area leaders and office-holders shut out culture in order to function rationally in abstract frameworks. Having rejected some forms of determinism, he introduces his own. His political leaders are constantly, almost exclusively, driven by the logic of the strategies that his theoretical framework imparts to them.

There is a great deal of theory in the book. The reader must get through eighty-four pages of it before the historical chapters begin, and even the histories are largely devoted to abstract progressions rather than the actions and interactions of individuals. The chapters on Britain offer a relative abundance of concrete depictions, but even here Silberman's purpose is not so much to describe sequences of events as to fit events and personalities into theoretical structures.

Silberman's book is useful as an indication of some tendencies in the rise of what is known as the rational state, but it does not cover as much ground as he seems to think. He repeatedly sets out to explain developments by posing broad questions but then narrows his view by setting forth two or three answers and asserting that they are the only possible ones. This procedure seems to follow from his implicit assumption that what happened in the past had to happen. When Silberman's political leaders adopt "strategies," he infers that they "had no choice" (for example, p. 131). The way is then clear to identify the necessities that presumably forced them into their strategies. Political scientists may learn from Silberman's book, but I doubt that many historians will finish it.

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JOHN B. WILLIAMSON and FRED C. PAMPEL. *Old-Age Security in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 304. $49.95.

In recent years, historical sociologists have staged fierce debates over the causes and motives for the enactment of Social Security. The longstanding assumption that pensions evolved out of the economic growth and changing family structure accompanying industrialization seemed inadequate at best. How, scholars asked, could such an explanation resolve the "exceptionalism" and origins of welfare in the United States, which failed to pass legislation until the Great Depression? According to the industrialism model, it should have been enacted decades earlier. Neither does the industrialism model seem to explain the policies in far less developed nations such as Brazil. In response, scholars have argued that other models can better be utilized to understand modern social policies. In this book, John B. Williamson and Fred C. Pampel assess the relative usefulness of five models for the origins of the welfare state that have adamant proponents. Along with the industrialism model they identify four others: the "social democratic perspective" that emphasizes the importance of organized labor; the "neo-Marxist perspective" that labels such programs as an attempt to coopt labor and use social welfare benefits for social control; the "neo-pluralist perspective" that argues that social policy was the outcome of competition among various groups; and, finally, the "state-centered perspective" that asserts that the state itself is an actor that shapes welfare policy to its own ends. By summarizing the history and growth of social security plans in four industrial nations (Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the United States) and three developing nations (Brazil, Nigeria, and India), Williamson and Pampel seek to discover which, if any, single model best explains the timing, form, and impact of the nations' old-age security programs.

This wide-sweeping approach clearly illustrates the limitations of each individual model when applied across countries and economic systems. The strength (or weakness) of the labor movement, often cited as the reason for the delay in the United States, is shown to have little effect in other nations; only in Sweden, the authors argue, can a case be made that organized labor and leftist political parties had an impact on pension policy. Similarly, they find that while the industrialism thesis helps to explain the evolution of many of the programs, it offers little assistance in interpreting the origins. Rather, Williamson and Pampel convincingly show that individual programs can best be explained by a complex array of factors, rather than by a single factor. "All of these perspectives," they write, "are useful in accounting for some developments, but the utility of each varies greatly depending on the historical and national context" (p. 207).

Although this perhaps is not a surprising conclusion to historians who are more comfortable with the unique than with general models, the findings of this comparative study offer important insights into the debate over competing models. Moreover, by including countries outside of the industrialized West, the authors are able to demonstrate the impact of issues such as agriculture and foreign trade on pension programs. Although they still depend on some questionable historical assumptions such as the decline of

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family support with industrialization or the decrease of wealth among the old, they challenge many general sociological theories that simply assume all pension plans had the same roots.

For historians, in fact, this book may not go far enough in detailing the unique circumstances of the policies' evolution. The histories the authors relate are often uneven due to the secondary works on which they rely. More times than I could count, they simply state "there is much evidence to suggest" a major issue, without supplying greater detail or elaborate notes. Moreover, as sociologists, they apparently feel somewhat uncomfortable about departing entirely from general models. In the conclusion, they create one of their own, based on recent quantitative materials and their qualitative summaries. "The influence of class groups," they conclude, "increases with corporatism while the influence of the aged population decreases with corporatism" (p. 188). America, they assert, is one example of the demographic importance of age over class. Although there may be merit in their model as well, the role of class in the passage of American Social Security Act or in the revoking of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act demonstrates again the complexity of the past.

Despite these reservations, this is an important book that adds a great deal to the literature about the development of old-age policies and demonstrates the limits of single-factor models. Detailing the events, groups, and expectations that created and transformed social welfare in both industrialized and developing countries, it brings a needed comparative perspective to a contentious debate.

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COLLEEN A. DUNLAVY. *Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia.* (Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives; Princeton Studies in Business and Technology.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. Pp. xiv, 303. $39.50.

Although we see more comparative history these days, it has still not swept the field, and it probably never will. This can be explained by the daunting nature of the task facing comparative historians: one must digest the monographic literature of at least two countries, master at least one foreign language, and be able to offer compelling arguments to justify the comparison and extract its significance. It is always a pleasure, therefore, to read a good work of comparative history. Colleen A. Dunlavy's analysis of early American and Prussian railroad development is such a contribution. Solidly researched and largely devoid of the third-rate prose that mars so much academic history, her book brings forth new information about railroads in both countries. The comparative perspective also enables us to focus on areas and issues otherwise left in the shadows. Like the best histories, moreover, it will undoubtedly stir a little controversy.

Dunlavy centers her analysis on the role that contrasting political structures played in shaping technological change. The "federal-legislative" structure of the United States allowed state legislatures to make the crucial decisions, whereas Prussia's "unitary-bureaucratic" system put the civil service, in particular, the ministry of finance, center stage. The relative ease of working through the statehouses permitted a rapid proliferation of railroad charters, in stark contrast to Prussia's central ministries, which first resisted railroad proposals, then, after 1838, began to approve them, but continued to reject state financing of railroads to avoid the necessity of parliamentary institutions. Without such constraints, the American states actively supported railroads with loans, share purchases, or outright state ownership. With state intervention, moreover, came the right to regulate the lines. Prussia, however, had to forego regulation, even to the point of ignoring regulations already on the books, to facilitate private railroad investment. The result before 1850 was 14,400 miles of track in the United States and only 2,970 miles in Prussia.

Dunlavy argues that political structures also molded technological styles and the organization of railroad interests. The rapid granting of railroad charters in the United States created a credit shortage that translated into ingenious cost-cutting measures such as opting for steeper grades and sharper curves over more expensively excavated flat and straight runs or the substitution of wood for iron on bridges and track. Such expedients were less evident in Prussia. Railroad entrepreneurs in Prussia found it easier to organize because they had one bureaucracy to influence, not several.

For the period after 1850, Dunlavy "shifts analytic gears" by emphasizing the extent to which political structures were influenced in turn by the technological changes they had earlier shaped. Thus, Prussia was eventually nudged in the direction of parliamentary institutions in order to finance railroads, whereas the United States drifted toward more centralization in order to regulate the long trunk roads that crossed state lines and exceeded the jurisdiction of individual states. With the interstate commerce legislation of the 1880s, moreover, American railroads were able to organize more effectively.

There can be no doubt that this work is historical and political-science analysis of the most sophisticated sort. Without detracting from this contribution, nevertheless, it may help stimulate discussion if we attempt to view Dunlavy's evidence from a somewhat different angle. It may be logical to conclude that the United States was destined to construct more miles of track, *ceteris paribus*, simply because there were more miles to cover, that is, a larger area to connect. But if we shift focus away from overall track mileage or per-capita mileage, which certainly favors the United States over Prussia or Germany, to the railroad net-

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work, then U.S. railroad development, even east of the Mississippi, pales somewhat in comparison to Prussia/Germany, which completed a national rail network ten to twenty years earlier. Viewed from this perspective, the reader asks what there was about America's "federal-legislative" political structure that inhibited completion of the national network. We know from this book, for instance, that state legislatures placed many obstacles in the path of the railroad companies at time of charter by insisting that companies contribute to canal tolls, compensate teamsters and wagoners, or even buy out these rival competitors. Later came heavy taxation. Similarly, the fragmentation of state-charter legislation may have acted as a barrier to the longer, interstate trunk lines. It was perhaps no coincidence that these lines came into existence in the early 1850s as states began to recede from the railroad business. Viewed from this different angle, the reader then asks what there was about the Prussian/German political structure that facilitated completion of the network. And here we would probably be drawn to the peculiar German "particularism" and the hostile atmosphere of a divided Europe that stimulated competition between states and drove technological progress forward. Despite these observations, I want to emphasize that Dunlavy has made a very impressive contribution.

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TERRY G. JORDAN. *North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation.* (Histories of the American Frontier.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 439. Cloth $35.00, paper $17.95.

Terry G. Jordan's book is the most recent volume in the "Histories of the American Frontier Series" and it merits a place among the finest of the contributions to that long-running and distinguished collection. Published at the quincentenial of the first introduction of cattle into the Americas, the book is not just another commentary on an old subject; rather, it is a comprehensive work of original scholarship that will undoubtedly redefine the course of scholarly debate in the field.

Jordan's monograph rests on a remarkably diverse foundation of primary sources and secondary works. The discrimination with which the author has approached his sources and his overall command of the literature is apparent in the annotated bibliography, which in itself stands as an impressive achievement.

On the premise that cattle ranching in the Americas does not represent a unique New World adaptation that materialized spontaneously with the arrival of Europeans, Jordan begins with an examination of the cattle-raising cultures of the Old World Atlantic fringe on the eve of transatlantic migration. He then traces the introduction and adaptation of the Celtic-North British, Iberian, and West African cattle-raising traditions in the West Indies and follows Antillean herding systems to their transplanted footholds along the North American coast from Carolina to Mexico. From this beginning Jordan goes on to examine, in sequence, the adaptation and dispersal of the cattle frontiers in northern Mexico and the Carolinas. He demonstrates that by the 1850s three distinct Euroamerican ranching cultures, Texan, Californian, and midwestern, had evolved and were poised on the perimeter of the vast continental interior to battle for dominance. Standing in judgment of the contest, Jordan convincingly shows that the largely British-inspired midwestern system derived from South Carolina by way of the upland South and Ohio River valley emerged as the triumphant pastoral adaptive strategy. He concludes: "The popular image of the western cattle-ranching history must be revised to allow a far greater role for these highly successful, if less colorful herders from the American heartland" (p. 307).

The most impressive feature of Jordan's study is its broad spatial, temporal, and comparative focus. This approach permits a remarkable range of insights. Strewn along the path of his main argument is the wreckage of numerous hallowed conventions prominent in existing regional literatures. For example, Jordan points out the deficiencies of those who fail to understand the crucial role played by the West Indies in the transfer of herding culture from the Old World to the New (p. 85); he challenges the traditional notion that the Spanish ranching system in north Florida was ephemeral (p. 107); he asserts that Louisiana, not Texas, played the critical role in the transfer of Spanish techniques to Anglo-American cattlemen (p. 158). He argues that the significance of the Mexican contribution to the Texas system is exaggerated (p. 212), as is the presence of the African-American cowboy (p. 220); he questions claims regarding Texan influence on the Arizona cattle industry (p. 230); he discounts the idea that Spanish influences in the Pacific Northwest derived from Texas rather than California (p. 255); and he argues persuasively that what Canadian scholars have interpreted as Canadian influences on the cattle frontier's northern periphery should properly be identified as evidence of the ascendence of the Midwest herding system (p. 294).

Not many books throw out such a provocative variety of challenges to existing scholarship, and fewer still do so in such a convincing manner.

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JAMES O. GUMP. *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 178. $25.00.

James O. Gump proves in this short book the value of the comparative approach to the study of frontiers. With it he specifically challenges the "exceptionalist" interpretation of the American past by showing many

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similarities in the frontier history of America with the contemporary experiences of Britain. His study compares the experiences of the Sioux in America with those of the Zulu in southern Africa from their rise as distinct people to their subjugation.

Gump effectively captures the reader's attention by describing the traumatic defeats of European-style armies by the Sioux at the Little Bighorn River in Montana in 1876 and by the Zulu at Isandhlwana in southeastern Africa in 1879. He contends that both invading armies failed because they were ignorant and contemptuous of their opponents.

He then turns to the early history of the Sioux and the Zulu to explain how they rose to preeminence to become "indigenous empires" that dominated their neighbors and faced the intruders. This includes a thorough survey and critique of recent research. It also offers an interesting new interpretation by replacing static ethnography with an analysis of how these indigenous societies evolved to meet changing environmental conditions, economic opportunities, and technology.

The book next focuses on events following the critical battles at Isandhlwana and Little Bighorn River to compare the reactions of these two societies to alien encroachments. This section begins by discussing attempts by the Sioux and Zulu leaders Red Cloud and Mpande to collaborate with whites. It then turns to the role played by "agents of empire." These include Philip Sheridan, William T. Sherman, and George Custer in America, and Theophilus Shepstone, Bartle Frere, and Lord Chelmsford in South Africa. It shows that these "men on the spot" executed their roles differently from how their home governments intended, thereby changing the course of developments on these frontiers.

Gump concludes his historical comparison by contrasting the "patterns of imperial overrule" of the British and Americans, explaining how the goals and policies of each nation differed, and how each influenced the development of their subject people. He asserts that contradictory policies, which intended to assimilate the Sioux into American society, failed, leaving them marginalized as "unassimilated dependents" on the periphery of the Christian, agricultural society that took their lands. Yet he contends that the British policy of incorporating the Zulu as unskilled laborers in the developing economy of South Africa provided the system that has persisted to the present time.

A delightful digression from the main thesis is the chapter titled "Images of Empire," which explains how the conquering nations used their literature and art to interpret these events to their people. He explains how this created the myth of the Sioux and the Zulu as "noble savages," thus explaining away their respective victories over white armies. The chapter is replete with quotes from news reports and from fiction and poetry, and with wonderful engravings from nineteenth-century publications.

The methodology used in this book reduces the confusion that often mars comparative studies. Gump breaks his comparisons of the two societies into many specific topics or types of incidents to make his points more readily understandable. The book is tightly organized and interestingly written. The data are current and well analyzed, and the comparative approach adds insight. A weakness in the book is the author's attempt to project his analysis forward to explain current conditions. This is too superficial to be of value and distracts from an otherwise informative and interesting study. Overall the book is informative to both specialists and general readers.

WILLIAM F. LYE
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GENEVIÈVE FRAISSE and MICHELLE PERROT, editors. *A History of Women in the West.* Volume 4, *Emerging Feminism from Revolution to World War.* Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 640. $29.95.

Evaluating this translation into English of volume 4 of *A History of Women* is no straightforward task for a North American reviewer. The book is part of an ambitious series edited by two prominent and creative French historical scholars, Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot. The series is designed to summarize the results of a generation of lively scholarship on the history of women in the West and to diffuse that scholarship to a broad audience. The Belknap Press brings the series, based heavily on French historiography and originally published in Italian, to American audiences in an attractive format. As an American scholar of European history, I cannot but applaud the effort and appreciate how the series in general and this volume in particular will provoke broad interest in women's history. Nevertheless, my appreciation is tempered by the volume's uneven success in challenging the limits imposed by national boundaries and historiographic traditions.

Volume 4 centers on an exciting historical epoch: that bounded by the French Revolution at the beginning and World War I at the end. The editors of this volume, Geneviève Fraisse and Michelle Perrot, introduce its main themes by highlighting the century's tensions between the movement toward democracy and the protracted exclusion of women, new forms of domestic subjugation and new forms of freedom for women, and conservative cultural representations of the feminine juxtaposed with far more complex female realities. Geographically, the volume's boundaries are described as the region from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Baltic to the Mediterranean, but they also include North America.

The volume is laid out in four parts. The first part, "The Political Rupture and the New Order of Discourse," begins with a useful comparative essay by Dominique Godineau on women in various revolutionary movements of the late eighteenth century. It

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is followed by several essays discussing political theory, philosophy, and law. There is less attention than one might have expected to the opinions and activities of women. Fraisse's own essay, on the "great" philosophers' view about gender, surprisingly passes over the opportunity to examine the broad question of canonization that has been so central to the development of critical feminist historiography.

The second section, "The Production of Women, Real and Imaginary," centers on cultural dimensions of women's history and includes some quite useful surveys, such as Nancy Green's essay on Jewish women and Ann Higonnet's overview of artistic images of and by women. Where they succeed best, as in these two cases, the essays manage to combine intelligent survey with enough concrete historical evidence to engage both the general and the more specialist reader.

The third section, "Civil Woman, Public and Private," begins with a general survey by Yvonne Kniebiehler about "bodies and hearts": women's health, clothing, sex, mothering, and personal relationships. The author takes on some of the newest and most challenging terrains of women's history, although the ambitious scope of the essay means that there is little space for detail or elaboration on any one theme. Cecile Dauphin limits herself to a provocative discussion of "single women." Further essays in this section by Joan Scott and Judith Walkowitz develop themes (the image of the woman worker and sexualities, respectively) that will be more familiar to North American readers.

Finally, the last section, "Modernities," is highlighted by an essay by Perrot that explores spatial imagery inherent in the notion of woman's place: women in the city and public space, the workplace, public organizations, in travel, and in spaces opened through the female imagination. This is a useful "stocktaking" chapter that might well be read as an introduction to the whole book despite its placement near the end. Perrot provides a clearer chronological and conceptual framework than is offered elsewhere in the book. Furthermore, in contrast with many other essays in the book, Perrot is also fully immersed in both international and cross-historiographical conversation.

Indeed, throughout the book, the most satisfying arguments are those based in sources close to women's experiences and informed by a scholarly conversation that is international and draws on scholarship from both sides of the Atlantic as well as several European countries. The American reader will often be frustrated by the failure of several of the authors (who have mostly had French historical training) to engage with pertinent scholarship emerging out of historiographical traditions other than their own. This response, it must be admitted, is made possible because of the relatively larger and better-supported community of women's historians in the United States compared with most European countries. The book as a whole certainly draws on North American, French, and, to some extent, German and Italian scholarship, and ventures over a broad geographic terrain. Its coverage of both areas and historiographies, however, is quite uneven. There is almost nothing on the experiences of Scandinavian or Mediterranean women, and nothing on Eastern Europe. This reflects not only the unevenness of the historiography itself but also the selection of contributors. It would certainly have been possible, for example, to include more material on Italy, where there is a rich developing field of historical scholarship on women.

In terms of themes and approaches, the collection is also uneven. It includes far more literary, philosophical, and intellectual discussions of representations of women than social-historical explorations of female experiences. Women's voices are an intrinsic part of some of the essays but nowhere to be found in others. There is a section entitled "Women's Voices" at the end, but it is comprised of only two brief excerpts from works by Germaine de Staël and Lou Andreas-Salomé, important figures in women's history to be sure, but hardly capable of speaking on behalf of European women in the nineteenth century. The volume will at times engage and provoke, and at times frustrate, scholars of women's history. But it is an important undertaking, engaged in the difficult but necessary work of translation not only across languages but also across historiographical traditions.

MARY JO MAYNES
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CHRISTINE BOLT. *The Women's Movements in the United States and Britain from the 1790s to the 1920s.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1993. Pp. x, 390. Cloth $45.00, paper $15.95.

This study provides a thorough comparison of the women's movements in the United States and Britain and shows an impressive grasp of the extensive, not to say ballooning, literature in this field. Christine Bolt's breadth of knowledge of the correspondence of women activists in both countries is also evident, and the dryness that is difficult to avoid in such works of synthesis is alleviated somewhat by a well-judged use of quotation from such sources. This book looks set, then, to find its place alongside the comparative studies by Olive Banks and Jane Rendall as an essential work of reference in this field.

Bolt argues for the applicability of a similar chronology to the history of both U.S. and British movements and identifies a number of issues of common significance for that history: the problems created by use of a conservative/radical dichotomy in some of the established interpretive and comparative frameworks; the common cultural and social contexts in which each movement developed; the need to recognize the breadth of each movement, both in terms of the questions raised and the social bases of support; a

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recognition of the limits on sisterhood created by differences of class, race, and ethnicity among supporters of each movement. At the same time, she points out the varying nature of class, regional, and racial tensions in each case and the differing political systems within which they had to operate. She also draws attention to distinctive national identities and shared internationalist aspirations as a source both of mutual support and competitiveness between the two movements. Each movement, in her view, "took the lead in some ways and at some times" (p. 279). Such even-handedness is evident also in her conclusion that each proved consistently progressive in outlook, a conclusion that rejects interpretations suggesting either an increasing conservatism within the American movement or a significant radicalization of the British movement in later stages.

Perhaps the least helpful aspect of this comparative treatment is Bolt's application of the term "partial" suffrage to encompass several essentially distinct issues that proved significant in the history of each movement. She introduces the term when linking the debate among British suffragists over whether to include married women in their demand with that among U.S. suffragists over the desirability of an educational qualification (p. 123). Yet the motivation behind each form of limitation was very different, and we must remember that full women's suffrage was only ever demanded by the most radical suffragists in Britain. Given the greater longevity and strength of the doctrine of coverture in Britain, few married women there would have been able to fulfill the existing qualifications for men, at least until 1882. Limiting the demand initially to single women and widows was a pragmatic decision, then, as well as sometimes indicating a more limited conception of citizenship. To expressly include married women in the demand was, equally, to attempt to remove a double disability in the civil status of that group of women. The educational qualifications advocated by some suffragists in the United States, in contrast, reflected racial, ethnic, and class tensions that did not inform the controversy over the exclusion of married women from the demand in Britain. Bolt adds to the confusion by using "partial suffrage" to refer to the gradual extension of local government franchises to women in Britain and the United States (pp. 152, 193, 198). In such instances a more rigorous comparison would have strengthened the analysis.

SANDRA STANLEY HOLTON
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W. PETER WARD. *Birth Weight and Economic Growth: Women's Living Standards in the Industrializing West.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 218. $38.00.

W. Peter Ward's study of the relation between birth weights of infants and their mothers' economic well-being is based on a sample of records from hospitals in Dublin, Edinburgh, Vienna, Boston, and Montreal. The book begins with a fine discussion of current scientific understanding of the determinants of weight at birth, including genetic, social, and economic factors. Ward's summary of the literature is clear and straightforward. The next five chapters contain case studies of the five cities' experience. Each is structured similarly, opening with a brief economic history and an introduction to the hospitals' patients. These narrative elements are followed by graphic and tabular analyses of mean birth weights and lengths of infants; proportions of low birth weight and stillbirths over time; and commentary on factors such as the disease or general nutritional environment of the city.

It is difficult in a short review to generalize about the representativeness of the hospital samples. This is obviously a key issue. If women delivering their infants in public hospitals were not broadly representative of urban populations, their patterns of birth weight can tell us little. Ward addresses this question head on, providing a great deal of detail about the evolution of patient populations. Not surprisingly, women in the samples were generally from the lower classes, although the general (not universal) trend was for the patient populations to increase their proportions of middle-class women over time. Ward succeeds in convincing us that the shifting composition of patient populations is not alone responsible for key results. He also succeeds in his argument that patterns in mean birth weight are more likely to reflect changes in women's nutritional status than other shifts, such as genetic ones.

Ward finds that mean birth weights in the New World—at least for white working-class women—were higher than those in Europe. He shows the generally positive correlation between upturns in business cycles and increases in mean birth weights, although correlations between annual variations in birth weights and economic indices are weak. The relationship between women's social or occupational background and birth weights is not so clear, due to a lack of information, crudeness in the data, or the fact that occupational categories are often those of the husbands of women rather than women themselves. Ward does show, however, that married women, domestics, and those in the food industry, all of whom typically bore heavier children, may be inferred to have enjoyed better nutrition than other working women. Variables such as sex of the infant, maternal age, and birth order of the child consistently also appear as statistically significant correlates of birth weight.

Institutional care also emerges as an independent source of variation, but here again Ward identifies nutrition as the proximate determinant of birth weight. In lying-in hospitals that allowed poor women a lengthy stay before delivery, birth weights rose significantly. Ward argues that this reinforces his claim that nutritional intake is the key to determining

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birth weights. But as he and other anthropometric historians well know, women's and men's nutritional status is also determined by the caloric outlays demanded by the work they do. Bed rest in a hospital setting may have been equally if not more important than women's increased food intake. For this reason also, his argument that the fuller plates of male family members (especially in the patriarchal Viennese working class) was de-facto evidence of the nutritional oppression of women seems unwarranted in the absence of an accounting of the differential demands of the work the two genders did.

Ward's is a highly detailed, specialized study that will be rather difficult for nonspecialists to read. Urban women figure here, but in highly quantitative and aggregated form. Ward's convenient summary of the results of his study in chapter 7, however, can be read with profit by those more concerned with the broad results of his analysis. For the more quantitatively inclined, however, Ward's treatment is an innovative and craftsmanlike product whose slim dimensions belie the massive amount of work such research requires.

KATHERINE A. LYNCH
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LEONIE STAR. *Julius Stone: An Intellectual Life.* New York: Oxford University Press, in association with Sydney University Press, Sydney, Australia. 1992. Pp. xii, 300. $55.00.

Lives of law professors are perhaps not inherently rewarding subjects for biographers, let alone for readers. But Julius Stone (1907–85), who spent most of his distinguished career as professor of jurisprudence and international law at the University of Sydney, was a complex and multifaceted individual whose life and achievements are worth the telling. Leonie Star's book is a gripping and enlightening biography of this gifted but decidedly difficult man. Her approach is partly thematic, permitting a full but always lucid discussion of Stone's legal thought and contributions.

Credited with originating the idea of a hotline between Washington and Moscow, Stone was a world-recognized Australian jurist, especially renowned and esteemed in the United States. A committed Jew and passionate Zionist, he sought to influence Australian political and public opinion regarding Israel, which during the 1940s brought him into conflict with former Australian Governor-General Sir Isaac Isaacs, another formidable legal mind and an archetypal Jewish anti-Zionist of the old school. Stone had a phenomenal publishing output and possessed one of the finest academic intellects ever encountered in Australia, as well as one of the most robust egos. He triumphed over humble beginnings and anti-Semitism to reach the pinnacle of his profession.

Born in the northern English industrial city of Leeds to lower-middle-class immigrant parents, Stone managed by determination and ability to win a scholarship to Oxford at a time when Jews, especially with his background, were rare among both students and faculty. Typically, he did not downplay his identity or his interest in Jewish causes and Zionism. From 1931 to 1936 he taught jurisprudence at Harvard under the celebrated Roscoe Pound, but he gained the dislike of Felix Frankfurter, the university's professor of law. Through Pound, Stone became interested in continental European rather than exclusively Anglo-Saxon legal thought. Pound's influence remained with him for life.

Thwarted in his ambition to succeed Pound as professor of jurisprudence at Harvard, Stone taught for a time in England and New Zealand before his appointment in 1941 as Challis Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney, a position he held until his retirement in 1972. The opinionated and pugnacious Stone was no stranger to controversy, or to anti-Semitism. But the events leading to his appointment became a cause célèbre in Australia. The conservative university senate attempted to reject him because of his reputation as a radical and his emphasis on sociological jurisprudence, and accusations of anti-Semitism flew.

Stone's international reputation was clinched early in his career at Sydney with the publication of two major works: *The Atlantic Charter* (1943) and *The Province and Function of Law* (1946). In the latter, an extremely important prize-winning work, he challenged the way jurisprudence was viewed and taught in Australia and other British-derived lands. He subsequently held several visiting professorships in the United States, including at Harvard. In 1959 he first suggested what was, in effect, the Washington-Moscow hotline, and it was of considerable personal satisfaction to him as a Jew, Zionist, and internationalist that the first significant use of that machinery was during the Six Day War of 1967. His importance as a scholar of international law was highlighted in 1972, when the city of Indianapolis proclaimed a day named in honor of "the greatest living expert in jurisprudence in the English-speaking world" (p. 130).

Disinclined to hagiography, Star has presented Stone's weaknesses as well as his strengths. She has pitched her narrative to readers of diverse backgrounds, so the discussion of Stone's contributions to legal thought is never heavy and obtuse, but readily comprehended by the lay reader. Her account of Stone's life and work is enhanced by her full understanding of the milieu that produced him and the circles in which he moved. She has a singularly elegant writing style and vivid descriptive powers. This book is a fine example of the biographer's craft and a valuable contribution to Australian, Jewish, and, in particular, legal historiography. It contains a comprehensive list of Stone's publications on the law and other topics.

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BARBARA J. SMITH. *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920–1929.* (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 258. $39.95.

Barbara J. Smith's study of British economic policy in Palestine during the first decade of the mandate provides a useful addition to the growing series of monographs on this historical period. Although this work is deliberately narrow in its focus, it helps to consolidate our understanding of the ways in which British policy contributed to shaping Arab-Jewish relations, often in unintended ways.

The task that Smith set herself is clearly articulated in her introduction. She argues that it has been commonly assumed that separatism developed as an outcome of growing communal conflict in the course of the 1930s. Instead, she seeks to show that "at least in the economic sphere, the institutional and ideological basis for separatism had crystallized by the time the 1929 riots signaled the growing anger and frustration of the Arab population" (p. 3). Moreover, according to the author, British economic policy played a significant role in contributing to the divergent development of the economy after World War I.

The bulk of this study consists of a series of chapters devoted to carefully documenting the decision making that governed British policy with regard to various economic questions. Smith places her discussion in the context of what she views as two primary factors: British colonial policy making and the commitment to a Jewish National Home (JNH) as embodied in the mandate. In addition, her work is particularly helpful in establishing the ways in which the different perspectives of London and Jerusalem helped inform the evolution of policy in a variety of areas.

Because Smith's primary focus is on British policy, she begins with a discussion of the ways in which traditional colonial priorities contributed to limitations on the possibility for government investment in Palestinian development. In these early chapters, Smith indeed stresses the constraints imposed on the Palestine administration by the "quasi-colonial framework" that governed the formulation of trade and external financing policies.

As she extends her discussion to include British policy regarding areas of particular relevance to establishment of the JNH, Smith begins to develop the underlying thesis that British policy contributed to creating the institutional and political basis for separatism between the two national communities. It appears at times that the author sees British policy as seeking to encourage development of the JNH in the belief that such a policy would ultimately benefit Palestine as a whole. At other times, she suggests that policies that met Zionist goals were at least partially the result of pressures exerted on the British government by representatives of the Zionist movement. In either case, the result appears to be one in which the impact of various economic policies on the Arab population was either ignored or incorrectly assessed. Thus, the obligation to facilitate the establishment of the JNH became the foundation for a de facto dualism in economic policy that precluded communal integration and, in the long run, contributed to significant disparities between the two communities.

The strength of this study is in some ways also its weakness. It is well written, clearly organized, and based solidly on a variety of archival and other unpublished materials. It retains its focus on economic policy and presents effectively a variety of factors influencing policy decisions. At the same time, the reader is left with a sense of incompleteness. There is no conclusion that reaches beyond the material to provide interpretive coherence to the underlying argument. This may have been beyond the scope of the author's intent, but it seems an unnecessary limit to her contribution.

YLANA N. MILLER
Duke University

RICHARD J. ALDRICH. *The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929–1942.* (South-East Asian Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xxii, 416. $49.95.

In beginning this thoughtful study on the background to the Pacific War in Southeast Asia, Richard J. Aldrich is careful to state what his book is not: it is not "a study of Thai-Western relations, Thai foreign policy, or Thai politics" (p. vii). It is concerned primarily with Anglo-American relations (involving to a lesser extent the French and the Thai) as they revolved around Siam in the dozen years preceding December 1941, and it is thus an exploration in the field of what might be called international history or diplomatic history.

Aldrich is perhaps too modest, no doubt in deference to the still-closed archives of the Thai foreign ministry and, moreover, to the murky waters of Thai politics during the heady days of the early "revolutionary" military governments after 1932. The British and American documents he has used tell us much about Thailand during this period, including the activities of the British financial adviser and the relations between the Thai and the Japanese.

After a very interesting introduction, part 1 of the book, titled "Informal Dominance in Decline, 1929–1938," consists of three chapters that deal with, respectively, the last years of the absolute monarchy, involving especially the world economic crisis; British relations with the new military regimes from 1932 to 1935; and "The Evolution of Western Policies towards Siamese Nationalism, 1935–1938." Part 2 deals with "The Approach of the Pacific War, 1938–1942" in four chapters centering on "The Impact of the European War" at the end of the 1930s; the "Franco-Thai Border Crisis, 1940–1941" and the opening it provided for Japan in the region; last-minute Western

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attempts to firm up its position in 1941; and a conclusion that focuses on the outbreak of war at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, with some thoughts on "A Challenge to the Colonial System in Asia."

The documentary basis of this book is exceptionally broad and thorough. Naturally, the evidence comes primarily from British official sources, especially the Public Record Office. But it also includes Bank of England and private records, and there is a good representation of both American and Thai archival sources (notwithstanding the author's disclaimer to the contrary). Moreover, the author's handling of this evidence seems even-handed and balanced. Aldrich does well to stress the importance of bureaucratic cultures and personalities in shaping both continuities and discontinuities in official policy through the period. His conclusions, dealing with the wartime resurgence of Colonial Office attitudes and newly assertive American radical anticolonialism, cry out for the sequel one hopes Aldrich soon will write.

For all its exemplary scholarship and clear writing, Aldrich's book leaves me wishing that he, or others, might rethink the common conceptualization of international history in the interwar period. It would seem to me to be worth discarding the old international law terminology of "sovereign states," "dominance," and "independence." The ancient Indian political philosopher Kautilya knew no such terms: all political units had greater or lesser power, just as all humans did; and states fell into no such neat and tidy categories. If, like Kautilya, we might find ways to speak of greater and lesser power, constantly susceptible to change, we might find it possible to write about the relations between the states of Southeast Asia in the 1930s in a more finely nuanced fashion.

DAVID K. WYATT
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A. MARTIN WAINWRIGHT. *Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India, and the Balance of Power in Asia, 1938–55.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1994. Pp. xiv, 237. $55.00.

This is a difficult book to review. The prose is sometimes labored and occasionally downright confusing, as with (anent what India got at partition) "India almost entirely acquired some of these resources" (p. 175). Key phrases repeat themselves, which causes trouble when the context and therefore the intent alter. Each chapter begins with a statement of what will be accomplished, but if readers cannot extract the argument as they work their way through, and so emerge bewildered, they can hardly be expected to applaud a similar statement at the end.

It is difficult, moreover, because the subtitle promises what the text cannot deliver. The book is about Britain and India. It is also about Pakistan and India, America and India, China and India, even Australia and India. But it is not about "the balance of power in Asia," for the same reason that no book can be about the balance of power in, say, the South Atlantic. Around that enormous body of water are ranged peoples of little power and less interaction. The consequence is that there is nothing to balance. It is the same with the venue to which A. Martin Wainwright actually applies his yardstick. "India," he avers, "emerged from the Second World War with the military potential to provide leadership to the lands bordering the ocean that bears its name" (p. 43). He means the Indian Ocean. Dutifully he compares India's "peak wartime production of selected armaments" (p. 48) with Australia's. Why? Presumably because he wishes to weigh power against power. But New Delhi and Sydney are 7,000 miles apart.

The strength of the book lies in the several lines of inquiry that Wainwright pursues. The most interesting, perhaps because it is the least cultivated in the literature, is India's armed strength, chiefly in materiel, not troops. Tables supplement the analysis, which occupies in one form or another several chapters. Another topic is Britain's attempt to harness independent India to the military support of its surviving empire. Still another is the Indo-Pakistan conflict and India's role in launching the "nonaligned" movement. About each Wainwright has something of importance to say.

Neither does he fail to relate one line of inquiry to another. Because Britain encouraged Indian ordnance factories, India entered independence with a strong arms infrastructure. Because the fight over Kashmir drove India to deny Pakistan its fair share of the movable parts of that infrastructure, Indo-Pakistan hostility settled on the subcontinent. Because of this hostility, the subcontinent was lost to the surviving British empire.

But these lines of inquiry often march side by side without touching, as with a chapter on India's nuclear resources that I found interesting but could not place. The root trouble, I suspect, lies in Wainwright's attempt to lift the "balance of power" proposition off the subcontinent and slap it down on the Indian Ocean. Thus magnified, it asks for at least one real world-class power. Wainwright nominates India. Early in the book he tells us it has that capacity. Repeatedly he assures us that its leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and others, wished to develop it. But they did not. All the evidence suggests that they did not. And although in the end he confesses that "moral guidance" (p. 123) was all they actually had in mind, and all that India could offer, the damage has been done. Trapped in a model that does not fit, the book, for all its virtues of detail, emerges as rather less than the sum of its parts.

PETER WARD FAY
California Institute of Technology

ROBERT J. MCMAHON. *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 431. $30.00.

Robert J. McMahon has written a superb study of the often tangled relations between the United States,

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India, and Pakistan from independence in 1947 to 1965. Based on the best available sources (regrettably, Indian and Pakistani archival sources are apparently not available), the book is written with clarity and grace.

McMahon argues that the skewed perceptions of the Cold War produced tragic and expensive mistakes. Despite the fact that South Asia had little to offer the United States (it had only a small industrial base, few raw materials, no major military advantages, and a geographical position of only limited strategic interest), the United States determined to line up both India and Pakistan with the free world.

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's inspired leader, insisted on nonalignment. In one of the best sections of the book, McMahon shows how U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson simply could not comprehend the Indian leader's unwillingness to choose sides, which "suggested to Nehru exactly the sort of arrogant self-righteousness that he most detested about the West" (p. 42). American stridency and Nehru's devotion to neutralism scuttled suggestions of making democratic India a counter model to communist China.

Pakistan, however, chose to cooperate with the West. Although Pakistan had little to show for its efforts prior to 1950, with the fall of China and especially with the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States tilted toward Pakistan, which, it was thought, could contribute to the security of the Middle East. McMahon insists that just how this could be done was never clear. Indeed, he contends that the Truman administration's approach to Pakistan was "rooted in a series of illusions" (p. 151).

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration forged ahead with a full-fledged alliance with Pakistan, although again without clear objectives. The United States had, as Nehru charged, brought the Cold War to South Asia. Later Eisenhower termed the alliance "a terrible error" (p. 207), a judgment in which McMahon fully concurs. It was, he writes, "a monumental strategic blunder" (p. 338), which only drove India closer to the Soviet Union. When Eisenhower subsequently attempted to balance the scales, Pakistan charged the United States with bad faith. McMahon credits Eisenhower with realizing that American policy needed to be changed, but the president could not resolve the inherent contradictions in U.S. policy.

The Kennedy administration shifted its support dramatically to India, particularly after the Sino-Indian clash of 1962 forced India to ask for American assistance. But the price demanded—that India make a serious attempt to settle the long festering Kashmir dispute—was not paid. Kennedy's shift toward India completely alienated Pakistan without getting long-term compensating advantages from India.

From 1963 to 1965, the United States reaped the whirlwind of its contradictory, shifting, unclear approach to South Asia. Pakistan's increasingly friendly relations with "Red China" angered Lyndon Johnson, who abruptly canceled a planned visit by Prime Minister Mohammed Ayub Khan. An attempt at balance—disinviting the new Indian prime minister—only angered India. Ultimately, however, Johnson did the right thing: he disengaged from the subcontinent. It is a pity that he did not do the same thing in South Vietnam.

McMahon argues that the United States should have avoided formal ties with both states, pursued a policy of careful evenhandedness, and maintained a steadfast neutrality on Kashmir. It should have adopted Nehru's call for a "zone of peace" (p. 343) on the subcontinent. Regrettably, the hysteria of the Cold War, which exaggerated threats to the region from both the Soviet Union and China, made such a rational approach almost impossible.

This excellent book is destined to be the definitive account of U.S. policy on the South Asian periphery of the Cold War for many years to come.

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RAMI GINAT. *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945–1955.* London: Frank Cass; distributed by ISBS, Portland, Oreg. 1993. Pp. xii, 268. $45.00.

This book by Rami Ginat treats Egyptian-Soviet relations during a decade often overlooked by scholars. The terminal date, 1955, is more often the starting point, the year in which Egypt, despairing of obtaining arms from the West, turned East. Ginat argues that the roots for Egyptian policy, as well as for the Soviet policy of supporting regimes that were both anti-imperialist and anticommunist, may be found in the decade that preceded the Bandung Conference and the Suez crisis. By his reading, the two dramatic shifts in regimes, the coup of July 1952 led by Gamel Abdel Nasser and Joseph Stalin's death a year later confirmed, rather than reoriented, a growing political and economic partnership.

In retracing Egyptian-Soviet relations during this decade, Ginat adds an important dimension to the story. Most accounts of the rise of Nasserism focus on the Anglo-American backdrop. It is illuminating to see the Soviet perspective of old regime flirtations with neutrality, the American courtship of revolutionary Egypt, Nasser's consolidation of power in 1954, and the Czech arms deal. Students of international commerce and Egyptian business interests will want to consult sections on Soviet-Egyptian trade relations.

Unfortunately, in an effort to set a broader regional context, much of the book rehashes familiar terrain at the expense of its primary subject. We need to know more of the individuals and interest groups who drove Egyptian-Soviet relations. The Soviets remain, with rare exception—Ambassador Daniil Solod stands out—faceless. Ginat's bibliography contains a wide variety of contemporary Soviet publications and wire services. These elucidate official Soviet policy yet,

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ideologically driven, their record of internal Egyptian developments is often less accurate than Ginat would believe. And they reveal little of how Soviet policy developed. For this Ginat relies on American records, which should be read with greater caution. Like the Soviet sources, many resonate with Cold War perspectives. And although the American appreciation of Egyptian politics grew increasingly sophisticated, palace minions and Free Officers often told U.S. contacts what they wanted them to hear.

Egyptian faces of both the old and new regimes are clearer, but Farouk and Muhammad Najib are given too much attention when the focus might be on—Nasser aside—policy makers, diplomats, and trade representatives like Hasan Rajab (later Egypt's papyrus tsar). There is little nuance to discussion of factions within the Wafd, the junta, or the Left. Generalizations about "Wafdist plans to replace the West by Soviet bloc countries as Egypt's main suppliers" (p. 139) or Nasser's "political credo" (p. 241) belie the struggles to shape liberal and revolutionary agendas. Claims that Egyptian communists were persecuted primarily due to pro-Soviet activities reflect Egyptian government propaganda (and Cold War scholarship) more than reality (pp. 22–23). To argue on the basis of membership rolls that communism was marginal misses the point. Egyptian communists helped fashion a broad reform agenda that ultimately produced Nasserism. Not ideologically prepared for revolution in 1952, they tried to influence the military regime. Failing, they resisted it. They made uneasy peace with Nasser after Suez, by which time Egypt had embarked on a road that, as Ginat reveals, was first charted a decade earlier.

JOEL GORDON
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SERGEI N. GONCHAROV, JOHN W. LEWIS, and XUE LITAI. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.* (Studies in International Security and Arms Control.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 393. $45.00.

The history of the Korean War is replete with drama, intrigue, deception, and high politics, and this book is a substantive addition to the literature on this subject. Based almost entirely on Russian and Chinese sources, many newly released, the book focuses on the 1949–50 period, encompassing the negotiations for the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the decision for war in Korea, and China's decision to intervene. An opening chapter discusses the treaty between the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government in 1945, which Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai employ to define Soviet strategic interests in Asia. (Also included is a sixty-five-page appendix of relevant cables, which, except for an unfortunate gap between April and June 1950, complements the text.)

The book resolves longstanding controversies regarding the fundamental questions of responsibility and purpose that have infused the scholarship on the war from the beginning. As the authors put it: "The invasion of June 25, 1950, was pre-planned, blessed, and directly assisted by Stalin and his generals, and reluctantly backed by Mao at Stalin's insistence." Indeed, Mao "was deliberately kept in the dark on the details of the North's preparations, including the timing of the attack" (p. 213). Kim Il-sung was an eager and willing pawn in Stalin's game.

Similarly, the purpose of the conflict was not simply to support Kim Il-sung's dream of unifying Korea. Stalin had larger objectives, principally to use the conflict "to separate China from the West" (p. 211) and ensure China's dependence on the Soviet Union (pp. 151, 204). Mao opposed this war but was deceived and outmaneuvered by Stalin. Stalin misled Mao into believing that the Soviet Union would provide the necessary weaponry for an assault on Taiwan, but he then secretly advanced the date for the Korean conflict, preempting and thus making impossible the assault on Taiwan. Indeed, it was Stalin's promised logistical support for both operations that put him in the position to determine which would occur first.

The failure of Kim's invasion and prospect of imminent defeat then enabled the Soviet leader to induce Beijing to enter the conflict. The authors do not examine the proposition that Moscow provided sufficient resources to begin the Korean conflict but not enough to win it, a possibility suggested by the paucity of air power supplied in the initial assault but not later after China's entry. It was total control of the air that enabled the United States to stave off defeat during the early weeks of the invasion.

Mao sought to avoid becoming involved but was forced to intervene when U.N. forces led by the United States approached China's Manchurian border. The authors' treatment of Mao's last-minute effort to secure Soviet air support prior to intervention is most enlightening. Mao played a high-stakes game from a position of weakness, threatening to hold off committing troops until Stalin guaranteed air support. But Stalin refused, knowing that approaching U.N. forces would force Mao's hand. Of course, once China did commit its forces, Stalin deployed over a thousand aircraft to the conflict.

The authors correctly, although not in sufficient depth, place these events within the larger context of evolving Soviet-American relations, particularly efforts by the Truman administration to probe the prospects for establishing a relationship with Beijing. Stalin evidently feared that London's recognition of the People's Republic in early 1950 would be followed by Washington's. His belief that Mao privately welcomed and sought such an opening fueled his determination to prevent it.

If Soviet decision making leading up to the war was a function of the perceived and changing correlation of forces with the United States, then an interesting

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question arises. Was evidence that Washington was preparing to rearm the factor that triggered Stalin's decision for war in Korea? Specifically, did Stalin know of the formulation of NSC–68, initiated January 31, 1950, and completed April 15? It was late in this time frame, we now know, during Kim Il-sung's secret trip to Moscow from March 30 to April 25, that Stalin gave the go-ahead for war.

This is a thought-provoking book, but not one without shortcomings. Three stand out. The first is the off-handed treatment of the role of the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, who receives only a single mention. The authors portray ambassador Shtykov as one who simply "helped Kim" persuade Stalin (p. 133). Kim was Stalin's creature, after all, but it is highly doubtful that Shtykov was Kim's. Rather, it was far more likely that it was Shtykov, acting under Stalin's instructions, who "persuaded" Kim in the usual manner of Soviet puppet-management to press the case for war. This interpretation would be fully consistent with the authors' overall view.

The second shortcoming is the one-dimensional treatment of Chinese politics. At a minimum, three distinct groups are discernible in the authors' sources. First and most obvious is Mao, who argued for maximum flexibility for China, and who was, after all, the impetus and the object of Stalin's machinations. Then there were the "internationalists" around Liu Shaoqi, who pressed successfully for treaty ties with Moscow. Finally, there was the Manchurian leader Gao Gang who openly supported a strong Soviet presence in Manchuria. An exploration of these intricacies within the Chinese leadership would have further enriched the manuscript.

The third shortcoming is the problem of multiple authorship, which results in numerous instances of contradiction. Three examples will suffice. If, as argued, the war was "pre-planned, blessed, and directly assisted by Stalin" (p. 213), then it cannot be said that "the decision to go to war cannot be laid alone to Stalin's pressure" (p. 214). If the war was designed to separate China from the West, then it cannot be said that "the invasion was a disaster" (p. 215). And, if both of those arguments are true, it cannot be said that the decision for war "was reckless war-making of the worst kind" (p. 214). Brutal, calculating, and risky it certainly was; "reckless" it was not.

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Jeffrey Herf. *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles.* New York: Free Press of Macmillan. 1991. Pp. xiii, 369. $29.95.

This is an important book, minor flaws and all. It goes far beyond the strategic debate that at first sight could appear to be its main topic. No serious student of contemporary German political culture and opinion formation can afford to overlook it.

What Jeffrey Herf calls the "battle of the Euromissiles" has already launched its own barrage of historical accounts. The many authors, including some committed observers such as Herf, are understandably fascinated by what turned out to be one of the last and most controversial acts of military containment by NATO during the Cold War. It took the form of the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe during the early 1980s as a countermove to the continuing Soviet build-up of SS–20 rockets, which had begun some years earlier. In their calculated response, NATO leaders followed the "dual track" decision of 1979, where they had agreed to seek negotiations with Moscow for the removal of the SS–20s and, if that failed, to install a comparable arsenal of intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe.

It was NATO's move onto this "second track" that ran into massive protests in Western Europe and the United States. Casting itself as the peace movement, the opposition was nowhere as intense as in West Germany, where most of the new weapons were to be stationed. The protests took on added vigor after October 1982, when a new conservative-liberal government, headed by Helmut Kohl, took office. In the end, Bonn weathered the storm and stayed on the course that had first been suggested to NATO by the new chancellor's predecessor, Helmut Schmidt. But Schmidt's own party largely disavowed his missile policy after leaving government.

Herf belongs among the analysts who see NATO's countermove as having blocked a major attempt by Moscow to shift the continental balance of power in its own favor. In their retrospective view, moreover, the West's firm response encouraged a later turnabout in Soviet foreign policy, which helped end the Cold War. From this perspective, Herf has given us an informed and unusually well-argued account of a major international controversy.

But Herf's main concern is really to analyze the debate within West Germany over the appropriate response to the Soviet challenge. In his hands, the controversy provides a fascinating case study of political culture, public discourse, and the process of opinion formation in the "old" Federal Republic. Herf also suggests some more general conclusions about a democracy's vulnerability and resilience in such a strategic interaction with a dictatorship that permits no free debate.

The controversy had some distinctive West German features. Herf emphasizes that a considerable part of the Left in the press and the universities had earlier moved away from the new republic's antitotalitarian stance as a "militant democracy" and toward a largely neutralist position in the Cold War. A radical minority decried NATO's military deterrence as part of a pathological anticommunism endemic to "late" capitalism. But Herf can also show that many politicians

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and intellectuals effectively resisted such views and, in the end, prevailed.

Herf's bold interpretation encourages a needed discussion. He portrays members of the West German New Left as frequently naive about power yet blended with a sense of their own moral superiority and political sophistication. His analysis contains much valuable insight, but occasionally he appears to oversimplify an aspect of West Germany's early political development to make it fit into his argument. In particular, Herf ignores the undertones of illiberal intolerance that at times accompanied the celebrated official commitment to "militant democracy."

The author has drawn skillfully on a wealth of sources, both primary and secondary. It is therefore surprising to discover that his bibliography omits several earlier and relevant works on the arms debate. Perhaps these exclusions can be explained by the unusual perspective that gives the book its striking intellectual coherence. Unfortunately, the text and footnotes of this otherwise well-written work are marred by misspellings of German words, phrases, and proper names along with a couple of poor translations. The tables are plentiful and informative, but one of them (number 6) contains two very simple calculation errors. These are minor but unnecessary blemishes in an incisive and challenging book.

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ANCIENT

LESLIE J. WORLEY. *Hippeis: The Cavalry of Ancient Greece.* (History and Warfare.) Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1994. Pp. xiii, 241. $34.95.

Leslie J. Worley offers a short military history of the cavalries of Greece from the Mycenaean period to the reign of Alexander the Great in the late fourth century B.C., along the way detailing with narrative and battlefield diagrams a number of well-known battles in the archaic and classical periods. His intention is to counter the widely held view that the only important military arm at this time was the infantry, composed of the heavily armed soldiers known as hoplites. Worley correctly argues that the role of the cavalry has been underappreciated in the face of this hoplite tradition.

In a diachronic survey, he identifies three stages of Greek cavalry development: in the Mycenaean and Dark Ages, the horse was used principally as a means of transportation to and from the battlefield; in the archaic and classical periods, aristocratic horsemen at first dominated but were then eclipsed by the rise of the citizen hoplite armies until, in the fifth century B.C., several states, most notably Thebes and Athens, came to recognize the potential of a citizen cavalry and subsequently utilized these new forces with success in the Peloponnesian War; and, finally, in the fourth century B.C., beginning with the Spartan campaigns in Ionia in the 390s and ending with the military reforms of Philip II of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great, the cavalry charge, as part of a coordinated infantry-cavalry attack, became "the decisive element in battle" (p. 171).

Worley presents an interesting thesis, reasonable in its general outline although problematic in its particulars. For example, outside of artistic representations on pottery, we know almost nothing about the status and use of cavalry in the Mycenaean, Dark Age, or even the archaic period. But when contemporary sources fail Worley, he rather too confidently reconstructs tactical formations by speculation and analogy sometimes from distant lexicographers and late military treatises, as with his arguments for the deployment of the rhomboid formation by the Thessalian cavalry as early as the seventh century B.C. (p. 30) or the organization of the archaic Athenian cavalry (pp. 65–66). Moreover, his uncritical use of ancient and modern sources often glosses over troubling details, such as whether or not the 200 Athenian horse archers were mercenaries (pp. 71, 80).

As a clearly written general survey, this book will be useful to nonspecialist students of ancient military history. It is a good, quick read. But because it is almost entirely derivative and uncritical of sources, the serious student of ancient Greek cavalry will want to return to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon and to the recent book by I. G. Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece* (1993), which covers much of the same ground with a good deal more depth and originality. Finally, Worley's book begs an obvious question: what happens to the cavalry in the hellenistic period?

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JAMES F. MCGLEW. *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. Pp. vii, 234. $31.50.

The last several decades have seen a large growth of interest in ancient Greek democracy, stimulated most recently by the 2,500th anniversary of the supposed "birth of democracy" in Athens under Cleisthenes in 507/8 B.C. We have learned much about democracy in the process, but other forms of government have been neglected—notably tyranny, which played an important role in the history of many Greek cities. James F. McGlew's book, based on his dissertation of 1986, is therefore welcome, despite its flaws; let us hope it inspires more study of tyranny, both as a historical phenomenon lasting from the late seventh to the mid-fifth centuries and as the focus of ideological discourse in later periods.

Contrary to the usual view of tyranny as a hindrance to the growth of democracy, McGlew maintains that tyranny was an essential ingredient in democracy's development. His argument is complex and rather diffuse. The main thread is that the tyrants succeeded

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in creating a political language that portrayed them as promoters of justice and emphasized the values of freedom and sovereignty, but their very success in inspiring devotion to these values led inevitably to a reaction (consistent with the archaic notion of retributive justice) in which the demos used these same values against the tyrant. Thus, tyranny's success in justifying its own existence led to a democratic ideology that rejected tyranny. Moreover, McGlew views the Athenian lawgiver Solon, who vocally opposed tyranny, as paradoxically preparing the way for tyranny by emphasizing the sovereignty of law. He thereby created the feeling that a sovereign was needed while simultaneously removing political protections against tyranny. Cleisthenes's democratic reforms thus resulted from Solon's failure and were not, as Aristotle and later historians saw them, a continuation of Solon's work. Some of McGlew's other interesting (although questionable) conclusions are that the epinician poets presented a mixed message of praise and warning to tyrants and that Peisistratus' bodyguards carried clubs, because clubs were associated with justice.

These brief notes do not do justice to the richness of McGlew's ideas, but this richness is also one of the book's problems: he covers a lot of ground, contrasting tyrants with founders, kings, lawgivers, and liberators, but his transitions and connections between topics are often unclear, and many of his conclusions are supported by questionable use of evidence and dubious arguments. Moreover, he states that a main focus is "the language the tyrants spoke" (p. 4), but he often does not clearly distinguish between contemporary discourse about tyranny and later ideology. He is aware of the limitations of our sources for tyranny but often seems to minimize or ignore these limitations.

In sum, there is much of interest here, but in struggling to follow McGlew's line of argument one comes away with more questions than answers. Thus, the value of this work may lie more in encouraging other scholars to question his views. This should result in a better understanding of the political phenomenon we know as tyranny.

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S. C. TODD. *The Shape of the Athenian Law.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 433. $68.00.

The aim of this volume, according to S. C. Todd, is twofold: first to "explore the shape" (p. vii) of Athenian law—that is, to understand its complex relationship with other aspects of Athenian culture—and second to offer general readers, including those who do not read Greek, a handbook on Athenian law. To accommodate his two aims, Todd devotes the first seventy-three pages of his work to a discussion of methodology, followed with a thorough and remarkably lucid treatment of Athenian legal procedure, and concluding with a section on substantive categories of law and legal action drawing on case studies in the works of Lysias. Todd himself suggests that his two aims are "perhaps incompatible" (p. vii). But he is wrong to be diffident. His distinctive focus helps him to present a coherent image of Athenian law while acknowledging its many distinctive features.

It is hardly Todd's discovery that Athenian law differed greatly, in concept as well as substance, from Roman law, and that it easily resists modern attempts to render it as a systematic whole. Yet his question—what, if not a dominant sense of legal system, shapes Athenian law?—does more than resist biases against its unsystematic nature. If, in this picture, Athenian law functioned without the benefit of professional jurists or clear distinctions between decree and law or law and fact, it also stood in a symbiotic, and—given the Athenian understanding of that word—fundamentally democratic, relationship to Athenian social and political life.

Todd is determined to find a logic in this relationship but carefully avoids putting it there himself. Although the book's organization seems to presume a universalist conception of law (in sections entitled "Procedure" and "Substance," and in chapter headings such as "Personal Status" and "Relations between Personals and Things"), he skillfully avoids the shackles of ideal conceptions of law. So, for example, his discussion of "Relations with the Polis" includes a brief but helpful discussion of constitutional law, and his chapter on "Relations outside the Polis" offers an insightful treatment of the state's legal response to interpolitical finances. In the end, Todd does more than include discussions of the social, political, and economic conditions that influenced Athenian laws and legal procedures; he reaches beyond "shape" to "shaping," placing Athenian law in context and relating it to cultural processes of democratic Athens.

Todd's interest in understanding law as an evolving cultural product dramatically separates his study from earlier treatments of Athenian law, particularly A. R. W. Harrison's *The Law of Athens* (1968–71) and Douglas M. MacDowell's *The Law in Classical Athens* (1978). Todd discusses access to law, its considerable procedural flexibility, and the Athenians' remarkable litigiousness as basic rather than peripheral elements of it. Most importantly, Todd's focus allows him to penetrate more fully into the political nature of Athenian legal procedures. This is evident on the concrete level when Todd traces the influence of the Athenian imperialistic policy on legal procedure in the later fifth century and, in more abstract terms, when, for example, he probes the relationship between the belief in authochthony and the absence of a notion of a property title by civic grant (p. 247). On the subject of criminal trials of incompetent magistrates, where others have argued that democratic Athens abused its own laws in treating incompetence as illegal, Todd makes more sense and shows more

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sympathy in noting that "this is precisely to miss the point, because Athenian public discourse rests on a success-oriented mode of politics in which incompetence is criminal" (p. 306). But, in addition to politics, this book offers insights into various aspects of Athenian social status, domestic relations, inheritance, and property.

Although Todd describes the shape of law in fifth and fourth-century Athens, he is searching for a methodology appropriate for laws and legal conceptions different from those of later times. He is seldom uncritical about his assumptions. Yet Todd does not pretend that his study is free of questions and principles borrowed from law in other times; instead, he wisely represents these as the inevitable starting points for any treatment of ancient law, and he makes deliberate use of them. Hence his healthy attitude to comparative methodology: if comparison is a tool that changes the objects under consideration, it is nonetheless unavoidable and becomes dangerous only when concealed (pp. 20–23).

There are some problems. Despite Todd's claim that this book is a handbook, it sometimes reads like a complex (if never querulous) dialogue with present and earlier scholars of Athenian law. This will attract more scholarly readers, but it may bother others. Moreover, Todd's section on legal method may not satisfy everyone's theoretical expectations. Todd teases his readers with Turner's notion of "social drama" (p. 26); but this idea plays little role in his accounts of procedures and substance; Todd could have done more to make sense of the social impact of the Athenians' extraordinary attention to legal matters. Finally, this volume, like any handbook, will seem to some to make odd decisions: it says little, for example, about informing, immunity, or occasional judicial intervention by the demos (such as happened when Alcibiades was recalled in 415). But these are minor objections.

Todd has presented a large body of material collected from disparate sources in an accessible form without the oversimplification that is a characteristic problem in books like his. This book cannot make Athenian law easy, but for the attention Todd pays to the distinct "shape" of Athenian law, and the challenge he allows Athenian law to present to modern ideas about the nature and function of law, it deserves much attention. Athenian law, in Todd's hands, no longer seems the chaotic, primitive, and overpoliticized ancestor of Roman law; to study it is to study Athenian democratic culture.

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Lisa Kallet-Marx. *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.25.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 229. $45.00.

Contemporary students of Thucydides are in general agreement that the historian was not interested in and paid insufficient attention to financial matters. Lisa Kallet-Marx puts this notion to rest forever. Avoiding the common shortcoming of looking for financial information in terms of twentieth-century economic concepts, she carefully examines the text of Thucydides and considers other pertinent material, mainly epigraphical, from a fresh and rewarding perspective.

Right from the outset in the Archaeology, she argues, Thucydides separated wealth from morality and recognized an intimate connection between financial resources and naval power. The necessary ingredients for the latter are money, income, and especially surplus wealth that can be readily expended. This notion is the centerpiece of his analysis of the development of power in early Greece and determined which incidents he chose to include in the Archaeology. The theme was continued in his analysis of the development of Athenian power in the Pentecontaetia, the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. In Kallet-Marx's analysis, I.96, a chapter frequently found wanting, is seminal. As she demonstrates in a tightly knit argument of fifteen pages, it is an explication of the most important stage in the development of Athenian power: the voluntary acceptance of Athenian hegemony by the allies and the institution of the *phoros.*

The importance of financial resources for naval power is stressed repeatedly in the speeches Thucydides either paraphrases or puts into the mouths of various speakers on the eve of the war. The reader comes away with a clear picture that Athens was well prepared financially with a steady income, a substantial surplus readily available for expenditure, and a political leader, Pericles, fully cognizant of the requirements of naval power. The Spartans, by contrast, were ill prepared financially and, apart from Archidamus, failed to appreciate the connection between financial resources and naval power. Throughout his treatment of the war years, Thucydides remained keenly interested in the role of finances. Kallet-Marx notices a sharp shift in financial policy after the death of Pericles. There are indications that tribute was getting more difficult to collect, but she sees no financial crisis at Athens at any time during the Archidamian War. The book includes important discussions on dating the Callias Decrees; on Thucydides's chapter 3.17, which, she argues, is neither spurious nor misplaced; and on IG I^3 71 and Thucydides's failure to mention the reassessment of 425 B.C. The inscription is too fragmentary to provide firm proof that tribute was tripled, and Thucydides had no need to mention the reassessment because it had no significant impact on Athenian revenue. A final chapter provides an overview of Athenian finances during the Archidamian War and offers additional insights on Thucydides.

There is much more to this important and well-

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written book than can be covered here. It is must reading for anyone interested in Thucydides or Athenian history. The research is thorough, the issues well thought out, and the various arguments fully developed. Best of all, however, is that Kallet-Marx plans to continue the study to encompass the whole of the *History*.

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PETER WHITE. *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 330.

What were the socioeconomic circumstances and relations of the Augustan poets and their patrons? Peter White studies this issue in seven closely integrated chapters, grouped as "Poets and Roman Social Life" and "Poets and Augustus." Although the focus lies with the Augustan era, he generously looks to the centuries on either side for apposite evidence and parallels. Readers will be hard pressed to find a favorite piece of primary evidence missing, so thorough is his compilation.

White has deliberately limited his citations to those primary materials, although including a bibliographical note (pp. 269–72) on the secondary scholarship; he reasonably proposes that the enormous bulk of modern scholarship would unreasonably bloat the book (p. xi). But it remains unclear if he has entirely escaped the inherent pitfalls of his agenda.

Sometimes White's notes will be incomprehensible to nonspecialists without scholarly guidance. For example, the notes on the Lares (pp. 171 n.43) or the "discovery" of Numa's alleged writings (p. 149 n.67) address specialists in Roman religion. Again, it encompasses too much to proffer his view of the neoteric poetry movement as "common parlance" (p. 82 n.29). Sometimes entire sections would benefit by brief reference to other scholarship; thus, the discussion of occasional verse (pp. 82–84) could benefit from reference to David Ross's *Style and Tradition in Catullus* (1969).

These problems also exist on the larger scale. Although White masterfully discusses the influence of the imperial cult on poets (pp. 169–82), he could have made his case even stronger by referring to Simon Price's *Rituals and Power* (1984). Price demonstrated how the cult represented a unique response to unique circumstances, with important implications for reading the Augustan poets. Again, White asserts that most studies of Augustan poetry assume its political intent (p. 96), a claim contradicted by the work of, for example, Ralph Johnson and Michael Putnam. This leads to what I consider the book's major conceptual problem.

White's claim that Augustan poetry was not political rests on his observation that Suetonius and Tacitus did not assert as much (pp. 98–99). True, but the *argumentum ex silentio* does not encourage confidence. First, Suetonius and Tacitus may have had their own reasons for not saying so. Second, as Keith Hopkins eloquently demonstrated, the absence of ancient material to support a modern view does not conceptually negate that modern view (*Journal of Roman Studies* 68 [1978], pp. 178–86). Thus, White's approach harkens to the empiricist claim that "facts speak for themselves"; readers' reactions will largely depend on their views of the conceptual legitimacy of empiricism. Is the Putnam/Johnson view that the poets were not political less legitimate because its proponents are modern? White and I differ on the point.

There are many felicitous *Einzelerklärungen*, particularly on Roman history. White uses the work of R. Duncan-Jones to produce a compelling picture of the poets' economic circumstances (pp. 5–14), and his summary of the Augustan regime (pp. 21–22) says more in a paragraph than others do in entire books. Unfortunately, his tendency to use terms such as "elite," "aristocrats," and "governing class" interchangeably detracts from his many valuable observations on social history and social exchange.

White gives a superb exegesis of the primary sources. Whether that will suffice for all readers remains debatable.

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J. DONALD HUGHES. *Pan's Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and Romans.* (Ancient Society and History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 277. $39.95.

For anyone who wishes to preserve a traditional, squeaky clean image of the ancient Greek and Roman world, this is a book to avoid. It may also shock those who consider the field of ancient history to lie well outside the mainstream of modern social and economic concerns, for the subject matter of this book—the Mediterranean environment and humans' long-term and dynamic interaction with it—is topical in the extreme. Within that larger theme, J. Donald Hughes has two more specific goals, one of which I can agree with more readily than the other.

First, the book sets out to demonstrate that environmental problems are not (contrary to popular opinion) solely of modern making. This argument has been made by historians, anthropologists, and archaeologists alike in numerous other contexts, for example, by students of the ecological fate of the monument builders on Easter Island. No one, however, had yet made this argument for the ancient Mediterranean world in any easily comprehensible and accessible fashion. Hughes provides a genuine service by pulling together a wide range of issues and sources. Among the environmental problems discussed are deforestation and overgrazing, erosion, wildlife depletion, pollution (air, land, and water), agricultural decline, and a host of urban troubles

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(including such depressing subjects as crowding, waste disposal, and vermin). Each of these topics is presented in a neat short discussion, with ancient and secondary sources cited for those who wish to pursue certain matters further. I have more difficulty with Hughes's second major argument: that this environmental degradation can be linked to the "decline of classical civilization": "the lands where Western civilization received its formative impulse were gradually drained, losing their living and nonliving heritage" (p. 199). This rather teleological view of Mediterranean history (with everything going downhill from the Greco-Roman period) no longer seems so clear cut today, and a more tightly argued connection between social and environmental change would have been welcome.

Hughes makes it very clear that the book is primarily for the general reader rather than for specialists, and it is among general readers that the book will do the most good. On behalf of the specialists, however, certain regrets can be voiced. While the bibliography is in many ways admirably up to date, the absence of certain works (such as Peter Garnsey's *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World* [1988] or Oliver Rackham's "Ancient Landscapes" in Oswyn Murray and Simon Price, eds., *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander* [1990]) is striking; such recent works might have modified somewhat Hughes's generally negative line about the ancient environment. Such pessimism is also fed in part by his relative willingness to accept the testimony of ancient authors more or less at face value. The countryside and its rural population provided a rich source of allusion and literary *topoi* for ancient elite and urban-based authors (a phenomenon not confined to the Greco-Roman world); the habitats about which they write can be, and often are, imaginary landscapes, not mirrors of the social and ecological traumas with which Hughes is concerned.

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GILLIAN CLARK. *Women in Late Antiquity: Pagan and Christian Lifestyles.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 158. $35.00.

Gillian Clark, in her preface to this brief examination of women from the second through the sixth centuries, explains her project as an attempt to relate information about Greco-Roman women to the writings of the fathers of the early Christian church. A historical overview, the book moves gracefully between the classical law, medicine, philosophy, and social practice, and it links these to patristic writings. Demonstrating the extent to which the church fathers worked in the world of Greek and Roman traditions but reinterpreted them because of the changed nature of their intellectual and spiritual goals, Clark points up the complexities of historical change, geographical diversity, and generic convention. Her book provides a solid grounding in late-antique women's history for the lay reader or student.

Clark takes the reader through chapters on women's legal and moral status, the female body and health, domestic and ascetic practice, and philosophical debates about women's inferiority. She organizes in a simple and clear way the divergences in opinion and practice over time both among Christian and non-Christian writers and in the eastern Greek-speaking and western Latin-speaking parts of the late-Roman world. Beginning with a survey of the basics of Roman law and church writings on marriage, divorce, and sexual behavior, she takes on each of her themes with an eye to the kinds of evidence available for the study of elite men's ideas about women.

Clark always keeps central the nature of the voice that speaks and stresses the absence of women's own voices in this period. Her consideration of the female body through secular medical writings and the opinions of Christian authors depends on this centrality because the medical writers, like the church fathers, rarely had much first-hand experience with certain aspects of women's bodies. Similarly, the domestic work of women is often discussed with less concern for specificity than for larger arguments about how life should be led; the domestic realm becomes a virtual chamber of horrors to writers exhorting women to virginity and asceticism. Clark is good at making these larger arguments clear both as sources of information (and its absence) about women and as the discursive settings within which their lives were being lived.

Clark's book stands as good, accessible women's history. It is less than completely successful, however, in its use of archaeological materials. Historians of the ancient world tend to be well trained in the use of written texts, but they have less background in art history and archaeology (even in England, where such training is better than in the United States). Thus, inscriptions are nowhere in evidence, and Clark's attempts to bring in visual analysis and discussion of, for example, the archaeological evidence of domestic architecture are too brief or too conventional to provide as much help as they might. The fault is not with Clark, but with disciplinary boundaries. As an introduction to the written historical materials on the women of late antiquity, her book is a fine contribution to the ongoing process of illuminating the lives of women and their relationship to the discourses that represent them to us.

NATALIE BOYMEL KAMPEN
Barnard College

MEDIEVAL

IAN WOOD. *The Merovingian Kingdoms 450–751.* New York: Longman. 1994. Pp. xii, 395.

Any attempt to reconstruct the history of the early Middle Ages is hampered by the limitations of the

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evidence. Merovingian Gaul is no exception here. One of the main strengths of this book is that Ian Wood makes clear at every turn exactly what sources he is using. Although he uses hagiography, numismatics, and archaeology, they cannot provide continuous narrative. For the sixth century we have Gregory of Tours but the unrivaled range and power of his writings present problems in themselves. For long stretches this book inevitably becomes an extended conversation with Gregory; cautiously but convincingly, Wood modifies views largely based on him. He redates the conversion of Clovis to about 508, provides a clear explanation for the fall of the Burgundian kingdom to the Franks, and, in ranking Chilperic above Guntram, revises Gregory's preferences among Frankish kings. Against Gregory, he argues that the wars between Merovingian rulers "did not pose a threat to the survival of the kingdom" (p. 101).

Wood also refuses to adopt the perspectives that Einhard and other apologists for the Merovingians' successors, the Carolingians, have imposed on later historians. He does not see the decline of Merovingian power as inevitable, nor does he think it began as early as is usually believed. Even when, in 687, the Carolingians were installed as *maiores* in Neustria as well as Austrasia, it was not until 719, in his view, that the Merovingians were reduced to ciphers.

Although Wood states that his book is "primarily an account of the politics, in the widest sense of the word, of the Merovingian period" (p. 3), his discussions of Merovingian legislation, the economy, the development of monasteries, and ecclesiastical culture are as valuable as is his disentangling of the political record. Here one might single out his analyses of the *Life* of Columban by Jonas, or of the will—rightly called "astonishing" (p. 208)—of Bishop Bertram of Le Mans. Wood shows that the dark picture of the church painted by the Anglo-Saxon St. Boniface in 742 should not be adopted without question. Nor should Boniface's own mission to Germany be seen as a completely new start, but as dependent on the work of his sixth and seventh-century Gallic predecessors. Charlemagne's empire, too, would have been impossible without the achievements of the supposedly ineffective Merovingian kings.

In this book Wood has given us a new interpretation, much of it based on his own research, of early medieval history. It is one with which later writers will have to reckon. Its value is increased by the useful bibliography, genealogies, prosopography, and maps it contains.

J. N. Hillgarth
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Jaroslav Pelikan. *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism.* (Gifford Lectures, 1992–93.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 368. $40.00.

As Jaroslav Pelikan states in his introduction, this work is similar in title to the famous book by Charles A. Cochrane, published in 1944, but, as its subtitle indicates, it is far more restricted in content. It confines itself to the use of the "natural philosophy" of pagan antiquity to interpret the Christian religion in the writings of the "three Cappadocians" of the late fourth century—Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nyssa—as well as the sister of the last two, Macrina, whose ideas are extant only in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, while she is unmentioned by her other brother, Basil.

This tightly organized and well-planned work is based on the Gifford lectures and devoted primarily to exposition of the ideas of these four theologians, characterized correctly as the founders of Eastern Orthodox theology. Although Byzantium never had an Augustine, these theologians, building on the work of Origen, comparably influenced the Eastern Christian world. Through them, the rhetorical and philosophical tradition of classical Greece was Christianized and transmitted to the Byzantine world. Pelikan emphasizes the resemblances between the ideas of the four theologians, alluding only occasionally to differences. He treats their ideas topically rather than by author or work, dividing his book into two sections. The first considers natural theology as apologetic, with some emphasis on apophasis, what Christianity (and other concepts) are not or exclude. The second section discusses natural theology as presupposition, emphasizing essentially axiomatic ideas that underpin reasoning. Comparisons with Western theology appear where appropriate.

A major achievement of this book is Pelikan's discussion of how concepts from Greek philosophy are adjusted and at times transformed when used to defend and expound the Bible and the Nicene creed. The essentially unbiblical concept of *apatheia*, or the impassability of God, which was derived from philosophical characterization of pagan gods, is, for example, attributed to the Christian God with considerable mental gymnastics in relation to the Creation (in chap. 12) and in relation to the crucifixion (in chap. 17). The theologians, as Pelikan demonstrates, had a far better knowledge of Plato's account of creation in the *Timaeus*, frequently cited by them, than of the account in Genesis, owing both to their sophistic and philosophical training and to their ignorance of Hebrew.

Although quibbles are possible—the discussion of the Trinity and the impossibility of finding analogies for God (pp. 207–10) is arguably prolix and repetitious—the scholarly world is again greatly in the debt of this eminent scholar for an exposition of material often neglected in the English-speaking world. Here perhaps we have the beginning of a Byzantine counterpart to the exposition of Western medieval culture recently surveyed in Norman F. Cantor's *Invention of the Middle Ages* (1991). Pelikan laudably puts his notes in the side margins, in small print, with abbreviations

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explained in a key at the beginning of the book; secondary works are cited only to mention an idea first found in them; although there are a few biblical and classical citations, many from Plato, as well as cross-references, most citations are to the works of the Cappadocians themselves. The adequate bibliography excludes, as the author notes in his preface, works in Greek and other non-Western languages, while the Greek in the body of the book is transliterated, Greek letters being relegated to the useful glossary at the end. This is a work with which students of the period, often parochial in outlook, will have to reckon.

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PAUL MAGDALINO. *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 557. $89.95.

This outstanding book is aptly titled, for it is much more than a biography of the emperor or a study of his policies. Rather, it is a complete, coherent investigation into the political and cultural unit he headed for thirty-seven years. Everything revolved around Manuel: the political, intellectual, and literary life of the capital, debates about theology and astrology, as well as family intrigue and sexual scandals. He rode with his soldiers on campaign and shared their hardships and dangers. His court was a dazzling display of power and wealth, visited by Western kings and dukes and Turkish sultans.

The contemporary historian Niketas Choniates was severely critical of Manuel as emperor, and modern historians have tended to agree with him. Such was the prevailing view when Paul Magdalino began his research ten years ago, but more recent scholarship has led to a reevaluation of Manuel's reign, and Magdalino acknowledges that he has written a much different book than he would have written a decade ago (p. xi). The twelfth century, he now maintains, was a distinctive and creative phase of Byzantine history, not one of decline.

Magdalino comes to grips in the introduction with the often negative accounts provided by the narrative sources. Yet the rhetoricians and poets of the age praised Manuel to extravagant lengths, and Magdalino has made exemplary use of this unwieldy corpus throughout his book. Rather than follow a strictly chronological approach, he chooses to look at the empire in terms of certain dominant themes. The first chapter deals with what we might call foreign policy, a complicated subject. Manuel had to deal with crusading German and French armies led by their respective kings. To the east were the Latin states of Jerusalem and Antioch and to the north the Hungarian kingdom, over all of which he asserted his suzerainty. With the Turkish powers in Asia Minor he was less successful but, in Magdalino's view, his policies were not as disastrous as some have contended.

Great emphasis is placed on the city of Constantinople, so central to Byzantine civilization. The provinces with their cities and towns are also discussed, as are fortifications, economy and trade, and the growth of large estates. Magdalino devotes a chapter to what he calls the Comnenian system, which concentrated power not just in the individual emperor but in his extended family. This involves marriage policy, the functioning of government, the importance of ceremonial, the administration of justice, and church-state relations. Orthodoxy and its guardians form the subject of an interesting chapter that includes such topics as education, law, medicine, rhetoric, and philosophy. Of great interest is the discussion on the central place of rhetoric in Byzantine culture and the explanation of rhetoric as "theatre" (p. 339). The chapter on the emperor and his image is a major contribution, examining the nature and characteristics of imperial panegyric; their purpose and importance as propaganda, and at the same time as historical sources, is clarified. In the epilogue Magdalino sums up the significance of Manuel's reign with its successes and its failures and concludes by stressing the positive accomplishments of Comnenian rule. The book contains a full bibliography, index, genealogical tables, and maps.

The thorough research, thoughtful composition, and clear articulation of difficult and complicated material, as well as Magdalino's distinctive approach, mark this as a truly significant contribution to the history not only of the Byzantine world, but of the world in which we all live.

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DAVID J. WASSERSTEIN. *The Caliphate in the West: An Islamic Political Institution in the Iberian Peninsula.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 280. $55.00.

David J. Wasserstein's book is strangely mistitled. It is not about the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba, as the title might indicate, but rather about what happens to the caliphal title and office after the end of the caliphate. Thus, the chronological span of the heart of the volume is from the jockeying for position among various pretenders in the second decade of the eleventh century to the definitive break-up of the caliphate in 1031 and its immediate aftermath. Hence the story is not about the caliphate but rather about the idea of the caliphate and what became of it.

Under al-Mansur, majordomo of the last caliphs, the caliphal institution was transmuted along ʿAbbasid lines into a "quasi-religious source of authority for other wielders of secular power" (p. 19), which in part explains why the institution refused to die a timely death in 1031. The caliphate was not abolished but simply declared vacant, inasmuch as none of the contenders for power wanted the Umayyads to continue, nor could they decide on any successor. Still

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the rulers of the successor "Taifa" kingdoms never failed to recognize a caliph whether the claimant was alive or dead.

I do not find Wasserstein's argument quite convincing, since he never makes clear just what positive benefit the Taifa kings gained from recognizing a phantom caliph, other than some vague claim of legitimacy. Peter Scales, in *The Fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba* (1994, p. 179), provides a parallel but more convincing answer by focusing on how the Taifa kings named themselves, rather than on the modalities of their recognition of phantom caliphs. He notes that only two Taifa kings adopted caliphal honorific names (*laqab/s*) while fourteen of sixteen Taifa kings between 1009 and 1110 took names that included the element *al-dawla*, "the state," which is hardly indicative of loyalty to the caliphal idea. Much of Wasserstein's evidence comes from coinage and the caliphal names and royal titles mentioned thereon. Such inscriptions, however, were highly stylized and as al-Maqqari wisely noted (p. 18) a name on a coin and a robe of honor do not a caliph make. Although the Taifa kings may have been wholly instrumentalist, as Wasserstein intimates, their sights were set clearly on a limited, secular zone of influence in the compass of a small state (*dawla*) and whose invocation of the caliphal dignity amounted to rhetorical posturing.

The book contains fully 100 pages of appendixes mainly on numismatic evidence, including a very long concordance of coin numbers in three catalogues of Andalusi coinage. This material is useful to scholars who depend on numismatic evidence, but the sheer space allotted to such detail highlights the book's narrow range.

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JOHN DAGENAIS. *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the* Libro de buen amor. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. Pp. xxiii, 278. $39.50.

For much of the twentieth century, medieval literary studies have abandoned the manuscripts in which medieval literary texts are preserved. Although textual editors have continued to pore over manuscripts and sort out textual variants, the products of their labors, editions of the "best" text, ironically have provided literary critics with the occasion to pursue their increasing preoccupation with theories about the poststructuralist abstraction of the *texte* as the locus of linguistic interplay. In this book, John Dagenais proposes a different approach that refocuses medieval literary studies on the extant manuscripts to re-create the experience of medieval reading. As the subtitle indicates, the literary work to which he applies his ideas is the *Libro de buen amor*, a Spanish composition thought to have been written by Juan Ruiz around 1330.

Dagenais divides his book almost equally into two sections. In the first part he sets forth the issues that arise from a reorientation that "privileges the individual reader" (p. xvii). Dagenais makes two main points. First, he asserts that the "individual, concrete manuscript codices" (p. xvii) should form the basis for medieval literary studies. Second, he argues that medieval readers interacted with texts in a continuing dialogue that involved making ethical judgments as an integral part of reading. These two points intersect because he uses the unique features of individual manuscripts that reveal reader response through scribal copying and marginal glossing to provide the primary evidence for demonstrating their practice of ethical reading.

In the second part he examines the three manuscripts containing the *Libro de buen amor* as well as its reception in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Spanish literature to determine the reaction of late-medieval readers. He begins by working out a new approach to understanding the scribal process through analysis of five intersecting "registers." The resulting variants not only reveal a type of reading through scribal copying but also leave ample occasion for readers to make ethical choices in the act of reading. Marginal *nota* and glosses elucidate how medieval readers focused on the ethical implications of *exempla* imbedded within the text. Finally, the way later authors incorporated portions of the *Libro* into their work suggests that they apprehended the *Libro* as piecemeal fragments rather than a unified narrative.

Although Dagenais succeeds in refocusing attention on the medieval reader's experience of individual manuscripts, he never fully escapes from the "spider's web of words" (p. 8) on the two-dimensional manuscript leaf. Codicological methodology could have expanded his provocative insights by helping to re-create the reader's encounter with the manuscript as a complete three-dimensional object. For example, the relationship of different parts of the text within the manuscript's gathering structure and the articulation of textual divisions as part of layout patterns could have been more fully explained. Codicological descriptions of the three manuscripts containing the *Libro* and illustrative plates would have helped to place what he terms the *scriptum* in its manuscript context. These comments, however, emphasize Dagenais's achievement in challenging critical assumptions and opening new areas for exploration and interaction between literary criticism and the history of the book.

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C. H. LAWRENCE. *The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society.* (The Medieval World.) New York: Longman. 1994. Pp. x, 245.

Now that this book has been written, one wonders how medievalists have managed without it. C. H. Lawrence offers an excellent survey of the early

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history of the mendicant orders. His lucid and graceful account assumes no previous familiarity with the material. Accordingly, it is self-explanatory but never demeaningly simple. The survey is wide-ranging. In addition to treating the origins of the *vita apostolica* movement, the Franciscans, and the Dominicans, Lawrence covers the constitutions of the new orders, the nature of their urban settlements, their preaching, their role in the history of the universities and in the shaping of Christian Aristotelianism, their activities on behalf of kings and popes, and their missions to East Asia. He also grants consideration to Augustinians, Carmelites, suppressed mendicant orders, and "the complaint of the clergy" (the secular-mendicant controversy and antimendicant literary polemics). His perspective is always international. Perhaps most gratifying is the freshness of Lawrence's illustrative examples; the array of quotations and insights he offers from underutilized primary sources is stunning. Although I thought I knew this material rather well, I learned and learned.

A warning is in order: the book is not "as much a work of social as of religious history" (p. x), to quote David Bates, the general editor. To my mind this is not a criticism, for Lawrence is concerned appropriately with examining religious trends in terms of their connections not only with society but also with politics and the life of the mind. But I do have a criticism, namely that Lawrence has such a rosy view of his protagonists that he almost invariably neglects to acknowledge their darker hues. Whenever there is a choice, he sides with the friars: William of Saint-Amour writes "propaganda" (p. 156), but Bonaventure never does. For Lawrence, the early mendicants linked themselves with "the humblest and most deprived sections of the population, in loud contrast to the careerism and ostentation of the secular clergy" (p. 126). They cared nothing for glory or preferment, were "beyond the reach of bribery" (p. 174), and were naturally inclined toward a "stance of benevolent detachment" (p. 180) in political affairs.

If Gerard of Modena or John of Vicenza were tricksters, Lawrence certainly will not say so. Nor will he say anything about the horrendous strife between the new orders or about the friars' terrible persecution of the Jews. The Inquisition does appear, but only in a subsection opening with the predictable warnings that persecution was "an ancient tradition" (p. 188) and that religious toleration was a historical novelty linked with the rise of liberal democracy. In keeping with this attempt to exculpate, Bernard Gui appears solely as the author of an inquisitorial handbook, but not as the dispenser of death sentences to scores of ardent disciples of St. Francis who happened to believe more in the centrality of poverty for Christians than Gui did. It is hard to see how the author of such a lively and intelligent book can wear such blinders.

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LINDA M. PATERSON. *The World of the Troubadours: Medieval Occitan Society, c. 1100–c. 1300.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 367. $59.95.

This is an easy, agreeable book to read, and a clutch of pertinent black-and-white illustrations, mainly taken from manuscript illuminations, enliven the text. Linda M. Paterson presents a well-informed synthesis of a substantial body of recent scholarship concerning the social history of the south of France during the High Middle Ages.

It is not immediately obvious, however, just what readers Paterson intended to address. Her purpose in writing the book, according to her own account (pp. 3–4), is to define the troubadours' vision of their own identity, the boundaries of the world as they saw it, and the main features of the society in which they lived and wrote. This makes it likely that the target audience may be students of medieval French literature who wish to place the troubadour poets in their social context. Students and teachers of medieval history will find this book useful for slightly different purposes. It provides an intelligent, well-informed overview of the results of a considerable body of recent scholarship on the social history of medieval Occitania. It should accordingly prove helpful in courses on medieval French history, while graduate students reviewing for comprehensive examinations may find it a godsend.

Paterson adopts a topical approach to her material. The early chapters of the book deal with knightly, chivalric, and courtly society. She then shifts her attention to peasants, townspeople, physicians, women, and children. The final—and to my mind least satisfactory—chapter of the book rather awkwardly lumps together the clergy, heretics, and inquisitors. At the close, Paterson presents a terse, one-paragraph summary of her conclusions, followed by a ten-page bibliography.

Although this book is primarily a work of synthesis, Paterson also incorporates occasional bits of original research into her text. In her chapter on knights, for example, she presents an original analysis of the terms that the writers of Occitan epics employed to distinguish between soldiers of different social classes and military functions. The principal contribution of this book, however, is to report and summarize in readily accessible prose the findings of current scholarship on medieval Occitania.

JAMES A. BRUNDAGE
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JOHN W. BERNHARDT. *Itinerant Kingship and Royal Monasteries in Early Medieval Germany, c. 936–1075.* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, series 4, number 21.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 376. $69.95.

To say that the argument John W. Bernhardt makes in this book is straightforward and fairly simple should

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not detract from the weight of its scholarship or the strength of the theses it presents. The book is a study in the growth of German royal power from the time of Henry I (d. 936) through the early years of Henry IV, although Otto I (936–73) is the centerpiece. Bernhardt tells his story by looking at the policies and strategies kings adopted to maintain and foster royal power that proved to be capable of implementation and ideologically appropriate and acceptable, given the quantity and quality of royal resources and the nature of the challenges that confronted the monarchs.

Bernhardt opens with a survey of the policies the German kings pursued to separate themselves from the nobility, to enhance both the sacral aspects of kingship and its practical power base and to dictate initiatives in foreign policy and territorial expansion. He argues that the need to differentiate monarchy from a *primes inter pares* aristocratic rule, plus the military and economic logistics of post-Carolingian German monarchy, necessitated an itinerant kingship. In addition, the kings (and their royal and noble relatives) were great founders and patrons of monastic houses; in fact, many of their female relatives ruled strategically located and well-endowed institutions. So the lines of Bernhardt's argument come together: in the course of the constant royal journeys designed to display their majesty and clout the kings would pass through and often stay at "their" houses; they would rely on the resources of these monasteries to feed and house the traveling court; such houses would become the pro-monarchical outposts proclaiming the growing royal dignity as well as physical bastions of great value for imposing domestic and foreign policy on the realm.

Beyond this reasonable account, Bernhardt's study has some particular virtues and features. One is his running commentary on German historiography of the last several decades, regarding his differences of interpretation (for instance, emphasizing royal support for regular houses over royal links to bishops and secular cathedrals) and the status of various projects-in-progress. For all our trips across the Atlantic and the presence of European scholars at conferences in this country, American medievalists are apt to be behind on the Continental currents in scholarship on Germany and the Holy Roman empire.

Bernhardt offers us a vast amount of data and detail to support his basic thesis. As befits a volume produced in good part at the home of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, the tale of endowment and of royal ties for such great houses as Quedlinburg, Gandersheim, Corvey, Hersfeld, and Fulda is carefully drawn. So are the many maps, by means of which the argument about the routes for itineration across Germany and the reliance on the royal monasteries comes together. The main regions of the realm are covered, monastery by monastery, and there is also time and material for lesser houses and those only visited on the odd occasion. In summary, the exposition developed by Bernhardt is convincing, the detail well-crafted in its mixed reliance on primary and secondary materials, and the book (with eleven maps and thirty-two pages of bibliography) a model case study that tackles a major problem, lays its arguments out for the reader, and is invariably clear and courteous. The emphasis on process and policy, rather than just an elaborate narrative of *res gestae*, makes this an engaging monograph.

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VALENTIN GROEBNER. *Ökonomie ohne Haus: Zum Wirtschaften armer Leute in Nürnberg am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts.* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, number 108.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1993. Pp. 291. DM 65.

The title of Valentin Groebner's book clarifies the economic situation of the working poor in the great imperial town of Nuremberg (1460–1510). Did the 5,002 persons defined as "poor handworkers, day-wage earners and house poor domestics" (p. 15) manage to maintain a household or domestic economy of their own, even though many did not enjoy a private dwelling? Groebner proposes to develop a view of Nuremberg's working poor that is told by them, not the aristocrats and authorities. His goal is to uncover their mentality, the economic and social logic (of an economy without a house) that they devised in their experience with poverty.

The rich archival sources of Nuremberg provide information about salaries, debts, pawnbroking, and exchange of properties, but the debtor's court records probably best elicit the story from the poor themselves. Most readers will find that Groebner has revealed much of the mentality of the poor and uncovered their economy.

There is valuable information on money, prices, and crafts that will interest those concerned with Nuremberg. Groebner reveals a complex, dual structure of wages that is particularly enlightening. Fixed payments made quarterly or annually at the renewal of contracts were not as large as the day-wage portion of wages. Low wages compelled many people to hold second jobs, whereas others were permitted to beg.

The heart of the book comprises two chapters dealing with the material assets and debts of the working poor. Looking closely at the building and metals crafts, the author shows clearly that common craftsmen often could not afford their own tools or materials. Tools and materials were very expensive, particularly relative to labor. Craftsmen were forced to take advances that, by contract, usually limited them to work only for the creditor until the debt was paid. Groebner modifies the standard view by showing that for most poor craftsmen there was no clear distinction between a money system and a material *Verlagssystem* (p. 205).

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What this book reveals about the nature of the common worker's assets represents its greatest contribution. As Groebner argues, everyday assets such as articles of clothing, beds and bedding, household items, and tableware were "economic media, capable of transfer and exchange" (p. 235). Whereas previous writers looked at such items (often listed in testaments) as simply valuables or status symbols, Groebner shows that they could be exchanged for money, used for collateral, or transferred to another person in return for old-age security. As Groebner says of clothes, they "not only symbolize property, they are property" (p. 243).

Groebner has also shown erroneous the older idea (associated with H. Bechtel) that medieval people bought beautiful or valuable personal effects because they conceived of these as the only investments open to them. Rather, they bought personal, work, and household items because they were useful and always capable of being exchanged for money or loans. They were hoarding "working capital" (p. 263).

Although they do not detract from what the author has contributed to our understanding of the socioeconomic realities of the lower classes in Nuremberg, there are two troublesome problems in relating his findings to broader issues. First, Groebner speaks of deficient liquidity as a causal force impacting on the poor (pp. 63, 205), without clearly indicating what this means: lack of bullion (and, hence, coin) theories are not distinguished from the simpler idea of low wages depriving workers of money. The book does not show a lack of actual coins. Second, the author has made no attempt to examine population fluctuations or to relate the same to fluctuating prices or low wages.

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PHILLIP H. STUMP. *The Reforms of the Council of Constance (1414–1418).* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, number 53.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1994. Pp. xv, 463. $151.50.

The reforms of the Council of Constance have long needed a major reevaluation and this book meets that need. Phillip H. Stump shows the limited perspectives of the earlier interpretations by Johannes Haller and Bernhard Hübler and that even Heinrich Finke's *Acta*, wonderful and heroic achievement that this was, are not the final texts. In that edition Finke's view was from the end product (the reform decrees) backward; this new study inverts this process. Stump examines the process from the beginning, using new manuscript sources that give reform proposals from the first reform committee, then the second committee, the responses of various groups and figures involved, and then the final texts. In this way he uses the different codices and their variations to show the conflicting and overlapping interests: curialists, papalists, prelates, universities, princes, and rulers each of whom pushed a somewhat different view of reform. Their interaction caused some ideas to fall by the wayside, others to evolve and take different shape.

The reformers wanted a church *unam et sanctam*, even if the steps taken to achieve the one goal seemed to impede progress toward the other. Their task seemed hopeless. If papal provisions were to be abolished as so many wanted, for instance, who would control such appointments? Kings, local nobles, and other interests all pressed their own cases forward. How could a fair and workable system be established that would provide all that was desired, a reliable system of supplying good, competent men for church office when any such reform would limit the rights of so many powerful groups?

Stump argues that we should see what the reformers strove for, how seriously they took their task, and how much they achieved within the limits of their world. Besides the analysis, he gives a modern edition of the major texts and information on the codices and reform traditions that correlates with and updates Finke's *Acta*. All who wish to examine Constance and its reforms will now have to start with this book. It is a pity that its price may limit its spread to the few libraries that can afford such an acquisition.

THOMAS E. MORRISSEY
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ANTONIO IVAN PINI. *Campagne bolognesi: Le radici agrarie di una metropoli medievale.* (Le vie della storia, number 15.) Florence: La Lettere. 1993. Pp. 287.

This book is a collection of articles written over the past twenty years; Antonio Ivan Pini himself calls it a "book written in installments" (p. 7). Unlike some works of this genre, which often fail to focus on a central theme, the articles here demonstrate Pini's continuing concern with the interconnections between rural and urban developments in medieval Bologna. In the last twenty years, a number of Italian medievalists have concentrated on rural history, intent on ending its neglect by generations of historians focusing on urban history. Pini, in common with other scholars at the University of Bologna, approaches agrarian history with the conviction that rural and urban history are so interrelated that one makes no sense without the other. Neither are rural and urban dwellers necessarily hostile to one another.

The first section, entitled "Agrarian Structures and Business Administration," contains five articles (the last a review article of Paulino Iradiel's study on the property of the College of Spain in Bologna). The first article surveys the construction of canals and mills in Bologna and the efforts of the city administration to control the food supply by controlling these structures. Next is an article analyzing the patrimony of a merchant, a man who began his career as a draper, but turned to raising animals for the urban

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market. Pini convincingly shows that this merchant invested in land not in search of status, but to take advantage of the expanding market for food. Next are two essays dealing with rural properties of religious institutions, the Monastery of S. Procolo and the Convent of S. Dominico. Pini ably argues that the investment decisions of the administrators of these institutions were based on their calculations about the value of rural produce in the urban market.

The second section ("The Citizen Culture") is comprised of three articles, all dealing with viticulture. The first analyzes the impact of viticulture on the development of agrarian contracts up to the twelfth century. Next is an excellent historiographical survey of works on viticulture published in the last twenty years. The volume concludes with an analysis of viticulture as described in two agrarian treatises of the fourteenth century.

This work has many merits. First, Pini's research is firmly grounded in archival sources, few of which have been published. He demonstrates how documents heretofore unstudied can provide insights into agrarian history. Second, in each essay, he provides extensive bibliographical coverage of work in the field, by no means limiting himself to the work of Italian scholars. There is a useful index of authors cited. Finally, the volume contains works previously dispersed among Italian historical journals, conference proceedings, and anthologies. When brought together as they are here, these articles allow the reader to appreciate Pini's success in integrating rural and urban history.

JANE K. LAURENT
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LAURA IKINS STERN. *The Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1994. Pp. xxii, 286. $49.50.

This volume is a careful analysis of the structure of the legal system of Florence between the mid-thirteenth and the early fifteenth centuries. Laura Ikins Stern's objective, however, is not so much to reveal the daily operation of the courts as it is to use the legal system to show that Florence was a "territorial state" in the sense used by Marvin Becker, that is, that "the government is run by a bureaucracy that seeks to work efficiently with the public interest in mind. No one class controls the government for its own benefit, because the government holds public good to be superior to the rights of any person or any good" (p. 2). In Becker's and Stern's conception, this trend toward the consolidation of government continued into the fifteenth century, virtually until the moment when the Medici took a dominant role in Florentine politics.

Stern focuses most of her attention on the courts of the foreign rectors: the Podestà, the Captain of the People, and the Executor of the Ordinances of the People, all of whom were foreign rectors recruited from outside Florence to serve as administrative and legal officials. She has chapters tracing the increasing reliance of their courts on inquisitions, in which the court actively prosecuted offenders rather than waiting for private accusations; on the officials working under each of the rectors; and on the courts of each of the rectors. In chapter 7 she considers the legal role of officials and agencies of the cities' "executive branch." Stern's final chapter examines the philosophies of prosecution shown by some actual cases. She argues that the foreign rectors became more similar to each other as the period progressed and as they applied more broadly a court-centered inquisitorial technique to criminal cases of various kinds. The continuing importance of the rectors in the early fifteenth century, she argues, casts doubt on the claim often made that Florentine government had fallen into the hands of a patriciate even before the Medici took control in the 1430s.

One problem with this book is that Stern relies almost entirely on the body of Florentine statutes describing the activities of the courts. Specific cases are not discussed, and Stern makes little use of court records or other archival sources, except for a sample of 177 cases drawn from the workings of one court, that of the Podestà between 1425–28, which she discusses in her last chapter. Given the richness of the Florentine archives, this research strategy comes as something of a surprise, the more so since the personnel of the court are discussed in a similarly abstract way: Stern has nothing to say about who served as foreign rectors or held offices in their courts, what their education was, or how long they stayed in office. The result not only leaves readers wondering whether the courts actually functioned as the statutes said that they should but also leaves open the question of whether the professionalism and coordination of the courts resulted from continuity of professional personnel rather than from broader trends within Florentine government.

A further difficulty is that Stern deliberately sets aside any discussion of the development of legal concepts within the professional and academic legal community. Until the question is investigated, however, it remains entirely possible that the standardization of procedures has more to do with legal theory, in which questions of proof were widely discussed in this period, or even with the accumulation of experience within the Florentine courts, than with the political aspirations of the "territorial state." Elsewhere in late-medieval Europe, many courts could deal with the great majority of their cases within judicial procedure not only because most cases lacked any political significance but also because, even in monarchies, jurists sometimes resisted political pressure when they saw it as undermining the integrity of

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the judicial system. Was there anything distinctive about Florence?

CHARLES M. RADDING
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ALESSANDRO STELLA. *La révolte des Ciompi: Les hommes, les lieux, le travail.* Foreword by CHRISTIANE KLAPISCH-ZUBER. (Recherches d'histoire et de sciences sociales/Studies in History and the Social Sciences, number 37.) Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 1993. Pp. 368.

This is the best study ever done of the *Ciompi* (1378), the famous insurrection of workers in the Florentine wool industry. Alessandro Stella challenges a whole historiographic tradition, which is largely paternalistic in slant, and vastly extends the scope of the underlying debate by introducing a wealth of new material on *gonfaloni* (official neighborhood units), the hierarchy of Florentine trades, and the urban-spatial scatter of occupations, wealth, and poverty. The approach is quantitative, the concern with method is sustained, and the result is a formidable inquiry with lessons for the social topography and textile industries of major cities in other parts of late medieval and early modern Europe.

Stella argues that the *Ciompi* were not a mob of ten thousand have-nots acting without a program or neighborhood organization. He finds that they had local and workshop solidarities, pursued concrete revolutionary objectives, knew how to make their clamorous bid for power, and had an echelon of practical, literate, able leaders. To extend the ground of these findings, most of the book is given to a delineation of occupational, wage, household, and neighborhood structures. Relying chiefly on tax records, he ranges over the years from 1352 to 1427.

Stella's overarching conclusion is remarkable and will not please the many historians who maintain that in the preindustrial city the networks of vertical relations between powerful patrons and clients eliminated the horizontal divisions of class. Renaissance Florence was, he finds, two cities: one for the rich and respectable, the other for the disreputable poor (among whom a quite disproportionate number were women). About a third of the Florentine population was officially designated as "wretched" (*miserabili*), and another 15 to 20 percent lived from hand to mouth. In the course of the fourteenth century, moreover, increasing numbers of wool workers and new immigrants settled in the city's peripheral areas, such as the outer parts of Ferza, Bue Nero, Unicorno, and Lion d'Oro. There, amid rows of small houses, rents and property values were much cheaper.

By contrast, the old city center (Vipera, Carro, Nicchio, and Scala) remained the primary ground of the political heavyweights, the rich and the wellborn. Here, too, servants and people in the service trades were also to be seen in numbers. But the wretched, the semiskilled, and the lowly workers of the wool industry resided mainly in the outer precincts, the new city walled in between 1284 and 1333. There was "*un véritable mélange des groupes sociaux*" only in an intermediate region of "*zones-tampons*" (p. 266).

Center and periphery thus made for an old and new city. Apparently unknown to himself, Stella provides the historical background for two imaginary cities of the age: L. B. Alberti's plan of an inner and outer city, for the upper and lower classes respectively; and Leonardo da Vinci's vision of a two-tiered city, the upper one for gentlefolk and the lower one for workers and indecorous tradesmen. No social historian of the period will want to overlook Stella's book.

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MODERN EUROPE

LONDA SCHIEBINGER. *Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science.* Boston: Beacon. 1993. Pp. viii, 289. $25.00.

The stated purpose of Londa Schiebinger's book is "to explore how gender—both the real relations between the sexes and ideological renderings of those relations—shaped European science in the eighteenth century, and natural history in particular" (p. 2). Key to her story, which also includes race, is the fact that eighteenth-century naturalists were almost exclusively white males. She offers a wealth of instances supporting the claim that "who does science affects the kind of science that gets done" (p. 3).

Previous studies have already presented this message in compelling fashion with respect to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see especially Cynthia Eagle Russett's *Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood* [1989], and Donna Haraway's *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* [1989]), and, given the androcentrism evident in biological writings from at least as far back as Aristotle, one should not be surprised to find evidence of the same in the eighteenth century. Still, the abundance and variety of examples offered by Schiebinger is impressive. If male biologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were fond of discoursing on adventurous sperm and passive ova, naturalists of the eighteenth century were equally or even more enthusiastic in writing their social assumptions into their representations of nature.

Schiebinger argues that Carolus Linnaeus's "sexual system" of plant classification sanctioned heterosexuality and "marriage" and gave primacy to males over females. Linnaeus's choice of the mammary glands as the key taxonomic feature on which to characterize the class of "mammals" also had a social context: by emphasizing "breasts" in the class of animals to which humans belong, he was endorsing and promoting the view that mothers should stay home and nurse their

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children. In studying apes, naturalists attributed familiar gender roles to the two sexes. In distinguishing between the human races, they focused almost exclusively on the characters of males. In identifying sex differences, they only studied whites. Schiebinger credits the anthropologist Johann Blumenbach with refusing to rank the different races along a single scale of being, but she also points out how he identified "Caucasians" as the original human stock on the aesthetic grounds of the race's "beauty." Although one may perhaps be amused by Erasmus Darwin's enshrining of Linnaeus's botanical system in a book of erotic poetry, one can only be appalled by the voyeurism of Georges Cuvier and his colleagues at the Paris Museum of Natural History as they sought to get a look at the genitalia of the "Hottentot Venus," Sarah Bartmann.

Although this book is rich in detail, it does not offer any clear sense of what the overall aims and practices of eighteenth-century natural history were. The study thus leaves the reader convinced that problems of gender found abundant expression in naturalists' writings but uncertain as to the extent to which gender "shaped" the enterprise of natural history as a whole. Sweeping generalizations do not solve the problem. Schiebinger writes that botany and anatomy were both "subject to the imperative to find and analyze sex (and gender) differences that dominated scientific communities in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" (p. 37), but this claim of "domination" remains unsupported in the absence of any discussion of the other concerns that naturalists pursued, such as providing names and inventories of plants and animals from other lands, searching for the "natural order" of classification, and constructing natural theologies. Inventorying nature's products and constructing natural theologies were both informed by broad, sociopolitical considerations (natural theologies indeed afforded special opportunities to endorse the social order), but it is not obvious that problems of gender "dominated" other concerns. The author's analysis needs more balance here, but one can still endorse her suggestion that the episodes she has selected might well have been different had there been women or people of color prominent among the naturalists of the eighteenth century.

Reading sociopolitical preconceptions into nature (a constructed category itself) is a problem that continues to the present. Among the special merits of this engaging and important book is its demonstration of just how prevalent and insidious such practices have been.

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Marie Tanner. *The Last Descendant of Aeneas: The Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of the Emperor.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp xi, 333. $45.00.

The legend of Troy has long fascinated the Western mind. Its enduring influence in the history of Western culture has seldom been studied as a general theme. This work is unique in its attempt to do so. Marie Tanner's main interest is to show how the legend of Aeneas's flight to Rome and the promise of world empire was adapted to the purposes of Christianity, Constantine, Charlemagne, and eventually to the claims to world empire made by Charles V and Philip II. Tanner skillfully combines her talents as iconographer and literary historian to produce a handsome volume of cultural history. It is profusely illustrated with black-and-white photographs of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance paintings, frescoes, illuminated manuscripts, sculptures, and tapestries to document the argument of the text.

Few historians would associate Philip II of Spain with Aeneas, the legendary Trojan exile, and even less with Constantine, Charlemagne, or the Eucharist. Tanner has placed them into a continuous mythic tradition linked to the premodern four-monarchies theory of history. The lore of Hellenistic culture was merged with that of Christianity in the Roman empire of the fourth century. Aeneas was viewed as the ancestor of all Roman and Christian emperors. These also descended from Adam and Noah and were even related to Jesus Christ. Tanner has made the history of these beliefs abundantly clear. The documentary evidence was drawn mostly from the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid.* Tanner's training in iconography has enabled her to open new vistas for the political historians of Roman and Holy Roman imperial history.

Tanner argues that the mythic image of the emperors enjoyed an unbroken tradition from ancient times to the sixteenth century. Philip II's manipulation of the image in the paintings commissioned by himself and his father, Charles V, expressed the Christianized forms of this myth. The architecture of the Escorial palace indicated a link with King Solomon, Philip's alleged ancestor, and was constructed according to the imagined plan of Solomon's temple. Philip II was the first king to rule four continents, and perhaps that went to his head. His absolutism, the model for later forms of European absolutism, is given a new interpretation focused on its relation not to administrative forms but to the mythic image of the Apollo (Christ), of the sun-god ruler whose coming heralds the age of the last and fifth monarchy.

It is within the context of such a continuum that Tanner reiterates the Golden Fleece *topos.* The Burgundian order, founded by Philip the Good, conveyed an identification with the Argonaut heritage that passed to Philip II by primogeniture. Because the Habsburgs divided their territories, one wonders whether the Austrian branch of the family rejected this tradition entirely. It might be noted that Maximilian I was the first Holy Roman emperor who did not journey to Rome to be crowned by the pope. Nor did Charles V. Philip II, who was to have succeeded his uncle Ferdinand I as emperor but was rejected by

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the German electors, identified kingship with a priestly role. He developed much stronger sun-god imagery than his ancestors and thus influenced the divine-right absolutism of Louis XIV of France, a descendant.

Although the Christianized Aeneas legend came down through Constantine, Charlemagne, and the Hohenstauffen to the Habsburgs, its influence on the Austrian branch of the family is apparently of less interest to Tanner. Ferdinand I is almost entirely ignored because King Philip II appeared to hold more geopolitical power in Europe. One might comment that Ferdinand I's acquisition of the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary could hardly have weakened his own political power. Philip II's ideology was supported by legend and astrology, but his kinsman Rudolf II could always make similar claims. Perhaps the Austrians were more open to the future and to science. Rudolf supported Johannes Kepler's researches, while Philip is identified with the Inquisition.

Most historians assume that history has meaning. The critical historian has to uncover the deeper structures on which the obvious rests. Conjectural history and imaginary genealogies began to lose their credibility among kings once the Enlightenment began. The yearning for the mythical past did not. But, for the modern critical historian who appreciates the meaning of legends in a social-science context, the insights to be gained from this inspiring analysis of some of the more profound aspects of European art, literature, and culture, are immense. Tanner has aptly demonstrated that the irrational aspects of political legitimation may be transformed into rational historical realities.

H. Liebel-Weckowicz
University of Alberta

Marie-Christine Leps. *Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse.* (Post-Contemporary Interventions.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1992. Pp. 262. Cloth $45.00, paper $15.95.

In the last third of the nineteenth century, Marie-Christine Leps argues in this suggestive but uneven book, a radically new stance toward crime and criminals crystallized in the West. Crime, once regarded as a sign of severe social trauma, became normalized, a simple fact of life to be regulated by newly modified laws, punished in recently established penitentiaries, and ultimately controlled by the emerging science of criminology, which took "criminal man" as the object of its investigations.

Rejecting what were to their minds the speculative metaphysics of their predecessors, such late-nineteenth-century founders of the discipline as Cesare Lombroso, along with his English (and, to a lesser extent, his more sociologically inclined French) antagonists, turned to facts, assiduously measuring criminals' skulls and exhaustively describing their physiognomies and natures. The "criminal man" that resulted from their labors, a man apart from the rest of humanity by reason of his degenerate nature, was an object not only of scientific but also popular knowledge. Leps traces the consolidation of this image in the pages of the daily press and in crime literature, engaging in "discourse analysis" (p. 9) to highlight appropriations and transformations across genres. The readings she offers of a variety of texts—criminological works, crime reports, detective fiction—are deft and for the most part quite persuasive.

Leps's handling of the larger issues that inform her study is less satisfactory. Why was it, she asks, that knowledge that was not particularly novel (much of what the new criminologists proferred can be found in earlier medical, sociological, and political treatises) caused such commotion, constituting, in her words, "a discursive event" (p. 36)? Conversely, why was criminology never successfully instituted as a discipline?

Here, as elsewhere, Leps's questions are better than her answers. In a functionalist vein, she suggests that criminology emerges "when the state lets it" (p. 43), when its structures of authority are threatened. Not a science but a form of, in her suggestive characterization, "intertextual *bricolage*" (p. 43), criminology, she argues, logically drew on other disciplines' prefabricated knowledge, the tenor of its own discourse "entirely determined by intertextual ideological maxims on race, sex, class, and morality" (p. 47). Elsewhere she posits that interests converge, sees the press serving established power relations and "leaving the social order intact" (p. 118), and, most puzzling, argues that the press created "a kind of nonunderstanding of the world" (p. 115) against which one might presumably juxtapose a truer account, such as those Leps favors involving "social structures" (p. 121). Leps examines the epistemology that underlay criminal man's emergence, arguing that it held reality to be given, truth absolute, and discourse transparent. Yet throughout she confidently tells readers whose interests were being served by what ideological move, suggesting, when it comes to history, that she may be working within the epistemology she critiques. The established power-knowledge relations that Leps argues criminology consistently honors, in both its scientific and popular manifestations, might more fruitfully have been conceptualized in constant relation to (instead of outside of) the processes of knowledge production that she chronicles. Historical truths are no more transparent than those produced by science.

Elizabeth Lunbeck
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Abraham Boxhoorn. *The Cold War and the Rift in the Governments of National Unity: Belgium, France, and Italy in the Spring of 1947; A Comparison.* (Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, number 25.) Amsterdam: Histo-

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risch Seminarium van de Universiteit van Amsterdam. 1993. Pp. viii, 276. 45 F.

Although it does not acknowledge itself as such, this book by Abraham Boxhoorn may be read as a contribution to a growing body of historiography stressing West European as opposed to U.S. foreign and domestic policies as causes of the Cold War. The principal merit of the work is its comparative treatment of the removal of communist ministers from the postwar governments of Belgium, France, and Italy. Coming roughly between the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, these crises have commonly been interpreted as American-dictated or inspired, a myth firmly established by infinite repetition of subsequent communist charges; Sovietologists, in contrast, have argued that the departures of the communists were orchestrated by Moscow, in a forecast of the harder line adopted at the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947. Lost in these Cold War–inspired polemics was the fact that participants in the crises at the time, both communists and anticommunists in all three countries, insisted on domestic policy differences as the reasons they occurred. Boxhoorn undertakes to sort out the evidence behind the three competing interpretations.

Scholars before Boxhoorn have amply demonstrated the basically passive role of the Americans in the crises in France and Italy; Boxhoorn summarizes their work and adds observations based on a reading of the Foreign Relations of the United States series and the press. Not surprisingly, on the basis of an overabundance of documentation, he concludes that Washington counted for little or nothing in all three cases. Russian archives still await examination by scholars, but the Soviet press of the period reveals a lack of interest in the Belgian and Italian crises. Only in France was there a direct correlation between a turn for the worse in Franco-Soviet relations and the Communist Party's departure from the cabinet. Boxhoorn misinterprets the reason for the sour turn in Franco-Soviet relations at the Moscow Conference in March 1947: it was Joseph Stalin's refusal to support French desires for a confederal or, better yet, dismembered Germany, rather than Georges Bidault's objections to the Soviet dictator's plans for harsh treatment of the Germans, that led to the French decision to sign on with Washington. But in either case Boxhoorn is able to show that domestic policy differences best explain all three crises. In Belgium the Communist Party decided to resign even before the Truman Doctrine, on March 10, in protest over a rise in the price of coal, apparently believing that it could strengthen its position in a successor government. In France, differences between the communists and the Socialists and Christian Democrats ranged from foreign policy and colonial war in Indochina and Madagascar to prices and wages; the break finally came over a wildcat Renault strike, with which the Communist Party had no choice but to identify. In Italy, where participation in the government yielded little influence for the Communist Party, the personal determination of Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi to form a homogeneous government of "technicians," without communist participation, precipitated the break. Boxhoorn could have strengthened his work greatly by giving more attention to the growing labor unrest that pressured communists to go into opposition in all three countries and the often vitriolic anticommunism of the politicians who used it to accomplish their removal. But he has succeeded in showing that all three crises, whose closeness to one another in timing was largely coincidental, were cause rather than consequence of the Cold War.

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EILEEN SPRING. *Law, Land, and Family: Aristocratic Inheritance in England, 1300 to 1800.* (Studies in Legal History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993. Pp. 199. $29.95.

Reviewing a book that is unabashedly critical of one's own scholarship is a sobering and difficult experience. Academic chivalry and intellectual propriety compel one to be gracious, to refrain from invective, and to contemplate one's own scholarly transgressions. Moreover, solace is to be taken from understanding that few works of history really endure. As a research student in Cambridge, I spent many an hour idly wandering among journals classified by the librarians as "Dead Periodicals," the wisdom of Victorian England laid to rest, and I fully expect my own work to wind up there, eventually. I shall be in good company; in the field of legal history, the work of F. W. Maitland and S. F. C. Milsom have not been immune to skeptical revision. After all, to have been as misguided as John Habakkuk and Lawrence Stone would be regarded by some as no disgrace. Eileen Spring's new book, however, argues for my (and their) work's speedy (and in my view unjustified) relegation to the dustheap.

Yet professional ethics do not require the reviewer in these circumstances to abstain from posing that most fundamental historiographical question, "where's the beef?" For nearly two decades, Spring has been instructing early modern English historians about their misguided conceptions of the operation of strict settlement without ever citing a contemporary document. This volume, which "aims to recast the story of inheritance" (p. 1), does so without a cast of characters. The players are in the archives, the settlements themselves, but Spring once again has chosen to theorize without their benefit.

Spring observes the fortunes of the women of preindustrial English landed families at various points of the life cycle and under different familial circumstances; they are discussed as heiresses, as widows, and

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as younger children. According to her, historians' perception of the fate of each set of women must be "recast" (p. 1). The dearth of archival support aside, her method is to apply "the family logic inherent in various legal devices" (p. 3). But there are no references to actual practice. She determines what she thinks they would have wanted to do, and then assumes they did it. As historical method, this just will not do.

Spring's first foray into revision is with the heiress, and it is illustrative of her approach. We are told that demographics were such that landed families produced one succession in five in which there would be only a surviving daughter; in another one in five cases, no surviving child would be produced. If "common law" were in force—by which she means the laws of descent—there would be a female heir in the former circumstance, and possibly a female heir in the latter. According to Spring, historians have ignored this fundamental principle of English law: that woman can inherit landed property.

Historians have not, in fact, forgotten this point. Admittedly, it is often set aside, and rightly so. The laws of descent were frequently of little consequence because landowners could, and usually did, modify them by settlement or will. It is far more important for historians to observe what landowners did, and therefore what actually happened to their property, than to consider how land might have been inherited if they had not taken such actions.

To conclude on a positive note, Spring is certainly right that the accounts of Stone, Habakkuk, and myself are indeed at times confusing. To use primary material gleaned from hundreds of landed families with differing quantities of wealth, types of property, family structures, values, emotions, and the like in order to attempt to construct a single prototypical inheritance strategy for the whole of preindustrial landed society may be an impossible task. But evidence of how those variables were implemented by thousands of landed families cannot be found in the couple of strict settlements that Orlando Bridgeman's clerk exhumed from the files after the great Lord Keeper, who may (or may not) have devised the strict settlement, passed away; and it is this source that supports her entire chapter on that troublesome conveyance. The variations on the theme of settlement illuminated, albeit imperfectly, since Habakkuk's seminal article ("Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth Century," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., vol. 23 [1950]), have been illustrated by painstaking hours in the archives, searching for what is absent in Spring's account, the beef.

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DOUGLAS R. BISSON. *The Merchant Adventurers of England: The Company and the Crown, 1474–1564.* Newark: University of Delaware Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 136. $29.50.

Douglas R. Bisson has produced a much-needed study of the Company of Merchant Adventurers during its greatest period of expansion. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Merchant Adventurers had achieved a monopoly on the export of woolen goods, a commodity that amounted to four-fifths of all English exports. As the most privileged of all English mercantile companies, they were well-positioned, with trading facilities in both London and Antwerp, to dominate the overseas trade. A small group of wealthy London merchants engrossed this trade to the detriment of the outports, and those who sought entry into the company from other parts of the realm were relegated to a distinctly inferior status. Because English foreign policy had become tied to the Burgundian Netherlands in the latter days of the Hundred Years' War, the governor of the Merchant Adventurers also acted as a "quasi-governmental" envoy at the Burgundian or Habsburg Court in Brussels (p. 6). Royal diplomatic and fiscal concerns often impinged on company priorities, as when company officers were compelled to assume the liability for loans raised in the Netherlands for the French wars should the crown default. The company's representatives were also expected to gather intelligence and maintain surveillance on the king's subjects in the Netherlands.

When the cloth trade at Antwerp went into decline in the early 1550s, London merchants attempted to reduce the glut of English cloth in Antwerp by excluding the mostly retail merchants from the English outports and making the monopoly of the Merchant Adventurers over the export of wool more complete. The Privy Council came to the aid of the London group out of a desire to reinforce the hierarchical structure of the company, but also because the Londoners offered to help reduce the crown's debts to Netherlandish bankers and continued to be indispensable in underwriting royal efforts to borrow money abroad. The Merchant Adventurers who resided in London were a potent political force by reason of their wealth. Bisson estimates that by 1526 they possessed 11 percent of the assessed wealth among the laiety in England, while the company's cloth exports paid two-thirds of the customs duties of the realm. Although London was only a satellite of Antwerp, when Sir Thomas Gresham was governor of the company he was able to relieve the crown's indebtness by creating an artificial shortage of sterling on the Antwerp bourse that forced exchange rates for English pounds higher. The company's ability to manipulate exchange rates, however, depended on its ability to enforce their monopoly of cloth exports. The fiscal stability that the company provided for the crown in its borrowing of money abroad helped to secure the monopoly they sought. At the same time, the value and importance of English wool imports to Emperor Charles V were sufficient to deter that monarch from joining a papal league put together to launch an invasion of England.

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If any historians continue to harbor the belief that Tudor governments and trading companies made decisions based on rational and mercantilistic polices of promoting English trade abroad and fostering full employment at home, Bisson's book will disabuse them of such illusions. Whether the crown imposed higher customs duties or undertook to regulate the export of unfinished cloths, its main concern was raising revenue for the government rather than preventing popular disorders by providing work for idled English clothworkers. Neither did the Merchant Adventurers concern themselves with such matters; they were interested only in enhancing their privileged status and attacking the German merchants of the Hanse in order to complete their monopoly over the export of woolen cloth.

Bisson's research contributes much to our knowledge of the importance of the wool trade in the relations between the Low Countries and England, but unfortunately the resulting book is not very readable. Readers must frequently supply the context themselves and hunt for Bisson's arguments in the dense prose of the text.

ROGER B. MANNING
Cleveland State University

CHRISTOPHER HAIGH. *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 367. $19.95.

Until about a dozen years ago, most of us knew pretty well what was meant by the "English Reformation," and where to turn for the definitive account. This was A. G. Dickens's monumental survey *The English Reformation* (1964). Dickens described the triumph of Protestantism chiefly in the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, with further developments of note in the reign of Elizabeth after the aberrant and unsuccessful attempt at a Catholic revival under Mary. Recently critics such as J. J. Scarisbrick, Patrick Collinson, Eamon Duffy, and Robert Whiting have argued, each in his own way, for a much more resilient Catholicism and a Protestantism that did not triumph until well after Elizabeth's accession. Christopher Haigh's work is the latest and most comprehensive assertion of a post-Dickensian position.

Drawing on an impressively wide reading of secondary works as well as his own sure grasp of parish and ecclesiastical court records, Haigh sees not one Reformation but many. In effect he describes not a single event but a process: one that went through several distinct stages and continued well beyond the period under consideration; one governed by political as well as religious considerations; and one (to demonstrate Haigh's revisionist credentials) in which chance proved as important as intention. Henry's infringement on a vibrant and popular Catholic tradition, largely in response to political, financial, and dynastic pressures, came to a halt with a reassertion of Catholic views from 1538 to 1546. These were reversed in turn by the truly revolutionary imposition of Protestant forms under Edward, after which Mary's reign represented a return to "normalcy" as far as the vast majority of English men and women were concerned. Only in the middle of Elizabeth's long reign did England become a Protestant nation, although not necessarily, as Haigh tells us, a nation of Protestants.

Any work as bold in its sweep and as polemical as this one will raise many questions and at least a few hackles. To be sure, Haigh employs evidence selectively, choosing from the vast literature before him those elements that best fit his story and making short weight of the rest, often stopping neither to explain nor to take prisoners. His revisionist dismissal of teleological tendencies flies in the face of those, like Dickens, who have dwelt so much on, for example, Lollardy, Lutheranism, humanism, and anticlericalism as deep-seated causative agents. His assertion of the absolute uniqueness of the English experience places him at odds with the less insularly inclined.

Many points, large and small alike, will still be fought out in the trench warfare of scholarly polemic. Still, this is as full, rich, well written, and often convincing a revisionist perspective on the English Reformation(s) as we have a right to expect at present. Its sweep, detail, and integration of political as well as religious concerns should propel it to the top of the syllabus.

ROBERT TITTLER
Concordia University

PETER S. BEARMAN. *Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540–1640.* (Arnold and Caroline Rose Monograph Series of the American Sociological Association.) New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 216. $40.00.

Peter S. Bearman's book is a revised dissertation in sociology. As such it is a reminder that sociological history and historical sociology are two quite different genres. Bearman's study of Norfolk's movement toward the Civil War is in the second category, using historical evidence to produce "concepts—which can transcend a particular context" (p. 11).

Normally a study of a county subtitled *Local Elite Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540–1640* creates expectations of a monograph in the style of A. Hassell Smith's *County and Court: Government and Politics in Norfolk, 1558–1603* (1974), teeming with specific examples and deeply rooted in primary sources. Instead, in the manner of Philip Lachmann's *From Manor to Market: Structural Change in England, 1536–1640* (1987), Bearman offers a sociologist's structural view culled from secondary and printed materials. The entire approach may remind historians of why they chose their own craft and not sociology, if only to

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avoid being subjected to lengthy, obtrusive, parenthetical references and jargon-laden sentences.

Bearman has searched for the underlying structures that led to rebellion among the Norfolk elite. He rejects revisionist historians' focus on events in the twenty years prior to the calling of the Short Parliament, but he also finds no explanation in traditional narrative accounts. His tool for uncovering the underlying structural changes are "blockmodels" that use prosopography to provide an "aggregation of individuals with similar patterns of social relationships into an equivalency class" (p. 13). Bearman takes care to explain his method of assigning individuals to groups on the basis of their pattern of relationships to others, rather than on direct, personal connections. Using four time periods, the blocks are examined in relation to three specific issues: local elite kinship networks, relationships between court and locality, and religious patronage.

Bearman believes he has discovered in Norfolk after 1590 a pattern of decaying traditional structural relationships, based on kinship, giving way to more "modern" relationships based on ideology. As the Norfolk gentry sought to enhance local status and power through national connections, ecclesiastical patronage was increasingly the means by which abstract ideas, rather than kinship, defined social position. Bearman argues that such a transformation was needed to create a national elite. He sees his contribution to be the development of a structural link above the individual level, but below classes or other large categorical groupings. An event such as the English Civil War required deep structural and ideological cleavages, destroying the traditional social order. Manipulation of the church, first via predation on monastic lands and then through exploitation of clerical patronage, Bearman perceives as critical in creating a national elite. He concludes by arguing that understanding how local elites were integrated into a national context is key for comprehending the origins of modernity.

Forty-eight tables and ten figures contribute to a very complex argument, full of interesting hypotheses. Bearman raises many issues, demonstrating that the era leading up to 1640 remains a fertile ground for new approaches and controversy.

Joel Berlatsky
Wilkes University

Glenn Burgess. *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603–1642.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 293. Cloth $45.00, paper $16.95.

Analysis of English legal and political thought of the early seventeenth century has been dominated by two assumptions. The first, that the Civil War stemmed from conflict between common law and royal prerogative, was a major element in the Whig interpretation; the second, that the lawyers shared an aggressively insular "common law mind," revering "the ancient constitution" as immemorial English custom, was associated with the early work of John G. A. Pocock. Glenn Burgess boldly confronts both theses and in so doing provides revisionists with some intellectual pedigree that they have sorely needed.

His book is divided into two parts, the first exploring the intellectual and the second the political ramifications of the common law mind. The early section, while the more difficult, will probably command the wider assent. Its major polemical contribution is, perhaps, to marginalize Sir Edward Coke, who was central to Pocock's analysis. Using recent scholarship and his own research impressively (the endnotes are a wonderful resource), Burgess argues that the common lawyers were neither as insular nor as custom-bound as Pocock contended. His account of sixteenth-century developments presents a more nuanced, if less elegant, version of early modern legal scholarship than Pocock's transition from an embattled Sir John Fortescue in the late fifteenth century to Coke over a century later. The excellence of common law for most thinkers, Burgess shows, lay not simply in its antiquity but also in its accordance with reason. In the intricacies of the doctrine of the reason of the law, and in the surprising relativism he uncovers in much advanced legal thought—which recognized that England's laws had evolved to suit changing English circumstances and conceded similar worthiness to neighbors' practices—Burgess provides a convincing context for such giants as Francis Bacon and John Selden.

The major claim of the second half of Burgess's book stems from a methodological contention. He argues cogently that historians' disputes over the prevalence of conflict or consensus in the early seventeenth century arise from failure to recognize that the three available discourses of politics—common law, natural law, and scripture—had their separate domains. The use of the first for discussion of taxation, and of the latter two for obedience, was a matter of consensus; there also was consensus that the king had specific powers defined by law and supplementary powers outside (not above) it. There was, therefore, no ideological conflict. Roger Manwaring and Robert Sibthorpe were guilty merely of category error, talking of taxation in the language of scripture; more serious was Charles I's political error (not ideological challenge) of eliding the supplementary and the specific. This argument is a fundamental contribution to the revisionist debate, but it does not quite convince. If Coke was intellectually marginal, why was he so important to kings and parliament-men alike? And although Burgess has read widely in the lawyers, what of the clericalists? As Johann P. Sommerville has shown, bishops such as Richard Bancroft and Richard Neile used scripture to urge taxation, disturbing the politics of James's reign and surely contributing to ideological conflict. Nevertheless, this

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book is essential reading for intellectual and political historians alike.

Derek Hirst
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri

Peter White. *Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 336. $54.95.

Historians of early modern England have had reason to be grateful to Peter White ever since his learned, pugnacious, and controversial article "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered" appeared in *Past and Present* (101 [1983]: 34–54). In it he took issue with Nicholas Tyacke's influential essay of 1973, "Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution," (in Conrad Russel, ed., *The Origins of the English Civil War*, pp. 119–43), where Tyacke argued the case for a moderate Calvinist consensus in the English church of the early seventeenth century and attributed its collapse to innovations in doctrine and practice by "Arminians," whose doctrinal point man in the 1620s was Richard Montagu. Although White may have persuaded relatively few historians to accept *in toto* his refutation of the Tyackean picture, his insistence on the extent of controversy and dissent over predestinarian doctrine in the reformed English church has forced everyone who thinks seriously about early Stuart religion to do so with new rigor.

We can no longer talk loosely of "predestination" or "election" but must deconstruct these concepts to a daunting cluster of theological positions. Infra and supra-lapsarianism, double predestination, reprobation, and the views of formerly forgotten theorists like Peter Baro confront the simple pragmatic historian. Now White expands his case, guiding us through the maze of theological polemic over predestination, "the characteristic doctrine of Calvinism" but also, he emphasizes, a view common to "all parties to the theological debate" (pp. xi, 13). Contention and division derived from distinctions and nuances within the protean concept of predestination.

These distinctions and nuances are White's subject. His method is chronological and taxonomic. He proceeds from John Hooper and Hugh Latimer to Richard Neile and William Laud, from the "Edwardian formularies" (p. 52) to the personal rule of Charles I, examining opinions on, for example, justification, perseverance, redemption, and reprobation. Until the Synod of Dort in 1618, he argues, "a central tradition" muted debate "and avoided too precise . . . definition" (p. 140). After it, however, disruptive pressures came from the more extreme Calvinists, not from irenic and moderate "Arminians." King Charles, Archbishop Laud, and their leading clergy had the interests of an orthodox Anglican *via media* at heart and tried to prevent divisive debate, although White concedes the "polarization" of John Cosin and Richard Montagu (pp. 222–23, 240, 243, 254). He is anxious to establish the reasonableness, moderation, and success of their policies (until destabilized by Scottish affairs); the seriousness of Laud's theological credentials; and the minority status of those who feared for predestination, were troubled by ceremonies, or incommoded by church discipline.

White's conclusions are clearly controversial, but his revisionist account is salutary and learned. It will be mined for the views of eminent churchmen and participants in famous debates such as Hampton Court and Dort, and also for its sympathetic recovery of obscure brethren like Richard ("Dutch") Thomson (pp. 168–74). As a guide to the progress of predestinarian debate the book is invaluable. Yet its method entails limitations. Despite the title, it deals largely in polemic but little in policy. Focus on a single issue enlightens by its concentration and distorts by its narrowness. White sees his project as "religious history" (pp. xi–xiii), but in these pages theology is religion and religion theology. The result is a nagging sense of absences: of pastoral divinity, for example, or of religion as experienced, lived, and politicized by lay believers. White addresses some of these issues, but the treatment is conventional compared with the provocative erudition of the theological narrative. The games theologians play are arcane, yet less expert nonprofessionals may still hold strong opinions that affect policy. White has little interest in such interplay.

White protests that doctrines attributed to "Arminians" were not those of Arminius, and that controversies over liturgy, preaching, or discipline had no necessary connection with Arminian theology. Yet this begs the question of what "Arminianism" meant to Englishmen before the civil war. Reevaluation of Arminianism and Calvinism through the words of theological professionals is in a real sense a scholastic exercise. White has given us a pioneering, scholarly, and admirable study of the academic polemics of predestinarianism. Policy, however, to the dismay of both Arminian and Puritan clergy, constantly escaped from the theologians.

Barbara Donagan
Huntington Library

Phillip Harth. *Pen for a Party: Dryden's Tory Propaganda in Its Contexts.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 341. $45.00.

John Dryden was the premiere poet of the English Restoration. He was also a subtle and skillful apologist for the Stuart court and the values and conventions it upheld. Dryden's best-known work was produced during the climactic crisis of Charles II's reign. He then employed his pen on behalf of royal authority in church and state, in defense of order and hierarchy in politics and society, and against the parliamentary and dissenting opposition. To Dryden, those who sought security for church and state in a Protestant

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succession seemed hellbent by 1681 on substituting a second civil war for the providential restoration of 1660.

In his poetic and dramatic compositions of 1681–85, as interpreted by Phillip Harth, Dryden encouraged Charles to stand firm against his adversaries, celebrated the king's recovery of the political initiative, and praised the work of God in maintaining the Stuart throne and civil order. In *Absalom and Achitophel* (1681), Dryden commended Charles's rescue of the nation at the Oxford Parliament from the ambition of the Earl of Shaftesbury and the evil of an altered succession. In *The Medall* (1682), he exposed the traitorous intentions of London and parliamentary Whigs, especially in their attempted Association, and rejoiced in the collapse of their projects. *The Duke of Guise* (1683) dwelt on the historical parallels between the French civil wars of the 1580s and England's civil strife a century later, but it also pointed to the differences that made Charles II a more successful monarch than Henri III. When the Rye House plot offered apparent confirmation of all that Dryden had written about the Whigs, he celebrated the king's deliverance, in *Albion and Albaniust* (1685), as a second intervention of providence in support of the restored monarchy.

Harth examines Dryden's work of these years in terms of the changing contexts of loyalist propaganda. Indeed, his study is as much about the history of Tory ideology, a history in which Dryden is a critical figure, as it is about Dryden's literary production. Placing the composition of each work in its historical context, Harth brings greater skill to bear on this task than any previous literary commentator, offering new insights, for instance, about the loyal addresses of 1681 and the abhorrences of 1682. And, in interpreting each work against the successive crescendos of Tory argumentation, Harth also provides compelling readings of each. A master of the literary contexts of Restoration sermons, historical and biblical parallels, and press warfare, he provides a definitive synthesis of Dryden's work and of the literary and polemical issues that engaged his attention.

What historians will find most helpful in Harth's study is its sequential account of the different emphases of Tory propaganda, an account that complements other recent examinations of the various elements of loyalist thought. One caution must be offered, however. This study was completed too early to take into account the current reconsideration of many of the conventions of Restoration political scholarship. For the Exclusion Crisis of Harth's narrative, some historians have substituted a Restoration Crisis defined in broader terms, terms that Dryden himself would have recognized. The centrality of Shaftesbury and the succession to this crisis have also been challenged. Furthermore, ideology has been elevated by some above the Whig and Tory parties around which Harth develops his political narrative.

Harth's reconstruction of Tory propaganda is a timely contribution to the current investigation of Restoration ideology, whatever may come of the reconsideration of party. Indeed, Harth offers much about public perceptions of the issues and personalities of the Restoration Crisis that bears on the current debate about party. That Dryden believed himself to be a pen for a party, and that he found his targets in an opposite party consisting of Shaftesbury and the dissenters, especially the London dissenters, is quite relevant to this discussion.

GARY S. DE KREY
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F. M. G. WILLSON. *A Strong Supporting Cast: The Shaw Lefevres, 1789–1936.* Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Athlone; distributed by Humanities Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 409. $70.00.

The extraordinary range of contemporary historical research is attested as much by the persistence of conventional studies as by the efflorescence of new methodologies and subjects. This book belongs indisputably to the former category. F. M. G. Willson has written a collective biography of the Shaw-Lefevres, the progeny of Charles Shaw (1758–1823) and Helena Lefevre (1767–1834), who married in 1789. Of Huguenot descent, the Lefevres were sufficiently wealthy for the bridegroom to affix their name to his, unhyphenated. Willson accords the twenty-two descendants of that union varying amounts of space, determined by both the individual's prominence and the availability of papers. Of Charles Shaw Lefevre's three sons, he gives Charles (1794–1888), the speaker of the House of Commons who was created Viscount Eversley in 1857, and John (1797–1879), who held a string of government positions in the expanding civil service, extensive treatment, fully half the volume. For the third surviving son, Henry (1802–80), a successful banker, Willson notes that "the lack of evidence is particularly tantalizing" (p. 55). Accordingly he remains a marginal figure in this book.

A more moderate Whig than his father-in-law, Samuel Whitbread, Charles Shaw Lefevre served the last eighteen of his twenty-seven years in the House of Commons as speaker. First elected speaker in 1839, he bestowed on the office "a powerful tradition of political neutrality" (p. 102). His younger brother John followed Charles to Trinity College, Cambridge, and was a formidable scholar, winning the competition for senior wrangler. John, however, was unsuccessful in electoral politics, becoming part of that "short-lived mid-nineteenth century category of constitutional hybrids, half politicians, half civil servants" (p. 129). He served successively on the central Poor Law Commission and the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission, as joint secretary to the Board of Trade and vice-chancellor of the University of London, and on various committees and commissions investigating the British Museum, the civil service of the East India Company, and the estates of the

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Church of England. By 1848 his sinecure as clerk of the parliaments had John joining his brother Charles in the ceremony of giving the royal assent to legislation.

Willson tracks the next generation, including the comfortably predictable lives of Charles Lefevre's daughters as country ladies. Among John's seven children, one, Rachael Hamilton Gordon (1828–89), led a wretched life as the wife of a diplomat posted successively to Trinidad, Mauritius, Fiji, New Zealand, and Ceylon; another, Madeleine Shaw Lefevre (1835–1914), was the first principal of Somerville Hall, Oxford. But the eldest surviving son, George Shaw Lefevre (1831–1928), Baron Eversley after 1906, had the most notable career. First elected as liberal MP for Reading in 1863, he served in Parliament for over three decades. Depicted by Willson as a drab, unpopular Gladstonian, he served governments in the Board of Trade, Home Department, and Admiralty before heading the unglamorous Office of Works. Declining the Irish secretaryship, he finally entered the cabinet as postmaster-general in the last months of William Ewart Gladstone's second cabinet, and served as head of the Local Government Board from 1892 to 1895. Willson characterizes his tenure in each department as sound and implies that his failure to emerge in the center of power hardly constituted an irretrievable loss.

This book's ornate style corresponds with its high-Victorian "life-and-times" theme. Willson acknowledges that this political story has been told before, but he presents an exceedingly thorough treatment of a notable nineteenth-century family.

Abraham D. Kriegel
University of Memphis

Anthony Brundage. *The People's Historian: John Richard Green and the Writing of History in Victorian England.* (Studies in Historiography, number 2.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1994. Pp. 184. $55.00.

Anthony Brundage has rescued J. R. Green from the condescension of a posterity that would dismiss him as Whiggish, along with T. B. Macaulay, E. A. Freeman, William Stubbs, and other nineteenth-century historians of England. Because Green took the "people" in his *Short History of the English People* (1874) seriously, a biographical study tracing his own formation is welcome; because Green's "little book" was a popular as well as a scholarly success, Brundage's attention to the history of its publication is admirable.

Criticized for abandoning the traditional structure of English history according to regnal dates, Green wrote: "I *won't* divide by Kings, a system whereby History is made Tory unawares and infants are made to hate history" (quoted on p. 105). His radicalism was rooted in life experience: Green was expelled from Magadalen College School, Oxford, at the age of fourteen, for criticizing Charles I in a prize essay, and his father's death left him in the care of an unsympathetic uncle. His undistinguished career at Jesus College, Oxford, was followed by ordination, ministry in a West End parish, a librarian's post at Lambeth Palace, and a turbulent experience of religious doubt in the context of Darwinian science and theological debate. His historical apprenticeship was served in journalism, as a contributor to *Saturday Review.* In 1869 he signed a contract with Macmillan for a short history of the English people, abandoning plans for a narrower and more scholarly project.

Green's *Short History* was powerfully written, interweaving biographical accounts of "great men" with social and cultural history and stinting political and military history: "more space to Chaucer than to Cressy, to Caxton than to the petty strife of Yorkist and Lancastrian, to the Poor Law of Elizabeth than to her victory at Cadiz, to the Methodist revival than to the escape of the Young Pretender" (p. 80). Brundage devotes a full chapter to the book's reception; among the mostly favorable reviews, a few critics took issue with Green's organizing principles and his radical bent. The sales figures and subsequent royalties established his reputation and raised expectations about what would come next.

Writing as a freelance in the Victorian tradition, eager to secure a sufficient income to enable him to marry, Green was more attuned to the wishes of publishers than to the increasingly professionalized contemporary standards of historical writing. He set aside plans for a "big book," a history of the great charter, but Macmillan got him to agree to edit a biographical series and a series of primers.

Green's politics were liberal, at some moments even republican. He was deeply engaged in the Eastern Question of 1877. His marriage with Alice Stopford, also in 1877, is the subject of a sympathetic chapter; after Green's death at age 45 in 1883 she edited and revised his books. An Everyman's Library edition in 1915 ensured that Green's work remained widely available to readers of popular history. Brundage rightly insists on the connection between the importance of Green as a popular and populist historian and the dissemination of his work to the English common reader.

Leslie Howsam
University of Windsor

Frank M. Turner. *Contesting Cultural Authority: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 368. $69.95.

For this collection of essays, many new, all freshly presented, Frank Turner calls his main theme "the attempt of various groups of Victorian intellectuals to establish foundations for new mental outlooks . . . to propose themselves as new authorities, or to resist the challenge of newcomers" (p. xi). He does this well and thoughtfully, following the pattern established in his earlier books by examining the two great intellectual cultures of Victorian England, the classical heri-

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tage and science. But this is not exactly a story of ancients and moderns, for (as even that angry antagonist of moderns, Jonathan Swift, noted) ancients and moderns could switch roles. Science could be used to uphold the moral and theological universe that secured the Old Regime, the rule of the oligarchs, the great and the good of the Victorian civil service; in a word (a complicated one), the Establishment. Classical scholarship could, through contextualization, evolutionary thinking, and the adoption of the higher criticism (or even without it), undermine the customary foundations of religious authority.

Surely that is right. Neither science nor any other body of received thought is ever as static as detractors cry, yet some two or three decades ago it was commonplace in accounts of Victorian schools and universities for authors to decry the influence of a classical curriculum and to denounce it as stagnant and narrow. Anyone who wishes to know otherwise should read Turner's account of how Greece replaced Rome in the affections of the English, how Virgil was supplanted by Homer and, *mirabile dictu*, even transformed into the blind bard's twin. And from there the reader will go on to learn how in our own century both poets suffered from a paradigm shift that left them outside public debate. Where once the discussion of classical personalities, cosmology and religion, and the exploration of ancient constitutions and politics were central to national argument concerning the meaning and directions of Victorian civilization, they were now the arenas of specialized academic interest.

Thus, we need to return to Turner's title. Although in bulk and substance this is a work in the history of ideas—ideas attached to personalities rather than specific systems and structures—the force of the collection is exactly as Turner states. His discussion of science is first presented in the context of natural theology as it developed from the seventeenth century. Science dovetailed with Anglican presuppositions regarding creation. (But on the strength of natural religion itself in the early nineteenth century, Richard Yeo took a more cautionary tone in his book on William Whewell, *Defining Science* [1993].) Yet science as a calling or profession could not achieve independence unless separated from religion, and this in turn required resources: public or private spending, university and research posts, access to the curriculum of the schools, scholarships and prizes. Turner explores this theme in memorable fashion, showing where, how, and why the campaign to institutionalize and professionalize science succeeded or failed. Hence the discussion inevitably touches on politics and political strategies (a further step would be to analyze the structural features of campaigning in the Victorian periods).

In similar manner, especially in the admirable discussion of the classical scholarship of the philosophical radical George Grote, Turner explains how a foremost intellect failed to capture the paragons of the future because he did not possess an institutionalized home where disciples and successors could be trained. Hence, ironically, neo-Kantianism rather than utilitarianism prevailed in thinking about the classics.

With exceptions like Samuel Haber (*The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750–1900* [1991]), today's historians and sociologists commonly equate professional with class self-interest. The tendency is to denigrate all claims to moral authority in knowledge-based occupations. What is Turner's attitude? As a former university provost at Yale, he doubtless experienced academic *parti pris* in all its hues and shapes. In several places he asks us to be wary of the higher morality claimed by the learned. But in general he avoids cynicism, and that is yet another sign of the good sense that permeates a truly useful collection of writings.

SHELDON ROTHBLATT
University of California, Berkeley

T. R. GOURVISH and R. G. WILSON. *The British Brewing Industry, 1830–1980.* Assisted by FIONA WOOD. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xxv, 690.

Not the least of the transformations that marked the making of modern Britain was a fundamental change in the place of alcohol consumption in British culture. Beer drinking was the principal recreation of Victorian society, and, with annual consumption at forty-one gallons per capita in 1875–76 and convictions for drunkenness running to 49.7 per 10,000 of the population in 1914, the British can fairly be said to have been a beer-loving and disorderly people. A century later consumption had fallen to twenty-six gallons per capita and convictions for drunkenness to 25 per 10,000 in 1980; although drinking remained "a major" feature of Britain's way of life" (p. 596), leisure activity no longer revolved around beer.

T. R. Gourvish and R. G. Wilson tell the story of this transformation, and they do so well. Blending narrative and analysis with uncommon skill, they recount the development of household names such as Bass and Guinness, the brewers' engagement with the temperance movement and with successive governments bent on maximizing tax revenues and political capital, and the impact of two great depressions and two world wars on the trade. This is an abundantly illustrated volume, and the well-chosen pictures that accompany the text are unusually effective in bringing these tales to life.

Gourvish and Wilson write from the perspective of the brewers, understandably since the book was written at the invitation of the Brewers' Society. The tied-house system and the concentration of production in the hands of progressively fewer and larger undertakings are the central themes around which they weave their account. Considerable portions of the text are given over to product choices, marketing

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strategies, changes in competitive tactics, the structure of brewing enterprises, and the culture of management. These are important topics, and their skillful handling makes this a major contribution to economic and business history.

There is a price to be paid for this brewer's-eye view, however, and the cost falls on the social-historical side of the ledger. What, the reader wonders, lay behind the great mid-nineteenth-century shift in consumer preferences from dark, sweet porters to bright, sparkling bitters that did so much to shape the brewing industry? And what about the rise of the private club and the home as centers of alcohol consumption in the twentieth century and the relative decline in the popularity of the pub? If, as Gourvish and Wilson contend, no industry is "more revealing about British culture, history and attitudes" (p. xxii) than brewing, what do these changes in beer-drinking habits tell us about the Britons and their history?

These are formidable questions, and any attempt to answer them would have made a big book larger still. As it stands, this volume will afford pleasure and instruction to even the most abstemious reader.

MICHAEL DINTENFASS
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DOROTHY MERMIN. *Godiva's Ride: Women of Letters in England, 1830–1880.* (Women of Letters.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 181. Cloth $35.00, paper $12.95.

In this book Dorothy Mermin chooses the legendary woman who rode naked through the streets of Coventry to evoke the heroism and vulnerability of the mid-nineteenth-century woman writer. Lady Godiva, now remembered more for exposing her body to public view than for the fact that she did so to protest her husband's unfair taxation of the poor, was for the Victorians an exemplary figure of self-sacrifice and nobility. Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem "Godiva" explicitly links the lady's willingness to die for the sake of the poor to his contemporaries' concerns with "lov[ing] the people well." Queen Victoria gave her consort Prince Albert a statuette of Godiva as a birthday gift in 1857; we can only imagine what this wifely gesture from the most politically powerful woman in England might have signified to each of them.

Women writers and activists drew inspiration from Godiva's heroic example. Elizabeth Barrett Browning invoked her when contemplating a poem on a political issue about which she and her father disagreed. Harriet Martineau wrote to Barrett Browning that the thought of Godiva had sustained her when speaking publicly of the salutary effects of mesmerism in curing a uterine tumor; later, when Martineau joined the cause of repealing the Contagious Diseases Acts, she again claimed Godiva as precursor and model. But as the case of Martineau suggests, it was not only the championing of the needy that Godiva symbolized for the intrepid Victorian woman but the disturbing sexualization of public expression and self-display as well.

It is precisely the transgressive power of writing for public consumption that interests Mermin in this survey of what Virginia Woolf called the "epic age" of women's writing (*A Room of One's Own* [1929]). The struggle to reconcile "womanly decorum and artistic expression" (p. 36) produced an insurmountable but artistically fruitful tension for women writers. Mermin finds evidence of the centrality of this tension in motifs of exposure, performance, courtroom testimony, public display, blushing, and journeying in texts by the women novelists and poets of the period. George Eliot's Methodist preacher Dinah Morris appears before the public unselfconsciously until her love for Adam Bede causes her body to tremble and her face to blush. Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton testifies to the innocence of her lover before a Liverpool courtroom and swoons under the scrutiny of prurient spectators. Charlotte Brontë's Lucy Snowe is driven to painful exhilaration by her own appearance on stage and by that of the grand tragedian Vashti.

For women poets the issue of exposure was more complicated still. Mermin, the author of important critical works on Barrett Browning and Christina Rossetti, poses the crucial question of how women, the proverbial objects of love lyrics and epic quests, were to place themselves in the position of the subject: the speaker, the lover, the questing prince or knight. More precisely, how was she to occupy the place of both subject and object? In a compelling reading of Rossetti's "Goblin Market," she sees the two sisters Lizzie and Laura splitting the roles of heroic savior and passive but articulate victim: "Sleeping Beauty tells her own story, and the rescuing prince is her sister" (p. 73).

Mermin's fine book is a work of synthesis that moves across many genres of women's writing—fiction, poetry, political writing, scientific tracts—and touches on neglected writers of the period (including Anna Jameson, Frances Power Cobbe, Augusta Webster, Margaret Oliphant) as well as on the canonized few. She includes interesting if overly schematic discussions of religion and science as arenas for women's intellectual work. Above all, she wants to establish the "woman of letters" as a historically specific type that proliferated and prospered during the period 1830–80. It is the historical question, speculated on briefly by her in the conclusion, that remains largely unanswered: what accounts for the glorious burgeoning of women's writing in the fourth decade of the century, and how do we explain its falling off after the publication of what Mermin takes to be its swan song, George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* (1876)? Attempts to recuperate the works of late-nineteenth-century and turn-of-the-century women writers have not dimin-

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ished our sense that such an "epic age" of women's writing never came again.

DEBORAH EPSTEIN NORD
Princeton University

J. MIRIAM BENN. *Predicaments of Love.* London: Pluto; distributed by Westview, Boulder, Colo. 1992. Pp. xiii, 304. Cloth $49.95, paper $21.95.

The Drysdale-Vickerys were the first family of British neo-Malthusianism. From the publication in 1855 of young George Drysdale's anonymous treatise *Physical, Sexual, and Natural Religion* (better known by its later title, *Elements of Social Science*) until the death in 1961 of his elderly nephew Charles Vickery Drysdale, the neo-Malthusian movement was conceived, flourished, atrophied, and died in the hands of five family members: the reclusive Dr. George Drysdale; his combative younger brother, Dr. Charles Drysdale; Charles's lifelong companion, the feminist Dr. Alice Vickery; Charles's and Alice's son, the scientist Charles Vickery Drysdale (familiarly known as C.V.); and C.V.'s wife, the suffragist Bessie Ingman Drysdale.

George's ruminations about morality and population grew out of his youthful sexual frustration, which led him to the equally unpalatable alternatives of an unhealthy celibacy or a dangerous resort to prostitutes. In *Elements*, he accepted Malthus's argument that the inexorable pressure of population on food resources would lead to poverty for the great mass of the people unless population pressure was checked by such measures as sexual abstinence or famine. As a solution to Malthus's dilemma, he recommended contraception, which would allow parents to limit the number of children and make it possible for society to break the cycle of poverty. Contraception would bring a healthy sexuality to all, married or not. Finally, George believed that contraception would lead to the emancipation of women because they could freely enter into and leave sexual partnerships.

George was temperamentally unable to lead a movement, but Charles and Alice were made of sterner stuff. Accepting George's arguments, they became the leaders of the Malthusian League and publishers of *The Malthusian*, through which they reached the height of their influence in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. They were active propagandists, lecturing, writing, and encouraging friends and would-be converts. Their cause overlapped with the causes of other contemporary reformers: Fabians, feminist medical reformers, vegetarians, and suffragists. Circumstances and ideology made some of them allies and others rivals. One of the strengths of J. Miriam Benn's book is her careful delineation of these relationships.

The most fascinating relationship is that between Alice Vickery, her son, and daughter-in-law and the American birth-control advocate Margaret Sanger. Although Sanger and the Drysdale-Vickerys enjoyed warm personal relations from 1915 to C.V.'s death in 1961, they disagreed about a fundamental issue. Sanger was an activist who wished to bring practical birth control information to working-class people. By contrast, C.V. and Bessie saw their role as convincing society's elite of the truth of Malthusian theory. They had a distaste for propagating vulgar information about birth control, just as they had a distrust for the lower orders for whom this information was intended.

Benn's book is exhaustively researched and clearly written. Its most serious shortcoming is its lack of analysis. We learn, for example, a great deal about C.V.'s declining years, but we are never given a proper conclusion. At this and other key points the reader is left wondering what to make of all this luxuriant detail.

TERRY M. PARSSINEN
University of Tampa

STANLEY WEINTRAUB. *Disraeli: A Biography.* New York: Truman Talley. 1993. Pp. xiv, 717. $30.00.

Stanley Weintraub's life of Benjamin Disraeli complements rather than supersedes Robert Blake's now classic political biography *Disraeli* (1967). It offers no new information about his political career, no new insights into the workings of Victorian politics, not even new thoughts about the genesis of his political ideas. In general, Weintraub is more interested in literary and social than political aspects of Disraeli's career. Still, this work merits attention because it restores to Disraeli's biography a dimension that Blake and others ignored or marginalized: his Jewishness and its impact on his personality and politics, a matter on which Disraeli's contemporaries, friend and foe alike, never ceased to comment. Citing Disraeli's own claim that he was "the blank page between the Old Testament and the New," Weintraub writes "to fill in that blank page in order to better fill out the man" (p. xii).

Blake's account of Disraeli's life minimized the influence of Disraeli's Jewish origins on his career and ideas, claiming that England at that time was a tolerant place where Jews faced little religious or social discrimination and Judaism was viewed with curiosity rather than derision. This benign view, with its implicit assumption of English tolerance toward minorities, does not stand up in light of recent research (see in particular David Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews, 1840–1914* [1994]). Weintraub shows that at every stage in Disraeli's life, from his school days to his years as prime minister, he was made to feel his "alien" origins as a cruel stigma. His baptism, while allowing him to pursue a career in politics, made little difference in public perceptions of him as an outsider.

That Disraeli succeeded in climbing "the greasy pole" and leading his party owed more to a dearth of Tory talent (and thus credible alternatives to his leadership) than it did to an absence of Tory prejudice. Although he did not write or speak explicitly

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about how he experienced attacks directed at his Jewishness, he did express his sense of hurt and desire for revenge indirectly in his fiction, now widely regarded, as he himself claimed, as "the secret history of my feelings." Disraeli's response, Weintraub explains, echoing a suggestion made almost thirty years ago by Isaiah Berlin, was a bold embrace of his origins: he constructed for himself a mythic background of racial superiority that rivaled the elitist claims of the English upper class.

However welcome and needed a more complete portrait of Disraeli may be, Weintraub's references to matters Judaic do not suggest that he is a reliable guide. Frequent errors of fact indicate a weak grasp of the history of Judaism and English Jews. The Prague rabbi David Gans (1541–1613) did not translate Maimonides into Latin (p. 112); the *gemara* and the Talmud are not two distinct works (p. 141); Rabbi Akiba did not write *Pirkei avot* (p. 171); Moses Montefiore did not make a loan to Pius IX on the condition that the Roman ghetto be torn down (p. 265); Jewish old-clothes dealers were not found in the East End of London in the seventeenth century (p. 268); and Moses Mendelssohn did not believe in "cultural emancipation from outworn ritual" (p. 278). Finally, Charlotte de Rothschild did not seek treatment for a painful foot infection at the Jews' Hospital in London in November 1867 (p. 457); the Jews' Hospital was an orphanage, trade school, and old-age home for the poor, not a clinic for the rich.

TODD M. ENDELMAN
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

CHARLES TOWNSHEND. *Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. 264. $28.00.

England has long had a reverence for individual liberties, pride in representative government, and an aversion to a powerful central state and bureaucracy (such things were seen as "continental" or "un-English"). This book traces a recent and opposite trend: the growth from the 1880s of sweeping, ill-defined, and vaguely justified government statutory powers in the sphere of public order and national security.

Charles Townshend suggests that it was both external threats (real, exaggerated, and manipulated) and the changing nature of English society that led to the accumulation of broad national executive powers over public order. Growth of cities, industry, and, by stages, democracy helped to shape the nation yet also eroded the old social compact, the unwritten understanding of popular deference and paternalistic upper-class governance. More visibly and jarringly, an unrelenting series of exogeneous events (beginning with late-nineteenth-century Irish bombings, German spy scares, and imperial patterns of top-down governance in India) produced and justified the government's new and growing powers to maintain (or, as the English prefer, restore) public order.

Perhaps the largest tectonic tilt in British constitutionalism came with World War I. The swift enactment of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) in 1914 awarded the government virtually unchecked powers of arrest, detention, and nonjury trial. (DORA would be widely useful in Ireland from Easter 1916 on, and was a model for the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act—ROIA—of 1920.) Interwar labor unrest, deemed threatening because of the external influence of Bolshevism, caused the government to pass sweeping public-order laws with typically mild English titles: the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 constituted "a substantial and irreversible redefinition of the British state" (p. 88); the draft Sedition Bill became the Incitement to Disaffection Act (1934); and the generically and plainly titled Public Order Act (1936) added to the armory of government power. The national security demands of World War II got the English public used to the continuing assault on its historic legacy of individual civil liberties. (A century and a half earlier, when England was at war with revolutionary France, Prime Minister William Pitt gained several repressive statutory powers, but never the broad, vaguely defined executive powers available to Winston Churchill.) By the late 1960s and the onset of the Northern Ireland crisis, followed by England's industrial and racial unrest of the 1980s, the government already had sweeping powers, which it nevertheless topped off with the Public Order Act of 1986.

Townshend's book is quarried from archival, legal, and parliamentary sources and reveals a wide acquaintance with the secondary literature. It is rich in both quotations and insightful, if often complex, argumentation. The legal and political discussions are effectively embedded in their social and cultural contexts. I felt that Townshend might have stressed more the domestic political consequences of English rule in Ireland and of imperial rule generally (his fascinating chapter on India, "The Indian Negative," fills a scant thirteen pages). As the author of *Political Violence in Ireland* (1983), Townshend may have overcompensated by underplaying Ireland in his current book. Excellent discussions of Ireland appear episodically throughout the text, but the formative Northern Ireland crisis from 1969 onward (pp. 167–85) is actually placed after the chapter on England in the 1970s and 1980s. I would interpret the Irish crisis of 1969–74 as conditioning London to a sterner government response to subsequent English disorders.

Townshend notes that the implementation of the government's huge statutory powers to enforce public order has in the last half century mostly affected Northern Ireland. But he suggests that the English public is in the mood for strong public-order measures. Rising crime, more frequent public disorder, and a vague national malaise make the cultural and legal mix combustible. The little-recognized, century-

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old accumulation of statutory executive powers, in the absence of a written constitution, has privileged the government in matters of order and security at the expense of a long tradition of individual rights and liberties.

STANLEY H. PALMER
University of Texas, Arlington

DAVID FELDMAN. *Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840–1914.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 401. $45.00.

David Feldman's new study of Englishmen and Jews from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1914 is brilliantly illuminating about both. He argues that the history of Anglo-Jewry has been too exclusively seen in terms of the Jews, ignoring the broader English context in which they were forced to make their way. The result has been to give us at best a limited understanding of their problems. Thus, for example, whenever Jews met resistance in English society, the tendency has been to explain it as anti-Semitism. According to Feldman, it was never simply, and probably not primarily, that. Rather, the problem was that Jews ran up against some broader political or social issue in English society, usually one that involved the way in which the English, or a significant portion of them, defined their national identity. Feldman develops the broader context with great skill, and in so doing he reveals much about contemporary English people as well as Jews.

Feldman is certainly right to argue, for example, that the stubborn Tory resistance to Jewish emancipation, which took the form of refusing to accept Lionel de Rothschild's election for the City of London for eleven years, grew from their traditional commitment to the Anglican church establishment. The concept of the "Christian nation" on which they based their opposition provided the last best theoretical defense for a privileged establishment. He is also right that the Jews' ultimate triumph derived largely from the fact that their cause could be fitted so comfortably under the old Whig-Liberal call for civil and religious liberty, a defining concept for that party of what Englishness was all about.

Feldman is equally correct to see a problem for the Jews arising from the grafting of Christian morality onto the old Liberal trunk that took place in the William Ewart Gladstone era. This was the cause of the onslaught, especially on Benjamin Disraeli but in a milder form on Jews generally, that took place during and after the agitation about the Bulgarian atrocities. Jews' natural dislike of Russia and much warmer feelings toward Turkey were decried as a sign of mere selfish self-interest, unworthy of right-thinking English people.

The latter part of the book examines the impact of the large Jewish immigration that took place after the pogroms in Russia in 1881. Feldman provides an exhaustive consideration of the social, political, ideological, and economic consequences of this influx. His is a far too dense and nuanced discussion for any brief review to do it justice. One can only indicate some of the highlights. Feldman dismisses traditional characterizations of the immigrants as either single-minded economic individualists or part of the shock troops of trade unionism. Rather, he says, they became part of the great unorganized mass of the labor force, in their case laboring in the small workshops that economic historians have recently recognized as an integral part of the growth of industrial production in the nineteenth century. The demands of production in tailoring, shoemaking, and furniture manufacture militated against union organization, and setting up as a small entrepreneur was as often the result of failure to find work as of ambition.

The social and political organization of the immigrants centered around the East End synagogues, which spawned burial and friendly societies typical of those that served the needs of the working classes generally. Two developments brought the immigrants into broader national life. One was the successful movement to restrict alien immigration. The other was the emergence of the collectivist state, and more particularly the National Insurance Bill. The immigrants were angry with the temporizing of the Anglo-Jewish elite on both issues. And they were insistent on the inclusion of their societies in the National Insurance scheme. In part due to the nature and demands of Liberal politics, on the latter issue they won.

A work as ambitious as this one is bound to arouse discussion and disagreement. This is as it should be. But whatever the conclusion on specific points, this is clearly one of those rare and important books that will permanently change the terms of debate about its subject.

R. W. DAVIS
Washington University St. Louis, Missouri

SHARMAN KADISH. *Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution.* Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass. 1992. Pp. xiv, 298.

In her history of the Anglo-Jewish community during the turbulent years between 1917 and 1921, Sharman Kadish demonstrates that the Russian Revolution and ensuing civil war unleashed a flood of anti-Semitic invective in Britain. Jews came to be identified with a Bolshevism that, in the minds of many, had already brought Russia to its knees and might yet destroy the British empire. Anti-alienism, anti-Communism, and anti-Semitism became inextricably linked. Yet, Kadish concludes, the influence of "Jewish Bolshevism" was vastly overestimated. Why, then, did these accusations receive such a sympathetic hearing from large segments of the British public? The dynamics of the campaign against Anglo-Jewry and the sometimes

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confused and even divisive response of the Jewish community form the subject of this work.

About half of the 300,000 Jews living in Great Britain on the eve of World War I were working-class immigrants from the Russian Pale of Settlement who had fled economic hardship and religious and political persecution to settle in London, Leeds, Manchester, Glasgow, and other cities. Some had participated in the struggles for Jewish emancipation; many continued to agitate against the tsarist autocracy in England, founding such organizations as the *Arbeter Ring* (Workers' Circle). Although their day-to-day political activities revolved around trade-union and municipal politics in London's East End, Glasgow's Gorbals, and similar Jewish ghettos, their hearts and minds—not to mention numerous relatives, friends, and political comrades—often remained in Russia.

Most Britons after 1914 were caught up in a politics of jingoistic nationalism; the East European immigrants, however, saw the war as an ideal opportunity to work for the destruction of the hated Romanov dynasty. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917, some segments of the immigrant community again found themselves at odds with much of British public opinion. Even those who were profoundly suspicious of V. I. Lenin's regime, such as Morris Myer, editor of the popular East End Yiddish daily *Di Tsayt*, shed few tears for the murdered tsar and opposed British military intervention in the Russian civil war. Because the only other visible support for the new Soviet state came from groups on the Left, many of whose members would go on to found the British Communist Party, Jews as a group were soon being regarded in some quarters as agents of Bolshevism.

As Kadish relates in her study, the assimilated Anglo-Jewish elite, itself insecure in its relations with the host society, was frightened by these developments. Prominent Jews took it upon themselves to denounce Bolshevism; one notable instance was the "Letter of the Ten" published in the right-wing *Morning Post* in April 1919. It seemed to make little difference. By the early 1920s that notorious tsarist forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, was enjoying wide circulation in Britain and was for a time taken seriously by many Tory politicians and respectable newspapers such as *The Times*. Even Winston Churchill, a firm proponent of the need to strangle the Bolshevik state in its infancy, feared opposition from the "international Jew" (p. 136).

The charge that immigrant Jews were "Bolsheviks" was strenuously denied by community spokespeople and could easily be disproved statistically. But Kadish suggests that this failed to convince those who preferred to believe that an ideology as fiendish as Leninism could only emanate from a people whose aim had always been the destruction of Russian—and British—Christian society. This book, in describing in meticulous detail this rather tawdry episode in British history, makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of European fascism and anti-Semitism in the interwar period.

HENRY SREBRNIK
University of Prince Edward Island

WILLIE THOMPSON. *The Good Old Cause: British Communism, 1920–1991*. London: Pluto; distributed by Westview, Boulder, Colo. 1992. Pp. 258. Cloth $59.95, paper $19.95.

Communist parties in most nations in Western Europe have exerted considerably more influence in the political sphere than has the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Established in 1920, with a membership of some 4,000, the CPGB expanded to a peak of close to 60,000 members in 1942 before declining in size to 30,000 members in the 1960s and fewer than 5,000 at its demise in 1991. Throughout its seventy-year history, Willie Thompson argues in this book, the CPGB embodied a style of politics alien to British political culture; hence, as its membership figures attest, the CPGB never played a major role in British political life. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the transformation of the CPGB into the Democratic Left, the time has come for a critical reassessment of the CPGB's history. This succinct and readable study provides such an assessment.

Because the preparation of an official, multivolume, party history is still in progress, Thompson has not seen fit to delve into the CPGB archives. Instead he makes use of published works, especially those of Ray Challinor, Walter Kendall, L. J. Macfarlane, Stuart Macintyre, and Henry Pelling. The result is a useful survey of the major contours of the party's history. Although many of Thompson's arguments have been rehearsed before, his study offers a perceptive analysis of the party leadership, its links to the Soviet Union, and the tenuous relationship between the CPGB and the Labour Party. His discussion of party influence in the 1930s, especially on the Left Book Club, is excellent, and he offers a valuable analysis of the impact of A. L. Morton's *People's History of England*, first published by the Left Book Club in 1938, on the subsequent Communist Party Historians' Group and on British historiography in general.

Thompson's account of the post–1945 history of the CPGB is detailed and convincing, and it is here that he assesses the inability of the party to come to terms with British economic change in the 1950s and traces the polarization of the party in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. He also offers a superb analysis of the tensions that tore the party apart in the 1980s as more traditional members argued with those representing what have been termed the "new social forces" of feminism, gay activism, environmental politics, and the politics of race. This battle was fought between the party's old guard and the staff of *Marxism Today*, the journal that, while demolishing many cherished myths and totems

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of the CPGB, became a vibrant and successful forum for discussing alternatives to the new conservatism. Thompson, in mapping the conflicts that led to the demise of the CPGB, recounts the arguments made by both sides, making this book a valuable and fair assessment not only of the general history of the CPGB but of the factors that led to its undoing as well.

CHRIS WATERS
Williams College

JOHN KENT. *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944–49.* New York: Leicester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's. 1993. Pp. xi, 224. $49.00.

Most studies of Britain's participation in the Cold War that have appeared since the relevant documents became available in the late 1970s have more or less accepted a Foreign Office view of events. Although they show that Britain, not just the United States and the Soviet Union, contributed significantly to the development of the Cold War and the division of Europe, they have generally located the main determinants of British policy in relation to Soviet actions and the growing perception of a Soviet threat to British security. In this sense, the historiography of Britain's role in the Cold War has been equivalent to the "traditional" or "orthodox" interpretation of American policy in these years. With few exceptions, there has been virtually no British equivalent to the "revisionist" school of U.S. diplomatic history. By focusing on the internal dynamics of British policy, John Kent has now provided a solid basis for a British revisionism.

In a complex, carefully researched, although sometimes weakly written study, Kent argues that British policy makers in these years were not responding primarily to Soviet actions but pursuing an "imperial strategy" that aimed to restore Britain as a power of the first rank, independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States. To that end, they determined to protect the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East as an exclusive British sphere. At the same time, although at one point willing to accept a spheres-of-influence agreement with the Soviets, the British came to reject the Soviet demand for exclusive control over Eastern Europe because they decided that acceptance of a Soviet sphere would indicate that Britain was no longer a global power and thereby reduce its prestige and influence. "The essential issue," Kent writes, was "the clash between rival imperialisms [British and Soviet] and the British attitude to a possible accommodation with the Soviet Empire" (p. xi).

Kent accounts for the various turns in British policy in this period as different attempts to secure the same fundamental goal: Britain's independence as an imperial power. This produced attempts to link other European powers in the development of the empire, unrealistic schemes to develop African resources to restore British economic health and military power, and eventual acceptance of a dependent position in relation to the United States that the Foreign Office had been "keen to avoid" (p. 194). By adopting a totally uncompromising position to the Soviet Union, not over concern for the peoples of Eastern Europe but to realize vague notions of British prestige and influence, British policy makers "played an active role in the breakdown of Allied cooperation" (p. x).

Kent's account reverses a number of established generalizations about the period. Britain's retreat from colonialism was never planned or intended; it retreated only to secure the remainder of Britain's imperial domain. British policy makers never aimed to act as a fulcrum between Europe and the United States but rather wanted to establish British leadership of a European third force that would strengthen the empire and reestablish British independence. Ernest Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers did not follow a pragmatic policy and a "grand design" to create a Western alliance but instead pursued "grandiose schemes and ill defined aims" (pp. 202, 197) that failed because they outran British fiscal and military capacities. "The Foreign Office was attempting to recreate those conditions which produced the kind of status which it believed was Britain's right, rather than adapting to the new power-political conditions existing at the end of the Second World War" (p. 194). As a result, policy makers "avoided . . . a radical reassessment of the costs and desirability of maintaining a global role" (p. 217). Kent's conclusion is not based just on hindsight. Alternative courses of action, particularly the more realistic ones put forth by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, could have been pursued but were rejected by the Joint Chiefs, Ernest Bevin, and the Foreign Office, who joined together in pursuit of an outdated imperial vision.

This is a pathbreaking study that will stimulate a much-needed debate about British policy in the early Cold War.

PETER WEILER
Boston College

GREGORY HANLON. *Confession and Community in Seventeenth-Century France: Catholic and Protestant Coexistence in Aquitaine.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1993. Pp. 312. $39.95.

This deeply researched and richly detailed book is about the historical process of "confessionalization" and the nature of confessional identity in the seventeenth century. Few studies have examined such important topics as well as this one.

Gregory Hanlon has chosen his site of analysis well: Layrac-en-Brulhois, a southern French town of about 1,000 inhabitants in the seventeenth century where Catholics and Protestants lived cheek by jowl. By mining baptismal and consistorial registers, municipal proceedings, judicial archives, lists of landowners (*livres terriers*), and, most importantly, notarial con-

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tracts, Hanlon finds a surprisingly low incidence of confessional rivalry or conflict. Instead, the two confessions coexisted peacefully in an age supposedly renowned for intolerance.

Hanlon shows that peaceful confessional coexistence thrived in Layrac because most inhabitants wanted to protect local autonomy from "centralization and catholicization" (p. 59), that is, from the fiscal, military, and "confessional" intrusions of royal power and the Catholic church whose resurgence accelerated as the century unfolded. Many people of the town closed ranks across confessional lines to fend off or at least delay these intrusions, clearly valuing local autonomy above confessional uniformity. Hanlon proves this interconfessional cooperation and association, most strikingly by uncovering widespread mixed-confessional marriages, 279 of which he gleaned from the notarial records between 1598 and 1700.

For Hanlon the triumph of confessionalization and the eventual disappearance of Protestantism was a result of the "relentless hegemony" (p. 263) of the confessionalizing state and, ironically if implicitly, the simultaneous weakening of the distinctiveness of Calvinism that resulted from the social alliances Huguenots had forged with Catholics. As the juggernaut of the authoritarian, confessional state shattered the institutional infrastructure of the Protestant church, Calvinists had little to fall back on that was distinctively their own. In this Hanlon claims that Layrac was little different from other parts of Europe. Calvinist communities with "rudderless churches [and] without ministers or bibles" (p. 256) could not reproduce themselves. Drawing on demographic theory, Hanlon asserts that "isolates" (p. 257) such as the Calvinist population needed at least 500 individuals to reproduce and thereby to perpetuate its distinctive trait. If that number fell below 300, as the Huguenot population of Layrac did in the seventeenth century, the continued existence of the community was impossible. He thus concludes that "there is no need to use the Revocation as the fatal date [for the eclipsing of Protestantism]—perhaps 1575 and the reflux of Calvinism across France would be more appropriate" (p. 258).

Hanlon is quite successful in demonstrating confessional coexistence and the process of confessionalization. His exploration of confessional identity in the seventeenth century is also compelling but, ironically, not for the reasons Hanlon would wish. He contends that there is no sure way to link belief with behavior in causal relation because beliefs are too unstable to have a consistent effect on behavior for many people. He thus asserts that one must study "practice rather than . . . discourse or representations, mostly because practice tends to be much more tangible than belief" (p. 7). His methodological objectives are grand—he wants to "nudge the tenor of research in cultural history back into an empirical, even neo-positivist direction" (p. 10)—but his treatment of "personal belief" (p. 195), conversion, and confessional boundaries still deduces belief from behavior. There is not the great distance between his approach and that of "representational" history that Hanlon seems to think.

In sum, even if Hanlon's methodological objectives ring a bit hollow, this book's great merit is that it significantly deepens our understanding of confessionalization and the nature of tolerance and confessional identity in the seventeenth century.

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LIANA VARDI. *The Land and the Loom: Peasants and Profit in Northern France, 1680–1800.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 297. $34.95.

The village monograph is a standard genre of historical writing about the countryside and its residents, and Liana Vardi's study of the village of Montigny-en-Cambrésis in northern France provides an opportunity to examine the interaction of external factors, agriculture, and rural industrial activity in *ancien-régime* France. The first section of the book suggests a relatively favored village, open to the world beyond its borders: its population was growing in the second half of the eighteenth century; in spite of social cleavages, the villagers provided considerable support for each other; and both seigneurial and royal exactions were lightly borne by the improving economy of the village. In the second section Vardi examines the limited availability of land, much of it held by religious chapters or nobles, and describes a trend of rising rents and greater fragmentation of the land held by peasants. By the middle of the eighteenth century the expansion of industry and several mid-century crises in agriculture weakened middling farmers, wiped out small farmers, and led to a significant movement from all strata of the agricultural population into weaving. The expansion of weaving allowed the formation of a group of merchant-weavers who developed their businesses using capital generated from land, and who were often enriched by their forays into the weaving trade. By the end of the *ancien régime*, however, weavers had moved back into farming, creating a new stratum of middling farmers, a development reinforced by the sale of *biens nationaux* during the French Revolution. Cottage industry, therefore, provided "the antidote to rural poverty" (p. 121).

Vardi's principal narrative is one in which agriculture and industry continually interacted: improvements in agriculture supported the growing population and provided capital for investment in weaving; weaving led to population growth, which in turn led to agricultural improvements; and earnings from one sector were often transferred to the other. This narrative at times intersects with important historiographical issues, such as the transition to a capitalist economy, protoindustrialization, rural social mobility, and the origins of the French Revolution in the

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countryside. Vardi at times alludes to these issues, but she never directly places the experiences of the peasants who lived in Montigny in the framework provided by any of these debates. Instead, her tactic is to criticize a particular facet of the debate—such as the supposed "immiseration" caused by protoindustry—and then move on. The reader is left wondering what the book is about, other than an obscure village.

In the end, Vardi seems to fasten on the origins of the rural revolution as her subject, as the narrative increasingly examines the formation of a group of middling peasants who made their fortunes as merchant-weavers, invested in land at the end of the *ancien régime,* and took over village government. This is a significant topic, although the way in which Vardi chooses to address it, an argument principally with Georges Lefebvre's *Les paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution français* (1927), does not place Montigny in a very large comparative context. It also leads to a focus on a handful of individuals and families and a marginalization of most of the residents of the village. Although we are given detailed histories of the dealings of a few merchant-weavers, we learn virtually nothing of the hundreds of weavers and spinners who worked for these intermediaries. The most disconcerting result is the almost complete absence of concerns about gender. This is a remarkable gap in a work about peasant economies and especially rural industry because numerous studies have shown how central gendered skill differences and varied roles in the family economy were in rural societies. These distinctions disappear in Vardi's account, and she dismisses the obvious comparisons with one of the best studies of this subject, Gay L. Gullickson's *Spinnners and Weavers of Auffay* (1986), which focused on the nearby Pays de Caux. The result is a village monograph that provides a wealth of information about Montigny but remains unconvincing as an account of, to use Vardi's phrase, "what the peasants were really like" (p. 1).

James R. Lehning
University of Utah

Jack Thomas. *Le temps des foires: Foires et marchés dans le Midi toulousain de la fin de l'Ancien Régime à 1914.* (Tempus, Collection historique.) Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, with the cooperation of Conseil Régional Midi-Pyrénées. 1993. Pp. 407. 170 fr.

Jacques Turgot, the physiocrat, dreamed of a France where, as in Holland, there would be no fairs but "all the country over and all year" would be "a continual fair" (p. 363). Jack Thomas has given us a picture of French reality where markets and fairs continued to thrive until World War I, not only for the trade they prompted but also for the social activities they eased.

Thomas's focus is regional, but the Toulouse region that he writes about stretches from Auvergne to the Pyrenees and testifies for trends in far broader areas. His markets (mostly weekly) and fairs (several times a year) took place for the most part in urban centers, some quite small, but served a fairly large hinterland delimited by the distance that could be walked, ridden, or driven in an hour or two. When railroads came, they facilitated movement of crops and other goods but did little to alter access zones, let alone the uses of the market. So Thomas tells the tale of institutions long crucial to country life and to the country's life, and he tells it well.

The study begins by tracing the fate of markets and market communities from the time of fiefs and royal grants to the revolution's attempts to liberalize and decentralize trading practices while imposing the ten-day week of a new calendar, resented and unsuccessful. It comes into its own when, under the Second Empire and Third Republic, markets and fairs were left to multiply under departmental and municipal jurisdictions, amid toll wars between rival localities or between urban centers and the rural public.

Thomas places all of this in institutional, legal, political, and economic context, but his most lively chapters deal with the social functions of fairs and markets. Occasions for idleness, dissipation, debauch, and disorder for their critics, fairs especially—often coinciding with religious feasts and growing in response to nineteenth-century developments in livestock rearing—saw cattle, sheep, pigs, and cash change hands. This was accompanied by exchange of other goods and services: tax payments, administrative and legal acts, hiring, vending, and, after the mid-nineteenth century, politicking. Not least, these transactions were accompanied by activities like gambling, violence, drinking, courtship, dancing, and a host of shows.

Where periodical sociability gathered crowds, professionals came to serve or prey on them: doctors, tailors, charlatans, healers, crooks, thieves, usurers, spellbinders and unbinders, buskers, pickpockets, prostitutes, politicians and police; there were as well the fairies, ghosts, devils and bandits one risked encountering while tottering home. Thomas deals with all of this. I would have liked a word about the effect of public works like Gustave Eiffel's bridge at Garabit, completed in 1902, on the economy of local *Ségalas* and on their fairs, but one cannot have everything.

Based on thorough knowledge of local geography and communal rivalries, this is a model study in the great French tradition of the slimmed-down *thèse de doctorat.* It should be required reading for students of French social and economic history and of peasant societies in general. But it deserves to be read more widely than that.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

Sarah Maza. *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France.* (Studies on the History of Society and Culture, number 18.)

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Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 354. $35.00.

Sarah Maza's outstanding book contributes to the quest for the cultural origins of the French Revolution. Building on a Habermasian concern with the rise of the bourgeois public sphere, the author draws attention to the significance of the legal briefs (*mémoires judiciaires*) that lawyers produced and sometimes circulated widely when arguing their cases. Looking at some of the more sensational trials from the 1770s to the eve of the revolution, Maza finds revealing changes in the form of the briefs. They ceased to be technical documents designed to inform judges how the law favored one side of the dispute and became much more ambitious works, which could win momentary fame for their authors. Lawyers started to go over the heads of the judges and address the public at large, occasionally printing thousands of copies of the briefs, which might sell briskly if the affair was sufficiently meaty. Eschewing dry references to the legal codes, barristers began to employ the literary techniques associated with the emerging bourgeois drama (*drame*), with its didactic and moralizing elements. Furthermore, the briefs went beyond the defense of a client and raised pointed questions about social reform.

What could these changes mean? Maza argues that the briefs constituted one of the social practices that was bringing civic society into existence. The publications helped to shape a critical public that assumed a role in weighing evidence on public matters. This signified a shift in the central metaphor of political life, from the theater, with its receptive audience, to the courthouse, with its judges. Ultimately, Maza joins Joan Landes in describing an eighteenth-century shift in political culture from the iconic (power centered on the king's visible body) to the textual (power represented by words, laws, and documents).

Maza also interrogates the revisionist historiography within which she works with probing and necessary questions. Noting that the scholarship on the cultural origins of the revolution focuses on a new vision of politics, Maza usefully asks (p. 319): "Why does *social* rhetoric pervade this allegedly political upheaval?" She answers by noting the overlapping of social and political categories in the briefs. They espoused an ideology opposing virtuous commoners and corrupt aristocrats. Moreover, the briefs invested private life with political meaning. Marital breakdowns, adultery, and even contentious village festivals took on ominous significance for the monarchical/aristocratic order. Some of the most infamous scandals in the prerevolutionary era demonized women for having public power, preparing for a shift in the symbolic center of political life from the royal court/household to the all-male representative assembly. Finally, Maza sees in the briefs a culture in which private virtues were coming to shape the sociopolitical order. As the French people made the well-ordered family the core of social existence, the public sphere had to become politicized and, eventually, revolutionary, in order to accomplish this transformation.

Maza is convincing that the changes in the legal briefs signified wider cultural reconstruction. Her book is a pleasure to read, too. Like the eighteenth-century barristers who penned the best-selling briefs, she finds ways both to entertain her audience and to start readers thinking in broad terms.

LENARD R. BERLANSTEIN
University of Virginia

HARRIET B. APPLEWHITE. *Political Alignment in the French National Assembly, 1789–1791.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1993. Pp. xxxii, 279. $45.00.

Using methods from political science, Harriet B. Applewhite attempts to explain the pattern of political alignment in the first French revolutionary assembly. Because the National Assembly recorded very few roll-call votes, she bases her work on a variety of sources, including membership lists from the Jacobins and other political clubs of the period, contemporaries' categorizations of the deputies, and the opinions expressed in pamphlets published by a sample of 247 deputies picked for more detailed analysis. Numerous statistical tables—not all of them explained sufficiently for the benefit of the innumerate historical reader—provide the results of her extensive research.

Applewhite challenges the "revisionist" interpreters of the French Revolution by showing that deputies originally elected by the privileged orders and those coming from the bourgeoisie did not form a homogeneous property-owning elite at the end of the Old Regime. Her data indicate that estate origin was the most significant predictor of how National Assembly deputies would vote throughout the first two years of the revolution. Other factors, such as participation in prerevolutionary political institutions, had some effect, but not as much as prerevolutionary social status. Despite the novelty of the problem deputies had to deal with, their fundamental attitudes toward the revolution, Applewhite contends, were set by the time the Estates-General convened in May 1789, and few of them changed their minds significantly after that. The relative rigidity of deputies' alignments, coupled with the fact that most gravitated toward one political extreme or the other, produced a confrontational politics and a refusal to accept compromise that had serious consequences for the revolution.

Applewhite demonstrates that the majority of conservative deputies continued to participate in the National Assembly until its dissolution, contrary to a frequent assertion that many nobles and clergy dropped out as the revolution became more radical. The left-wing patriot deputies never had a stable numerical majority in the assembly, but they fur-

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nished a disproportionate number of its leaders. Focusing her attention narrowly on the politics of the assembly, Applewhite does not explain this result, beyond pointing to the importance of the small but influential group of patriot nobles who split with their peers and supported the reform movement. The answer most likely lies in the National Assembly's response to pressures from "out of doors," which the author alludes to but never discusses in any systematic fashion. Applewhite's data clarify some important aspects of the assembly's history, but her study does not really engage the important work done by Lynn Hunt and others on the revolution's political culture. A full-fledged history of the assembly's internal politics, along the lines suggested in Timothy Tackett's article, "Nobles and Third Estate in the Revolutionary Dynamic of the National Assembly, 1789–1790" (*AHR*, 94 [April 1989], 271–301), remains an important desideratum. A thorough prosopographical study of the deputies would have to incorporate data from Edna Hines Lemay's *Dictionnaire des Constituants* (1991), published too late for Applewhite to make use of it.

JEREMY D. POPKIN
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DORA B. WEINER. *The Citizen-Patient in Revolutionary and Imperial Paris.* (Henry E. Sigerist Series in the History of Medicine.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 444. $48.50.

In 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton spoke of health care that cannot be taken away; some two hundred years ago, François Alexandre Frédéric, duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, called for "assistance that is prompt, free, assured, and complete" (p. 3). How much health care do society and government owe the citizenry? What is the responsibility of the patient in assuring his or her own health? These questions, which bedevil the contemporary United States, also troubled reformers during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, as Dora B. Weiner shows in this masterful synthesis of political and medical history.

Weiner asserts that during the 1790s medical care moved from the institutional management of dependency to a partnership wherein a new entity, the citizen-patient, cooperated with increasingly specialized medical providers. Enlightenment writers from Félix Vicq d'Azyr to Antoine Augustin Parmentier had explored various aspects of health care; during the French Revolution, the Health Committee under the physician Joseph Ignace Guillotin and the Poverty Committee chaired by the reforming La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt wrestled with reform legislation. Guillotin's committee won in the short term, preventing physicians from becoming part of a government network of health-care providers. But, Weiner argues, the longer-term aim of improved health for citizens was partially implemented and remained, as a goal and a dream, to inform later nineteenth-century legislation.

One accomplishment of the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods was an increased focus on specific medical problems. Administrators of hospitals—very often nuns—were key players in this transition, mediating between the human needs of the patients and the scientific goals of the physicians. Specializations arose (in geriatrics, psychiatry, neonatology, pediatrics, and venereology), as did smaller hospitals, dispensaries, nursing homes, and outpatient services. Outpatient services especially were directed to citizen-patients: people "who had families to support, who preferred independence to hospitalization and were ready to accept medical counseling and directions for self-medication" (p. 153).

This is a most readable book. There is a well-informed section on psychiatry in which we see Philippe Pinel, Jean Baptiste Pussin, and others in action. Women appear in this book, as they rarely do in studies not specifically focused on gender. They figure as patients whose diseases got considerable attention, "perhaps the only true equality that women attained during that era" (p. 5). They surface as midwives and as experienced members of religious orders, with long traditions of skilled nursing and administration that were sacrificed to the demands of political correctness. Patients appear also, relishing nourishing soups or churlish about being deprived of garden privileges. Pleasantly absent from this book is the heavy hand of theory; Weiner reviews theoretical stances often used in the history of medicine, especially those of Michel Foucault, but essentially writes a history where human agency has a broad role.

This is, above all, a heavily populated book. Not only do we learn about the issues of health-care reform at the turn of the nineteenth century but we also see, in vivid detail, the actors, striving, bickering, and sometimes succeeding.

EVELYN BERNETTE ACKERMAN
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JONATHAN P. RIBNER. *Broken Tablets: The Cult of the Law in French Art from David to Delacroix.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xxiii, 222. $50.00.

France's revolutionary leaders challenged the Bourbon monarchy in 1789 with the popular claim that elected representatives of the nation should write new laws to create a new French state and society. Although this challenge began in the realm of political institutions, its consequences spread quickly throughout the art, language, and symbols that shaped all the overlapping spheres of French culture, as Jonathan P. Ribner shows in this carefully written, well-illustrated study of early nineteenth-century French art.

Substituting a cult of impersonal laws for that of

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kings, revolutionary legislators proclaimed their essential, heroic role in modern history by celebrating the unique, priest-like calling of the lawgiver. Artists such as Jacques-Louis David provided brilliant imagery to support their aspirations and self-perceptions, but the optimism of 1789 could not survive the changing regimes, political repressions, and disillusionments of the next six decades. Indeed, the exalted expectations for the newly defined "rights of man" and a written constitution gave way by the 1840s to a pervasive cynicism and contempt for legislators; the classical allusions of David were replaced by the caricatures of Honoré Daumier.

Ribner examines this cultural evolution in an imaginative commentary on the artistic representation of legal codes and lawgivers from the beginning of the revolution to the demise of Louis-Philippe's regime in 1848, stressing that every government attempted to bolster its authority with images that depicted the sanctity of law. The Napoleonic Code became the most famous example of the nineteenth-century desire to defend the legal legitimacy of a postrevolutionary political order, but Ribner shows how other regimes followed the Napoleonic precedent in their search for artists who could portray new or old laws as expressions of universal truths.

Historians have long noted the universalist themes in French ideologies of the era. In contrast to accounts that trace these ideas to the influence of the Enlightenment or classical Rome, however, Ribner emphasizes the use of Old Testament imagery, especially the importance of Moses as the religious prototype of a powerful, divinely inspired lawgiver. The modern confidence in universal laws resembled a traditional religious faith in the Ten Commandments, which suggests why the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was often inscribed on tablets that promised durability as well as truth.

Despite such claims for the justice of their laws, each regime was challenged by opponents and artists who proposed different visions of the truth or charged that French laws protected specific interests rather than universal ideals. The cult of the law and lawgivers, in short, offered lucrative employment for official artists and rich material for caricaturists and critics. Meanwhile, legal "tablets" that were to serve a new millennium were often shattered in a decade or a year.

Ribner finds allusions to wider historical conflicts and anxieties in the contrasting, ambivalent images of figures such as Napoleon and Moses, both of whom could be used to support the status quo, to challenge it, or to justify the aspirations of artists who sought to appropriate the authority of lawgivers for themselves. Like their Enlightenment and revolutionary predecessors, Romantic artists and poets began to claim their own exalted status as the legitimate representatives of higher truths that neither governments nor laws had yet established in the modern world.

Ribner discusses these transitions with reference to more than a hundred illustrations, although his own interests and expertise carry him more deeply into the 1830s and 1840s than into the earlier decades. His most detailed interpretations of specific paintings, for example, skillfully analyze the work of Eugène Delacroix in the context of social conflicts and intellectual debates that dominated French political culture during the July Monarchy.

Ribner's book thus offers new perspectives on the legacy of the French Revolution in nineteenth-century art and well-informed commentary on the evolving, modern image of legislators as greedy, self-interested successors to an earlier generation's public-minded servants of high ideals.

LLOYD KRAMER
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JANN MATLOCK. *Scenes of Seduction: Prostitution, Hysteria, and Reading Difference in Nineteenth-Century France.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1994. Pp. xviii, 422. Cloth $60.00, paper $18.00.

In this book Jann Matlock explores the ways that women were represented in a variety of literary texts and documents in nineteenth-century France. She does so in such an unusually acute and intelligent way that it is unlikely anyone familiar with this book will read Honoré de Balzac's *Cousine Bette* (1846), Eugène Sue's *Mystères de Paris* (1842–43), or a number of other popular nineteenth-century *romans-feuilletons* again in the same way. The real originality of Matlock's accomplishment, however, is the way she extends "reading difference," as she calls it, to a host of other texts—pamphlets, psychiatric case studies, social investigations, criticism—that are the sorts of things historians typically use as factual documentation. Because she is as familiar with the social and institutional history of the era as with its literary and cultural materials, she manages this intertextual enterprise with great assurance. In contrast to various works of literary criticism that have laid claim to the status, Matlock's work is an example of genuine interdisciplinarity, and it will prove valuable to historians and literary scholars alike.

Matlock focuses on the ways that a multitude of texts imitated and therefore reinforced the gendered spaces to which women and the poor were confined in nineteenth-century society. She demonstrates how both the vast compendium on prostitution written by Alexandre Parent-Duchâtelet in 1836 and Sue's serialized *Mystères de Paris* replicate in their textual spaces the system of legalized prostitution (*tolérance*) that they set out to reform. She also effectively explores the ultimately similar symptomatology of the prostitute and the middle-class female hysteric who appeared in psychiatric treatises and contemporary novels, most notably the hugely popular work of Balzac. As the title of Matlock's book suggests, it was their dreaded capacity to seduce and to be seduced that

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linked lower and upper-class women and made them so dangerous to the system of patriarchy that prevailed in the post-Napoleonic era; women were confined to their appropriate space in the bordello or asylum when they failed to follow the script of good wife or daughter.

Matlock also attempts to show how these various texts were sufficiently multivocal to permit resistance—both individual and social—by women and their allies during the revolutionary ferment of 1830 and 1848, when the liberation of prostitutes became a metaphor for the liberation of humanity in general. She strains hard to make this theme work, both theoretically and historically, but her arguments are so imaginative, and her documentation so thorough and original, that she generally succeeds in revealing how determined women could resist, if not subvert, the system designed to make them pliant servants of their fathers and husbands.

Although her book covers much of the ground explored in the last fifteen years by a small army of critics and historians, Matlock's readings and archival investigations widen and deepen our understanding of the linguistic and conceptual devices French culture created and used to classify and analyze women. Her writing is clear and witty, argumentative but undogmatic, and largely free of technical critical jargon. I am convinced that this book will become a much emulated model for how to do cultural history that is equally well-grounded in textual analysis and in the history of the society that produced and read those texts.

ROBERT A. NYE
Oregon State University

NICHOLAS PAPAYANIS. *The Coachmen of Nineteenth-Century Paris: Service Workers and Class Consciousness.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 247. $45.00.

In this book Nicholas Papayanis paints a colorful portrait of an occupational category on the fringes of traditional labor and in transition from the era of horse-drawn cabs to that of motorized transport. He thereby suggests intriguing parallels and contrasts to the experiences of other urban labor groups whose confrontation with economic and technical changes spurred the rise of class consciousness in sometimes very different ways. Yet, despite its subtitle, the book seems less designed to reach general conclusions about service workers and their class identity than simply to "recreate the world of Paris coachmen" (p. 3) and to contrast their diverse and distorted images (varying from utmost honesty to criminality) with a reality drawn from statistical surveys, company records, and union newspapers. However engaging, such detail often obscures the larger issues that labor historians might wish to see more prominently displayed.

One point of the revised portrait is to show the coachmen as a group whose goals of upward social mobility (including owning one's own cab) made it hard for them to cast their lot with conventional "proletarianized" workers. Although the corporate ideology of early nineteenth-century labor movements helped to bridge the divide, the gulf widened due to later economic developments (sometimes labeled the second industrial revolution) that affected the cab industry by concentrating ownership into fewer hands. Intensified company discipline (for road safety and to prevent unreported fares) also reduced the autonomy that had once made drivers more like artisans than proletarianized workers. But the technical changes that accompanied the automobile at least spared drivers the threat of technological unemployment, because motorization increased rather than reduced the demand for their skills.

Papayanis carefully documents these developments and traces their consequences for labor organization, strike activity, and class consciousness (however difficult the latter may be to define or to measure). Yet none of these developments were specific to service workers, and their parallels to the experiences of other categories are never fully drawn. For example, the coachmen's debate over the method of wage payment—whether a fixed daily rate or a percentage of receipts—is presented here as a contest between a proletarianized identity and a sense of shared interest with company owners. But piecework pay rates and even early versions of profit sharing were becoming common in manufacturing industries, and they rarely undermined the working-class identity of their recipients, even if that is what the new schemes' proponents may have hoped to achieve.

The study's brief concluding chapter does little more to raise the comparative perspective. True, the book "fills a gap in the literature" by targeting a "hitherto neglected" category of workers, as promised in the preface's opening lines. But the book rarely moves beyond the particular to the general. The larger rationale for such a case study, and the hypotheses to be tested among its distinctive constituency, begin to materialize as the book progresses, but they remain at the end less than fully spelled out.

KATHRYN E. AMDUR
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RICHARD ABEL. *The Ciné Goes to Town: French Cinema 1896–1914.* (A Centennial Book.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1994. Pp. xxiii, 568. $55.00.

Richard Abel's excellent first book *French Cinema* (1984) bore the subtitle *The First Wave, 1915–1929.* His new book, implicitly correcting that subtitle, goes back to treat the rich earlier period from the beginnings of cinema up to World War I. Revising his and others' prior assumptions, Abel now gives more weight to the role of French movies and less to American movies in that true "first wave."

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After an opening chapter sketching French society and entertainment at the turn of the century, he gives us a minutely detailed chronicle of the early film industry, recounting the changing fortunes and strategies of the many competing companies. Adopting film historian Georges Sadoul's periodization, Abel moves briskly through the early years (from 1896 to 1902), giving less attention to the Lumière, Gaumont, and Méliès companies than to Pathé. For the period after 1902 his central story is the spectacular success of Pathé-Frères. By 1907 French film makers led the world, and Pathé-Frères was the giant among them, leading in film production and distribution all through the world, supplying American nickelodeons, Russian showmen, and French fairgrounds alike. Abel's account of Pathé's rise to dominance is a convincingly complicated one, scattered through several chapters. Abel further shows that by 1913, well before the devastating blows of World War I, the French lost the lead to the Americans.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the films themselves. Many of them have been lost, and the surviving ones—about 700 film prints—are not easy to find or view. Abel gives us innumerable detailed, perceptive summaries and analyses of those early movies. He tells about the subject matter, notes the kinds of camera shots and editing techniques used, and explains how such devices as intertitles and the dissolve functioned. He also provides some analysis of gender and class relationships as well as comparisons with older forms of entertainment such as magic shows and music halls. The detailed information is so copious—with fast-forwarding through so many movies—that much of the book is best approached, I think, as a reference work (the first two chapters of which are loaded with specialized film terminology).

Abel gives most of his attention to the development of the forms of film: "the textual system of representation and narration" (p. xvi). First he leads us through a rich variety of early films centered on tableaux with little or no narration: fairyland spectaculars, magic effects, pantomimes, documentaries (some of them staged), and newsreels. In treating that "cinema of attractions" (p. 60), he is at his best bringing out the brilliance of Georges Méliès's works, especially the trick films. Abel goes on to tell how, in this kind of cinema as in others, Pathé moved in and took over, rapidly expanding its offerings of whatever worked with audiences. Next, through three long chapters, Abel delivers the main story of his book: the emergence of the multi-reel narrative feature film from brief transitional works. In the several hundred pages devoted to that story, he illustrates each new cinematic development with at least several films as examples. There is little on such actors as Max Linder or directors or the rise of stars, but their films and "representational strategies" (p. 241) are amply discussed. The rise of the narrative film, Abel explains, was part of cinema producers' effort to reach a bourgeois audience and gain legitimacy. Another part of the same effort was the shift of cinema from the fairgrounds to permanent halls on the boulevards.

For historians, I think, the author's observations on the social composition of audiences and the ideological messages in cinema may well be more important than his account of the developing long-story film. His commentary on contemporary melodrama films is particularly instructive. Abel shows that some films called the social order into question, but more of them presented ambiguous views (notably toward crime and criminals from the petty poacher to the master outlaw Fantômas). Even more often they ended by legitimizing the established order, particularly the bourgeois patriarchal family. Yet he also shows that in comic films the bourgeoisie was most often the butt of jokes and the higher levels of hierarchies were often ridiculed. Clearly, film makers seeking the favor of a big diverse public faced difficult challenges. As they chose scenarios and points of view, they had to compete not only with other film companies (both French and foreign) but also with other entertainments such as theater and with the Roman Catholic church, which took an early strong interest in producing films for its cause. Pathé, predictably, hewed more closely to establishment ideological positions than Méliès, although it often included anticlerical touches.

In his concluding section Abel acknowledges omissions in his study, the most important of which is the history of audience reception. He has taken some tentative steps in that direction, pointing out possible alternative readings of plots and surmising the kinds of social groups likely to be interested. That is a good beginning. For the rest, he has given us a valuable, richly detailed film history, one that is the fullest account in English and the most up to date in any language.

Charles Rearick
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Leonard V. Smith. *Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. Pp. xvii, 274. $35.00.

In a meticulously researched and beautifully written book, Leonard V. Smith focuses on the soldiers of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I. He offers a unique perspective: he studies the power relationship between soldiers and their commanders as a means to shed light on the question of obedience and resistance to authority. The core of this relationship was how much violence the soldiers would accept in order to win the war. These soldiers were not apolitical; they were citizen-soldiers, keenly aware that in a democracy command authority ultimately depended on their consent. When consent was not given, the citizen-soldiers would first use resistance and then confrontation to stop the ineffective tactics

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and strategy ordered by their senior commanders. In a highly original thesis, Smith argues persuasively that these confrontations shifted the balance of power over the course of the war in favor of battlefield soldiers and as a consequence changed the parameters of command authority.

In the opening battle at Charleroi in August 1914, strict obedience to command authority, the all-out offensive, resulted in calamity for the Fifth Infantry Division. In the ensuing battles over the next few weeks, Smith shows how the soldiers would go only so far. On more than one occasion they retreated without proper authorization when faced with overwhelming German fire power. By October 1914 the common soldier's refusal to be fodder and to follow orders blindly forced the commanders of the Fifth Infantry Division to accept a tacit understanding with the soldiers. This understanding was based on the concept of proportionality, that is, a willingness of the common soldier to fight aggressively if there existed some perceived utility; likewise, all aggression would cease if there was no likelihood of gain. Proportionality, however, began to break down during the Verdun slaughter of 1916, as soldiers realized that their deaths had no military purpose. This state of despair set the stage for the mutinies of 1917.

The standard interpretation of the mutinies maintains that they were basically military outbursts and hence "nonpolitical." Smith, however, finds that the mutinies had a strong political component, so much so that they could be called political demonstrations rather than mutinies. The soldiers wanted peace, but not at any cost; the Germans would have to return Alsace-Lorraine or the French would continue the war. They also wanted better working conditions on the home front. Most important, they wanted an end to the senseless offensives. To buttress further his argument, Smith shows that the close premutiny rapport between soldiers and commanders remained intact; a military mutiny would have resulted in a more hostile attitude toward the officers. The demonstrators even asked their commanders to take their demands to civilian authorities such as the Chamber of Deputies. By looking to the established political institutions to redress their grievances, soldiers were asserting their peacetime identities as citizens who, as such, believed that they had a legitimate right to be heard. They were heard: "the politics of citizen-soldiers at last made itself felt on the authority structure at the highest levels" (p. 175).

Philippe Pétain, recently appointed commander in chief, immediately changed France's military policy: he initiated a defensive strategy. This meant that he acknowledged a changed balance of power between soldiers and commanders. He explicitly recognized what had been tacitly accepted since 1914: the citizen-soldier had the power to stop fruitless offensives.

JAN KARL TANENBAUM
Florida State University

STEPHEN D. CARLS. *Louis Loucheur and the Shaping of Modern France, 1916–1931.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 330. $45.00.

Stephen D. Carls's book conscientiously examines the career of a lesser-known political figure of the Third Republic who undoubtedly merits wider recognition. A graduate of the École Polytechnique, Louis Loucheur was a partner in an expanding construction firm in the years before 1914 that converted during World War I to the manufacture of munitions, resulting in a small fortune for Loucheur. His organizational skills had already come to the attention of the hard-pressed wartime government, and in 1916 he was appointed an undersecretary of state in the newly organized ministry of armaments headed by Albert Thomas. Succeeding Thomas as minister of armaments, Loucheur became a key organizer of the war effort, although he never received as much credit as his predecessor.

Loucheur emerged after the war as Georges Clemenceau's principal economic adviser, served as minister of industrial reconstruction and as minister of the liberated territories, and took part in the Paris Peace Conference. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1919, he served over the years in several cabinets, often for only brief periods of time, heading ministries of commerce, finance, labor and health, and national economy. He was also a member of the French delegation to the League of Nations from 1924 to 1929. From 1916 to his death in 1931 he remained in public service and politics.

Affiliating himself in the Chamber with a small but influential centrist group bearing a typically inappropriate name, the Gauche Radicale, Loucheur was always a moderate and a pragmatist, committed to economic liberalism, but he recognized far more clearly than many of his contemporaries the need for government involvement in order to stimulate economic growth, productivity, and modernization. Unlike many of his colleagues, he did not favor tariff protection for the noncompetitive, or "static," sector of the economy, and he championed European economic cooperation, even the integration of the French and German metallurgical industries.

Carls has diligently tracked down and exploited a variety of sources, but he does not always help the reader to assess them critically, as for example the edited volume of Loucheur's *Carnets secrets, 1908–1932* (1962). His conclusions are sensible but bland and fail to communicate his ultimate judgment about the character and personality of Loucheur, who seems to have backed off from critical decisions when political pressures mounted. Above all, Carls tends to exaggerate Loucheur's stature, and even sees him as "partly to blame" (p. 307) for France's failure to modernize in the post–1919 years. Yet on the whole the biography effectively serves to place Loucheur in the front ranks of "the modernizers" (p. xiv) and to establish him as a precursor of the manager-techni-

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cians and technocrats whose influence, although weak in the interwar years, came to prevail in the Fourth and Fifth republics. In that sense Loucheur did contribute, as the title of the book informs us, to "the shaping of modern France."

JOEL COLTON
Duke University

JONATHAN BOYARIN. *Polish Jews in Paris: The Ethnography of Memory.* (The Modern Jewish Experience.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 195. $25.00.

During the two decades preceding World War II, in the face of new American immigration restrictions, a large number of the Jews streaming out of Poland remained in Western Europe. Many of those who settled in Paris were illegal immigrants, but whether or not they became naturalized they suffered decimation during the Vichy period. Jonathan Boyarin's study is an investigation of part of the secular, politically left-wing component of this population, those who survived both the war and time to live on into the 1980s in Paris.

Boyarin views his topic primarily through the prism of *landsmanshaftn*, the Yiddish term for societies founded by immigrants from a single place of origin, which provided mutual aid, burial services, and social activities. Such hometown societies have been a common phenomenon among immigrant populations, but Jews may have been more prolific in their creation than other immigrants. Although American *landsmanshaftn* have attracted scholarly attention since 1938 (Isaac Rontch, Hannah Kliger, Michael Weisser, Boyarin), this study is the first to focus on the French associations and the role they played in the creation of community and memory for immigrant Jews in Paris.

Not all secular Polish Jewish immigrants joined hometown societies, and Boyarin appropriately also includes in his study the socialist Yiddishists who clustered around the Jewish Labor Bund. His population of informants is the group of highly politicized communists, ex-communists, labor Zionists, and socialists who arrived in Paris during the 1920s and 1930s, and, to a lesser extent, in the postwar years. Other characteristics unifying this group are their Yiddish language, their survival of the Holocaust, the loss of their home of origin, and their struggle to shape, articulate, and transmit the memory of the tragedy of the lost culture. Notably missing are the religiously observant.

As an ethnographer, Boyarin attended and participated in the immigrants' social and commemorative rituals in 1982–83, including burials, Holocaust remembrances, and annual balls. In the published report of his findings, he describes himself as "an amateur historian as well as . . . a competent ethnographer" (p. 5). The historical background is drawn largely from oral testimony and consists of episodic chapters in individual life histories, with varying detail. Boyarin reproduces his informants' anecdotes about their political activities and their social and economic integration into Paris. To demonstrate their attempts to link the present with Jewish tradition, he describes some of the secularized versions of Jewish holiday observance that are sponsored by the societies.

There are several regrettable omissions. One would like data on the immigrants' reception by the host society or the rest of French Jewry. There is little on how and where they survived the war. The chapter on "Children and Other Strangers" only begins the discussion of how the next generation meets or deviates from their parents' aspirations for them. Confined to the activities promoted by the organizations, the study avoids any discussion of more private social interactions. Lacking, too, is a comparative perspective, notably with the American *landsmanshaftn.*

Inspired, as he acknowledges, by postmodern cultural theory, Boyarin consciously injects himself into both the events that he attends and the descriptions that he provides. In accord with this school, he dismisses the idea that the enterprise might be "scientific," and his continual presence serves to emphasize that we are only seeing what he is capable of reflecting.

Judged from the point of view of a modernist historian, this reflexive work of a postmodernist ethnographer leaves much unanswered. The personal intrusion vies with the subject, and the author's contentment with "amateur" history may even appear to belittle the seriousness of the historical enterprise. The historian looks in vain for a discussion of change and causation. Perhaps, however, Boyarin's ethnographic contribution to history is to provide the raw material for the historian.

PHYLLIS COHEN ALBERT
Harvard University

MARTIN S. ALEXANDER. *The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933–1940.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 573. $94.95.

History is rarely kind to the losers. Historians have been particularly harsh on General Maurice Gamelin, who presided over the first nine, and decisive, days of the French military collapse of May 1940. Martin S. Alexander's important book attempts a reassessment and rehabilitation of the unfortunate general. And, to a very large degree, he succeeds. Alexander's mastery of the sources—especially the archival materials—is impressive and his judgments carry considerable authority. As the subtitle of the book indicates, this is less a biography of Gamelin than a study in the "politics of French defense" in the second half of the 1930s. The author skillfully details the complex and daunting political, diplomatic, and economic obsta-

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cles facing both France and Gamelin. The difficulties of adapting both the French economy and French politics to the armaments needs of a future war are incisively studied in a particularly rich and detailed account of the problems involved in arms procurement. There are some brilliant sections on interservice rivalries and the strategic debates of the 1930s and, in particular, some trenchant observations about Charles de Gaulle. The result is a masterful portrait of the very nearly intractable problems confronting this archly republican general who sought to preserve both the territorial integrity of France and the French Republic. Alexander makes a convincing case that Gamelin overcame many, albeit not all, of these obstacles and was fully justified in assuring the French premier, Edouard Daladier, in September 1939 that France was ready for war with Germany.

Although Gamelin surely played a decisive role in the outstanding rearmament effort of the late 1930s, France nevertheless collapsed militarily in 1940. Why this should have been so is not Alexander's subject, nor, apparently, is the question of Gamelin's direct responsibility for the campaign of May 1940. He draws a rigid distinction between "Gamelin as architect of a program of unprecedented peacetime defensive preparation" and "Gamelin as military commander" (p. 379). Perhaps this self-denying ordinance is understandable; one can certainly sympathize with the author when he declares that "to rehabilitate Gamelin as a field commander in 1940 will be the uphill task of a more Quixotic study than this one" (p. 379). Still, the decision to omit the last nine days of Gamelin's active career will disappoint readers who persist in wondering why, in spite of Gamelin's accomplishments, France fell. Alexander himself seems uncertain. He hints at the responsibility of the "republic of pals" mentality that infected even the best of the Third Republic's politicians; he also has dark suspicions of the role of reactionaries in the army, most notably Maxime Weygand. But these arguments are not really developed. In his chapter on the Phony War he convincingly demonstrates that the French high command did learn the lessons of the Polish campaign, although he is less certain about the lower ranks. He also demolishes the legend of Gamelin as an armchair general. But he remains uncharacteristically noncommittal about Gamelin's decision to redeploy Henri Giraud's Seventh Army in the so-called Dyle-Breda plan. The decision, at the outbreak of hostilities in the west, to send what had heretofore been his strategic reserve headlong up the Belgian coast toward Holland was entirely Gamelin's idea and, as the author acknowledges, a strategy that "cost the allies dearly in May 1940" (p. 336).

But if one regrets Alexander's reluctance to finish the story, it is primarily because the rest of it is so skillfully told.

WILLIAM D. IRVINE
York University
Toronto

BERND KASTEN. *"Gute Franzosen": Die französische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungmacht im besetzten Frankreich 1940–1944.* (Kieler historische Studien, number 37.) Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke. 1993. Pp. 263. DM 88.00.

In this book, Bernd Kasten explores the complex problem of the police in Vichy France. Kasten's subject is really the police, as part of France's military arm, and its policy toward nonconformists during the Vichy period. Following their defeat in 1940, the French armed services were reorganized. More than a million men became hostages in Germany. Thousands more were demobilized without jobs. Still others were stationed in an idle fleet and the civil police, the latter now centralized under Vichy as a military force with even the mayors excluded from authority over it.

Kasten has made rich use of German archives, which show, for example, that the Gestapo had personnel in the Paris embassy by 1937. Focusing on the military command in occupied Paris, he discusses neither Alsace and Lorraine, annexed by Germany, nor the northern departments, placed under the German military command in Belgium. The Germans could not have controlled France without local cooperation, Kasten notes. Their services were understaffed and many of their officials could not read French. Despite the occasional self-serving postwar claims of French collaborators that they had tried to serve French interests by exploiting divisions between Wehrmacht and SS authorities in France, there were no policy differences among the German occupation authorities. Rather, individual officials who had been brutalized by having served in the east tended to treat the French more harshly than did their confreres without such experience.

There is much of interest in Kasten's book. Feelings about the Germans on the part of the French police, as of the population generally, varied in time and space. The police collaborated more in Paris, Bordeaux, and Poitiers than in Orléans, Angers, Dijon, Nancy, and Châlons-sur-Marne where they were "correct" but more distant. In the south and in Brittany, the police were more confrontational. German intelligence, however, described the French as "apathetic and indifferent" (p. 105), although it favored England. Most important, the French did not want to get reinvolved in the war after 1940. The police generally reflected broader French attitudes. Even in 1944, the police, who, after all, had privileged and protected positions, did little to support the Liberation fighters. The police suffered little during the post-Liberation purges.

French police collaborated with the Germans in hunting down communists but were less willing to seek out Jews, although few were inclined to take risks on behalf of Jews. The police, however, kept a watchful eye on the collaborationist parties, which they viewed as enemies of France. As Kasten emphasizes in his title, the police were, to quote a German military

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command report, "gute Franzosen," whose patriotism had to be respected because the Germans needed their collaboration (p. 57). Indeed, the police as a microcosm of the French were so "good" in their "apathy and indifference" that, perhaps unselfconsciously, they lured the Germans into an unnecessary campaign and occupation in the West that diverted resources from their interests in Central and Eastern Europe, and may ultimately have cost them the war.

BERTRAM M. GORDON
Mills College

JAY A. LEVENSON, editor. *The Age of the Baroque in Portugal.* New Haven: Yale University Press or National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. 1994. Pp. 303; 140 plates. $60.00.

This volume was published to accompany an exhibition held at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., from November 1993 to February 1994. The gallery mounted the display in collaboration with the Portuguese secretary of state for culture.

The volume contains eleven essays. Those by historians A. J. R. Russell-Wood (on Portugal and the world) and Kenneth R. Maxwell (on eighteenth-century Portugal) are essentially syntheses of some of their major publications. Both provide authoritative sociopolitical context but little connection with the visual arts of the era. Similarly, essays by Angela Delaforce (on Portuguese relations with Rome), José Augusto França (on Pombaline Lisbon), and Simonetta Luz Afonso (on court festivities at Queluz) add contextual detail. Delaforce's carefully researched study acts as a needed bridge between contextual essays and chapters on baroque art per se. Those chapters include the work of Jennifer Montagu (on Italian sculpture), Hellmut Wohl (on architecture), Leonor d'Orey (on jewelry and silver table service), and Marco Fabio Apolloni (on lavishly decorated coaches).

The eleven essays are followed by a catalog of *azulejos* (Portuguese blue-and-white painted tiles), paintings, furniture, silverware, ceramics and porcelain, jewelry, scientific instruments, and sumptuous religious art, including a stunning Indian-made red silk dalmatic embroidered with gold and silver. A brief chronology of eighteenth-century Portugal and a helpful bibliography conclude the volume.

Various artistic traditions and communities contributed to the opulent brand of baroque that emerged in Portugal after 1700. As this book shows, the most important influences came from Italy, France, Portuguese India, and Portugal itself. Movement toward a distinctive Portuguese style can be seen in various artistic endeavors, but probably no more impressively than in the Italian-influenced architecture of northern Portugal. Well-known examples include the Casa de Mateus and the Church of the Clérigos, both the work of the Tuscan Nicolau Nasoni. As this volume also shows, the age of the baroque in Portugal saw a rather eclectic gathering of European and Asian styles and motifs. Little is said, however, about what inspiration came from Spain and China.

Repetitive passages (for example, discussions of the Mafra commission) and careless editing (see p. 29, for example) mar the book. Illustrations accompanying essays and in the catalog (nearly 200 in all) are often wonderfully reproduced and artfully presented, but not all catalog entries have plates. Entries 117, "Two Maces," and 118, "Two Trumpets," show only one of each. And entry 119, "Tabard," has no illustration.

This is a hybrid work, a combination of history, art history, and exhibition catalog. Taken together, the essays provide a valuable, if incomplete and disjointed, view of Portuguese art and its sociopolitical context. The chapters by Delaforce and Wohl anchor discussion of foreign influences and show how the baroque in Portugal varied from north to south. Better flow from essay to essay and greater textual coherence might have been achieved by changing the chapter order and by including an integrative introduction that also spoke to gaps in coverage inherent in collaborative works. Placing Maxwell's essay after Russell-Woods's and França's after that of Delaforce, for example, might have yielded better results.

Despite various editorial shortcomings, this volume contains much fine scholarship and illustrative material. It thus stands as a solid and attractive introduction to the history and visual arts of eighteenth-century Portugal.

CARL A. HANSON
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas

MARTINE GOOSSENS. *The Economic Development of Belgian Agriculture: A Regional Perspective, 1812–1846.* (Studies in Social and Economic History, number 24.) Leuven: Leuven University Press. 1993. Pp. 443. 2,200 F.

JAN BLOMME. *The Economic Development of Belgian Agriculture, 1880–1980: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis.* (Studies in Social and Economic History, number 25.) Leuven: Leuven University Press. 1993. Pp. 501. 2,500 F.

The first step in preparing histories of modern economic growth is to construct time series of inputs and outputs. On the quality of this tedious work, analogous to the preparation of *stemma* for works in manuscript, depends the reliability of the historical account. These two studies of Belgian agriculture are excellent examples of historical income accounting. The estimates are competently constructed from contemporary data and are subjected to a battery of tests to evaluate their robustness. They are definitive; as such, the two books are indispensable to any serious investigation of comparative economic performance in the modern era and deserve to be in every agricultural research library.

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General historians will be more interested in the overall interpretation than in the details of the statistical constructions that occupy most of both texts. Martine Goossens's interpretation is organized around a conventional Malthusian paradigm, according to which agricultural expansion was largely sustained by population growth. This hypothesis seems to be supported by her data, which indicate that over 60 percent of the growth in agricultural output between 1812 and 1846 is attributable to growth in the labor force; but this conclusion is in large part due to a probable overestimate of the share of product going to wages: an incredible 67 percent in the densely populated province of Antwerp, and 62 percent for Belgium as a whole. This is about 50 percent greater than similar estimates for Britain and France, where wages were significantly higher. Capital inputs are underestimated by the exclusion of buildings and land improvements. The effect of these statistical decisions is to understate the contribution of capital and improvements in methods of cultivation to the growth in output.

Jan Blomme's survey covers the century following 1880, so that the two studies give a complete statistical rendering of Belgian agriculture with the exception of a forty-year hiatus, which one hopes will soon be closed. Blomme's estimates are expertly executed and well explained. As with Goossens's exercise in growth accounting, however, the estimates of labor productivity and, *a fortiori*, total factor productivity, are questionable. By computing the total days of labor input from technical input coefficients, Blomme renders circular the ensuing exercise in growth accounting; productivity estimates are in effect employed to make other productivity estimates. Like Goossens, Blomme does not count the agricultural capital embodied in buildings and improvements to land, the returns to which are imputed to land.

The summary productivity statistics that emerge from these present exercises are much what one would expect: slow productivity growth in the first half of the century (.17 percent per year), moderate growth from 1880 to 1950 (.40 percent), and astonishing growth since 1950 (3.07 percent). It is clear that by any standard the true agricultural revolution occurred after World War II. The earlier processes of agricultural change were to a large extent endogenous to movements in market opportunity for farmers. These determined the intensity of cultivation and the profitability of employing such intermediate inputs as could be obtained from nearby towns and industrial enterprises. The estimated rates of productivity growth for Belgium are significantly below those that have been calculated for nineteenth-century France and Britain. Because there can be no question of a technological lag—Belgium was then considered a leader in agricultural techniques—the reason for Belgium's relatively modest performance must either lie in some difference of economic environment or in the exhaustion of the possibilities for growth within the limits of pre–twentieth-century technology. Both factors may have been operating. Closer attention to Belgium's place in the evolving European economy over the century and three-quarters covered by these studies would provide a more adequate account of the reasons why the adjustments of Belgium's farmers to their economy produced so little sustained productivity growth before 1950. This would be, of course, another book. It is possible to conceive only because of the foundations laid by this excellent pair of studies.

GEORGE GRANTHAM
McGill University

MARTIN CONWAY. *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940–1944.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 364. $35.00.

The twin phenomena of resistance and collaboration were characteristic of responses to German occupation during World War II. In Belgium, wartime opposition and collaboration were made more complex by the existence of two competing language communities.

Martin Conway examines the francophone Rex Movement and its leader Léon Degrelle as an example of the wider history of collaboration in occupied Europe. Founded and led by the charismatic Degrelle, Rex is viewed by Conway as remaining in the 1930s well within the consensus of conservative Catholic opinion and within the framework of widespread discontent with liberalism and parliamentary democracy. After the first few months of the occupation, however, the personal ambition of Degrelle to gain power in Belgium with German support entrapped Rex in a policy of unconditional collaboration. With the invasion of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of the "Crusade against Bolshevism," Degrelle sought to advance his quest for power through the creation of a military formation, the *Légion wallonnie*, serving first in the German Army, and later in the *Waffen-SS*. By 1944, Degrelle's pursuit of German patronage induced Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler to recognize Rex as the "official" francophone New Order organization in Belgium. This achievement turned out to be a hollow victory because Degrelle's subservience to Nazi Germany had cost Rex the support of all but a tiny minority. Indeed, by 1944 Rexists had become the primary target of resistance violence and assassination.

Conway is insightful in his description of the milieu and ambience of prewar and wartime Rex. He rightly emphasizes the extent to which Rex became primarily the instrument of the personal ambitions of an unscrupulous and manipulative leader. Conway draws incisive portraits of Degrelle and other leaders of the movement. In his description of francophone sentiment he makes excellent use of Belgian and German

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sources, including documentation from postwar judicial proceedings that has long been unavailable to researchers.

He is somewhat less sure-footed in dealing with the complexities of the German power structure. He sometimes falls victim to making oversimplified categorical statements (such as the claim that the military commander, Alexander von Falkenhausen, was only a figurehead, or that Hitler, in 1940 or later, was only interested in the economic exploitation of Belgium). Neither has Conway avoided paying a price for his basic design of focusing almost exclusively on francophone collaboration without paying much attention to the impact of Flemish collaboration with German policies and of francophone attitudes.

In his conclusion, Conway emphasizes the point that Rex left no postwar political legacy. He suggests that the history of Rex shows that the general phenomenon of collaboration has been overblown in postwar memory, but in doing so he disregards the impact of Flemish nationalism represented by the collaborationist Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (V.N.V.), which experienced a strong postwar revival and which has led to the creation of a federalized Belgian state with an uncertain future. Moreover, not all readers share Conway's optimism that current xenophobic right-wing nationalism in Belgium and elsewhere is a phenomenon without ties to a fascist past and without a future.

These reservations, however, are marginal to the central subject of the book. For a study of the wartime Rex movement and of Degrelle, Conway's work can serve as a reliable and sophisticated basis, and its bibliography as a useful guide to further research.

WERNER WARMBRUNN
Pitzer College

RICHARD L. GAWTHROP. *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 305. $54.95.

For historians of Germany in the West, one casualty of the Cold War was Prussian history. Owing to the relative inaccessibility of archives in the former East Germany, our understanding of Prussia's rise to great-power status in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has advanced little beyond the earlier work of scholars like Hans Rosenberg and F. L. Carsten. Now that reunification has eased access to libraries and archives in eastern Germany, however, Prussian history could well become the next growth industry in German historical scholarship.

Yet it is precisely the new opportunities facing students of Prussian history that make Richard L. Gawthrop's book a disappointment. His basic argument is plausible enough. For all the emphasis historians have placed on the reign of the Great Elector (1640–88) in the making of the Hohenzollern monarchy, Prussia at the beginning of the eighteenth century was in qualitative terms little more powerful than neighboring German states such as Saxony or Bavaria. It remained a relatively "premodern," post-Reformation *Fürstenstaat* limited in its ability to mobilize the resources of its territory and subjects. What, then, catapulted Prussia to political preeminence? For Gawthrop the answer lies in what he calls a "hitherto underestimated cultural factor" (p. xi), namely Prussian Pietism, which he sees as developing into a state ideology during the reign of Frederick William I (1713–40). In partnership with the Hohenzollern king, Pietist-inspired reformers and institutions served to inculcate at all levels of society the virtues of work-discipline, obedience, and devotion to duty. In the process they helped lay the cultural foundations for Prussia's political, economic, and military strength.

The problem here is not that Gawthrop is wrong, but simply that most of his arguments have been advanced by earlier scholars. The Prussian state did change dramatically during the reign of Frederick William I, who doubled the size of its army, significantly expanded its tax base, and developed a much more elaborate administrative infrastructure than that of his predecessors. But historians since Otto Hintze have emphasized the achievements of Frederick William I, and Gawthrop's exclusive reliance on published sources adds relatively little to their story. His interpretation remains very much within the older "reform from above" model, and, without further primary research, Gawthrop's assertion that Pietism represented a "cultural revolution" (as opposed to simply a cultural program) remains an unproven hypothesis. One might well argue that what contributed most to the consolidation of the Prussian state between 1713 and 1740 was not Pietism but a period of peace resulting from the rapid decline of Sweden and Poland, Prussia's traditional Baltic rivals, and the foiling of French expansionist designs in the empire.

This is not to deny the importance of Pietism, but it is far from the neglected subject Gawthrop makes it out to be. Koppel Pinson argued for the cultural and political significance of Pietism more than sixty years ago in his *Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism* (1934), and, as Gawthrop himself acknowledges, Carl Hinrichs's pathbreaking *Preussentum und Pietismus* (1971) made a convincing case for the movement's importance in Prussian history. Scholars since Hinrichs, including Mary Fulbrook, Anthony J. La Vopa, and myself, have all pointed in various ways to the historical significance of Prussian Pietism. None of these studies drew on the Pietist archives of the Francke Foundation in Halle, now fully accessible in the wake of reunification, and Gawthrop might have made a real contribution by drawing on these and other archival sources. As it stands, much remains to be said about the impact of Pietism on Prussian society, and doing the theme

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justice will require a study that goes well beyond the sources and methods employed in this book.

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KARL-PETER ELLERBROCK. *Geschichte der deutschen Nahrungs- und Genussmittelindustrie 1750–1914.* (Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Beiheft, number 76.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1993. Pp. 477. DM 128.

In recent years economic historians in England, France, and the United States have called attention to the critical role food processing played in the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In terms of capital investment, turnover, and technological innovation, that industry is being seen, increasingly, as one of the key sectors supporting what W. W. Rostow called the "take-off" into sustained, accelerating economic growth. Thus, it comes as a surprise to find that the rise of food products manufacturing in Germany has never been studied in a comprehensive way. Karl-Peter Ellerbrock, drawing on just about all the sources available, seeks to fill this gap.

The author begins by examining the provision of food supplies—demand, distribution, and consumption—within the framework of eighteenth-century crafts regulation in the March of Brandenburg. As he demonstrates, absolutist and mercantilist restrictions remained a major cause of economic and technological stagnation in the food-processing industry until a more liberal trade policy began to take shape in the late eighteenth century. A second phase (1800–70) saw the beginning of the changeover from "craft" to "industrial" production and organization, a process gathering strength in the 1850s and 1860s. Finally, Ellenbrock identifies a third phase (1870–1914) in which industrial food processing came, at last, to prevail. As measured by amount, structure and profitability of capital investments, form and size of enterprise, technical standards, and location and regional spread, the transformation was, however, gradual through both phases and thus confutes conventional notions of a "breakthrough." Augmented by both unitary and global analyses of ten representative food-processing lines, the data also serve to illuminate the development of the industry and its relationship to aggregate production and distribution, technological and organizational innovation, changing consumption patterns, agricultural production, and economic and fiscal policy in the Reich.

This is an extraordinarily comprehensive treatment well attuned to the current debate over the "New Institutional Economics." More to the point, however, it broadens significantly our understanding of the process of economic development in Germany as it has been analyzed in so many studies concentrating on the coal, iron and steel, textile, electrical, chemical, railroad, and banking industries. It is clear now that the "food and luxury foods industry," to use Ellenbrock's term, played a leading role among the manufacturing sectors that shaped and promoted Germany's industrialization. And this, in turn, suggests a reevaluation of Walther Hoffmann's stage model that sees food processing as initiating industrialization but subsequently trailing the growth of the overall economy. It is a model, says Ellenbrock, based on a "superficial and undifferentiated evaluation of limited statistical sources" (p. 426), its methodology is imprecise, and its conclusions are untenable. Instead, the author urges renewed attention to economic regions and sectors to amend and correct current theories based on highly aggregated macroeconomic data. The point is well taken, persuasively argued, and impressively supported by nearly 200 charts and tables and an exhaustive bibliography. Inexplicably, though, there is no index.

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WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN. *Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik: Die Aussenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914.* (Propyläen-Studienausgabe.) Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein. 1993. Pp. 360. DM 49.90.

This solidly researched and comprehensive study of Germany's decline and fall from Bismarckian half-hegemony in 1871 to near-isolation and insecurity in 1914 offers no surprises, but the many insights and sound judgments it contains make it a valuable contribution. Having reviewed Bismarck's policies and generally defended them as representing a coherent strategy rather than a series of stop-gap measures, Wolfgang J. Mommsen depicts Wilhelmian *Weltpolitik* as unrealistic, inconsistent, needlessly provocative, and riddled with ultimately fatal miscalculations. Yet while severely criticizing many individual policies and leaders, he emphasizes that behind them lay the superheated nationalism promoted by various parties, press, and extra-party mass organizations and permeating the middle class, especially its educated leaders.

This broad portrait of German foreign policy and decision making is generally convincing, especially because it is calmly stated and carefully nuanced, with some common accusations against Germany rejected. I have no serious grounds for complaint about coverage, emphases, and interpretations of the facts, although over the latter, as always, questions could be raised. For example, Anglo-German relations are stressed to the relative neglect of Franco-German, Russo-German, and Austro-German ones, and the brief treatments necessarily given other states' policies leads to some omissions and misleading impressions (for example, on Franco-German relations from 1911 to 1914, the origins of the Bosnian crisis and the Balkan Wars, Russian and Austrian "imperialism" in the Balkans, and so on). A serious question arises only if this general interpretation of German policy, now

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fairly standard in Germany and elsewhere, is taken also to explain the breakdown of the system and the origins of the war.

Such is true here, for Mommsen's case against Germany's hardliners involves his frequent suggestion (although not systematic argument) that Germany could have avoided disaster and achieved success by the means often proposed by moderates: a slow, quiet pursuit of world position, seeking rapprochement and partnership with Great Britain in small, unprovocative steps. To make this belief plausible, however, not only must one explain this policy's actual failure each time it was tried—and deal seriously with those aspects of British, French, Russian, Italian, and even Austrian policy directed toward insuring its failure—but also show how such a policy could have succeeded in the face of the systemic international practices, norms, and principles of this era. This would seem an insuperable obstacle. The outstanding fact of international history in the period 1890–1914 is that virtually every great power in the world, along with lesser ones, resorted to armed aggression to achieve its goals, and in every instance, unless defeated by armed force, profited by it. Only two great powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, refrained from using force, or were deterred from it, and they lost.

Thus, Germany's hardliners deserve almost everything Mommsen says about them. One point, unfortunately, must be conceded: their understanding of the prewar international system as a ruthless zero-sum contest rewarding successful aggression and penalizing moderation, which no single power or side could change and which a Germany unwilling to risk war at a favorable moment could not win, was basically correct. Mommsen himself seems at times to approach this insight (see, for example, pp. 312–14, 319), only to return to his criticism of German miscalculations.

This does not vindicate the hardliners or exculpate Germany and make its enemies responsible for disaster. It does challenge the notion that the moderate course was a viable alternative and emphasizes the need for systemic explanation of a systemic breakdown and general war. Mommsen's analysis, although legitimate and valuable as well as illuminating on many aspects of Germany's foreign policy and general history in this era, cannot provide that.

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John Moncure. *Forging the King's Sword: Military Education between Tradition and Modernization; The Case of the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps, 1871–1918.* (American University Studies, series 9: History, number 132.) New York: Peter Lang. 1993. Pp. viii, 323.

Why is the education of military officers an important topic of historical research? In October 1919, after they returned from the Versailles Peace Conference, Max Weber wrote Hans Delbrück suggesting they collaborate to create a new university research institute. Military history had to be studied anew "from the ground up." Weber soon died, Delbrück retired, and the study of the military "from the ground up" had to wait. Sixty years later, Martin van Creveld's *Fighting Power* (1982) and Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness* (3 vols., 1988) gave German armies in World War I and World War II high marks for combat efficiency. Part of the explanation lies in their educational systems.

John Moncure describes the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps, 1871–1920, an organization of nine schools (by 1914) for boys ages ten to eighteen that supplied roughly one-third of Prussian army officers. Founded in 1717 to educate sons of officers, by the 1850s, when there were 900 cadets, the school was opened up to all whose fathers had served the state as non-commissioned officers, or temporary officers. A few years later the father's profession was dropped as a mandatory criterion, although it remained important, especially in determining who paid and how much. Various categories of officers' sons—those whose fathers had died on active duty, were still on active duty, or had twenty-five years of service—paid very little. In contrast, more than 50 percent of the students paid full tuition, roughly 800 marks a year in 1914. By 1900, the eight lower schools each had roughly 200 boys in their five grades, the higher school about 1,000 in four grades. By 1914, roughly two-thirds of students were from non-noble families. Most graduates served in a regiment as officer candidates, graduated from a ten-month-long war school, and became officers on regimental election. From each higher school class the excellent were chosen for a special two-year (the *Prima*) and the outstanding for a special one-year program (the *Selekta*). Each of these resulted in more rapid commissioning and better initial assignment.

As Moncure amply demonstrates, these schools were not, strictly speaking, military schools. In terms of admissions, faculty, curriculum, and the final or ensign examination, they were military-sponsored but civilian-run equivalents of the *Realschule* and *Realgymnasium*. Ten year olds were examined in reading and writing German and Latin and in mathematics. They were given a physical examination, their maturity was assessed, and their family background was examined. Rates of acceptance varied between 40 percent and 75 percent, depending on the applicant pool. Moncure concludes that entrance standards paralleled those of German civilian schools. Teachers were civilians, most with doctorates, many of whom published books and articles. The handful of military officers on staff taught only French or English. The curriculum, set by the Higher Military Education Commission, was civilian, not military, and, by the 1880s, it was very compatible with the *Realschule* and *Realgymnasium*. Students studied German, English, and French and

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took a lot of mathematics, physics, and chemistry. No purely military subjects were taught until the *Selekta* year, which educated only a fraction of the cadets. The author concludes that "military instruction formed an insignificant part of the education and training at the cadet schools" (p. 212). At the close of seven years all cadets took the ensign examination. Given in Berlin by civilian examiners under the aegis of the Higher Military Examination Commission, it consisted of twenty-eight hours of written exams, many essay type—including translations from Latin and French and questions on German literature—followed by a one-hour oral examination. As for discipline, although throughout their school years cadets received "very close and careful monitoring," Emory Upton, commandant of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, noted in 1876 that discipline was "so mild as to give the cadets but little idea of the stern duties required of a soldier" (p. 189). In sum, the author concludes that the "facilities for education were superb" (p. 152).

He goes on, however, to say that these facilities "were ill-used to promote academic excellence" (p. 152); that "the evolution of the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps from a tiny group of pampered Junker sons to a complex hierarchy of pan-German military schools would have pleased Heinrich von Treitzschke" (*sic*) (p. 55); and that "whatever qualities the faculty had, their skills were hampered by the militaristic nature of the institutions" (p. 158). The problem is that there are insufficient examples to support these sweeping, negative conclusions. In fact, the reader is stunned to find them. The main examples in the book support van Creveld's conclusions in *The Training of Officers* (1990) that Prussian military education prior to 1914 was essentially first rate when measured by the results obtained.

Beyond this serious problem, there are weaknesses in organization, quantification, and contextualization. The reader must work hard to make sense of all this material. In spite of a game attempt to quantify the 11,000 graduates, the tables do not always work. For example, after describing nineteen prominent families of 380 higher school graduates, Moncure does not really get much closer to the family origins of all cadet school students than to conclude that "the eleven thousand cadets included in this study came from a much smaller number of families" (p. 73). The author tends to take all his sources equally seriously. He argues that Kaiser Wilhelm II's personal supervision and involvement in cadet life was consistent and important. Most historians are skeptical of Wilhelm's "work life" as monarch, following Admiral Alexander von Müller's remark in 1914 that the country had not had a working monarch in twenty-five years. We must await the second volume of John Röhl's magisterial biography of Wilhelm II to be sure on this point.

In spite of these reservations, this is a solid building block for an important topic. It is an enormously industrious book, painstakingly researched using primary sources from German archives as well as interviews with former cadets. The book is supplemented by photographs of school buildings and student activities and is handsomely produced. Used carefully, along with Steven Clemente's *For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860–1914* (1992), which has three chapters devoted to the cadet corps, gradually military education in some of the pre–1914 German states is becoming clear. Still needed is work on the Bavarian army, for which the War Archive in Munich has rich holdings—the printed catalog for its general staff materials alone runs more than 230 pages—and much more work on the NCOs and soldiers of the Prussian army. This research should focus on education, training, and conditions of service such as remuneration, benefits, and pensions, all in comparison to standards in civil society for men from similar social and economic milieus. More than forty tons of documents captured in World War II, recently returned to Germany from former Soviet archives and integrated into the reorganized Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv system, might contain some surprises for post–Cold War historians along the lines of Moncure. It is time to replace "Militarism," the sin assigned to the Imperial German Army for most of this century, with something more specific and nuanced. Military education may be one way to accomplish this.

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LOTHAR HÖBELT. *Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882–1918.* Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik or R. Oldenbourg, Munich. 1993. Pp. 387. S 496.

In the late Habsburg empire, the liberal faction in parliament was divided against itself in nearly every way imaginable. Its leaders squabbled with one another; it was split by nationality, social class, confession, and ideology. Lothar Höbelt has written a magisterial work illuminating one branch of this highly complex, diverse, and hitherto sadly neglected part of the Habsburg body politic. One of the strengths of Höbelt's work is that it successfully sorts through the diverse blocs within the Austrian liberal movement, which was represented in the last half-century of the monarchy by a confusing tangle of different parties.

Although he successfully leads the reader through the Byzantine internal politics of the liberals, Höbelt also diverges from established opinion about the state of the liberals' fortunes at the turn of the century. It has often been argued that by then the German liberals were in decline, brought down by infighting and the rise of new, more dynamic ideologies such as social democracy and Christian socialism. Höbelt persuasively argues that, far from being swept aside,

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the liberals continued to play a vital role in Cislithania. Their internal divisions were never so complete, nor their decline so precipitous, as other historians (including Carl Schorske) have maintained.

In emphasizing the continuity in liberal politics, Höbelt does not deny the existence of a "paradigm shift" (p. 22) in the Austrian "Left." After having won the establishment of constitutional government, liberals found they had new competitors for power. The rise of social democracy and Christian socialism was accompanied by the loss of the German majority in parliament, the shift from the "politics of principle to interest-group politics" after 1873, and the extension of the franchise. Taken together, these factors helped shift the balance of power within the German liberal movement farther to the left. The right wing of the movement (loyalist and upper middle class) gave way to its left wing (oppositionist and middle class). In short, the center of gravity shifted from liberal to German nationalist, but not dramatically so. The shift took place without much of a change in personnel. Indeed, it can be traced within the careers of individual politicians such as Carl Beurle and Adolf Glöckner as they switched from one *freiheitliche* party to another. In addition, in many localities the shift was only marginally successful, with traditional liberals continuing to hold sway until the end of the empire.

One victim of Austrian liberalism's paradigm shift was civil political discourse. Höbelt claims that the new radical rhetoric served a specific political function in helping to define what made the new politics new. Unfortunately, he concedes, its practitioners were wont to forget how to differentiate between ends and means, between rhetoric and reality. The politics of the "radical phrase" (p. 359) did little to make the German nationalists of the day more effective as legislators; indeed it did much to contribute to the ill repute in which parliament was held at the outbreak of World War I. This stridency has its best representative in contemporary Austrian politics in Jörg Haider, who is often deliberately provocative in order to draw a clear line between himself and the ruling coalition. One has to wonder whether such stridency is any more conducive to effective governance today than it was at the end of the last century.

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John McCole. *Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 329. Cloth $43.95, paper $18.95.

To those with a strong interest in Walter Benjamin, it is no news that there has been a wealth of outstanding work published on him during the past fifteen years. Because there are now, in fact, so many fine studies of Benjamin, one might think that there could not possibly be anything more to say about him. To draw this conclusion, however, would be a mistake, for John McCole has managed to write a superb and original work on Benjamin, one that will take its place among the best studies on Benjamin available in any language.

McCole's book is part intellectual biography, part *explication de texte* (some of Benjamin's key works are interpreted with fresh insight), and part intellectual history (Benjamin's relation to what McCole calls the "force field" of his age is nicely illuminated). By drawing not only on Benjamin's main works but also on many notes, sketches, and unpublished essays frequently neglected by other commentators, McCole is able to shed new light on Benjamin's thought and overall development. For example, one learns much from McCole regarding Benjamin's involvement in the German Youth Movement before 1914 and the reasons for his eventual break with it. One likewise gains from McCole a clear picture of the issues Benjamin dealt with both in his immanent critique of early German Romanticism (the subject of his dissertation on Friedrich Schlegel) and in his pivotal 1920s *Trauerspiel* study which he had initially planned to submit as his *Habilitationsschrift.* And perhaps even more importantly, one achieves, thanks to McCole's thorough treatment, new understandings with respect to Benjamin's relation to movements as different from one another as Weimar modernism and twentieth-century German neoconservatism—and also to individuals as different from one another as Marcel Proust and Martin Buber, Bertolt Brecht and Ludwig Klages.

According to McCole, it is not enough to notice, as many have, only that side of Benjamin's thought that stresses the need to rescue and redeem the past; there is also, he insists, a "liquidationist" side to Benjamin's work, a side that, in his opinion, other commentators have seen but not developed adequately. For Benjamin, the urge to liquidate (even to liquidate the whole of past culture and yet, in Benjamin's words, "survive [without it] if need be" [p. 2]) and the urge to rescue are intertwined, because only by destroying the past in its inherited form as "legacy" or "tradition" can it truly be saved and then effectively utilized in the present.

In McCole's view, Benjamin's work is alive with antinomies, but antinomies that lean on and require one another. In fact, for McCole, the numerous tensions and oppositions in Benjamin are not the result of confused thinking but are part of a concerted intellectual strategy designed to produce a coherent and unified whole which is easily missed if the destructive aspects of Benjamin's thought are not given as much attention as the redemptive aspects. Hence, it is important for McCole to point out that Benjamin both laments the poverty of experience in modern life, and affirms it; that he bemoans the loss of "aura" in things (because it carries valuable historical meanings) but at the same time celebrates this loss (because an aura can also mystify); and finally, that he, like the conservative critics of his time,

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mourns the demise of traditional culture, but, like the radicals of his age, simultaneously regards this demise as a gain, because it opens the way to new possibilities for the future.

McCole's book is a fine addition to the already impressive body of work on Benjamin. McCole gives us an ambitious and convincing interpretation of Benjamin, but one that for the most part augments and deepens rather than fundamentally challenges existing assessments of this very complex but appealing German thinker.

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MANFRED OVERESCH. *Hermann Brill in Thüringen 1895–1946: Ein Kämpfer gegen Hitler und Ulbricht.* (Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Reihe: Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, number 29.) Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz. 1992. Pp. 422. DM 75.

Hermann Brill, a Social Democrat who died in 1959, is not exactly a household name in Germany, much less elsewhere. Manfred Overesch thinks, rightly, that Brill deserves to be rescued from the threat of historical oblivion. Brill's life unfolds as a dramatic morality tale, the saga of a "good German" who proceeds from the battlefields of World War I to the struggle for democracy and social reform in the Weimar Republic to active resistance against, and persecution by, the Third Reich and, finally, to the postwar effort to purge perpetrators, reward resisters, and unite German workers in an all-encompassing labor party.

The biographer's second and main goal arises from this last point. Overesch wants to tell the story of Brill's relations with Social Democracy's great competitor, the Communist Party (KPD). What slight historical reputation Brill enjoys has been tarnished by Communist historians. They denounced him as an "informer" and "Right Social Democrat" because in 1923 he helped thwart a KPD putsch in Thuringia and in 1946 opposed the consolidation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and KPD into the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the Soviet zone of occupation. Drawing on documents now accessible in former East German archives, Overesch proves that Brill was, in fact, a leftist socialist, a maverick who criticized the SPD from within and left it in 1918 and in 1933, when, in Brill's view, it betrayed the proletariat.

Overesch carefully traces the complex maneuvering that took place during the "German October" of 1923. He focuses so precisely, however, on Brill's negotiations with the Reichswehr, as opposed to the activities of the SPD as a whole, that one loses sight of the ideological and popular context in which Brill operated. In contrast, Communist machinations are covered extensively. A similar lack of balance detracts from the discussion of Brill's ideological development and organizational work before and during his imprisonment in Buchenwald (1939–45). Although Brill was estranged from Social Democracy throughout the Third Reich, his ideas about leadership and social change evolved analogously to those of other critical (but "Rightist") Social Democrats. Overesch neither explains Brill's "revisionism" nor places it within the Social Democratic spectrum. True to the mission of the book, he emphasizes, instead, that Brill continually championed cooperation between Communist and other left-wing antifascist resisters.

The most riveting section of the book recounts Brill's opposition to the formation of the SED. Overesch appraises the views and actions not only of Brill and the Communists but also of Otto Grotewohl and Brill's Thuringian Social Democratic opponents. Especially tantalizing are the glimpses we get of worsening relations between Social Democrats and Communists at the grass-roots level.

Overesch does not slight other aspects of Brill's professional and political activities. Indeed, they are considered in some detail. His discussion of Brill's contribution to efforts to democratize and secularize Thuringia's school system in the 1920s will interest historians of German education reform. The treatment of Brill's brief but productive tenure as acting premier of Thuringia in 1945 brings much new material to light. Appointed by the American commander before authority passed to the Soviets in July 1945, Brill promulgated stringent guidelines for denazification and reconstruction of the civil service and police.

Overall, Overesch's book is distinguished more by a sense of purpose than a set of theses. It is an honest and thorough biography of an unusual, almost forgotten, but significant political activist.

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ALAN E. STEINWEIS. *Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993. Pp. x, 233. $34.95.

National Socialist leaders were determined to create an idealized world of wholeness out of the chaos that characterized the twentieth century. As a result, they attempted to integrate the arts with politics so that fascist aesthetics might suffuse the authoritarian, racially unified state in the divine illumination of eternal beauty. Weimar Germany was seen to celebrate degeneracy, class struggle, and urban confusion, while denigrating the values of eternal beauty, noble character, and the wholesomeness of family. Modernism—the alleged Jewish assault on all that was of true value—had to be mercilessly rooted out in all its forms, making way for the unchanging qualities of eternity. Adolf Hitler made it his life's goal to create an integrated mythical world, and he was motivated by both political and personal considerations.

Alan E. Steinweis has written a commendable book, in which he focuses on the economic, social, and

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professional components of three divisions of the *Reichskulturkammer*: theater, music, and the visual arts. The result is a major contribution to our understanding of the practical dimension involved in the formation of Nazi aesthetics, offering far more than one would expect in a revised dissertation dealing with cultural and artistic policy.

Laying waste the myth of centralized artistic control in the Third Reich, the author demonstrates rather that in the Byzantine world of culture, Joseph Goebbels had many competitors and was forced to deal not only with Alfred Rosenberg but also with Heinrich Himmler and Bernhard Rust, among others. It was Goebbels's practice to manipulate professional organizations that existed in the Weimar era, and to use them for the controlling of culture. The result was that great numbers of artists not only cooperated with the regime but also collaborated enthusiastically, most notably the musician Gustav Havemann, the antimodernist architect Eugen Hönig, and Otto Laubinger and Benno von Arent from the theater community. *Gleichschaltung* became the order of the day, and Steinweis demonstrates how the *Kulturkammer* underwent a "metamorphosis from a fairly loose confederation of nazified associations into a more highly centralized organ of the state" (p. 58). His survey stretches from the 1920s to 1945, and successive chapters deal with the professional context, the creation and evolution of the chamber system, the patronage network, the Aryanization of the artistic community, and the mobilization of artists in World War II.

Several vignettes of key individuals involved in the work of the chambers are both descriptive and colorful. Above all, we learn more about Goebbels and the artistic community, especially about the transition the minister underwent in his attitude toward leading expressionist artists and sculptors. The ambitious intriguer, Hans Hinkel, emerged as a highly effective administrator of the day-to-day affairs of the *Kulturkammer*, and he easily outmaneuvered the pedantic Franz Moraller and the legal expert Hans Schmidt-Leonhardt. Ultimately appointed an SS Gruppenführer, Hinkel was most useful to Goebbels in removing Jews from the artistic community in the period of centralization after 1935. As *Reichstheaterdramaturg* and head of the theater section of the propaganda ministry, Rainer Schlösser joined an intellect sensitive to the classics with a ruthlessness in making way for the new order.

Steinweis submits that the net effect of the changes for artists in the Third Reich was "prosperity amid hardship" (p. 94). There was less censorship than self-censorship, and professional advances were made in many areas. The regime provided work, expanded the social insurance system, and realigned the marketplace. Drama flourished, as subsidies to theaters rose 350 percent in the era, and many new theaters were opened. Government commissions were offered to artists, architects, and musicians. Youth was exposed to the arts in great numbers. But a high price was paid for these accomplishments, and Goebbels would be able to gloat that "There is no Jew active in the cultural life of our people" (p. 111).

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Kristie Macrakis. *Surviving the Swastika: Scientific Research in Nazi Germany.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 280. $39.95.

For nearly a century, the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft and its successor organization, the Max Planck Gesellschaft, have been at the forefront of German science. Kristie Macrakis traces the history of the society from its origins prior to World War I through the turbulent years of the Nazi period. Her thesis is that a great deal of "high-quality" scientific research survived the swastika; Nazi Germany was not a "scientific wasteland."

The emphasis on continuity is a by-now familiar aspect of Nazi science historiography. The strength of Macrakis's account lies in the insights she offers into the institutional history of science at this time in areas such as virology, hormonal research, fission research, and radiation genetics. Macrakis reassesses Max Planck's meeting with Adolf Hitler in 1933 and the Fritz Haber memorial ceremony of 1935, and she notes the occasional derision of the society as a "playground for Catholics, Socialists, and Jews." (Philipp Lenard, the notorious champion of *Deutsche Physik*, once characterized the society as a "Jewish monstrosity" and argued for its abolition.) The mobilization of scientists for the war is well described, as are the society's plans to exploit Soviet and European scientific resources after the anticipated German victory and postwar debates over how to reconstitute the society.

The are a few minor errors: the T 4 euthanasia program is mischaracterized, for example, and it is surely an oversimplification to say, as Macrakis does, that by 1942 Nazi leaders recognized that their policies toward Jewish scientists had been "a mistake." Hermann Göring worried that a few successful scientists with Jewish wives should probably not have been fired, but there is little evidence that the regret went very deep. One might also quarrel with her exculpation of Max Planck, director of the society since 1930. Macrakis argues that it "made more sense" for Planck to cooperate with Nazi authorities than to resist openly. This may be true if by "making sense" one means taking steps to ensure that research continues smoothly, but surely there are stronger moral grounds on which one can question Planck's readiness to collaborate. Relevant secondary works are sometimes left unacknowledged, but the book is generally well researched and documented, always with an eye to tying changes in science and science administration to larger political, military, and social struggles.

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Macrakis's thesis that the society "thrived both institutionally and in its scientific research" (p. 5) is supported by the fact that its research budget doubled in the first six years of the Third Reich. The point that the society "maintained much of its autonomy" (p. 6) is a tricky one, however, since it is not always clear what autonomy means in this context. Macrakis rightly cautions that it is wrong to believe that science is the unwavering enemy of totalitarianism. But what needs to be problematized, however, is whether autonomy is a guarantor of virtue in such situations. Macrakis sometimes seems to attribute support for "good science" to the absence of ideology: but she and others have given us reason to believe that "good science" was sometimes supported in the name of "bad" ideology. We know that Nazi ideology gave a spur to aeronautics and to midwifery, to herbal cures and cancer genetics, but we also need to ask what kind of moral responsibility scholars should have displayed in such circumstances, however much freedom they may have enjoyed to pursue their research. Survival, after all, is not always a moral virtue.

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KONRAD H. JARAUSCH. *The Rush to German Unity.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1994. Pp. xvii, 280. Cloth $35.00, paper $14.95.

As we have learned to expect from Konrad H. Jarausch, this book makes another critical contribution to a *sujet du jour* in German history. Like his pioneering works on the war-guilt debate (his book on Bethmann Hollweg), quantitative history, the professions, and the new cultural history, this book will stand for some time as an indispensable foundation on the newest quasi-revolution in Germany. Naturally, a study on such recent events cannot be the last word, as Jarausch acknowledges in his many calls for further study. The importance of this book is first and foremost its clear and comprehensive narration of the main events, reactions, and first interpretations. One can only marvel at the diligence and speed with which he scoured the available sources. Equally impressive is the remarkably even-handed, empathetic, yet sensibly detached evaluation of the protagonists and critics of unification.

But Jarausch moves beyond this spadework and suggests, in several excellent chapter conclusions, contours of an anatomy of this quasi-revolution. Underlying this anatomy are two assumptions. First, the "rush to German unity" was an evolving process with its own dynamic of unplanned and unpredictable changes, which led to several, strikingly distinct stages. Second, this process differed essentially from earlier revolutions, because it reflected a post-totalitarian reality.

He identifies four stages of the unification process. The first, "quasi-revolutionary" period created political space for a "unity from below" through factors classic for prerevolutionary periods, namely economic deterioration following a period of rising expectations and splits among the ruling elites under the aging Erich Honecker. The typical growth of opposition, however, was, in the East German case, overshadowed by mass escapes, far more threatening for a modern dictatorship. Jarausch identifies the second phase, the "civic revolution," as the critical, defining phase because it was carried, in contrast to past revolutions, by a citizen movement (*Bürgerbewegung*). This stage reached its peak with the "Round Table" that, in cooperation with the Communist reform government, still hoped to rebuild East Germany as a model for a democratic socialist "Third Way." But the reformers were soon pushed aside by a "national revolution," when the masses, who yearned for material improvement and naturally identified with national unity, began dominating the demonstrations and voted for Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Western prosperity in March 1990. The fourth and final phase, which began with the actual "rush to unity," closely managed by Kohl, has been marked by a major and still ongoing "social revolution" in the east, driven by the new political and economic realities of West German accession.

Jarausch's sense of balance lets him harmonize the most acrimonious political claims and counterclaims that have followed unification. Thus, he credits both Konrad Adenauer's policy of strength and the Willy Brandt/Helmut Schmidt detente with laying critical foundations for unification. He shows more sympathy for the varying forms of collaboration by most East German intellectuals than their West German critics have done in the so-called *Literaturstreit.* He rightly rejects the assertion, long popular on the Left, that Kohl drove East and West Germans mercilessly toward unification for his own political gain, without denying Kohl's political savvy in the critical elections. In the end, most readers will endorse Jarausch's three essential conclusions that "shared history made reunification a logical course" (p. 203), that "twice burnt by bids for hegemony, a democratic and satiated Federal Republic is likely to exercise its power more prudently than in the past" (p. 210), and, finally, that this reuniting process, like Otto von Bismarck's unification, will be a complex, often difficult and painful one, demonstrated not least by the terrifying radical Right terror on the political margins of the new "Berlin Republic."

DIETHELM PROWE
Carleton College

JAN HERMAN BRINKS. *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Luther, Friedrich II und Bismarck als Paradigmen politischen Wandels.* (Campus Forschung, number 685.) New York: Campus. 1992. Pp. vii, 342. DM 68.

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Among those least surprised by the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany was the author of this valuable study. As a result of an extensive series of interviews and a thorough examination of historical writing in the then German Democratic Republic (DDR), Jan Herman Brinks had previously concluded that East German historians were helping to pave the road to national unity. He arrived at this view despite the fact that their conscious intent was to strengthen the communist regime's claim to legitimacy and to further its policy of demarcation (*Abgrenzung*) vis-à-vis the Federal Republic (BRD).

Even in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels themselves, Brinks begins, one can find a tension between the conflicting desiderata of German national unity and social demarcation, between the ethnic and the class (proletarian) nation. To be sure, the classical Marxist thinkers preferred the class nation—"the workers have no Fatherland"—but they also recognized that national unity was required to complete the historically progressive transformation from feudalism to capitalism. For that reason they welcomed the establishment of the German Reich in 1871 as a "revolution from above," without thinking it necessary to revise their negative estimate of Prussia and Otto von Bismarck, contributors to the "misery" that was German history.

Revolutionary social democrats such as V. I. Lenin, August Bebel, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and Franz Mehring adopted an even more hostile attitude toward much of German history, but like Marx and Engels they extolled a minority—revolutionary—tradition that included Thomas Müntzer and the Peasant War of 1525, the 1848 Revolution, and, later, the Russian Revolution and the abortive November 1918 Revolution.

Brinks devotes the remainder of his book to the evolution of East German historiography from 1945 to 1971 and 1971 to 1987. He does not deny, indeed he asserts, that the regime's political agenda defined the tasks of historical research and set the boundaries of professional judgment, but he maintains that one can also discern an inner logic of historiographical development. During the first period, from war's end to Erich Honecker's accession to power, Alexander Abusch's *Irrweg einer Nation* (1947) set the initial tone; in search of the origins of National Socialism, East German historians provided variations on the "misery" theme.

Soon, however, they accepted a new assignment, that of portraying the DDR as the culmination of a limited, but real, German revolutionary tradition driven by the workers' movement. They spoke of national unity—on socialist terms—but, especially after the erection of the Wall, they emphasized *Abgrenzung*, not least because they had cast West Germany in the role of heir of a reactionary tradition to which Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Martin Luther belonged. And yet, according to Brinks, sympathy for *Einheit* and for a more genuinely national tradition was never wholly absent; witness the commemoration of the Reformation's 450th anniversary in 1967.

It was, however, during the period from 1971 to 1987 that East German historiography underwent a sea change. In an attempt to sink deeper roots in Germany's historical soil, the regime expanded the revolutionary tradition to include a "humanistic heritage" that permitted a more "differentiated" (favorable) view of Luther, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and even "militaristic" Prussia, which, after all, had lain primarily within the confines of the DDR. The rehabilitation of Luther was particularly notable; no longer the "princes' lackey," the famed reformer and Bible translator was, Honecker announced in 1980, "one of the German Volk's greatest sons" (p. 235). East German historians, in Brinks's view, were only too glad to adopt the new line, because it corresponded to a historical outlook that had already been present, in embryonic form, in some of their work of the 1950s and 1960s.

Brinks was right to conclude, as he had by the late 1980s, that the regime's strategy to achieve greater recognition and to rally support for a policy of *Abgrenzung* would backfire; by embracing so much of Germany's heritage, East German historical writing revivified a national consciousness and encouraged new hope for national unity. As the regime should have known, and as its historians undoubtedly did know, nationalism runs deeper than socialism.

LEE CONGDON
James Madison University

K. J. P. LOWE. *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: The Life and Career of Cardinal Francesco Soderini (1453–1524)*. (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 314. $59.95.

This book is an important contribution to the growing body of literature regarding the Italian church in the crucial period between the end of the Great Schism and the onset of the Reformation. In particular, K. J. P. Lowe deals with the role of cardinals during this phase of the reaffirmation of papal authority, taking as her subject one of the lesser known members of the early sixteenth-century College of Cardinals, the Florentine Francesco Soderini. Soderini is a particularly interesting figure because his brother Piero acted as the permanent head of the Florentine republic from 1502 to 1512; Francesco consequently possessed an important political role as a member of the city's new leading family. Therefore he is an excellent example of the central place of politics in the career of a Renaissance cardinal, and Lowe gives full attention to this aspect of his study, illustrating, for example, the significance of Soderini's commitment to France for both Florence and his own family. Lowe also emphasizes Soderini's efforts to

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provide alternative power bases for his relatives, particularly after the restoration of the Medici to power in Florence in 1512 embroiled his family in serious political difficulties there.

Given that Lowe's declared intention is to illuminate how the links between influential Florentines and foreign powers affected the history of Florence in this period, however, there is relatively little concerning Soderini's involvement in and concern for city politics. We hear of his role as an ambassador for his city after the Medici expulsion in 1494, something of his relations with Niccolo Machiavelli, and of the concerns voiced in Florence about his and his family's increasingly powerful position. There is little, however, on Soderini's own attitudes toward what was happening in Florence or his personal involvement there. To a large degree, this is undoubtedly because of the paucity of surviving material, but occasional tantalizing hints suggest that more might be said. For example, Lowe asserts that Soderini and Machiavelli "shared the same political outlook and used the same vocabulary for the discussion of political affairs" (p. 61), but this is not further developed.

In fact, the focus of this book is less on Florence than Rome, and its primary concern is with the activities of a leading figure in the papal curia. Here Lowe has succeeded in discovering new information to illuminate cardinals' ceremonial and administrative roles, the mechanics of benefice-hunting and cardinals' finances, and the functioning of ecclesiastical patronage, The sections on Soderini's intellectual and artistic concerns are particularly interesting, given the essential role of the Roman curia's patronage during the High Renaissance. Lowe illustrates both the reality and the limitations of such patronage: on the one hand, she questions the weight of humanistic as opposed to legal studies in Soderini's education and points out his unwillingness to support literary figures within his household; on the other hand, she highlights his interest in history and rhetoric and his concern above all for architecture and building. Much new information emerges regarding Soderini's building projects, and Lowe admirably illustrates the financial as well as the aesthetic motivations behind these.

Despite the limitations of the surviving information, Lowe has succeeded in reconstructing a fascinating picture of the activities of a Renaissance cardinal. She appropriately concludes that Soderini was a representative figure in the College of Cardinals in its pre-Reformation stage, before religious and reforming concerns became the dominant preoccupation of its members.

PAULA CLARKE
McGill University

CHRISTINE SHAW. *Julius II: The Warrior Pope.* Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 1993. Pp. 360. $39.95.

Scholars and general readers who like their political, diplomatic, and military history virtually unadulterated by matters of religious ideology, cultural ambiguity, economic practicalities, and social realities will be delighted with this book. Christine Shaw has written not a biography of Pope Julius II (r. 1503–13)—despite dust-jacket promises—but a monograph based on archival sources where the title tells all. Shaw describes Julius from his first duties as favored papal *nipote* until his dying breath as pope with just one set of terms: those linked to his avocation as a warrior head of state.

Shaw's contribution lies in the reevaluation of the vast archival material relevant to the diplomatic and military career of this Renaissance character. She extracts sources from collections all over Italy and uses them deftly. She demonstrates the complexities of his election, for Julius received the tiara not simply through bribery but also because of his reputation for defending ecclesiastical dignity and liberty. Shaw discourages oversimplification of his curial administration, proving that although sale of offices fattened his war chest, the amount of a contribution did not always determine who served in what function. In the curia, Shaw reveals, Julius came to be viewed as unpredictable—if not mad—by fearful employees, even in the college of cardinals. He listened to no one, not even his own doctors, elevating his own assessments, opinions, and plans above any other.

Shaw's contribution is also the essence of the major flaw in her book: the absence of information necessary to depict Julius in a human fashion. There is no explanation of his Franciscan education received at the order of his uncle. We learn virtually nothing about his family and shockingly little about his enormous patronage of art and literature. The eighteen-page chapter on that topic is the book's shortest. Errors within it—such as repeated citations of Howard "Hibberd" instead of "Hibbard"—reveal a lack of familiarity with the literature and issues at stake. Julius's commissions for the Belvedere court, St. Peter's, Santa Maria del Popolo, and the shrine of Loreto, not to mention his relationship with artists like Michelangelo and Bramante, surely deserve more space. Even Ludwig von Pastor's sketch of Julius in *History of the Popes* (1866–1938) has better balance. The omission is glaring because recent archival investigations of patronage in early modern society are revealing as much about rulers who patronized as about the artists and scientists on their generous payrolls.

Amid the barrage of detail in this limited portrait there also lies a decided attempt at rehabilitation. A fuller picture highlighting contradictions in the pope's policies as well as the basic dichotomy between Julius the military man and Julius the lover and sponsor of art could easily promote a more sympathetic approach to his character. But Shaw chooses a focus that leaves her with only one way to carry out rehabilitation—and a damning one at that—as the

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conclusion essentially argues that Julius was not as bad as Alexander VI. Those hoping for a full biography must await a scholar who will apply the methodology here to the rest of Julius's complex personality and career.

WILLIAM V. HUDON
Bloomsburg University

JOHN M. NAJEMY. *Between Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513–1515.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 358. $39.50.

This book makes a substantial contribution to Machiavelli studies and compares well with the most stimulating work by scholars such as Hanna Pitkin, Mark Hulliung, Ezio Raimondi, and Gennaro Sasso. Examining the letters exchanged by Machiavelli and Francesco Vettori during the two-year period that witnessed the genesis of *The Prince* and, most likely, *The Discourses*, John M. Najemy brilliantly illuminates puzzling turns of phrase and clarifies biographical and historical questions. More important, he successfully argues that the correspondence should be read as a dialogue constituting the essential matrix within which many of Machiavelli's central political ideas were produced. After an introduction outlining his thesis, Najemy situates the Machiavelli-Vettori letters in the relevant epistolary traditions and then reviews the pair's personal histories following the collapse of the Florentine republic. Proceeding in strict chronological order, the rest of the volume analyzes their letters in detail, showing how Vettori served as a reference point for Machiavelli, an interlocutor whose resistance provoked Machiavelli's thought and prompted its most significant modifications. In the exchange Vettori played skeptic to Machiavelli's rational optimist, leading him to crystallize that outlook in *The Prince* with its belief in the comprehensibility of politics and history and in the power of discourse, of reason and language, to make sense of and control experience. Najemy tells the "story" of how Machiavelli eventually came to realize his naiveté, embrace Vettori's skepticism, and accept the uncontrollable mutability of history, politics, and human reason. Najemy concludes that this final transformation in Machiavelli's thought is then reflected in the very different perspective of *The Discourses.*

Although there is much to recommend this study, I do have reservations about it. Most fundamental is my discomfort with the characterization of *The Prince* in terms of rational optimism, a characterization that fits the first, more schematic half of the work much better than it does the second. This work shows Machiavelli struggling to make sense out of history, and if it does express faith in reason and language, it does so with a clear recognition that they are limited by the irrationality of history and human desire. Moreover, concerned to present Vettori as a serious thinker, Najemy sometimes seems to go to the extreme of making him into Machiavelli's intellectual superior, just as, by presenting *The Prince* and *The Discourses* as opposites, he ignores or minimizes their many similarities in analytical style. Najemy also strains credulity in the elaborate allegories he constructs for many letters, as when he takes a reference to Ovid, produces a complicated interpretation, and then claims that his interpretation is just what Machiavelli or Vettori intended and just what the other would have, or should have, understood. Finally, although Najemy's decision to proceed chronologically is necessitated by his "story" about Machiavelli's development, it results at times in too much lengthy summarizing as well as some unnecessary repetition. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, this study is an important book; it contains a wealth of insights and should possess great interest not only for Machiavelli scholars but for all historians and literary critics concerned with the Italian Renaissance.

WAYNE A. REBHORN
University of Texas, Austin

GUIDO RUGGIERO. *Binding Passions: Tales of Magic, Marriage, and Power and the End of the Renaissance.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 286. Cloth $49.95, paper $18.95.

In the past twenty years historians have exploited the rich material of Venetian Holy Office trials for a variety of purposes. In this book Guido Ruggiero uses them to tell five stories of the use of magic. Ruggiero does not present a history of the prosecution of magical practices by the Venetian Inquisition; Ruth Martin did this well in *Witchcraft and the Inquisition in Venice 1550–1650* (1989). Rather, Ruggiero focuses on how men and women attempted to use magical powers in order to achieve "binding passion." That is, they used magic in order to bind one person to another through love illicitly won.

The five stories that constitute the body of the book date from the late 1570s through 1591, a period in which the Venetian Inquisition became increasingly preoccupied with magic. Ruggiero's tales necessarily stop in 1591 because the records from between 1592 and 1616 have disappeared, probably a casualty of fire. In the first tale, a prostitute allegedly used magic to get a noble to marry her, a union that others sought to nullify. In the second story, a woman impregnated by her lover attempted to get the latter to honor a clandestine marriage to her. She stuck needles into a male statue in order to bind him to her and to get him to acknowledge the marriage. The effort failed. Ruggiero continues through other tales involving the use of magic by prostitutes, commoners, rogue priests, and a few nobles, with women predominating. He supplements the Holy Office records with additional Venetian archival sources. In the first chapter, for example, he offers a good deal of additional information about prostitution. He also makes

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good use of contemporary literary sources such as the works of Pietro Aretino and Matteo Bandello.

Ruggiero is less interested in the history of magic than in what these stories tell us about the importance of love magic in the lives of ordinary people. In his view, magic opened up a realm of power to the powerless, especially women. And he terms the Inquisition's effort to eliminate such practices part of the "despiritualization" (p. 17) of the world in early modern Europe. Like other scholars, he sees the Venetian Holy Office pursuing its goal in a cautious, bureaucratic, and generally humane way.

Ruggiero has interesting stories to tell. He draws out the implications of the stories without inflicting dreary theory on the reader. And he obviously knows his Venetian sources well. Two small criticisms are in order. The unidentified *Legendario delle Vite di Santi* of "a certain Fra Giacomo" (p. 89) is clearly a vernacular version of Jacopo da Varazze's *Legenda aurea*, a widely read work of popular culture and a school text. More important, the reader sometimes would like to know exactly what the accused or a witness stated, but Ruggiero does not include the original statements in the notes, not even when translating. Overall, he succeeds in telling good stories and in writing interesting microhistory.

PAUL F. GRENDLER
University of Toronto

DAVID GENTILCORE. *From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto.* New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's. 1992. Pp. x, 292. $49.95.

Working under the supervision of pathbreaking teachers is no guarantee of early scholarly success. In this book, however, David Gentilcore does his mentors, Peter Burke and Robert Scribner, proud. Rather than selecting for his doctoral thesis at Cambridge the usual narrow monographic topic, he cast a wide net, no less than "the complex of ritual behaviour and attitudes toward the sacred of a Mediterranean society over the two hundred and fifty years following the close of the Council of Trent" (p. ix). Eschewing well-trodden paths in northern or central Italy, he dared to venture into what for most Anglophone scholars is *terra incognita*: the deep South, the heel of the peninsula. During the early modern period, the predominantly rural Terra d'Otranto, on the southeastern edge of the kingdom of Naples, experienced economic and demographic stagnation in some microregions and slow decline in others. The revolts of 1647–48 constituted the only ripple on the political surface. Thus, this peripheral territory is ideally suited for study over a *longue durée*.

In his mental toolbox Gentilcore carried to the Terra d'Otranto thoroughly modern equipment. As he explains in his introduction and shows in the body of the book, he is attentive to the pitfalls in several recent approaches to the social history of religion in early modern Europe. Trying to distinguish between "popular" and "elite" and between "true religion" (that is, Christianity) and "mere ritual" (that is, pagan superstition) means accepting definitions coined and implemented by those in power; the consequence is an anachronistic, distorted bifurcation of social reality. Relying on a single category of sources—writings of missionaries "to the Indies down here," episcopal visitations, synodal decrees, *ad limina* reports, or heresy trials in episcopal courts (Inquisition dossiers are thin in this region)—compounds the problem. Therefore, Gentilcore elected to use all available sources in order to reconstruct a "system of the sacred." This concept is not as structural and static as it may appear at first glance. Through processes of mediation and negotiation initiated both from on high and below, boundaries between "the proposed," "the prescribed," "the tolerated," and "the proscribed" (pp. 3–4) shifted gradually from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth.

Gentilcore's somewhat puzzling title, virtually the only awkward patch in this elegantly written volume, is intended to suggest his organizational scheme. After introducing readers to the territory, he begins on top with the bishops of the thirteen dioceses and their courts and seminaries. Then, in chapters 3 through 8, he proceeds to examine missionary orders and confraternities, priests (some 70 percent of parishes were corporate *chiese ricettizie*, the personnel of which were for all practical purposes exempt from episcopal control and influence), popular healers, canonized and aspiring saints, sorceresses and necromancers, and witches. To gain supernatural aid, bishops, members of religious orders, and priests tended to draw on "official" means of access, above all the sacraments; the laity were wont to resort to ritual "of a more *ad hoc*, spontaneous kind" (p. 259). But the lines between the two were never firmly drawn. Women and men on all social levels, even when they came into conflict, belonged—and recognized that they belonged—to a single Christian system.

Throughout, Gentilcore gracefully and persuasively combines historical-anthropological generalization with concrete supporting detail. Although his many exemplary stories are well told, he is less concerned with narration than with socioreligious analysis. Because this book does not make the "linguistic turn," it may strike some readers as old-fashioned. Not me: I highly recommend it both for the importance of its findings and for its method, which has much to teach certain less-than-adept practitioners of microhistory.

ANNE JACOBSON SCHUTTE
University of Virginia

CHRISTOPHER M. S. JOHNS. *Papal Art and Cultural Politics: Rome in the Age of Clement XI.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 269. $75.00.

Pope Clement XI Albani ruled the Catholic church during the first of the great dynastic wars of the

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eighteenth century and at the time of the early stirrings of the Enlightenment in Italy. His reign from 1700 to 1721 was lengthy by papal standards, and long pontificates had traditionally produced impressive records of artistic patronage in Rome. Since the Renaissance, few popes had let an opportunity to commission buildings, statues, books, and paintings slip through their fingers. The Albani pope was no exception. Of all his activities, visitors to Rome today will probably appreciate most the graceful fountain in front of the Pantheon with its obelisk and dolphins, commissioned by Clement XI in 1711. Thanks to modern traffic restrictions Clement's fountain is the focus of one of Rome's most delightful urban squares. But in this study Christopher M. S. Johns is at pains to point out how constrained papal art patronage actually was at the beginning of the eighteenth century and how difficult it was for Clement to fund the projects he did undertake. In 1700 the financial resources of the papacy, which had been so grand in 1500, had been whittled down to paltry size, and the political and spiritual capital of the office were similarly, if momentarily, reduced. Johns argues that Clement XI made the most of what he had, focusing his energies on repairing older buildings rather than constructing new ones and creating ingenious new fund-raising devices like having foreign monarchs pay for statues in his cathedral church of St. John Lateran.

It is important for historians to understand the genre of Johns's book. It is a patronage study, meaning that its aim is to describe all the works of art, in whatever medium, commissioned by the pope, and to try to discern the patron's intentions in these commissions. (It should not be confused with a *catalogue raisonné* of the relevant works of art, however, because among other things it does not treat them in sufficient detail.) Within the limits of his chosen genre Johns succeeds in making a larger argument, that Pope Clement XI used high culture to bolster the image of the papacy at a time when even Catholic rulers regarded the pontiff with indifference.

The book bears the marks of the editorial negligence that we are now coming to expect from Cambridge University Press. More substantively it suffers from the author's thin reading in the history of the papacy both as an institution and as a patron of culture. Johns accepts at face value the pope's assertions that he eschewed nepotism, despite evidence to the contrary such as the splendid Villa Albani. Nepotism is a "deep structure" of the early modern papacy that even the Albani pope could not escape. Johns also makes misleading claims, which reach their zenith in the astonishing final sentence of the book, for the novelty of many of Clement XI's efforts. It is simply not the case that in Rome "museums, restored churches and monuments, spacious squares adorned with fountains and obelisks, [and] libraries with public access" were "initially developed" by Clement XI (p. 207). Each of these had appeared between 1450 and 1650.

Although it must be used with caution, Johns's study does focus on an important tradition of Western cultural patronage at a significant moment, the moment when it came back down to earth after two remarkable centuries. Julius II might not have approved, but Gregory the Great undoubtedly would have.

LAURIE NUSSDORFER
Wesleyan University

WALTER L. ADAMSON. *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 338. $39.95.

The avant-garde that emerged in Florence just after the turn of the century sought to spearhead sociocultural renewal in Italy, partly through interaction with the emerging modernism of Paris. Its central figures, Giuseppe Prezzolini, Giovanni Papini, and Ardengo Soffici, led the movement through such reviews as *Leonardo*, *La Voce*, and *Lacerba*. The significance of this group has long been known to specialists, but Walter L. Adamson places it in illuminating new perspective by featuring its Florentine context, following the "great cities" approach that has yielded some of the best recent work in modern European intellectual history.

Florence is a promising setting because, with its museums and tourists, it manifested the tension between glorious tradition and modern uncertainty in an especially dramatic way. Still, by 1900 Florence was a small provincial city in a multicentered country, so the quest for renewal involved the Florentines in a web of interaction with other Italian cities. And although Adamson is sensitive to the limits of his local focus, his accent on the Florentine context occasionally seems forced. Italians from elsewhere who affected the Florentine avant-garde—especially Giovanni Gentile—remain shadowy in his account, and he must stretch to explain the crucially important relationship with F. T. Marinetti's futurism, which was centered in Milan.

Despite the distinctiveness of the Florentine context, much of Adamson's story simply confirms Robert Wohl's interpretation in *The Generation of 1914* (1979), a study notable for its supranational focus. Like Wohl, Adamson tells of young intellectuals who sought cultural "rejuvenation" or "spiritual renewal," but whose ignorance of concrete socioeconomic needs and real political prospects blunted their effectiveness. Still, the Italian chapter is especially significant because the Italians invented fascism. And Adamson demonstrates that fascism was not simply a "great temptation," as it was for Wohl's figures, but the political harvest of the Florentine avant-garde, which offered Benito Mussolini and his followers the rhetoric of renewal and even the justification for violence.

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At the same time, however, Adamson's nuanced treatment makes sense of the diversity of responses to Italy's political crisis. Whereas Soffici became an active fascist, Prezzolini proved curiously squeamish and ambivalent, and Papini turned from politics altogether. For Adamson fascism remains as troubling as ever, but by linking it to cultural modernism he clarifies the limits of explanatory categories such as antimodern or reactionary and invites a wider array of questions.

In accenting the connection with fascism, Adamson side-steps any explicit conclusion about the place of the Florentine chapter in the wider European avant-garde. To be sure, he credits these young Italians for daring to take on Paris, for interacting with the likes of Apollinaire and William James, and for expanding cultural horizons in smug, provincial Florence. But he also accents their wider ambitions: to contribute to the European cultural mainstream by addressing the modern situation with "the death of God." They kept stumbling over parochial Italian preoccupations, however, and the value of their contribution to European modernism remains uncertain. It can be argued that, despite their excesses, the Milanese futurists managed, as these Florentines did not, to translate their idiosyncratic Italian concerns into a distinctive European contribution.

Nevertheless, the Florentine experience entailed a special poignancy, and Adamson dramatizes it nicely as he explores the interweaving of idealism, innovation, excess, and disillusionment among his major figures. This authoritative collective biography is among the most significant English-language contributions to modern Italian studies of recent years.

DAVID D. ROBERTS
University of Georgia

ELENA AGA ROSSI. *Una nazione allo sbando: L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943.* (Collana di Storia contemporanea.) Bologna: Mulino. 1993. Pp. 168. L. 15,000.

Italy's exit from World War II was marked, in Elena Aga Rossi's words, by a "series of misunderstandings, deceptions, illusions" (p. 74). The historical truth of the muddled negotiations among the Americans, British, and Italians from the fall of Mussolini on July 25, 1943, to the "short armistice" at Cassibile on September 8 is not easily established. In Italy several subsequent official enquiries yielded little (as perhaps was the intention), exculpatory memoirs flowed from the generals, and available archival material was incomplete because on the eve of surrender many files were destroyed to prevent them falling into German hands. Hitherto the best scholarly accounts have been those based on U.S. documentation: Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (1965), and Mario Toscano, *Dal 25 luglio all'8 settembre* (1966). Since the mid–1960s, much more evidence has become accessible, the recently opened Italian records of the Ufficio Storico dello Stato maggiore dell'Esercito being particularly valuable. Some of this new material from all three countries is included in Aga Rossi's substantial documentary collection, *L'inganno reciproco: L'armistizio tra l'Italia e gli anglo-americani del settembre 1943* (1993), a companion volume to this brief but authoritative monograph.

Aga Rossi in turn confirms and then challenges the received wisdom of this period. Intra-Allied divisions of opinion are well known, as is the shadow that the doctrine of unconditional surrender, arrived at during the Casablanca Conference, cast over all exchanges with the Italians. Aga Rossi does insist, however, that anticommunism played no role in Allied policy at this time, no matter how large it loomed after the armistice. On the vexing issue of the timing and location of the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland, the Anglo-Americans are absolved of calculated duplicity. Rather, the main thrust of the argument is to indict the royal government in Rome for its "ineptitude." Aga Rossi dismisses the old canard of a secret deal with the German high command, but she demonstrates conclusively that Mussolini's successor, Pietro Badoglio, and the king "never intended to confront the Germans militarily, not even where military strength permitted it" (p. 123). Their tactic was to sit on the fence until an Allied landing and the German reaction dictated which way to jump. Catastrophically, in the end, the royal government made no clear choice at all.

All of these events are analyzed with scrupulous scholarship, although the tone is one of passionate indignation. In places this involves counterfactual history. If only the Allied commanders had been more adventurous and, above all, if the governing elite in Rome had behaved responsibly, the Germans might have been confined to northern Italy, thus saving Rome from Nazi occupation and 600,000 Italians from internment. Outwardly this book is addressed to the international scholarly community, and an English translation would be worthwhile. But inwardly and emotionally it speaks to an audience within Italy, where the armistice of 1943 remains a live public issue.

ALAN CASSELS
McMaster University

STEPHEN VELYCHENKO. *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914.* Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta; distributed by Libraries Unlimited, Englewood, Colo. 1992. Pp. xxxv, 283. $24.95.

The reawakening of nationalism in Eastern Europe seems to have led to a certain reawakening of nationalist criteria even in the West. Stephen Velychenko's review of nineteenth-century Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian writings on Ukrainian history groups all

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the historians in national camps and then proceeds to register their degree of emotional sympathy to Ukrainian history. To be sure, the result is not a simple apologia for pre–1914 Ukrainian historians. He notes that they had virtually none of the concerns of later nationalist politicians and gives a good, often critical account of their historiographical and political views. His overall conclusion, however, is that nationalism triumphed over scholarship in all three "national" historiographies.

The grouping of historians on the basis of their presumed national loyalties and origins rather than their overall world view has the effect of downplaying fundamental differences within national traditions. Thus, the relatively favorable view of Ukrainian history by Joachim Lelewel appears in the same chapter with the less-sympathetic approach of Józef Szujski as part of "the Polish view." Velychenko's grouping also radically oversimplifies the complex issues of national identity that his subjects faced, giving them a more "modern" and exclusive identity than was the reality. The Ukrainian historians who wrote in Russian (and mostly had binational consciousness) make particular trouble for him. Among Russian historians between N. M. Karamzin and S. M. Solov'ev he treats only the obscure N. G. Ustrialov, as if the Ukrainian theme was ignored. It was not. The basic literature on Ukrainian history in the Russian language, however, was the work of authors such as N. A. Markevich or D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, whom Velychenko has decided are exclusively Ukrainian and assigns to "the Ukrainian view." This approach removes these historians from their proper historical context, for their work comprised the standard Russian literature on Ukrainian topics for the first half of the nineteenth century. N. I. Kostomarov provides a similar problem, for Velychenko presents him merely as Ukrainian, even though the bulk of his work was on Russian history. As a historian of Russia he was a major figure, but one looks in vain for comment on the consequences of that fact for his work on Ukrainian history.

Velychenko provides little in the way of intellectual context. His method is to survey the general histories of each country looking for comments on Ukrainian affairs. He gives us labels ("romantic," "positivist") for the historians, but no thorough attempt to place their views in general intellectual and historiographical context. Only cursory attempts are made to relate them to larger European trends, although all of the professional historians mentioned were deeply imbued with European notions and methods. He does try to give the reader some sense of the larger Ukrainian theme at the time but omits fiction and poetry, without which it is not possible to comprehend the context of the historians' work.

Velychenko's decision to emphasize general histories of the three countries accounts for much of the unsatisfactory quality of his work. It obliges him to treat "official" Russian historians such as Ustrialov (whose historiographic impact was minimal) or minor Polish publicists on the same level as major historians such as Szujski or V. O. Kliuchevskii. This decision naturally leads him to his conclusion that nationalism overrode scholarship, which he seems to regret. There is no need. The problem, as some Ukrainian historians of the time already noted, was that the subject was quite undeveloped, leaving the writers of surveys (as always) with little to go on but general ideas that were as much political as historical. Where real research was done, there was much debate and change, and scholarship remained primary.

PAUL BUSHKOVITCH
Yale University

GÉZA ANDREAS VON GEYR. *Sándor Wekerle 1848–1921: Die politische Biographie eines ungarischen Staatsmannes der Donaumonarchie.* (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, number 91.) Munich: R. Oldenbourg, for the Südost-Institut München. 1993. Pp. 529.

Prior to World War II, Hungarians liked to point to the similarities between their political and parliamentary institutions and those of England. Using an expression from English history, Sándor Wekerle could be called "the great commoner" of Hungarian political history. When, in 1892, he became, for the first times, Hungary's prime minister, he was the first non-noble to hold this position. He held this post three times, the last time during the closing days of World War I. He also served three times as minister of finance and once each as minister of commerce, agriculture, and interior. He was a master politician, recognized as one of the leading financial experts of his time, whose merits and achievements were universally recognized even in his lifetime. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the monarch never raised him into the rank of the nobility.

Wekerle's family was a highly respected and financially well-situated bourgeois family with good connections to the aristocracy, which several of its members served. This made it easy for him to attend a good high school and earn a law degree from the university in Pest. At that institution he established good relations with important friends and teachers who helped him in his career. This began as a clerk in the Hungarian finance ministry, where he steadily rose in rank. His ability was recognized. When marriage into the gentry made him "acceptable" to Hungary's noble power brokers, he was appointed minister of finance in 1889, making his entry into both Austro-Hungarian politics on the highest level and Europe's financial elite.

Géza Andreas von Geyr's volume is the first detailed study of Wekerle's life. It is more than just a political biography because the author pays attention not only to the statesman but also to the man who emerges from these pages as a reliable friend, good family man, and a true gentleman in the best sense of this term. Chapters dealing with Wekerle's private life are cleverly interwoven with those depicting his profes-

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sional career and appear in this chronologically organized volume whenever it covers years when its subject was out of office. Von Geyr does not make his subject into a hero and tries, usually successfully, to give an objective picture of his ideas and actions.

The work is extremely well researched using German and Hungarian archival and private primary sources, newspapers, and a wide range of secondary works. The writing is clear, easy to read, and free of academic jargon. Well-selected photographs and cartoons enhance the volume's value. This volume is a welcome addition to our knowledge of some crucial decades in Central Europe's history. The negative comments must be limited to the expression of regrets that the index is only a list of names, making it difficult to exploit the rich information contained in the volume.

PETER F. SUGAR
University of Washington

MARK MAZOWER. *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. xxv, 437. $30.00.

Mark Mazower notes in his introductory remarks that the controversy surrounding Kurt Waldheim's activities in Nazi-occupied Greece spurred his interest in trying to establish "what he had known and done" (p. xiii). Determining that Waldheim knew much but had few opportunities to kill people, Mazower also concluded that the existing historiography inadequately covered daily life during this "long night of barbarism" (Winston Churchill's phrase). The product of extensive research in unpublished German, Italian, Greek, British, French, and American materials, this is a well-conceived study and invaluable resource for scholars seeking insights into the conditions of life in and popular responses to wartime occupation with its accompanying hardships and brutalities. Sixty-nine illustrations graphically portray the macabre situation.

Few European countries matched the extent of famine, inflation, and physical destruction of Greece during the Axis occupation. These desperate conditions contributed directly to a radicalization of the masses and, ultimately, after liberation, to civil war. Whereas other analysts have dealt authoritatively with the politics of the Greek resistance, Mazower deliberately chooses to stress the social origins of resistance activity. His findings, he contends, are also relevant for understanding related struggles in, for example, Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Indochina, and the Philippines.

By drawing on a broad range of official sources, newspapers, and diaries, Mazower skillfully reconstructs the complex mosaic of daily life in Athens and other areas of Greece. The Nazi new order, for Greece, produced nothing less than administrative chaos, as Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria initially divided occupation regions and responsibilities with little concern for the needs of the local population. The first winter of 1941–42 witnessed widespread famine, particularly in Athens, which suffered the worst starvation levels outside the concentration camps and thousands of deaths. Because of the weak power of the state, rampant inflation and a pervasive black market dominated. By 1944 money became worthless even for the smallest transaction. Mazower's reliance on anecdotal information and individual experiences poignantly reproduces the grim conditions confronted by the overwhelming majority of Greeks.

A number of organizations emerged to challenge the Axis occupation, but EAM/ELAS, the mass left-wing resistance movement, predominated, in large part because of the bankruptcy of traditional politics and its ability to draw on the widespread anti-Axis sentiments in the populace. Initially, it was the acute shortage of food that created the circumstances for political mobilization. The collapse of Italy in the late summer of 1943 added people, arms, and psychological inspiration to the Greek resistance, but it also granted Germany exclusive responsibility for occupation policy. The resulting antiguerrilla campaign and general tactics of terror, reprisals, and violence expanded levels of deaths and physical destruction.

In the chapter "Greek Jewry and the Final Solution," Mazower analyzes the process that resulted in the killing of perhaps 90 percent of all Greek Jews; few European countries lost a higher percentage of their Jewish populations. German authorities experienced few difficulties in rounding up the large concentration of Jews in Salonika, clustered as they were in its central section. Anti-Semitism, as the Germans perceived it, had no traditional place in Greece, and Mazower concludes: "Overall, Orthodox Greeks showed a remarkable generosity of spirit towards the Jews which bears comparison with that of any other group in Europe" (p. 259).

With communists playing a commanding role in EAM/ELAS and with the probability of liberation becoming more promising in 1944, Greek society reflected violent divisions as rival factions sought to prevail in a post-occupation Greece. The prospect of a "people's democracy" inspired many Greeks in EAM/ELAS ranks and threatened others in hostile, anticommunist sections of the population. The Germans sought to manipulate this factionalism with limited success for their immediate objectives of controlling the country, but they did contribute to the hardening of positions for political blocs in post-liberation Greece's fratricidal struggle.

Mazower's "bottom-up" approach, with its emphasis on social and economic conditions in occupied Greece and its comprehensive treatment of them, makes his study one of the most important additions to Greek historiography in recent years.

S. VICTOR PAPACOSMA
Kent State University

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GALE STOKES. *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 319. $25.00.

This book by the distinguished historian Gale Stokes traces the history of Eastern Europe from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 until the early months of 1993. The story has been told often enough, but what Stokes brings to the account is a conviction that the Soviet invasion in 1968 was a turning point that eliminated the possibility of organic adaptations of socialism in the region and led directly to the collapse of the communist states there in 1989. His conviction here is strong enough, but the point is not argued or demonstrated, only taken as a starting point for discussion.

Stokes's focus is on center stage, on the high political drama of failed elite policies and struggling oppositionist movements. Charter 77 (in Czechoslovakia), Solidarity (in Poland), and the Hungarian Democratic Forum get ample play here; other actors are either downplayed (such as Fighting Solidarity in Poland) or ignored (such as the church-sponsored alternative culture scene in Poland and the Jazz Section in Czechoslovakia).

Stokes wants to tell the story from 1968, and to explain events since then in terms of that crucial turning point, but the subject matter repeatedly strains at this delimitation as Stokes refers explanations on several occasions back to earlier periods, even precommunist, finally casting off the post–1968 framework altogether on turning to Yugoslavia.

Historians of Eastern Europe have, for good reason, long been fond of tracing some differences even in present cultural patterns and strategies to differences rooted in the Ottoman and Habsburg experiences. But to avoid a mystical historical determinism it would be necessary to note just which factors in the differentiated experience are relevant, for example, differences in traditions of civic education or differences in legal traditions relating to property ownership.

The book is suffused with democratic optimism, starting with the suggestion that twenty-first-century students will find it hard to imagine why people in the twentieth century accepted authoritarian forms of rule (p. 3) and ending with the prediction that "the general trend of European development . . . is the elaboration of pluralism" (p. 253). Stokes may, of course, be right. But his optimism is not enough to relieve pessimists such as myself of our fears for the future.

The book is at its best in the sections dealing with Poland and—ironically—at its weakest in the sections dealing with Yugoslavia, where Stokes makes a few overstatements, and, regrettably, does not cite any of the scholarly books published since the war began in June 1991. And although Stokes mentions nineteenth-century figures Ljudevit Gaj and Bishop Strossmayer in the context of setting the stage for the outbreak of interethnic war in 1991, there is no mention either of the Serbian Orthodox church's vocal espousal of the interests of Kosovo's Serbs beginning in 1982, or of the manipulation of memories of World War II by Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia beginning in 1987, both of which played crucial roles in heating up the political cauldron. Stokes also claims that European Community recognition of Slovenia and Croatia "almost certainly contributed to a worsening of the situation" (p. 251), although he does not tell us how or explain what positive benefits would have flowed from continuing a diplomatic isolation of these new states.

This study is, by my count, the sixth English-language scholarly book to explore the subject of the collapse of communism. Yet surprisingly, Stokes does not refer to one of these previous books, or even acknowledge their existence, even though all of them were published prior to the date when he completed work on the text (February 1993, as revealed in his notes). Even more perplexing is the blurb by John R. Lampe, which represents this as the first scholarly account of the revolutions of 1989 to include an account of processes since 1968. This claim is true only in the most pedantic sense, namely, that because each scholar takes a different starting point (for example, 1945 for David Mason, 1980 for myself, 1987 for Ivo Banac), it is true that only Stokes starts the story in 1968; and if that is Lampe's point, then it was not worth making.

Despite occasional errors in fact, the book is on the whole a satisfying product that throws much interesting light on developments since 1968 and is sure to be useful as a classroom text.

SABRINA PETRA RAMET
University of Washington

ANDREW BARUCH WACHTEL. *An Obsession with History: Russian Writers Confront the Past.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1994. Pp. viii, 276. $35.00.

What could so diverse a group of personages as Empress Catherine II, the historian N. N. Karamzin, the classic writers Alexander Pushkin, Lev Tolstoy, and Fedor Dostoyevsky, the futurist V. V. Khlebnikov, the formalist Iu. N. Tynianov, and the prophetic Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have in common? According to Andrew Baruch Wachtel's original and absorbing study, these writers shared an obsession with history. Working within a tradition initiated by Catherine the Great, each of these figures was led to consider all or some segment of the Russian past, and from multiple perspectives rather than a single one. Thus, although virtually all were primarily (in Karamzin's case initially) writers of *belles lettres*, they produced fiction concerned with matters historical, and distinctly historical works as well. They did so out of a sense that neither fiction nor history was capable of grasping the entire truth about the past, a desideratum that could best be achieved through "intergeneric dialogue"

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between fiction and history, with each supplementing the other. Wachtel contends that this analytical approach "provides a window on the special Russian attitude to history" and makes it possible "to read some major literary works in an entirely new light" (p. 7). In my view, the body of the work bears out the second of these contentions more satisfyingly than the first.

Intergeneric dialogue evolved and assumed different forms over time. Initially involving dialogue between two works (Catherine II and Pushkin), with such writers as Tolstoy and Solzhenitsyn, dialogue between the fictional and historical took place within a single work. Recourse to history by men of letters served patriotic, pedagogic, and pleasure-affording ends until the 1870s, when Dostoyevsky drew on an imagined history as a prophecy of the fulfillment of Russia's messianic mission. The intermixture of literature and history in Russia is perceived as a consequence of the disinclination in Russia, as contrasted with the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to draw a distinct boundary between genres.

Although Wachtel's paradigm centers on dialogue between fiction and history, his analysis shows a considerably wider variety of interaction: with Karamzin between text and notes, with Khlebnikov between linguistics and mathematics, and with Aleksandr Kamenskii between pre-Soviet and Soviet literature. If the paradigm is not strictly adhered to, the discussions of such works as Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*, and Solzhenitsyn's *The Red Wheel* nevertheless are decidedly rewarding, complex, rich, and insightful. This is a work that certainly warrants a second reading.

Despite its title, Wachtel's book will likely be of interest primarily to literary scholars, who will recognize its affinity with Caryl Emerson's pioneering study, *Boris Godunov*. It is far from irrelevant to historians, however, one of whom, Simon Schama, has recently given us a not dissimilar endeavor in the experimental *Dead Certainties* (1992).

Samuel H. Baron
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Michael F. Hamm. *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xviii, 304. $29.95.

The last decade and a half has witnessed the appearance in English of several monographs devoted to individual cities in east-central Europe: Vienna by Carl Schorske (*Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* [1979]); Odessa by Patricia Herlihy (*Odessa: A History, 1794–1914* [1986]), and Budapest by John Lukács (*Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture* [1988]). Each of these works focused on the "historic" nineteenth century, in some cases with particular attention on its last decades from the 1880s to the outbreak of World War I. Michael F. Hamm has added Kiev to the list of cities in the "other half of Europe" for which there is now a reliable history about a crucial period in its development.

Kiev was actually reborn in the nineteenth century. As a medieval city, it had been one of the largest in Europe, having in the twelfth century over 30,000 inhabitants and serving as the political and cultural center of a state known as Kievan Rus' and as a hub of international commerce connecting the rest of the Continent with Central Asia and the Middle East. In subsequent centuries, Kiev fell on hard times, and by the outset of the nineteenth century it was no more than a small provincial outpost of the Russian empire numbering about 20,000 souls. In the course of that century Kiev's population grew to 247,000 by 1897 and to 626,000 by 1914. This enormous and rapid growth, which took place primarily after the 1870s, is the subject of Hamm's urban biography.

The book is divided into nine thematic chapters that, in part, follow a chronological order. Throughout the author rightly recognizes that Kiev, like virtually all cities in east-central and Eastern Europe, has historically been inhabited by many different peoples. Consequently, there are separate chapters on what Hamm calls "Polish Kiev," "Jewish Kiev," and "Ukrainians in Russian Kiev." This organizational framework does not, however, inhibit the author from stressing that these and other ethnic groups never existed in isolation from each other. An exception to the otherwise peaceful symbiotic nature of group interaction was the case of Kiev's Jews, who were victims of pogroms, the most serious of which occurred in 1905 and for which there is a separate chapter.

This solidly researched volume is based on a few former Soviet archives, a wide body of memoiristic and secondary literature, and, most importantly, contemporary newspapers from the second half of the century. This has allowed the author to provide fascinating insights into the city's everyday life, such as its early exposure to the automobile, airplane, and cinema, or the more widespread interests of its inhabitants, which included gambling, consumption in taverns and tearooms, patronage in brothels, and just plain "hanging out." These descriptions are often backed up with statistical data, including the astonishing statement that in the early 1870s an estimated one-third of all Kievans was afflicted by venereal disease (p. 161).

Despite its title, the volume effectively ends with the revolution and pogrom of 1905, whose impact in Kiev is dealt with in two chapters. Greater coverage is needed on the remaining years of Russian imperial rule, including the impact of World War I on the city, which is treated only cursorily and deserves more attention. Such coverage could serve as the background for what is now needed: a biography of the city during its Soviet period that was to last from 1919 to 1991. Hopefully, the author who undertakes the story of Kiev in the twentieth century will maintain

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the high standard that Hamm has given us for the nineteenth century.

PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI
University of Toronto

WENDY Z. GOLDMAN. *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936.* (Cambridge Russian Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, number 90.) New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xi, 351. Cloth $59.95, paper $18.95.

In this long-awaited book Wendy Z. Goldman provides a guide to the treatment of women and the family in the first twenty years of Soviet rule. She describes the major debates on a series of issues and sets them in the context of a changing and crisis-ridden social and political environment. An unrepentant materialist, she believes that ideas reflect material circumstances. The Soviet regime, she concludes, erred in losing sight of this truth. Its attempt to enact a utopian alternative to bourgeois-patriarchal family and gender relations shattered on the granite of underdevelopment. Its guiding principles, imported from abroad, were premature in the local context. In proceeding nevertheless, the Soviets forgot to be good Marxists. Had they remembered the basic rule, they would not have attempted this grandiose feat of social and cultural engineering, which could not help but fail.

The very notion of women's emancipation from patriarchal domination, Goldman argues, was unthinkable before the economic preconditions for equality were at hand. Only when capitalism took women out of the family and put them into the labor market and provided the possibility of their economic independence could the goal of female autonomy first be conceived. One might object that some thinkers managed to think the unthinkable before the appearance of capitalism and that its appearance has certainly not guaranteed the result. It is clearly not true, judging from this book, that intellectuals are incapable of cultivating ideas inappropriate to their particular circumstances. That is precisely Goldman's point.

Goldman explores the analogy between the fate of socialism as a social ideal and of feminism, a subsidiary aspiration, as both foundered on the shoals of material hardship. For the same reason, presumably, that the socialist model (collective control of production plus civic equality) turned into a system of coerced labor and administrative repression, the ideal of collective reproductive work (state-supported child care, from toddlers to teens) and gender equality became a system of uncompensated domestic labor (housework, without benefit of a consumer-oriented economy) and paternal responsibility. On all the great issues of private life—marriage and the family, procreation, and child-rearing—the Soviet regime began with dreams of public responsibility and domestic liberation but ended with a return to the structures and instruments that have served capitalist society. This movement paralleled the shift in values and institutions associated with the regulation of public life as well; having renounced the law as an artifact of bourgeois class domination, the regime redefined it as an instrument of proletarian democracy. In so doing the state deprived the law of the features of legality as practiced in the invidious bourgeois world. Likewise, in reverting to conventional notions of paternal duty and hypernatalist motherhood, the regime eliminated the features of privacy and personal inviolability that, at least in principle, the bourgeois arrangement provides.

This book makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of women and society in the early Soviet period. First and foremost, it outlines the major issues and describes the shifting terms in which they were debated. We listen to officials and experts still free to disagree, to practitioners reporting from the front as yet without compulsory rose-colored glasses, and to the views of affected parties. Second, we learn once again in what specific ways this traumatic period was hard on women (and children). Third, we are presented with a strong interpretation that will provoke healthy debate. On one level Goldman surely is correct to emphasize the issue of "backwardness": not surprisingly, the young Soviet state was unable to provide the luxury of an elaborate welfare system on a scale magnified by the stress of war and revolution. Yet "backwardness" cannot entirely explain the Bolsheviks' failure to conquer problems that beset women in all modern societies, no matter how advanced: workplace discrimination, limits to reproductive self-determination, and the double burden. We are, however, grateful to Goldman for demonstrating how these persistent dilemmas defeated at least one utopian effort at transcendence, although the contemplated solution would no doubt have replaced one set of ills with another, less desirable still. In that sense, one should perhaps not regret this particular failure.

LAURA ENGELSTEIN
Princeton University

ALAN M. BALL. *And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918–1930.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1994. Pp. xxi, 335. $45.00.

Social histories of the early Soviet period commonly include horrific images of the millions of abandoned and orphaned children who were left to wander around the cities and villages of the Russian empire, but until now we have had neither a detailed study of the children's lives nor a thorough survey of government efforts to shelter and educate them. Alan M. Ball's eloquent monograph on these homeless children (known as *besprizorniki* and the phenomenon as *besprizornost'*) is a tightly focused and meticulously

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researched volume that conveys both in painstaking detail.

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which is devoted to the daily lives of the children forced to live by their wits on the streets. Although much of the material here is familiar in general outline from earlier works, Ball's comprehensive research, including the use of previously untapped archives, will likely make this the fundamental study of the subject. We learn here, for example, about dozens of ways to abandon children, about every available makeshift form of housing that street children devised, about every possible method they used to scrape together something to eat, and about all the various criminal activities in which they engaged. We also learn something about such elusive topics as the street gangs of the period, and street and youth culture more generally.

In the second part of the book Ball details the financial crisis that perpetuated juvenile homelessness and the bureaucratic and institutional efforts the government made to provide a socialist upbringing on a shoestring budget. As in so many other areas of social life, early Soviet goals for child rearing, rooted in socialist utopian theory, were overwhelmed by the complexity, scope, and expense of the problems connected with *besprizornost'*. There was never enough money to house and feed all the children, let alone offer them education or training; many of the most needy children rejected the constraints and cultural expectations of state-run orphanages, schools, and colonies; and no consensus could be reached among specialists on the best methods for reclaiming the children of the streets. As in part 1, this section's strength lies in the detail it contributes to our previous knowledge about the bureaucracies, the professionals, and the variety of institutional settings devoted to caring for the waifs.

But the book's strength—its exhaustive detail—is also its main weakness. By focusing so closely on the minutiae of street life and state policy, the story lacks context and analytical depth. Many of the subjects discussed, from gang argot to experimental rehabilitation colonies to professional debates about youth culture, had rich prerevolutionary histories, which Ball ignores. More important, one misses the larger cultural and political context that informed social policy and determined its outcome, such as one finds in Wendy Goldman's recent treatment of *besprizorniki* in *Women, the State and Revolution* (1993). Ball makes only the briefest references to NEP and its influence or (despite the dates in the book's subtitle) to the effect of the initial stages of the Stalin revolution begun in 1928. Some attention to these issues is necessary to evaluate the author's argument that neither the Bolsheviks nor communism should be blamed for widespread *besprizornost'*, but rather preexisting poverty, the dislocation of war and revolution, and especially the famine of 1920–22.

Although essentially a descriptive work, this book is still very useful social history. Historians who read solely for new arguments may be disappointed in it, but those who care about what life was like for a significant portion of the population struggling to survive amid social turmoil will find much in the book fascinating. And considering the freight that American readers bring to a study of this sort—given the depth of our own problems of juvenile poverty and our ability to ignore them—Ball deserves praise for achieving the perfect tone of voice for a historical work on this subject: it is equal parts dispassionate and heartbreaking.

JOAN NEUBERGER
University of Texas, Austin

AMY KNIGHT. *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 312. $24.95.

Lavrenty Beria was no worse than others in Joseph Stalin's entourage, according to this first systematic biography of Stalin's last secret police chief, a major contender for power after Stalin's death. The evil, in the view of Amy Knight, was inherent in a "patrimonial power structure" that "bred tyrants" at every level (p. 228).

Knight is a recognized expert on the Soviet secret police (her last book was *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union* [1990]). Now, with the help of newly available Soviet documents, she has brilliantly reconstructed the personal story of the man most immediately associated with the Stalin terror-state. Knight sees Beria as a total cynic, "a terrifying human being," according to Andrei Sakharov, who had to work with him (p. 138). But despite Beria's cruelty and perversity, Knight finds him intelligent and realistic about communism's shortcomings. He held Stalin in contempt.

Beria spent almost his entire adult life directing police operations. As a secret police official in Georgia he plunged readily into the world of plots and terror, and then worked his way up by intriguing against his superiors and contributing to the Stalin cult. Yet Knight finds that he had practical reservations about the mass purges of 1937–38, although he readily followed Stalin's lead by arranging a series of show trials in Georgia and liquidating most of his former rivals. Marked for elimination himself by NKVD Commissar Nikolai Yezhov, Beria became Stalin's instrument to get rid of the great purger; he installed his own Georgian clientele in the national police apparatus and went on to complete the purges (especially in the foreign ministry), expand the labor camp system, and exploit the opportunities for repression offered by the Soviet Union's westward expansion of 1939–40. Oddly enough, Beria put Stalin's prejudices ahead of his own intelligence information in failing to press warnings of the German attack in 1941. Nevertheless, he was made a member of the inner cabinet, the State Defense Committee (GKO),

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and given special authority to root out suspected disaffection in the army. Beria's wartime experience in intelligence and forced labor operations made him a logical choice to head the Soviet Union's atomic weapons program afterward.

The most interesting and innovative parts of Knight's work concern Beria's role under late Stalinism and his abortive reform efforts and quick downfall after Stalin's death. Just after the war Stalin removed Beria from direct control of the police ministries, like the other members of the Politburo who were also distanced from their personal fiefdoms. Still, elevated to the Politburo, Beria retained unique influence over Stalin by unstinting flattery, playing up to his paranoia, and trading on their common background as Georgians. Knight recounts his unceasing maneuvers for power in the Kremlin snake pit as, teamed up with the irresolute Georgi Malenkov, he fought Andrei Zhdanov and his following, marginalized Viacheslav Molotov, and resisted the rising Nikita Khrushchev.

Reinforcing the "liberal Beria" theory, Knight documents his pragmatic bid for power immediately after Stalin's death, with an extraordinary reform program to shake up the bureaucracy, give amnesty to labor camp inmates, liberate the economy from party interference, ease up on the non-Russian nationalities, and pursue detente with the West by abandoning the attempt to make East Germany a Soviet-style socialist state. Likening Beria to Yuri Andropov, Knight concludes, "The full extent of his bold initiatives has only recently come to light . . . He was advocating sweeping reforms that, had they succeeded, would not only have changed the nature of the Soviet system but would have opened the way for a partial dismantlement of the Soviet bloc" (pp. 193–94).

As Knight shows, the opposition to Beria was neither principled nor united but rather fear-driven; the East German uprising of June 1953 was only a pretext. Khrushchev was the organizer of the plot to remove him, and Malenkov and Molotov came over only reluctantly. The conspirators were terribly worried about executing and legitimizing their deed, and the plan nearly misfired. Knight discounts the stories that Beria actually was executed before the trial; I have also heard that version refuted by Alexei Yakushev, an émigré who, as a loyal student, had been hand-picked to be a "public" spectator at the trial, and who remarked on Beria's attempt to fight back and defend himself.

Knight's account is both readable and solidly documented, with a minimum of conjecture, and it makes the context of events clear to non-specialists. Her work only underscores the horror of the system that permitted men such as Beria to rise to the top and steer the destinies of the country that they victimized.

ROBERT V. DANIELS
University of Vermont

NEAR EAST

CARL F. PETRY. *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashrāf Qāytbāy and Qānsūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt.* (Middle East Center, Jackson School of International Studies, Occasional Papers, number 4.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 261. $20.00.

This study by Carl F. Petry is a curious, even frustrating mélange of historical genres. In many respects, the book mirrors such classics as Gaston Wiet's survey of medieval Cairo and Bernard Lewis's vignette of life in Ottoman Istanbul, offering nonspecialists an accessible account that "recapture[s] the flavor of a tumultuous epoch" in Egyptian history (p. 326). This kind of project requires the author to fill numerous gaps in the written record with informed speculation: Petry suggests that it was Qāytbāy's wife who convinced him to accumulate agricultural estates and who then "may have administered [their] proceeds, freeing her husband to address his formal duties" (p. 33); Qāytbāy's chief administrative officer is averred to have "coveted no other major office" (p. 49); in his dealings with his lieutenants Yashbak and Azbak, Qāytbāy "consistently divided his time equally between these two haughty aides, never playing favorites" (p. 76); "[Qānsūh] al-Ghawrī neither desired nor sought the companionship of revered clerics, who figured so prominently in Qāytbāy's circles" (p. 167); and so on. Scholars of the Mamluk era may well be discomfited by such inferences, but general readers will find them indispensable to the story line.

Yet Petry does offer nuanced descriptions of factional infighting within the Egyptian political elite and of Mamluk foreign affairs. The treatments of topics such as Qāytbāy's military campaigns against Shah Suwar of Ilbistin (pp. 57–72), the initial skirmishes between the Mamluks and the Ottomans (pp. 94–98), the subsequent diplomacy between Cairo and Istanbul (pp. 98–102) and the strategic circumstances surrounding the Ottoman invasion of the Mamluk empire (pp. 199–228) represent notable contributions to the literature. Whether undergraduates and casual readers will appreciate the insights contained in these detailed narratives is an open question.

At the same time, the book alternates between exploring the concrete differences in leadership style that distinguished Qāytbāy from Qānsūh al-Ghawrī and addressing the question of why the two rulers "received vastly differing treatment from the pens of contemporary chroniclers" (p. 123). Fortunately for nonspecialists, the former issue receives considerably more attention than does the latter. But Petry's concern with historiographical matters leads him to introduce the book with a lengthy bibliographical essay instead of with a précis of Mamluk history or institutions that might assist the uninitiated to decipher the technical terms that pepper the text. The justification for this maneuver appears to be that little separates the facts of these two reigns from their

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presentation: "The disparate images of ruling style in the Mamluk sultanate during its closing years that emerge show two distinct approaches to sovereignty in one of the most prominent militarist states of the Muslim world at the end of the Middle Ages" (p. 14). This conviction is most evident in the discussion of Qānsūh al-Ghawrī, which focuses as much on how the ruler was memorialized as it does on how his reign in fact differed from that of his predecessor (pp. 126–30). Postmodernists will no doubt delight in Petry's subtle melding of events and interpretation. To old-fashioned modernists, however, blurring the line between reality and representation in this fashion confuses two quite different areas of inquiry and makes it much more difficult to grapple with either subject satisfactorily.

FRED H. LAWSON
Mills College

LESLIE P. PEIRCE. *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire.* (Studies in Middle Eastern History.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 374. Cloth $60.00, paper $19.95.

The harem described in Leslie P. Peirce's fascinating book is not the lascivious sexual playground conceived by the Western imagination but the locus of power in the Ottoman empire. The rule of the House of Osman was a family affair: sovereignty was held less by any particular (male) sultan than by the family as a whole, an attitude derived from both Islamic and Turco-Mongol traditions. In such a world the women of the imperial household could, under certain conditions, hold a considerable degree of power. Peirce's book is a detailed survey of the conditions which, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, afforded the women of the Ottoman dynasty a remarkable share of both the trappings and substance of sovereignty.

The women at the center of Peirce's study are the royal concubines, the focus of the dynasty's efforts to reproduce itself. With the gradual withdrawal of the sultans and their male offspring into the private precincts of the imperial palace, women favored by the sultan and occupying an important place within the hierarchy of the harem were well positioned to influence the course of events. Beginning with Hurrem, concubine (and later wife) to Süleyman the Magnificent, the *haseki* (favorite) of the sultan began to play an important role in Ottoman dynastic politics. Later, as a series of preadolescent or mentally incompetent sultans came to the throne, power shifted away from the *haseki* to the *valide sultan*, the mother of the reigning sultan. By most accounts, the "sultanate of the women" ended with the rise to power of the Köprülü family of grand vizirs in the 1650s, although Peirce makes it clear that their ascendancy reflected a calculated political decision on the part of the current *valide sultan*.

That the women of the imperial household wielded considerable power represents no major discovery; contemporary Ottoman observers commented on the fact, as have the standard Western accounts. What Peirce has done is to set that phenomenon in context, arguing for its integral connection to broader themes of Ottoman political history. The book's first section, "The Politics of Reproduction," is a reworking of Ottoman dynastic history to the middle of the seventeenth century, arguing that the power wielded by Hurrem and others was a logical development within the ideological and political parameters of Ottoman tradition. Chapter 5, based largely on original archival research, is a detailed description of the hierarchy in the imperial harem and of the personal and political networks that connected its inmates to the outside world. Especially intriguing is a chapter on the symbols and the display of sovereign authority, arguing that the *haseki* and *valide sultan* used public ceremonial and their enormous wealth to make themselves active "partner[s] in sultanic sovereignty" (p. 188).

In Peirce's analysis, the participation of Ottoman women in dynastic sovereignty was a normal if not inevitable consequence of Ottoman political traditions. To demonstrate this, she must overcome the suspicions of both her sources and much Western scholarship that the "sultanate of the women" was an aberration. Contemporary European accounts of political life in the Ottoman capital were distorted by both a prurient fascination with the imagined sexual extravagance of the harem's inmates and the evolving Western criticism of the Ottomans as a depraved and despotic "Oriental" monarchy, a discourse that itself had a pronounced sexual element. Ottoman observers, inspired by Islamic and Near Eastern traditions that frowned on women's participation in politics, portrayed the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as a period of decline and saw in the activities of Hurrem and others a cause of imperial weakness. In this respect Peirce's book reinforces the current reluctance of historians to accept easy judgments about the decline of the Ottoman empire, seeing ideological rather than historical arguments at their foundation.

There are points where the argument gets the better of the evidence. For instance, Peirce argues that Sultan Murad III, by burying his mother next to his father Selim II, "emphasized his mother's place within the dynastic family and suggested that his legitimacy was derived from her as well as from his father" (p. 189). But, as she goes on to note, Selim's five other sons, all executed by Murad, were also buried with their father; to say the least, this raises questions about the precise political significance of interment with the sultan. More generally, the book is full of qualifications such as "no doubt" and "it seems likely that" and "perhaps," by which Pierce casts many of her conclusions in a speculative light. But the general thesis of this outstanding book—that the power wielded by the women of the imperial harem was real, and that it stood in an organic relation to

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broader Ottoman political traditions and practice—will be widely accepted.

JONATHAN P. BERKEY
Davidson College

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN. *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 188. Cloth $45.00, paper $16.00.

Do the political ideas and practices associated with the name of Ayatollah Khomeini amount to a distinct ideology that plausibly could be called "Khomeinism"? Ervand Abrahamian's answer is yes, but with the important caveat that Khomeinism is in fact a variant of Third World populism. He justifiably criticizes the simplistic approach that tends to explain the developments of the past fifteen years in Iran in terms of the analytically flawed notion of "Islamic fundamentalism." By populism Abrahamian primarily means a middle-class movement that uses radical rhetoric to mobilize the lower classes. It entails the struggle of nation-states to come to terms with modernity; it is ideologically flexible and tends to be intellectually feeble. Khomeini, we are told, broke sharply with Shi'i tradition and employed a borrowed radical rhetoric of immense public appeal, centered not on theological issues but on real socioeconomic and political grievances. In league with other populists, however, his ideological radicalism did not mask his middle-class concerns.

To elucidate this argument, Abrahamian surveys certain salient corollaries of Khomeinism. He shows how May Day, adopted from Western socialist traditions, can in its metamorphosed form indicate the erosion of the radical rhetoric of the regime, but can also serve to illustrate the symbolic strength of leftist traditions in Iran. He discusses how history has been manipulated and distorted, how complex issues have been simplified along a sharp dichotomy of good versus evil to endow the regime with "populistic as well as religious legitimacy" (p. 92), and also to persecute, demonize, denigrate, marginalize, or coopt opponents. He also deals with "the paranoid style" in Iranian politics, which, borrowing from Richard Hofstadter, he insists should be seen not as a psychological disorder or a by-product of the Iranian "national character" but as a political style. Pervasive across the Iranian political spectrum, the paranoid style should be explained in terms of Iran's experience of imperialism as well as the gap between the Iranian state and the society. Based on a ubiquitous belief in invisible foreign hands and insidious conspiracies, this style of politics links opposition to treason, thus seeing or portraying political actors as mere puppets. The result, in Abrahamian's view, has been detrimental for political pluralism and has plagued collective efforts and coalitions.

Abrahamian admits that he has left many issues unexplored but contends that an investigation of other questions would similarly reveal the primacy of political and socioeconomic considerations over "scriptural principles." By insisting on this point and by focusing on populism, he does not wish to deny the specificity of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its consequences. Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic sought to base its legitimacy on popular-revolutionary validations and the frequently invoked support of "the people," expressed formally through elections and informally through mass rallies and demonstrations. Simultaneously, the republic has justified itself by claiming to represent and aiming to perpetuate the authentic principles of Islam. It has viewed itself as fully competent to identify and serve the higher spiritual interests of the people, and has sought to bring about not only sociopolitical change but also a new moral and spiritual order. It has sought to sacralize governance and reverse the process that Max Weber called the "disenchantment of the world." Populism understood in a general and analytically undifferentiated sense does not adequately account for the politics of religion and for the ideological and structural configuration of the post–1979 Iranian state. It can be vulnerable to some of the same criticisms leveled against the notion of Islamic fundamentalism, and its descriptive use exceeds its explanatory value.

In his treatment of the use and abuse of history, the author could have employed the ideas of Maurice Halbwachs and included a discussion of collective memory. He might also have investigated the extent to which the belief in conspiracy is internalized and strongly held, and the circumstances in which it is tactically invoked, and elaborated on the factors that have, in his view, accounted for the gap between the people and the state. To broach such issues is not, however, to deny that Abrahamian has written a lucid and provocative book.

FAKHREDDIN AZIMI
University of Connecticut, Storrs

JACOB ABADI. *Israel's Leadership: From Utopia to Crisis.* (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 40.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1993. Pp. 199. $55.00.

Jacob Abadi begins this study by telling us that it is "an evaluation of Israel's founding fathers and their successors" (p. 1). This book is not the source to which scholars will want to turn, however, if they seek serious evaluation of the few individuals covered in these pages, much less if they seek systematic study of the topic suggested in the title of the book. This is not really a book about Israel's political leadership—broadly speaking—at all. Rather, it provides superficial profiles of a limited number of Israel's political leaders.

Abadi writes in the introduction that there has been little systematic study of political leadership in

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Israel. That is true, and this fact suggests that this would have been a good subject of study for a book; it may have been what convinced Greenwood Press to publish a book with this title. Unfortunately, instead of a systematic study of Israel's political leadership, what we get here is a series of superficial chapters on a small number of (albeit historically very important) individual leaders in Israel's political history. There is no real discussion here of leadership per se.

Even the initial ten-page introductory chapter fails to deliver on its promise. After Abadi begins by telling us that it is necessary to understand what leadership is before it is possible to assess the quality of leaders in Israel, he provides an extremely superficial (nine-page) discussion of leadership, referring to only four sources dealing with political leadership, to provide the theoretical foundation for the work. Needless to say, he does not even begin to scratch the surface of all of the general literature on political leadership, and consequently he fails to provide a theoretical base for the pages that follow.

Four of the six brief chapters provide mini-biographies of individual leaders who have been important in Israel's political history: Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Menachem Begin. The last two chapters cover groups of leaders. "The Old Guard and the End of the Labor's Ascendency" and "Mapai's Youngsters and Shamir's Rise to Power" each treat several of the newer cadre of Israel's political leadership. Given that the full-chapter discussions of individual leaders are inadequate, the reader can imagine how unsatisfactory these "minisections" are.

This book will be of interest only to scholars who have no access to other resource materials on Israeli politics and political history. The discussion is atheoretical and generally superficial. Although the book has an adequate bibliography, this is not a work for which scholars and libraries will want to commit overstretched acquisition dollars.

GREGORY S. MAHLER
University of Mississippi

AFRICA

MICHAEL A. GOMEZ. *Pragmatism in the Age of Jihad: The Precolonial State of Bundu.* (African Studies Series, number 75.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 252.

Bundu was a small, multiethnic Muslim state in eastern Senegambia situated along the northern band of the West African savanna. According to oral tradition, it was founded by Mālik Sī, an itinerant cleric, in the late seventeenth century. Bundu emerged in the aftermath of a failed Islamic revolution launched in northwestern Senegambia that brought catastrophe to the Wolof states and to the Fulbe state of Futa Tooro. On the death of the founder Mālik Sī, his son Bubu Mālik Sī took the reigns of power. At the son's death, early in the eighteenth century, Bundu experienced a period of political disorder in which the state fell apart. Out of this chaos the Sissibe clan emerged to establish themselves as the ruling Muslim aristocracy. By the late eighteenth century in Senegambia, following successful jihads in Futa Jallon (1720s–1740s) to the south and Futa Tooro (1760s–1770s) to the northwest, Bundu was one of three Muslim polities in a larger mosaic of states that were not led by Muslim aristocracies but that often incorporated substantial Muslim trading communities. It successfully negotiated this relationship into the first half of the nineteenth century. Weakened successively by civil war, regional jihad, and a tyrant's reign during the second half of the nineteenth century, Bundu, along with the other Muslim and non-Muslim states of the western savanna, eventually fell to French colonial conquest in the 1880s.

Michael A. Gomez has undertaken a careful study of the conflicting oral sources and documentation on Bundu in English, French, and Arabic. He has brought forth some new and convincing interpretations. He argues that Mālik Sī was not a crusading cleric but rather a humble practitioner of the Islamic arts whose challenge was to integrate his spiritual concerns with political governance. He argues that the Muslim polity of Bundu was not militant, and that it can best be understood as pursuing a policy of pragmatism that allowed it to negotiate with both Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors. This policy was made necessary by Bundu's strategic position in the western savanna, which allowed it to participate both in the trans-Saharan and Atlantic trades. This argument for Bundu's pragmatism is advanced in a series of well-designed chapters in which Gomez reconstructs the political history of the Bundu elite, including the reconstitution of the state by Maka Jiba (1720–64), the troubled relationship between Bundu and the more radical Muslim state of Futa Tooro, and the conflicts and divisions between the Sissibe ruling clan and the Jakhanke clerisy, which handled matters of trade.

This is a book for precolonial historians of the western savanna. It might have been destined for a larger readership had some important, broader issues been engaged. Gomez states that Bundu's participation in international trade with North Africa and into the Atlantic world was key, yet he does not investigate the nature of this trade or how and why it changed over time. Bundu exported captives, but Gomez does not discuss the warfare or raiding that generated this enslavement. Neither does he treat the relationship between the peasantry and the state. The general interpretive framework would have been even more robust and convincing had these issues been addressed.

Yet, these reservations aside, Gomez's accomplishment is impressive. He has written the first modern political history of Bundu and has revised our understanding of the origins and religio-political character

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of the Bundunke state. His book provides specialists with a valuable chronology of events from the founding of the state until its dissolution in 1905. He thereby makes an important contribution both to the history of precolonial Senegambia and to the study of Islam in West Africa.

JAMES L. A. WEBB, JR.
Colby College

JEFFREY A. FADIMAN. *When We Began There Were Witchmen: An Oral History from Mount Kenya.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 395. Cloth $45.00, paper $18.00.

In this oral history of the Meru peoples of Kenya, Jeffrey A. Fadiman breaks with recent trends in the writing of African history, in which oral traditions are employed as data for historians' own interpretations of African pasts, to place Meru traditions themselves in the forefront as interpretations of their own history. In the author's words, "This book is intended . . . not as a 'definitive' history of Meru, but as its oral history, the past as perceived by those who lived it" (p. 18).

According to the earliest Meru traditions, their forebears once lived on an island as fishers and farmers until they were forced to cross to the mainland and migrate across an arid desert to settle eventually on the fertile slopes of Mount Kenya. During their migration and subsequent settlement, the original community began to fragment into different groups according to their occupations as farmers, hunters, and iron workers or their places of settlement, each group developing its own distinctive cultural traditions marked by different ritual associations and practices.

Subsequent Meru history is largely related in terms of these ritual associations, as different groups of people sought to mobilize supernatural powers to ensure their own well-being and access to vital resources as well as to protect themselves from others. Later, when threatened in the 1890s by unprecedented natural disasters and in the twentieth century by colonial conquest, Meru society became increasingly differentiated between those with access to increasingly scarce resources and those without; some of these associations were adapted by impoverished peoples on the fringes of Meru society to lay claim to resources controlled by wealthier farmers and cattle owners.

These conflicts ran largely along generational lines between formally constituted age-sets in which young men sought to become warriors and raid for cattle so that they might later marry and settle down as prosperous family heads and eventually become wise and respected elders. Shrinking resources and the end of warfare thus brought increased tensions between the young men, who were unable to perform their allotted roles, and their elders, who controlled the resources the young needed if they were to advance to become successful family heads and elders themselves. Colonial labor requirements, the appointment of government chiefs, demands placed by missionaries on their young converts, and colonial attacks on the ritual associations in the name of countering "witchcraft" all exacerbated these tensions until Meru society was in danger of internal collapse by the 1930s.

This oral history provides a valuable inside perspective on Meru history and is especially revealing on the subject of internal conflicts generated by colonialism as well as on issues pertaining to Meru conversion to Christianity. Fadiman tends, however, to accept idealized and normative views of a "golden past" (recreated as Meru historians recast their memories to provide historical meaning to current practice) uncritically as traditions "passed down word for word by no fewer than nineteen generations" (p. 8). He also freely interpolates earlier accounts while ignoring important reconceptualizations of central Kenyan, Swahili, and Maasai history published over the past twenty years that cast some doubt on his interpretations of Meru migrations and settlement. By uncritically accepting Meru traditions as immutable and interweaving them with other sources, Fadiman thus tends to create a romanticized and reified "traditional history" of his own. The result is neither a critical history based on oral traditions nor an oral history as transmitted by Meru themselves, but rather a free rendering—largely unfootnoted—very much in the author's own voice that harks back to colonial administrators in the 1930s who reinvented Meru tradition in a vain attempt to counter the disruptions of colonial rule.

THOMAS SPEAR
University of Wisconsin, Madison

HENRIETTA L. MOORE and MEGAN VAUGHAN. *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia 1890–1990.* (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann or James Currey, London, or University of Zambia Press, Lusaka. 1994. Pp. xxvi, 278. Cloth $45.00, paper $22.95.

This book consists of a series of interrelated essays on agrarian history in Northern Province, Zambia, in the colonial and postcolonial periods. Conceived originally as a follow-up of Audrey Richards's ethnographic classic, *Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia* (1939), this volume is both more and less than that. Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan abandoned their original plan, both because the mobility of people and settlements in northeastern Zambia made it difficult to trace the communities Richards had studied, and because they concluded that Richards's concern with uncovering the political structure that she believed to be the permanent reality underlying the Bemba peoples' ostensibly mo-

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bile and impermanent way of life led her to exaggerate the unity and uniformity of Bemba society and culture. In the process of correcting what they came to see as fundamental limitations in Richards's analysis and method, Moore and Vaughan have produced a richly textured study of diversity, not only in the ecology of northeastern Zambia and the agricultural practices of its peoples but also in their strategies of consumption and distribution, their social relations, and the historical trajectories of their engagements with supralocal economic and social processes. Through an extended dialogue with their primary sources and secondary works, the authors describe and interpret the construction of knowledge about agriculture and society in the region as well as contribute to it.

Some of the most absorbing chapters in the book are those that juxtapose evidence on the 1980s with primary and scholarly material on the latter half of the colonial period to reframe previous debates about the history of agriculture, labor migration, marriage, women's work, and food security in the region. In particular, the authors argue that the peoples of northeastern Zambia have never followed a single set of agricultural and cultural practices but rather pursued multiple strategies of production, consumption, settlement, and social interaction throughout this period, with varied outcomes. From this perspective, they go on to propose significant revisions to previous scholarly discussion of the effects of commercialization, labor migration, and *citemene* cultivation on the social and ecological history of the region. For example, they argue convincingly that people have continued to practice *citemene,* despite decades of official discouragement, not out of habit or as a form of resistance to state authority but as part of a strategy of diversifying household food supplies and work schedules (p. 139). Similarly, they suggest that previous efforts to assess the net effect of labor migration on levels of agricultural production and rural livelihood in northeastern Zambia have underplayed variations, over space and time, in its impact on patterns of agricultural production or the division of rural labor. And they offer an important critique of the argument that labor migration and commercialization led to a "breakdown" of marital relations and rural families in the Northern Province. On the contrary, marriage has remained important in a range of interrelated social processes—from labor control and household reproduction to the formation of social networks—and people's experiences of marriage have changed accordingly, in diverse ways that defy single labels or summary assessments.

Moore and Vaughan's reinterpretations of agricultural and social history in northeastern Zambia are effective in part because they are carefully, almost reluctantly, teased out of a mass of detailed, locally specific, and inevitably fragmentary material. They give scrupulous attention to the work of previous researchers, combing through the published and unpublished work of scholars and government officials, carefully acknowledging their contributions as well as the gaps and limitations in their evidence and interpretations, and seeking to reposition earlier research in relation to recent debates in historiographical and anthropological writing about Africa. Indeed, given their detailed and thoughtful discussions of others' methods of research and interpretation, and their stated intent to "develop new methodological practices for the writing of African historiography and anthropology" (p. xv), Moore and Vaughan are surprisingly reticent about discussing their own methods of field research. Thus, we are told only the number, occupation, gender, and location of the people they interviewed, but nothing about how they selected their research sites or decided whom to interview, let alone anything about the context or conduct of the interviews themselves. Oddly, then, Moore and Vaughan's exemplary effort to "locate" others' field research—both historically and conceptually—is not matched by an equivalent treatment of their own.

Nonetheless, this is an important book that provides new ways of thinking and writing about agrarian history in northeastern Zambia and in Africa more generally. Like the cropping and settlement patterns, income sources, domestic arrangements, and social histories of the people of northeastern Zambia, Moore and Vaughan's chapters are sometimes overlapping and repetitive but invariably filled with rich diversity, multiple perspectives, and a vivid appreciation of the contingencies and possibilities of rural life.

Sara Berry
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Les Switzer. *Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of South Africa.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 452. Cloth $72.50, paper $29.50.

This is the second notable work on the Xhosa of the eastern Cape in South Africa in as many years. The first, Clifton Crais's *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (1992), presented Xhosa resistance to European colonialism up to the late 1850s from a postmodern perspective, examining not only the clash of power between conquerer and conquered but also, more pointedly, the interaction of contrasting world views and perceptions of reality and identity. Les Switzer by contrast offers a more classic view of the Ciskei (one of the two Xhosa-speaking "homelands" under the late apartheid regime) as, at various times, either the engine or the train of resistance to colonialism and apartheid. "The history of the Ciskei," he argues, "has been the history of South Africa in microcosm" (p. 351).

Switzer makes the case for his assertion by fashioning a comprehensive and meticulously argued account of Ciskei Xhosa history from the Iron Age down to 1981, using for the most part printed primary sources and secondary works. His Xhosa began pri-

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marily as stockfarmers, becoming mixed farmers by the nineteenth century. They lived in segmentary states led by chiefs descended from a single royal lineage (in contrast to other powerful centralized nineteenth-century states in the region, such as the Zulu or the Swazi). Political segmentation, he claims, did not prevent the Xhosa from mounting the most formidable defense of any southern African peoples against European colonialism after the 1770s.

That argument will have its detractors, because the Europeans were at various times able to play one Xhosa chief off against another in the various wars that led to the end of their sovereignty; and because that end, when it came (in the late 1850s), constituted not a capitulation so much as an implosion, both political and spiritual, which was the product of Xhosa national exhaustion and despair. It was known as the Cattle-killing (1856–57) and amounted to a self-inflicted famine instigated by spirit mediums made powerful by the desperation of the times. Switzer thinks, in any event, that the very vastness of the catastrophe led to the unparalleled scope with which the Xhosa were then subordinated into the monetary and mercantile system that colonialism brought in its tow. Already as early as the 1830s the Xhosa homestead was in the process of disintegrating beyond the point of agricultural self-sufficiency; after the Cattle-killing, beginning in the 1870s (the mineral era, diamond discoveries followed by gold discoveries) the Xhosa became the first African society to send its men off to migrant labor in substantial numbers.

Proletarianization principally, along with the influence of the missions, led to the formation of a Xhosa middle class; with it came the beginnings of African resistance. Switzer posits the Ciskei as "the region where the first independent African religious, educational, and economic organizations in the postconquest era were launched" (p. 353). It was there, for instance, that African clergymen were among the first to establish churches independent of the European missions. It was also there that Fort Hare Native College was established in 1916, South Africa's first nonracial institution of higher education, some of whose graduates (or, in the case of Nelson Mandela, expellees) would one day complement the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and lead the nation out of the era of apartheid.

It was really beginning in the 1920s that Switzer sees the Ciskei Xhosa becoming principal contestants in popular resistance struggles. Those struggles took many forms: millenarian movements, often violent, during the 1920s; widespread peasant support of the most notable labor union movement of the early 1930s; petit-bourgeois support of the then-activist wing of the ANC, the Youth League (especially the Fort Hare branch) during the 1950s. During the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, the Ciskei, being by then the most impoverished and politically repressed of all the African "homeland" labor reserves, became the scene of the most embittered and violent unionization and other labor resistance struggles in all of South Africa. It was consequently entirely appropriate that the South African apartheid government's client regime in the Ciskei, led by the Sebe brothers (Lennox and Charles), should present it with the most spectacularly bizarre and tragicomical collapse of all its puppet homeland governments, during the 1980s.

Switzer's study of the Ciskei will certainly merit a prominent place in the growing body of literature on resistance in southern Africa. It is based on extensive research in printed sources and articulately argued within a helpful historiographical framework, supported by excellent maps and tables. Its weakness lies in its balance and emphasis. In his attempt to clearly introduce each new phase of Xhosa history or dimension of Ciskei resistance, the author places heavy emphasis on the broader, general background (the formation and development, say, of the ANC), sometimes to the extent of overshadowing his principal subject. And there remains much to be written on Xhosa resistance, particularly over the past hundred years or so, based more on archival and oral sources. Finally, it is a pity that a comprehensive work of scholarship such as this should contain no bibliography. Still, those interested in the Xhosa and resistance will find this an indispensable source, a work of broad research and insightful interpretation, and a significant contribution to our understanding.

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ASIA

EDWARD A. MCCORD. *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. 436. $45.00.

Edward A. McCord's study traces and analyzes the development of warlordism in the central Chinese provinces of Hubei and Hunan from 1911 to 1921. McCord essentially asks three questions: when, how, and why did warlordism begin? He argues that warlordism did not emerge at a single point in time but rather over a span of several years, from 1911 to 1916, during which the unified civil administration of the Qing dynasty gave way, in a three-step process, to the multiple military regimes of the warlords.

The first step, which began the politicization of the military, was the 1911 revolution: on the one hand, the intervention of the provincial New Armies assured the success of the revolution; on the other hand, the revolution legitimized the use of military power for political purposes. But the "military governors" (*dudu*) who dominated after the revolution were not yet warlords, because they worked with and carried out the wishes of the provincial civil elite, as evi-

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denced by the large-scale demobilization of unruly soldiers at this time in both Hubei and Hunan. Furthermore, although the revolution led to the devolution of authority from the center to the provinces, it did not produce political fragmentation; on the contrary, there was "a vibrant new civil polity" at the provincial level (p. 83).

The second step in the militarization of Chinese politics was the unsuccessful Second Revolution against Yuan Shikai in 1913, as both Yuan and his opponents sought once again to achieve political ends by military means. Yuan's subsequent reliance on coercion to implement his policies—for example, his revival of the monarchy with himself as monarch—further contributed to the growth of warlordism. Yuan's was not a military regime, however, but rather a revival of the "civilian-oriented central bureaucratic administration" (p. 162) of the Qing; it also halted, although only temporarily, the drift of authority from the center to the provinces.

The third and most crucial step came in the "Anti-Monarchical War" that was launched in late 1915 by opponents of Yuan's monarchist scheme. This was yet another instance of resorting to military power to solve a political problem. The consequences this time were far more serious, as the war not only justified an enormous expansion of the armed forces but also "created an opportunity for military commanders on both sides of the conflict to increase their political influence." In some places, they "effectively freed themselves from remaining central constraints and consolidated their authority over provincial administrations." One such place was Hubei, where the incumbent military governor, the Beiyang general Wang Zhanyuan, "emerged from the war with all the characteristics of a warlord" (pp. 206, 207). In Hunan, however, warlordism was delayed a couple of years. It was not until the North-South War of 1917–18 that the regime of the civilian Tan Yankai was replaced by that of the Beiyang warlord Zhang Jingyao. In short, by the late 1910s full warlordism, defined as "a situation where a number of individual military commanders exercise autonomous political power by virtue of the actual or threatened use of the military force under their personal control" (p. 4), had triumphed in both provinces.

The book ends with a description of the warlord regimes of Wang Zhanyuan in Hubei and Zhang Jingyao in Hunan. It is ironic as well as symptomatic of the times that neither of them lasted long. Zhang was ousted in May 1920 and replaced by a native Hunanese warlord, Zhao Hengti; Wang, in Hubei, was gone by July 1921, replaced by another Beiyang warlord.

McCord's analysis is well organized, thoroughly documented, and, with but one exception, persuasive. His principal sources include contemporary newspapers such as the *Shibao* of Shanghai, memoirs of participants (for example, those published in the national and local editions of the *Wenshi ziliao* series), and American consular despatches. The one possible weakness in the analysis concerns the introduction of non-native (or "guest") armies into both provinces in 1912 to help with the demobilization of the provincial troops. McCord fails to explain satisfactorily how this move, so characteristic of the later warlords, was consistent with the principle of provincial self-rule that the regimes of Li Yuanhong in Hubei and Tan Yankai in Hunan were supposedly upholding at this time.

As with any case study, there is always the question of its typicality. McCord acknowledges that the experiences of Hubei and Hunan were "unique in a number of respects" (p. 15). But by examining two provinces he is better able to highlight both their similarities and their differences than if he had focused on only one. His book complements several earlier studies, including Joseph Esherick's on the 1911 revolution in Hubei and Hunan (*Reform and Revolution in China* [1976]), Ernest Young's on the dictatorship of Yuan Shikai (*The Presidency of Yuan Shih-K'ai* [1977]), and Donald Sutton's on the warlord army in Yunnan (*Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic* [1980]).

EDWARD RHOADS
University of Texas, Austin

DEBORAH A. KAPLE. *Dream of A Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1994. Pp. xvi, 163. $35.00.

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949, its leaders had reason to be wary of the Soviet Union, whose dictator Joseph Stalin had long viewed them with suspicion and provided only limited assistance to the Communists during their revolutionary civil war. Nevertheless, in short order the People's Republic of China (PRC) not only formed an alliance with the Soviet Union but also adopted the Soviet model of economic development. Deborah A. Kaple's narrowly conceived monograph skirts the question of why Mao Zedong, who had learned to discount Soviet views on questions of foreign policy and revolutionary strategy, so fervently embraced Moscow's economic model. Instead, she focuses on the question of what exactly was the model that the Chinese adopted and how the Soviet experience was transmitted to the Chinese during the first several years of the PRC.

The author's major thesis is that what the Chinese adopted was not a generic Soviet developmental model but rather the very specific contours of high Stalinism as incorporated in the Soviet Union's Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1946–50. The core features of this plan were an emphasis on management and control of every aspect of industrial life by the Communist Party and the mobilization and indoctrination of workers through non-material incentives. Because significant numbers of Soviet specialists did not actually go to China until 1953, she argues, the primary

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means for transmitting the Soviet experience to China was through Soviet textbooks on management, which were translated in large numbers from Russian to Chinese, mostly by the Chinese Communists themselves. Kaple compares the Chinese translations against the Russian originals to make the point that the PRC's industrial management model in the early years was taken lock, stock, and barrel from the Soviets. The CCP's plans for socialist industrialization, its "dream of the red factory"—an allusion to the great Qing novel *Dream of a Red Chamber*—is actually a Stalinist dream, and in this respect Maoism and high Stalinism are virtually identical.

Kaple repeatedly cautions her readers that the industrial management model spelled out in Soviet textbooks and their Chinese translations is an idealized model that does not necessarily bear much resemblance to actual practices in Soviet or Chinese industry. Indeed, she says that, after only a year and a half, Moscow quietly jettisoned the Fourth Five-Year Plan, which proved unworkable, but that, apparently unaware of this, the Chinese continued to take it as their own template.

That the Chinese, with their characteristic if short-lived enthusiasm for new approaches, quickly translated large numbers of Soviet textbooks is an interesting point, but it is hardly enough to sustain even as slim a book as Kaple's. Her formalistic approach boils down to little more than a comparison of Chinese and Soviet management textbooks and tells us nothing of how actual Chinese management practices in the early 1950s compared with their close Soviet antecedents. All her Russian and Chinese sources are openly published books. One wonders whether access to the limited edition, restricted circulation literature that was so important in both the Soviet Union and the PRC might have altered the picture she presents. Moreover, had she delved further into the existing scholarly literature on Chinese factories in the early 1950s, and perhaps conducted interviews with Chinese workers and managers from that era, she might have provided us with a much more substantive and revealing account of the interaction between the Soviet and Chinese experiences of industrialization and management.

As it is, this book is a disappointment. It contains only enough material for an interesting journal article or two. Its 115 pages of text are repetitive, the single thesis is reiterated again and again, it is woodenly written, and it still bears the earmarks of its origins as a dissertation. The subject of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1950s is a rich and still underexplored area. In continuing her research in this area, one hopes that in both a conceptual and empirical sense Kaple will cast her net more broadly than she has in this study, whose title, unfortunately, is the best part of the book.

Steven I. Levine
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A. Doak Barnett. *China's Far West: Four Decades of Change.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1993. Pp. xiii, 688. $39.95.

As A. Doak Barnett explains in his introduction, this book is a combination of travelogue, scholarship, journalistic reporting, and personal reflections on change in China. The first of a multivolume project, it covers western China, broadly defined to include Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, the Ganzi region in Sichuan, and the southwestern province of Yunnan. Although these regions are extremely diverse—and not all of them are strictly speaking in the west—a common thread is their relative remoteness and their ethnic diversity. Given the vast territory covered and brief amount of time the author was able to spend in each region, it is perhaps not surprising that the result is an uneven portrayal of change in China's borderlands.

There are some good things about this study. Having traveled extensively throughout western China in 1948, Barnett is able to do what many younger sinologists cannot: draw comparisons based on personal observations made in both 1948 and 1988. Indeed, in each chapter, Barnett draws on his earlier travels, recounted in his *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (1963), vividly reminding us of that earlier era in "frontier China" which he portrayed so well. It is also worth remembering—and Barnett frequently reminds us—that China's economic metamorphosis is a remarkable achievement when measured by the standard of 1948.

This account is not for the faint of heart. At 660 pages of text, it is extremely lengthy, at times overwhelming in its detail, and often repetitive. Each chapter covers one particular region and is illustrated with maps and some intriguing "before and after" photographs. There is no bibliography, the sources being primarily government officials he interviewed and his own observations.

Given Barnett's special guest status, his access to Chinese officials, and his long and intimate acquaintance with China (he was born and raised there), one would anticipate that this study would provide some material not otherwise available. There are some nuggets to be discovered in the voluminous text, but several chapters have already been superseded by recent publications.

For each region, copious amounts of government-generated detail and officially sanctioned views are offered with little to guide the reader unfamiliar with China in assessing their value and reliability. For instance, in commenting on the reconfiguring of the boundaries of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) in 1978, he was told, and found plausible, the government line that this was in response to Mongol desire for unity (p. 52). The impression he gives of a government sensitive to local minority wishes, however, is misleading. On issues ranging from nuclear testing in Xinjiang to Han

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Chinese migration into all the border areas, Beijing is clearly on record as being little concerned with meeting minority demands.

In other instances Barnett relies on his own observations, but here, too, he is not always a reliable guide. For example, he repeatedly avows that he personally saw no instances of interracial conflict. Having traveled to most of the regions he visited, however, my impressions were vastly different. In Xinjiang, in particular, conflict between Chinese and Uighurs occurs on a daily basis. Even if he did not personally witness any of this during his visit to Urumqi, he must have learned later of the demonstrations against ethnic discrimination that erupted there in June 1988, just after his late-April visit. (Demonstrations by Uighurs and other minority groups continued throughout that summer and fall and were followed by violent clashes in 1989 and 1990.) Not to tell the whole story is surely a disservice to the reader as well as to the record of Chinese-minority relations.

Throughout the text Barnett details the arrival of modernization, largely in the form of new factories, better transportation, and the nearly universal availability of television, all advances that local populations must welcome. But the locals these days are largely Han Chinese, the result of a massive demographic shift over the past decades. Virtually all the important changes described here are the result of this single most important change, a fact that is easily submerged in masses of detail.

In the final chapter, a relatively concise, focused discussion draws together Barnett's general observations and provides the reader with the analysis one sought in vain in the body of the text. Although some of the same difficulties are apparent here, the concluding chapter is the best.

This book is not up to the high standards Barnett set in his earlier works or in his other major contributions to the field over his long career. Those contributions remain a significant body of work for which he has been justly admired for so long. They ought to continue to serve as the gauge by which his reputation is measured.

LINDA BENSON
Oakland University

DENNIS DALTON. *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 279. $29.50.

This volume is a collection of essays on selected aspects of Gandhi's philosophy and leadership, illustrated with two case studies of "nonviolent power in action": the salt march and the Calcutta fast. It represents the culmination of decades of research and study (some of the interviews cited are from the 1960s), which accounts for Dennis Dalton's sureness of touch, cogent handling of ideas, lucid prose, and effortless movement between theory and narrative.

Dalton begins with an exposition of the fundamentals of Gandhism, which he sees as the interaction of *swaraj* (personal self-discipline leading to freedom, especially freedom from fear) and *satyagraha* (the sociopolitical activity that both utilizes and nourishes *swaraj*). He points out that Gandhi's genius was in combining *swaraj* and *satyagraha*—theory and practice—and the book's strength lies in the author's ability to follow Gandhi in showing exactly how ideas were translated into action.

In the story of the salt *satyagraha* of 1930, Dalton discusses the origin of the idea, the mechanics of organization, the use of the media, the powerful symbolism of salt, and its special meaning to women, who came to see the relation of home to politics. By research into official correspondence, Dalton shows the profound dilemma this humble band of marchers caused the British empire. The success of the salt *satyagraha* put new life into Gandhi's leadership and raised the morale of the Indian National Congress. The second case study is more somber. It shows Gandhi, near the end of his life, utilizing his charismatic power and his ultimate weapon, the fast, to bring the Hindus and Muslims of Calcutta together in 1947 after over a year of brutal communal violence.

Dalton also devotes a chapter to the relationship of the Gandhian movement to the civil rights movement in America with a comparative analysis of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. He comes to the surprising conclusion that Malcolm X, no less than King, was the soul brother of Gandhi.

The book has some minor shortcomings. In his chapter on Gandhi's critics, Dalton does not pay enough attention to attacks on Gandhian economics. In view of the needs of India's huge population, could Jawaharlal Nehru have afforded not to undertake a massive economic development program? Dalton could have enlightened us with a discussion of whether Gandhi's eccentric economic theories are essential to his concept of *satyagraha.* Elsewhere, in a discussion of the utility of using *satyagraha* against the Nazis, Dalton appears somewhat ambivalent. He first concedes the limits of the method, then points out that after World War II nonviolent mass protest has been successful against a number of dictators. Is it because the power of nonviolent resistance was little understood in the 1930s and 1940s that its use became widespread only after World War II? Finally, it would have been helpful if citations from the multivolume *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* included dates to enable the reader to place quotations in their historical setting as well as in the context of Gandhi's own intellectual development.

These problems are minor compared to the overall quality and power of the book. Although it adds important new dimensions to the specialist's understanding of Gandhi, it can also serve as a readable and absorbing introduction to the man. Let us hope the

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publisher will quickly bring out a paperback edition for classroom use.

BLAIR B. KLING
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JOHN MURPHY. *Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1994. Pp. xxii, 335. $19.95.

Few nations supported the U.S. effort in Vietnam with more enthusiasm than Australia. After the Geneva Conference in 1954, Canberra gave firm support to the Saigon regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1962, at the request of the Kennedy administration, the government of Prime Minister Robert Menzies dispatched a team of advisers to assist in the counterinsurgency effort. Three years later, it sent an infantry battalion to Phuoc Tuy province, on the coast east of Saigon, where it remained as part of the allied effort until its final withdrawal in December 1971.

In this ambitious book, John Murphy attempts to demonstrate not only why Australia became a firm ally of the United States in Vietnam but also why that effort was doomed to fail. In his view, initially the Australian public suffered from "a harvest of fear," a mentality that harbored a deep distrust of Asia and suspected that the menace of Chinese regional domination lay behind the bitter struggle taking place in Indochina. Responding to that public concern, successive Australian governments were willing and eager to offer assistance to the United States in its determination to stave off the communist threat in Southeast Asia.

The main focus of this book is the impact of the Vietnam War on the Australian political scene. Opposition to possible Australian involvement in Vietnam surfaced as early as the mid–1950s, but it was initially hampered by the leading role played by the Australian Communist Party in the peace movement, as well as the prevailing pro-American attitude of the electorate. Resistance began to crystallize after conscription was declared in the fall of 1964, but opinion within the opposition Labor Party was badly divided, and it was not until the late 1960s, when the Tet Offensive undermined confidence in U.S. policies, that an Australian equivalent of the New Left movement in the United States began systematically to protest Australian participation in the conflict. Yet the government continued to support the war effort, and it was only in July 1971, when President Richard Nixon announced his forthcoming trip to Beijing, that Canberra saw its main rationale for involvement disappear.

In following Washington's lead in Southeast Asia, the Australian government fell into the same trap that plagued U.S. policy makers in carrying out their strategy of nation-building in South Vietnam. Although the Australian mission was defined in terms of civic action, most Australian troops knew little about the area, while the local population reacted with indifference or hostility. Like the Americans, the Australians sometimes found it necessary to burn villages and resettle their inhabitants. By the end of the war, over 500 Australians had been killed and 3,000 wounded.

The strength of this book lies in its trenchant coverage of the domestic debate that accompanied Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. The author is also effective in pointing out the problems encountered by Australian troops in their nation-building effort. His portrayal of the situation in Phuoc Tuy province is a good case study of the dilemmas facing U.S. forces elsewhere in the country. What is lacking is adequate attention to the overall foreign policy context that motivated the Australian government to join regional alliances to prevent the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia. There is virtually no mention of Canberra's role in forming ANZUS and the SEATO agreement. Although Murphy may be correct in depicting the war in Vietnam as a civil conflict rather than northern aggression, it is surely insufficient merely to assert that Australian security concerns were based on an irrational fear of China without taking a closer look at the broader regional situation in postwar Southeast Asia.

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UNITED STATES

RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN. *Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It?* Assisted by JEROME AGEL. (Times Books.) New York: Random House. 1993. Pp. xix, 392. $24.50.

The title of this book gives thoughtful readers the vital clue they need to answer this trivia question: what place does Gregory D. Watson hold among the founders of the American republic? The answer, of course, is that Watson is the obscure Texas legislative aide who plucked from the dustbin of history James Madison's proposed amendment to delay congressional salary increases from being implemented until a fresh election of Representatives had taken place, and who then secured its ratification as the Twenty-seventh Amendment a scant 203 years after it was submitted to the states.

Watson's heroically trivial effort is only one of countless strange but true anecdotes that can be told about efforts to amend the Constitution. One virtue of Richard B. Bernstein's book is that it never degenerates into the cabinet of curiosities it might easily become (even if the subtitle suggests that impulse is difficult to resist). While providing capsule histories of all the successful amendments and not a few of the failures, Bernstein also proposes to consider Article 5 of the Constitution and its uses as serious subjects in their own right. Bernstein examines the various ways in which Article 5 has been activated instrumentally

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to secure particular ends unobtainable by lesser means; and in dealing with the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction amendments, he reviews the gap between original purposes and ensuing interpretations. To these predictable concerns, however, Bernstein adds a set of topical chapters that ask us to consider Article 5 as a serious element of American constitutionalism more generally. Drawing on Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional politics, Bernstein views the process established by Article 5 as an essential or even the most "energetic" part of a "continuing conversation" or "constitutional discourse" (pp. 270–71).

As this summary suggests, Bernstein's work is engaging and stimulating, but it is also one not easily characterized. In some ways it is more a compendium than a history in the strict sense, perhaps because a skeptical reader can conclude that the whole story of Article 5 is rather less than the sum of its parts. The overriding question this subject raises remains the one that dominates substantive constitutional discourse today: how have the principled affirmations of rights added to the Constitution in 1789–91 and again after the Civil War been translated into judicial doctrine and legislative enactments? Bernstein several times reminds the reader that the ratification of an amendment is only a prelude to its real history, which may see it sink into the long desuetude of the federal Bill of Rights; or undergo the interpretive shifts that transformed the Fourteenth Amendment, first contracting and then expanding its application in ways that defied the expectations of its adopters; or take effect in unanticipated situations, such as the dual use of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to place not one but two unelected vice presidents in the position once occupied by Spiro Agnew. But these developments and episodes carry us away from the rarely traversed channels of Article 5 and back onto the more familiar terrain of judicial interpretation and conventional politics.

This weakness is probably inherent in the subject, however, and rather than fault Bernstein on these grounds, I think he is to be commended for explaining so carefully just how complex a set of questions and problems cluster around Article 5. Whether we consider the impact of the individual amendments that have loomed largest in American constitutional history or the imperatives for judicial interpretation and political innovation that the high hurdles of the amendment process have generated, it is clear that Article 5 is not merely a constitutional joker. Where are you now, Gregory Watson?

JACK N. RAKOVE
Stanford University

DAVID A. J. RICHARDS. *Conscience and the Constitution: History, Theory, and Law of The Reconstruction Amendments.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 295. $35.00.

In this book, David A. J. Richards expands his interdisciplinary jurisprudential approach to constitutional interpretation, moving beyond the Constitution of 1787 to focus on the Reconstruction Amendments. Richards offers his jurisprudence, which brings "history, law, and political theory into a fruitful working relationship" (p. 16), as a superior alternative to John Hart Ely's majoritarianism or Robert Bork's flawed originalism.

After outlining the struggle between proslavery advocates and antislavery forces over constitutional interpretation, Richards concludes that the Reconstruction Amendments must be understood in light of three interrelated factors: revolutionary contractual constitutionalism with "toleration (based on the inalienable right of conscience)" as its central value (p. 4); Lockean political principles, which emphasize "respect for inalienable human rights and the pursuit of the public good" (p. 5); and abolitionist, rights-based, national government theory. Such an interpretation demonstrates that the Reconstruction Amendments mandate the national government to protect all inalienable rights and liberties. Courts must apply these amendments to protect a whole series of rights and groups within American society.

Richards next examines each of the Fourteenth Amendment's three clauses to determine which rights should be protected. After analyzing the framers' arguments and critiquing the Supreme Court's interpretive errors, he concludes that the privileges and immunities clause calls on the national government to protect not only those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights but unenumerated rights as well. The Court has misused the due process clause by giving it a substantive meaning. A more defensible and consistent jurisprudence would protect rights under the privileges and immunities clause instead. Hindered by the interpretive errors of the *Slaughterhouse* cases (1873), the Court needs to overturn this flawed ruling and revitalize the privileges and immunities clause. Thus, for example, the right of privacy would be protected under the privileges and immunities rather than the due process clause. The Court properly decided *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) and *Roe v. Wade* (1973), but its reasoning was flawed. But a better jurisprudential approach would prevent such interpretive errors as those found in *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986).

Based on his analysis of history, law, and political theory, Richards maintains that the equal protection clause must also be broadly defined. Suspect classification jurisprudence should apply to race, gender, and sexual preference, for each group has suffered unjust moral degradation because of historical and cultural marginalization. Most affirmative action plans, likewise, provide appropriate remedies to correct historical and cultural patterns of intolerance.

Finally, Richards concludes that the Reconstruction Amendments, because they are based on a condemnation of slavery as an economic injustice, clearly call

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for redistributive justice. The Supreme Court should not have retreated from its responsibility to examine economic legislation and protect economic rights. It needs to be especially careful to ensure justice by analyzing poverty as a suspect classification.

Richards presents an attractive jurisprudence that calls on courts to interpret the Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments broadly to protect inalienable rights. Richards defends his jurisprudence, in part, by historical analysis, but he clearly is not a historian. Although he recognizes that abolitionists comprised a small minority of the nation and that John A. Bingham and others, as framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not reflect the thinking of the entire Republican Party, his conclusions ignore this reality. Moreover, he stresses moral commitment as the prime motivator, ignoring the political struggles and the human reaction to the South's intransigence. Northerners did not emerge from the Civil War committed to equal rights; their views of freedom and rights evolved as they struggled against southern and presidential policies. This sense of development over time and the recognition of differing motivations and factions are the stuff historians thrive on. This study, like Richards's earlier works, bends standards of sound historical scholarship, concentrating on a handful of antebellum and Reconstruction leaders and often ignoring the broader historical context. But legal theorists and jurists seek clear answers, and Richards's volume provides a compelling one because of his broad, humanistic, interdisciplinary approach.

ROBERTA SUE ALEXANDER
University of Dayton

WILLIAM P. LAPIANA. *Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1994. Pp. x, 254. $39.95.

Historians have long recognized the importance of Christopher Columbus Langdell in the modernizing of American legal education. As dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, Langdell introduced the "case method" of instruction that still prevails. He also allegedly helped to create a formalistic jurisprudence that ignored changing societal needs and demanded strict adherence to laissez-faire principles. Criticized by his contemporary Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as "perhaps the greatest living legal theologian," Langdell has gone down in history as a plodding pedagogue whose concern for logical consistency insulated the law from any meaningful contact with the world of everyday experience. But William P. LaPiana offers a strikingly different assessment of Langdell's work and influence in this illuminating revisionist study. Through extensive research in archival and manuscript collections, legal periodicals, and the reports of professional organizations, LaPiana places Langdell's innovations for the first time within a comprehensive cultural framework.

To appreciate the significance of the case method, for example, one must first understand the nature of antebellum legal education. Law schools before the Civil War trained relatively few lawyers, and they taught principles rather than procedure. Attorneys and judges, who generally combined part-time teaching with an active professional career, lectured from treatises and sometimes engaged students in an intensive discussion of supporting cases. The cases were of no interest in themselves, however; they merely illustrated the application of some timeless moral principle that governed human behavior as part of a divine plan. Although academic "legal science" was thus idealistic and uplifting, it offered no guidance concerning the actual practice of law. Most antebellum attorneys accordingly learned law through apprenticeship in a law office, where they became familiar with the common-law system of pleading. That system, with its ancient forms of action, provided the only effective means of organizing antebellum legal knowledge, argues LaPiana. Through form books containing standardized pleas for all types of legal actions, prospective attorneys gained an understanding of both substantive and procedural principles.

The advent of code pleading, which began with New York's adoption of the Field Code of Civil Procedure in 1848, destroyed the structure of antebellum law by abolishing the forms of action in favor of a single "civil action." Practitioners could no longer rely on traditional formulas to assert a client's claim; they now had to create their own fact-based pleadings and to understand the principle behind such concepts as "debt" and "trover." In his most original chapter, LaPiana demonstrates convincingly that Langdell did not devise the case method as an ivory tower exercise but rather as a form of practical training for lawyers confronting the novel demands of modern practice. Although he retained the antebellum colloquy between teacher and student (soon to be known more pretentiously as the "Socratic dialogue"), Langdell broke with prevailing legal science by insisting that cases contained all law and should therefore be the primary focus of legal study. A positivist like Holmes, he believed in the separation of law and morals and denied the existence of timeless legal principles. Through the case method, students would engage in the rigorous analysis of appellate court opinions, from which they would derive the kind of narrow, technical principles that judges used in resolving everyday disputes. Langdell's stress on technical proficiency served the needs of practitioners, while the scholarly demands of the case method enhanced the status of law schools and created a full-time law professoriat.

MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD
Catholic University of America

TONI MARIE MASSARO. *Constitutional Literacy: A Core Curriculum for a Multicultural Nation.* (Constitutional Conflicts.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. viii, 200. $24.95.

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Toni Marie Massaro has skillfully entered into the currently raging debate over a national core curriculum. She proposes constructing a national core curriculum around the theme of the U.S. Constitution and cases related to its interpretation, especially those concerned with rights and due process. Implicit in her argument is the assumption of the existence of an American paideia that brings persons into cultural understanding and participation; that schooling, or organized education, has been a powerful force of cultural transmission and formation; that a curricular core that emphasizes constitutional literacy can revitalize schooling's cultural mission in American society; that such a constitutional curricular core can consensually accommodate both political and procedural commonalities and cultural conflicts.

The book is organized into two parts: "Formal Schooling and the America Paideia" and the "Constitution and the American Paideia." In part 1, Massaro fashions a historical and philosophical perspective that considers the development of American public schooling and analyzes arguments for and against a national core curriculum. Whether or not the reader agrees with her recommendation for a national core curriculum emphasizing constitutional literacy, the book's first part is highly instructive for its cogent analysis of the contemporary curricular debate. Essentially, advocates of a national core curriculum such as E. D. Hirsch, Allan Bloom, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and others fear that America's cultural commonality is rapidly and seriously disintegrating and needs restoration. Proponents of a national core curriculum attribute this disintegration to both a declining historical and political public literacy and to a deliberate disuniting of the strands of American cultural identity. Critics of a national core curriculum, preferring cultural diversity, argue that the public school curriculum should not transmit a monocultural version of American cultural identity as it did in its assimilationist past. Rather, it should encourage racial, religious, gender, and ethnic pluralism. Following the canons of sound legal scholarship, Massaro offers a plausible synthesis: a national core curriculum is needed; such a curriculum can embrace both the commonality that unites Americans as well as the diversity that enriches their society; the U.S. Constitution, its rights and processes, provides the context for constructing the curricular core. Although such a national core constitutional curriculum is needed as the foundation of an American paideia, she emphasizes that it need not necessarily be federally sponsored or mandated.

In part 2, Massaro contends that the Constitution and its legal interpretation offers a coherent framework for a core curriculum that can be the springboard for educating a constitutionally literate populace. Here, she identifies and examines the key issues of freedom of religion, expression, and equal protection and the cases that have shaped American public schooling's legal context. Her analysis confronts what she regards as liberal democracy's essential educational paradox of promoting "neutrality among competing versions of the good life while trying to instill . . . the principles of the liberal democratic state, among them the nonneutral preference for critical deliberation" (p. 73).

Massaro's concluding chapter, "Toward Constitutional Literacy," sums up her basic curriculum rationale. Meaningful conversation, informed by constitutional literacy and within the communal framework of shared process, will encourage rather than quash debates about Americans' religious, racial, ethnic, gender, class, and other differences. It will cultivate a "common sense" of mutuality that also takes an "informed account of our different histories, beliefs, and interests" (p. 129). The successful functioning of a constitutional core curriculum requires some educational preconditions such as basic literacy in essential language skills, critical thinking, and a broadly conceived pluralistic history of the American experience. With these needed prerequisites and the constitutional core in place, teachers and students then can critically examine America's continuing multicultural issues: its racial, religious, ethnic, gender, and class conflicts. Moving from an agreed on constitutional framework, Massaro's proposed curriculum is experimentally open-ended in that the continuing conflicts in American life constitute an emerging rather than a finished paideia. These conflicts, she writes, "should be defined capaciously, critically, and provisionally" to "remain subject to perpetual reformulation and reconsideration" (p. 146).

A product of sound legal and educational scholarship, Massaro's book is a prudently conceived and executed contribution to the often polemical debate over multiculturalism and a core curriculum. Some questions, however, remain. Although the Constitution and case law exists on crucial questions relating to public schooling, does not this legal corpus provide a context for a core curriculum rather than a curriculum itself? Furthermore, do American educators not already face a powerful national informal or hidden curriculum (for example, that of the media), which may be shaping beliefs and values in a way that is not conducive to the critical issues debate the author envisions?

Finally, the book has a useful index. I found, however, that the Dante typeface made for very small print.

GERALD L. GUTEK
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MARK V. TUSHNET. *Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–1961.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 399. $35.00.

Mark V. Tushnet's book has a dual purpose. The first is to trace the campaign by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) "to secure civil rights through litigation" (p. vii) during

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Thurgood Marshall's direction of the NAACP's legal activities. The second is to unravel the Supreme Court's decision making. "The way the justices responded to each case the NAACP presented," Tushnet explains, "affected what Marshall and his colleagues could do in the next case. The book therefore goes inside the Supreme Court to describe what the justices were worried about in the NAACP's cases" (p. viii).

The book has major strengths. One is an immense amount of research. The second is surehandedness in dealing with technical issues that often confuse or even mislead lay writers on the Court. The third is Tushnet's fair-minded and balanced treatment of even those with whom he has personally not much sympathy. Perhaps the most striking example is his judicious appraisal of the memorandum regarding the decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) by (now Chief Justice) William Rehnquist. One possible instance of axe-grinding is his deflationary assessment of Justice Felix Frankfurter's contribution to *Brown*. He pictures Frankfurter as more an obstacle to than promoter of agreement and suggests that he was moved by vanity at least as much as by substantive concerns.

Notwithstanding these strengths, the question remains what new contribution the work makes. As Tushnet acknowledges, the three primary spheres of NAACP litigation—transportation, restrictive covenants, and education—have received in-depth monographic examination. He believes the "main difference" between this volume and those earlier studies is his "emphasis on the way the NAACP's legal activities in different areas interacted, both conceptually and in forcing the organization to structure its activities in particular ways" (p. 371).

Tushnet's footnotes reveal the extent to which his account of the judicial response retraces ground explored by Dennis J. Hutchinson ("Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958," *Georgetown Law Journal* [1979]). But Tushnet has the advantage of access to major collections of justices' papers that have since become available. The papers of Robert H. Jackson are probably the most important new source, allowing Tushnet to illuminate the complexity of Jackson's attitudes on race. Tushnet's most significant revision in the realm of interpretation—apart from deflating Frankfurter's contribution—is his downplaying the extent of division among the justices over *Brown*. He finds a consensus from the start—except possibly for Stanley Reed—in favor of overturning *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) so long as implementation would be made gradual.

The book's subtitle suggests, and the preface explicitly affirms, that "Marshall serves as the focus of the book" (p. vii). Here Tushnet at least partly misleads. There is a brief biographical sketch of Marshall before his joining the NAACP staff. But there are no more than passing allusions to his personal life after 1936. Although Marshall as civil rights lawyer holds center stage during roughly the first half of the book (through the first argument in *Brown*), thereafter he fades into the background.

One of Tushnet's goals is to show readers "how Marshall was a great lawyer" (p. 371). To what extent he succeeds depends on one's criteria for greatness as a lawyer. Tushnet admits that Marshall was not "as flashy at developing lines of argument as some" of his advisers were. Marshall's "brilliance" lay in that he was "an extremely sensitive judge of what arguments would be persuasive and what would not" (pp. 38, 216).

Tushnet repeats what has become the standard indictment of the Supreme Court for failing to elucidate the significance of *Brown* in the aftermath of the decision. That complaint ignores how the justices remained unsure about what *Brown* should mean. And in his wish to put the most favorable gloss on Marshall's role, Tushnet skirts the strong evidence that Marshall himself saw the point of *Brown* as no more than that school boards could not use race as a basis for pupil assignment.

The book has relevance for one other issue: the controversy generated by arguments (such as Gerald N. Rosenberg's *The Hollow Hope* [1991]) that the Supreme Court was not as important for the civil rights revolution as the conventional wisdom has held. Tushnet does not face this question directly. In his preface, he applauds the NAACP's litigation campaign as "arguably the most successful of the civil rights efforts" from the 1930s to the early 1960s (p. vii). In the body of his text, however, he repeatedly underlines how the NAACP's repeated legal victories brought minimal real-life benefits, at least during the period covered by his study.

JOHN BRAEMAN
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MARTHA F. DAVIS. *Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960–1973*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 187. $26.50.

This book confirms the old adage that sometimes good things come in small packages. Martha F. Davis's study is a brief but important and pioneering contribution to American social welfare and legal history, at least in the 1960s and early 1970s when, in conjunction with welfare recipients and activists, "poverty lawyers" mounted a campaign to organize the poor and get the courts to recognize their legal right to welfare.

The litigation strategy to constitutionalize welfare, initiated by Edward Sparer and others at the newly created Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law (housed at the Columbia University School of Social Work), owed much to the campaign against racial segregation led earlier by the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund. It was designed, in other

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words, like its predecessor, to use the law as an instrument of social change, mainly by getting the U.S. Supreme Court to agree that class (as well as race) was a factor in legal discrimination.

To a degree, that effort succeeded. Thanks to legal proceedings initiated by the new breed of lawyers, many clients were reinstated to the welfare rolls, residency requirements and "man-in-the-house" rules were invalidated, many public assistance grants were increased, and a number of other important changes occurred in the nation's welfare system and the way in which it was administered. Ultimately, however, the strategy failed. By the early 1970s the welfare rights movement was over and a real backlash occurred, one from which many of the nation's needy citizens continue to suffer. Why the movement succeeded, and then collapsed, and what lessons, if any, can be learned from that neglected episode in American history, forms the substance of this compelling and well-written work.

Davis, a staff attorney for the National Organization for Women, is at her best in discussing complicated legal principles and analyzing the meaning of important court cases—*King v. Smith, Shapiro v. Thompson, Goldberg v. Kelly*, and numerous others—in a way that laypersons easily can understand. She also has a knack for composing short but extremely interesting biographical sketches of the major characters in the drama; Sparer (the "father of welfare law"), Jacobus tenBroek, David Gilman, Robert Cover, Stephen Wizer, Brian Glick, Lee Albert, Charles Reich, Sylvia Law, and other important figures about whom most students of American social welfare history know very little, if anything. And, although she is sympathetic toward most of these people, she certainly is not uncritical of at least some of them. Indeed, she discusses their disagreements (over principles and strategies), their turf wars, their infighting and sparring for fame and glory, especially by arguing cases before the Supreme Court, and other factors that, at times, hindered the movement. Still, at a time when the legal profession is the butt of everyone's jokes, the poverty lawyers of the 1960s and 1970s speak well for the profession, and the nation. It is a story worth reading.

WALTER I. TRATTNER
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

KENNETH L. KARST. *Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power in the Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 321. $30.00.

Kenneth L. Karst offers his meditations on the connection between law and the "social issues" agenda of today's cultural conservatives. He argues that "promises to deploy law in the service of cultural counterrevolution" (p. x) are an important part of that agenda, which has as a unifying theme the ideology of masculinity. After chapters on "family values" (including discussions of abortion and pornography), race, the questions of gays and women in the military, and patriotism and religion, Karst concludes by pointing out that the cultural counterrevolution has failed on the national level but continues in local battles, as in Colorado's anti–gay-rights initiative.

Karst's book falls in the category "cultural criticism," and readers might wonder what Karst's views, as a law professor, on cultural criticism might distinctively offer them. His observations are most interesting where he deploys his legal expertise extensively, as in his detailed chapter on gays and women in the military. Similarly, Karst effectively connects his cultural criticism to legal arguments about religious and patriotic symbols, explaining why, in his view, the Supreme Court has properly focused on the way in which legal arguments supporting prayer in the schools and against flag-burning ultimately rest on judgments that exclude religious and political minorities from equal citizenship.

Karst offers astute criticisms as well of arguments by prominent legal scholars, such as Cass Sunstein, who seek to reconstruct political discourse on a model of rational deliberation in the public interest. Karst argues that the notion of "Reason" at work in such arguments can be a mask for cultural values not shared by all; the reconstruction of public discourse may then poorly serve a multicultural society. Here, however, Karst sometimes lapses into a trendy postmodernist criticism of "Reason" that, as the tone of his work shows, he does not really share. It is one thing to point out that what has passed for disembodied "Reason" actually has socially exclusionary content; it is another to reject the possibility of reasoned discourse entirely.

There is an odd inconsistency in tone between the book's opening and its ending. At the start Karst seems alarmist, concerned that the cultural counterrevolutionaries are close to succeeding in writing their agenda into law. At the end he seems more complacent, noting the Supreme Court defeats the cultural conservatives have recently suffered. Battles may continue locally, but, it would seem, the counterrevolution's failure is all but assured.

Karst might have avoided this tension with a somewhat thicker historical account. Law, and the Supreme Court, have always been involved in ratifying cultural victories achieved elsewhere. For a relatively short period remembered as "the Warren Court," the courts provided the culture with symbols validating claims by subordinated groups. Now they have reverted to their more traditional role.

Karst's final pages discuss the ways in which the religious Right's concerns about family values might be accommodated within the framework of the First Amendment's religion clauses. He argues that "equal citizenship implies tolerance" (p. 209). In context, this seems rather like the victors in the cultural wars

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being generous to those they have defeated. The losers may sense in this a certain condescension.

MARK TUSHNET
Georgetown University Law Center

CAROLE HABER and BRIAN GRATTON. *Old Age and the Search for Security: An American Social History.* (Interdisciplinary Studies in History.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994. Pp. xv, 230. $14.95.

Carole Haber and Brian Gratton have written a short, valuable synthesis of the scholarship that has appeared since 1977, when David Hackett Fischer published the first historical overview of old age, *Growing Old in America.* They develop a sensible periodization—of preindustrial, industrial, and Social Security eras—into which most subjects associated with the history of American old age fit easily. And the authors readily acknowledge important continuities and discontinuities that cross the boundaries they have established. It is noteworthy that Haber and Gratton avoid homogenizing the old by focusing attention on the old who were often overlooked: widowed women, African Americans, immigrants, rural, small-town, and urban elders. Earlier works have not paid sufficient attention to the important differences of class, race, ethnicity, and gender among the old.

The authors identify five topics around which most historical work has been done and attempt a synthesis of the sometimes conflicting interpretations that have been established within each, and they provide each area with fresh perspectives and insights. In their chapter on families and the old, for example, they emphasize the diversity and flexibility of family arrangements to provide care for their elderly members and point to long-term continuities in intergenerational relations, a perspective contrasting with earlier interpretations that emphasized the destructive impact of industrialization on the family.

In a chapter on the economic status of the old, Haber and Gratton argue strongly that most old people were never pitiful, penniless dependents. They especially challenge the notion that industrialization impoverished the elderly and argue instead that industrialization was a rising tide lifting all boats. Although this chapter is a useful corrective to exaggerated perceptions of the evils of industrialization to the old, it is somewhat inconsistent in tone and evidence; the strong statement of the rising-tide thesis and the evidence to support it are challenged by persuasive discussions of the aged's economic problems, the reality of age prejudice, the elderly's sense of obsolescence, and the persistence of poverty among a minority of the elderly. Unlike the cohesive synthesis of conflicting analyses found elsewhere in the book, this particular chapter seems an uneasy compromise between the two authors' differing views of the elderly's economic conditions.

Further chapters on work and retirement, on the threat of the almshouse, and on advice to the old combine original research with thoughtful syntheses of other historians' work. The chapter on the almshouse as a social and political symbol shaping public responses to the needs of the elderly, for example, gives a fresh perspective on a much-studied topic. The final, summary chapter is the best short overview of the history of old age in the United States that I have read. It is destined to be excerpted in family history readers and gerontology anthologies.

Haber and Gratton's meaty little book does more than provide an intelligent synthesis of existing old-age history; its new interpretations, insights, and shifts of emphasis will provoke responses and help move historians' work away from the now threadbare original disputes in the field toward new questions and approaches.

MICHEL R. DAHLIN
University of Colorado

PETER KOLCHIN. *American Slavery: 1619–1877.* New York: Hill and Wang. 1993. Pp. xv, 304. $25.00.

The scope and purpose of this work is to synthesize and evaluate the work of the past twenty-five years concerning slavery in the United States. Peter Kolchin discusses slavery's origins during the colonial period and the American Revolution in the British mainland colonies; the antebellum period, focusing on slave life and the white south; and the end of slavery. His purpose is to discuss slavery within the context of changes over time while placing U.S. slavery within a comparative context. It contains several interesting tables and a useful bibliographic essay.

This ambitious book has some good qualities. It covers a great deal of ground in relatively few pages, is clearly, simply, straightforwardly written, and pays attention to changes over time and to some extent over space. It is at times insightful. But there are symptoms of hasty, superficial reading, overgeneralizations from largely regional models, simplistic arguments in places, and a strongly Eurocentric bias in discussions of culture and culture formation, all of which detract from the book's value and possibilities as a standard, useful synthesis. Although Kolchin is correct that slave culture(s) cannot be discussed in isolation from white culture(s) and the institution of slavery, his image is of an orderly world in which the cultural influence went largely one way: from knowledgeable whites to ignorant blacks. In fact, most of the crops cultivated in the Americas were domesticated in or introduced into and widely cultivated in Africa long before the United States was colonized. Techniques of rice, tobacco, and corn cultivation, animal husbandry, control and navigation of waterways, metalworking, and hunting, fishing, and warfare were transferred largely from blacks to whites. It does not follow that African cultural influences were minimized because the numbers of slaves per estate were comparatively small in the United States and that there was a much higher proportion of resident

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owners than elsewhere in the Americas unless we assume a unidirectional cultural influence from whites to blacks. The earlier end of the African slave trade to the United States is a more cogent argument for less significant African cultural influence in North America than in some other parts of the Americas, particularly Cuba and Brazil, but this argument should not be pushed too far. The African slave trade ended earlier in St. Domingue (Haiti) and Jamaica than in the United States, and no one would argue that these countries are not culturally African. The work of Ira Berlin has cogently argued that regional patterns over time, especially demographic patterns, had a significant impact on the varieties of African-American cultures that emerged in the United States. We cannot homogenize African-American cultures and assume simplistically that internal immigration destroyed regional cultural differences. South Carolina and Louisiana began with concentrated African slaves and tended to socialize those slaves imported from the Chesapeake.

Kolchin writes that the only periods of disorder were during the American Revolution and the Civil War. He does not discuss the impact of the French, Spanish, and Indians from the earliest years of colonization through the Seminole wars. Flight from South to North during the nineteenth century is discussed, but flight to Indian villages, Spanish Florida, Havana, Texas, and then to Mexico are not. Neither is long-term and consistent maroon colonies in the cypress swamps along the Mississippi River and the bayous of South Louisiana mentioned. The revolt in Louisiana in 1811 is dismissed. The discussion of the overthrow of Reconstruction is marred by minimizing the level and the role of terror against blacks and sympathetic whites and dismissing civil and political rights as largely a black middle-class concern. Kolchin argues that the exodus to Kansas was because of rumors about the availability of cheap, available land when in fact it was a reaction against the terror unleashed during the overthrow of Reconstruction. Nell Irvin Painter's *The Exodusters* (1976) is not listed in the bibliographical essay.

Kolchin's view of an orderly world is projected abroad. He describes abolition in Cuba as a process simply promulgated from the top down by the government, when actually it was largely a military *fait accompli* during the Ten Years' War for Cuban independence (1868–78). The writer claims that there was widespread emancipation of individual slaves in Cuba during the nineteenth century when, on the contrary, individual emancipations were sharply restricted and large numbers of free people of African descent were expelled.

Kolchin overstates the argument that slavery involved an inflexible labor supply. He largely ignores the impact of the transfer of slave labor through sales, leases, slaves hiring themselves out both full time and part time, in rural as well as in urban settings. Placing a dollar amount on per-capita income in the South to determine comparative wealth does not take into account the value of widespread subsistence activities. The extent and economic value of autonomous economic activities of slaves is greatly understated. The economic argument is largely within the context of development theory which needs to be reexamined.

In short, although this book has good qualities, it does not meet the goals it sets for itself. A new synthesis of slavery in the United States has yet to be researched and written.

GWENDOLYN MIDLO HALL
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EDGAR J. MCMANUS. *Law and Liberty in Early New England: Criminal Justice and Due Process, 1620–1692.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 279. $29.95.

Based on printed records, this volume by Edgar J. McManus intends only to provide a succinct general survey of the legal systems of the New England colonies during the seventeenth century. To that end, it covers all the obvious topics: the sources, scope, and objectives of the law; the structure of the judicial systems; legal procedures and processes; patterns of crime and law enforcement; the differential philosophy and operation of the law; and witchcraft.

With Massachusetts setting the example for the other three orthodox Puritan colonies of Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, New England lawmakers, operating with considerable independence, so far succeeded in their efforts "to modify English law by the light of scripture" (p. 37) as to carry "trends in Reformation law" to "their fullest development" (p. 4) in the Anglophone world. Yet an attachment to English forms always modified and contained the impulse to base law on scripture. Indeed, early settler demands "for a body of written laws in resemblance to a Magna Charta" (p. 5) underlined the centrality of English legal traditions to English identity, both for colonists and metropolitans. Even in the most Puritan colonies, legal codes drew more heavily on such standard English sources as Mathew Dalton's *Country Justice* and Sir Edward Coke's legal writings than on the Bible, and Rhode Island relied entirely on English legal models. Although New England courts discarded many of the technicalities of English trial practices, they adopted "the substance of common-law safeguards" (p. 91) and procedures. They prohibited torture to obtain confessions and (except for New Haven) employed jury trials, two components of the English legal system that were a special "source of national pride" (p. 108).

New England legal systems differed from those of the English in other significant respects. First, New England had much less violent crime than England, most crime involving petty thefts, illicit sex, drinking violations, and contempt of authority. As a result, law

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functioned less as a protector of property than as a defender of morality. Second, New Englanders, wanting to keep taxes low, had no police system except for local constables and no facilities for long-term imprisonment. Hence, they mostly used fines, humiliation, and corporal punishments to penalize crime. Punishments were far less severe in practice than statutory stipulations. Third, New England lawmakers set "more explicit and binding" (p. 181) limits on governmental power than were characteristic of English common law. Rhode Island carried such protections much further than the Puritan colonies, but even Massachusetts spelled out "the defendant's rights" in ways that left little to judicial discretion. Fourth, although Rhode Island also went furthest in guaranteeing its people's "rights . . . to be left alone" (p. 56), weak coercive resources meant that, in practice, if not in theory, even settlers in the orthodox Puritan colonies enjoyed considerable freedom from public intrusions into private affairs. In one important respect, New England legal systems did not depart radically from the English. No less than in the metropolis, law served the interests of dominant male property holders. Expressing their assumptions about gender and class, it also "served as a tool for promoting" (p. 123) settler over Amerindian interests.

Few specialists will be surprised by these findings. Without strict comparative study, however, they will rightly be wary of the author's implicitly novoanglocentric suggestion that "the key guarantees of American constitutionalism first took root and flourished in the legal culture of Puritan New England" (p. xi).

Jack P. Greene
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Larry D. Eldridge. *A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America.* New York: New York University Press. 1994. Pp. xv, 198. $40.00.

Larry D. Eldridge argues that late-seventeenth-century English colonists enjoyed increasing liberty to criticize government and authority figures in general. Because colonial officials declined to prosecute false news and personal insults as rigorously as before, the "foundation in practical colonial experience" was laid for the later, eighteenth-century "flowering of dissent against English authority" (p. 4).

Eldridge's foil is Leonard Levy's work on freedom of the press. His own study surveys 1,244 prosecutions for seditious speech against individuals in sixteen English colonies or provinces (all on the mainland). Unfortunately, a potentially worthwhile topic is damaged by exaggerated claims for significance and by conclusions not supported by the evidence. The Whiggish "growth of liberty" is relocated in a seventeenth century most scholars will scarcely recognize.

Unhelpful categories such as "the North" and "the South" are trundled into use with little sensitivity for the colonies' regional social, political, and legal differences. Findings do not demonstrate significance. When "false news" prosecutions (pp. 63–66) declined, Eldridge can show no causal evidence linking this to a change in attitudes toward seditious speech. Rather, a sweeping subjunctive concludes that respect for authority must have declined.

The counter-argument is obvious: why prosecute minor insults or false news when the increasingly royal colonies were more stable, more deferential? The whole of chapter 6 ("A Growing Leniency") undermines Eldridge's thesis. Absence of bond forfeitures in seditious libel cases (p. 119) forces Eldridge to admit that deference—or at least terror—kept the obstreperous and potentially seditious in line.

But the final chapter ("Fruits of Circumstance") leaps to extraordinarily opposite, and wrong, conclusions. Although admitting that stability and deference provide a probable explanation (p. 138), Eldridge struggles to fit his findings into a Whig framework. That government on both sides of the Atlantic became more "responsive" because of "commoners" (p. 138) and that by 1700 Parliament "occupied a position of indisputable dominance over the monarchy" (p. 139) will come as news to students of British and colonial constitutional history. The Church of England steadily lost respect from the Reformation to 1700?

In short, this is a book flawed in conception and execution, and one to be read with extreme caution and skepticism.

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Charles G. Steffen. *From Gentlemen to Townsmen: The Gentry of Baltimore County, Maryland, 1660–1776.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1993. Pp. 209. $35.00.

To the expanding literature on social and economic life in the early Chesapeake, Charles G. Steffen has contributed an attractive study examining Baltimore County, an area less well known than the lower tidewater counties from which come the generalizations that too often characterize descriptions of Maryland and Virginia. Focusing his analysis on the more affluent colonists, Steffen particularly seeks to illuminate a county elite, in contrast to the provincial elite of the Byrds, Carters, and their like, who again are more familiar and have traditionally been presented as characteristic of a gentry for which they were really only the most outstanding examples. This study, then, of the northern perimeter of Maryland provides interesting comparisons to counties such as Charles and Prince Georges in Maryland and Middlesex in Virginia, about which excellent and more detailed studies have appeared in recent years.

Baltimore County was established around 1660, almost three decades after the founding of Maryland.

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For the first half-century of settlement, Baltimore bore little resemblance to the older Chesapeake counties bordering the bay. Although tobacco was the predominant crop, slavery was slow to emerge as a major source of labor. Few large estates materialized during these years, and the county displayed scant evidence of the social consolidation more apparent to the South. Steffen describes "a society without men who believed they had a right to rule and who had the economic and political resources to make others believe it. This was a society without a gentry" (p. 26).

After 1700, the county began to change, with considerable population growth, a sizeable increase in the number and distribution of slaves, more occupational differentiation, and greater variations in wealth. By 1740, Baltimore more pervasively matched the profile typical of counties in the lower Chesapeake region, including the presence of a more defined county elite. Access to gentry status remained open, however, and movement was fluid; indeed, numerous members of the next generation failed to maintain a comparable position in society, slipping back into the middling ranks, as families practiced partible inheritance more than primogeniture. Although a county elite was recognizable, tenure on the local bench or in the assembly rarely matched the years of service common in other counties, and fewer men successfully transferred or bequeathed political prominence to their relatives. In the church as well as other local institutions, power tended to be shared with less-affluent neighbors. Steffen provides for these years a brief but insightful profile of the work force and of various aspects of community life.

New patterns developed in the middle third of the eighteenth century that once again rendered Baltimore less similar to the other coastal settlements of the Chesapeake. A shift from tobacco to grain production transformed the agrarian economy and increasingly pulled the county into the orbit of the Middle Atlantic region. An ascendancy of merchants reflected a growing index of commercialization. The relative fluidity of social status provided immigrant merchants greater opportunities for access to power with less dependence on landed estates, while sons of the planter elite also began to pursue commercial careers. Gradually these two groups consolidated into a firmly established native-born merchant elite. The new Baltimore Town that was the hub of their enterprises became the largest concentration of population between Charleston and Philadelphia, as the county attained a degree of urbanization rare in the Chesapeake world. A quite different society existed by the eve of the revolutionary era.

In examining the economic evolution and stratification of Baltimore County's population over a 116–year period, Steffen has combed carefully the local records and built insightfully on the extensive social and economic analyses of the colonial Chesapeake world compiled by other scholars. Central to this study has been the identification of 389 individuals, the "life-sized gentlemen," who satisfy his definition of the county elite and inhabit "a world far removed from that of William Byrd or Landon Carter" (p. 7). Steffen intersperses general descriptions of this elite with brief biographies and stories that contribute a personal dimension to what easily could be too lifeless an account. Exceptions and nuances nicely color this rapidly moving local study, and in text and footnotes the author returns frequently to the larger canvas historians are painting of early British America. This is not a parochial exercise in local history. Well researched, succinct, and felicitously written, Steffen's modest volume should attract an appreciative audience among scholars, students, and others interested in the colonial Chesapeake world.

DAVID W. JORDAN
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JOYCE E. CHAPLIN. *An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South, 1730–1815.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va. 1993. Pp. xiv, 411. $45.00.

In this provocative book, Joyce E. Chaplin portrays the colonial lower South as a dynamic, modern culture and economy, little resembling the conservative, static antebellum region of historical stereotype. The author is concerned with change in the lower South and also with the nature of the "first phase of modernity in the West" in a provincial area. How did "modern" ideas (especially that of progress) coexist with non-modern socioeconomic forms (especially slavery)? She tackles these issues by examining agricultural innovations—those substantive changes in crops, tools, and techniques (as opposed to mere adjustments in existing methods) that succeeded so well as to make South Carolina one of the richest colonies by the 1770s. Chaplin points out that in the colonial period modernizing forces in the economy were overwhelmingly commercial rather than industrial, and therefore it is appropriate to consider commercial agriculture as a major source of economic dynamism. Focusing on agrarian reform, she seeks to combine social and intellectual history, skillfully tying early modern social thought to evidence from the fields and irrigation works.

As the account develops on how the lower South's white elite evolved their identity, the tortured ambiguity of their "modernity" becomes manifest. Goaded by outsiders' allegations that they were lazy and corrupted by the hot climate, they responded with an ideology of "directed and productive activity" (p. 92). Part of this response was aimed at combating endemic tropical diseases, substituting active measures for passive acceptance. An ideology of acquired resistance fed into notions of social superiority. But of course "activity" was cast in terms of management skills; slaves still did all the work. Whites justified this

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system with the ugly argument that because blacks' resistance was inherited rather than acquired, slaves' identity rested on a racial rather than a social basis. Chaplin returns to the theme of modernity here, applying Eric Williams's analysis that these ideas rested on a "modern" notion of human nature: that people have to be prodded to work and that humanitarian treatment of subordinates was the best tactic for achieving high productivity. Thus, a valuable argument Chaplin makes is that both northern and southern economic elites shared fundamental values, but applied them in different social systems.

Whites of the lower South "realized" modernity through a series of crises: first, during the early eighteenth century, they developed a new crop, indigo; then, during the American Revolution, they experimented with cotton in the context of nonimportation; and finally, after the revolution, they embarked on an ambitious irrigation campaign for rice cultivation. This last activity transformed the landscape and involved an unprecedented investment in capital, labor, and machinery (especially rice mills). Although her focus is on activities of elites, Chaplin does not ignore the impact slave initiatives had on the decisions made by elites.

This century of innovation and modernization set the background for "Creating a Cotton South." The rise of cotton thus was the logical continuation of earlier times. Whites pushing into the interior were "overtly commercial" (p. 278) in their goals, although they drew from the more relevant grain and tobacco model of the mid-Atlantic region. Moreover, they were eager to acquire slaves, even before the advent of the cotton gin. Cotton became king after prices for grain and tobacco fell. But with this development the rationale for slavery changed from a climatic one to one that claimed its benefits, actual or potential, to all whites.

Chaplin examines the implications of this argument in a final chapter, concluding that "planters' intensifying sense of peculiarity and isolation resulted, not from any inevitable development of plantation economics, but from the difficulty of arraying regional powers against federal powers" (p. 357). This brief and vague claim deserves elaboration, especially to defend against the possible circularity implied in the assumption that the region had distinctive interests to protect.

This book raises more questions even as it makes an important contribution to our understanding of the puzzle of agricultural reform and innovation, North and South. A comparative study would seem especially appropriate. Moving backward in time, it might be useful to compare agricultural innovation in the colonial lower South to activities in England; Chaplin's assertion to the contrary, there seem to be as many parallels as differences between, for example, the draining of the English fens and the improvement projects of the lower South. Similarly, given how little we know about agricultural innovation and its social context in the colonial North, a comparative study might uncover still more common ground between the two. In the nineteenth-century North, and indeed arguably even today, agricultural innovation has been associated with social conservatism and upper-class domination, just as in the colonial South. Chaplin's book helps explain why this pattern prevailed in colonial America and helps us to think about the wider implications.

SALLY MCMURRY
Pennsylvania State University

KATHRYN E. HOLLAND BRAUND. *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685–1815.* (Indians of the Southeast.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 306. $37.50.

This excellent monograph is a fine example of the advantages and drawbacks of sharply focused research. Within its field, it contributes so strongly to knowledge that "mainstream" historians without race bias must modify their interpretations to accord with this newly revealed factuality. (Confirmed racists, of course, are beyond hope.)

Kathryn E. Holland Braund's purpose is to show the importance of the Creek Indians in the history of Britain's southeastern colonies in the eighteenth century. Lately there has been an increase in attention to the bloody rivalries between French Louisiana and Spanish Florida on the one side, and British South Carolina and Georgia on the other, involving intermediate Timucuas, Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Catawbas, but the attention has focused on imperial concerns. Braund tells us about the Creeks: how they maneuvered in the midst of turmoil, what sort of people they were, and how their communities and cultures changed throughout the century. She is specific.

She is right to believe that the key to all else was the trade between Indians and colonials: deerskins traded for guns, textiles, rum, and other industrial goods. When deer became scarce, they were replaced by land: "the acre replaced the deerskin as the unit of trade" (p. 180). She shows precisely how this trade started, how the Creek peoples became dependent on it, and how it was used eventually as a weapon against them. Guns received in trade first enabled Creek warriors to build a forest empire by defeating unarmed enemies and by amassing wealth through capture, enslavement, and sale of Florida's Timucua Indians as well as French-allied Choctaws.

The value of guns changed when Creek enemies were armed. Carolinians provided or denied weapons according to Creek compliance with colonial demands. The processes were never simple, for Creek factions were matched not only by imperial rivalries but also by factions among the Carolinians.

Although the heterogeneous people called Creeks showed amazing versatility in relations with all colo-

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nials, they were hampered by strong localism. Braund says, "It was this unity of spirit and division of authority that constituted the Creek Confederacy" (p. 140).

She shows the intimate relationship between trade and tribal politics and racial mixing. Resident colonial traders married Creek women, and their children's sophistication enabled them to rise to leadership. These mixed-race offspring aroused hostility among their tribal peers, especially as the traders introduced English customs at variance with Creek traditions. For example, Creek custom dictated communal ownership; the traders demanded individual property. The traders' nuclear families collided with the matrilineal clans controlling Creek society.

The liberating effects of the American Revolution had a negative impact on the Creeks, first because the war deprived them of guns needed for both hunting and fighting, then through the swarming of Georgians into tribal territory, a process that led inexorably to Andrew Jackson's conquest and seizure of 30 million acres. (The Trail of Tears was yet to come.) Jackson was not an innovator, but rather violently continued the smoother devices of Thomas Jefferson, who directed agents to run the Creeks deeply into debt to make them cede lands for payment—temporarily (p. 178).

Braund's narrow focus hides the initiatives of Sir William Johnson in New York when he made recommendations to the crown that became directives to all the colonies. She also misses that Tecumseh's effort to recruit Creeks for his liberation war failed because too many Creek scalps still hung in the lodges of Tecumseh's Shawnees. Braund's book is a model of regional history. We must not forget, however, that the Creeks far outnumbered the English in Carolina during much of the nineteenth century.

FRANCIS JENNINGS
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R. DAVID EDMUNDS and JOSEPH L. PEYSER. *The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France.* (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 211.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 282. $24.95.

The Fox (or Mesquakie) Indians have long attracted the attention of historians, but Phelps Kellogg has been the only historian who extensively treated the Fox-French relations during the colonial period. Her studies, however, appeared in the early twentieth century and are now dated. Using recently discovered documents unknown to Kellogg, R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser recount the Foxes' struggle to maintain their identity and independence against New France through the middle of the eighteenth century. They present fresh insights and offer the Fox as well as the French perspectives.

The Mesquakies, "the People of the Red Earth," were forced to migrate, due to their conflict with the Chippewas, from Michigan to east-central Wisconsin, where they established themselves securely by the early seventeenth century. Quite different from other tribes in the region, such as the Chippewas, the Potawatomis, and the Miamis, who maintained close relations with the French, the Foxes remained outside the realm of French hegemony.

Accordingly, French governors such as Louis Hector de Callieres, Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, and Marquis de Beauharnois threatened and attempted to coerce the Foxes into submitting to French authority. The Foxes, under the leadership of Noro, Pemoussa, and Ouchala, rejected these demands and remained free, although they paid a heavy price. Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac's invitation to the Foxes to resettle in the Detroit region in 1711 became a turning point because it resulted in a catastrophe that demanded full retribution on both sides. Yet the Foxes, caught between the French and the Sioux (with whom they had quarreled for a long time), were able to enlist other tribes' support and maintain their independence until the late 1720s. In 1730, the French offered the Foxes peace and then treacherously launched a campaign of annihilation against them enlisting the support of the pro-French tribes. The Foxes fought back gallantly but were finally brought to their knees. After 1732, however, their alliance with the Sacs provided both a refuge and an opportunity for regeneration. Beauharnois's military victory, the authors argue, ironically alienated many western tribes from the French, creating a favorable climate for the Foxes to renew their friendship with other tribes.

This book is a story of intrigues, betrayals, and atrocities by the French against the Foxes. It keeps the reader wondering throughout why the Foxes, who rapidly declined in population and ceased to be a serious menace to the French, deserved such ruthless treatment. Edmunds and Peyser, who concentrate on presenting a detailed, vivid narrative account, address this issue only in the epilogue. They point out that several factors, such as the Foxes' hostility toward the neighboring tribes, the negative attitude of the French officials toward the Foxes, the ill-conceived French policies, and the Foxes' inability to fully understand the real intention of the French, contributed to the downfall of the Foxes. One may wish, however, that the authors had analyzed these problems more fully in the course of their discussion. Moreover, the motives of the French aggression and treachery and the unique qualities of the Foxes should have been examined more thoroughly.

Nonetheless, Edmunds and Peyser contribute to a deeper understanding of the Foxes and their relations with the French. In their sympathetic treatment of the Foxes, in which the villains were no doubt the French and their allied tribes, the authors convey a

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strong sense of admiration for the Foxes' courage and perseverance in their struggle.

YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA
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WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN. *After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees' Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839–1880.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 439. Cloth $39.95, paper $17.95.

By the spring of 1839, most Cherokee were removed to present-day northeastern Oklahoma, then called Indian Territory. In their new home, the Cherokee struggled to rebuild their lives and maintain their national freedom from U.S. encroachments. William G. McLoughlin provides considerable detail about Cherokee efforts to form a stable representative government and recounts the conflict and changing relations among Old Settlers, the Treaty Party, and the majority of Cherokee conservatives, or the national party. To his credit, slaves, freedmen, and women are given more attention than is usual in Cherokee history books. Although he covers issues such as agricultural development, education, and law and order, McLoughlin pays most of his attention to Cherokee leaders and their attempts to preserve Cherokee sovereignty in the face of numerous threats, ranging from near internal civil war in the early 1840s, abolitionism in the late 1850s, the Civil War, adverse reconstruction treaties, railroad clamoring for Cherokee land and rights of way, and the influx of U.S. settlers into Cherokee country.

McLoughlin is the author of several highly regarded books about the Cherokee and had little interest in other historical topics or peoples. One would like to say that this volume is his crowning achievement, but I think the book will be controversial, because it suffers from conceptual and empirical problems.

Some small but distinct empirical problems are that McLoughlin gives the date of the Cherokee Constitution and John Ross's election to Principal Chief as 1827. In 1827, however, the Cherokee held a constitutional convention, but the document was not ratified until the spring of 1828. Similarly, Ross was not elected Principal Chief until the new constitution was in place in 1828. Furthermore, the author mentions a Cherokee Ghost Dance movement in the summer of 1867 (p. 248). This name for a movement of political mobilization among Cherokee conservatives is extremely unfortunate and needs more specific analysis and understanding. McLoughlin used the "Ghost Dance" epitaph for a Cherokee movement in 1811–13 in an earlier volume, but the Cherokee movements only vaguely resemble the doctrines or scope of the Paiute Ghost Dances of the 1870s and 1890s.

These minor errors mask greater conceptual difficulties. Causal analysis is reduced to issues of racism, acculturation, and factionalism. This tends to greatly oversimplify the treatment. Although Cherokee culture is described, it is not used in the analysis of historical events. Perhaps the most serious conceptual shortcoming is the author's treatment of the political strength of the Cherokee conservatives and their relation to Ross. Ross's leadership and relation to the conservatives remains an enigma to McLoughlin throughout the book, and it even continues to plague the story of leadership and political relations after Ross's death in 1866. Greater effort to secure the point of view of the Cherokee conservatives, which can be found in the John Payne Papers and the Indian-Pioneer Papers of Oklahoma, would have greatly improved the book's exposition.

DUANE CHAMPAGNE
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JAMES R. SHARP. *American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis.* New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp. x, 365. $30.00.

James R. Sharp retells the story of the emergence of the Federalist and Republican parties in the 1790s in a coherent, well-written narrative that focuses primarily on conflict among elites but which largely covers familiar ground, except on a number of key issues.

Arguing that the Federalists and Republicans were "proto-parties," not the fully formed modern ones mistakenly discovered by other historians, Sharp's case rests largely on rehearsing the persisting animus toward "parties" among the creators of the first "proto-parties." That animus is well known—and persists to the present as Ross Perot understands—but is hardly conclusive. Events, conflicting interests, and the structure of the federal system pushed Americans toward the creation of new forms of political organization in the 1790s even though early party builders did not intend to create them or accept their legitimacy. Historians are not bound to be prisoners of the myopia of those whose lives and society they reconstruct. That the first parties were not mature "modern" parties one may grant, but Sharp assumes a norm belied by the complex development of parties in the nineteenth century: their instability, their difficulty in creating permanent organization, the very late development of "machine politics," and the beginnings of party decomposition before 1900. To discern the innovative character of political organization in the 1790s, one must compare it with earlier political forms in the eighteenth century, a comparison Sharp forgoes. However different the "proto-parties" of the 1790s were from later ones, they aggregated diverse interests, fashioned an electorally integrative set of issues, recruited leaders, mobilized voters for unprecedented turnouts, and commanded the continuing loyalty of voters over a series of elections as numerous quantitative, demographic, and localized studies reveal. Even as party leaders

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disdained functioning as broker politicians, they played precisely that role.

Sharp compounds the problem of taking antipartisan professions of party builders at face value by insisting that the Jeffersonians were classical republicans who did not accept the inevitability of conflicting notions of the public good in generating struggles for political power. On this they were as confused and conflicted as on party-building. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison both recognized at times that there were inevitable, fundamental differences of interest in all societies, yet, like Federalists, they refused to accept the consequence that variant notions of the common good were bound to generate political struggle.

Sharp's contention that sectionalism was the driving force behind political contention—a view consistent with Madison's assertion that slavery and North/South differences were the most contentious issues at the federal convention—requires much deeper probing than it receives here because it is the pivot on which the argument turns. Sharp never probes the contradictions between Jeffersonian democracy and Upper South social realities, including the enormous growth of slavery in the early republic and the aristocratic nature of the polity, and he does not explain the reasons for growing Republican strength outside the South and Federalist strength within the slave states in the late 1790s. Modern scholarship amply documents the socially heterogeneous and complex character of the parties, despite their sectional character, a characteristic shared by "modern" parties. A narrative that focuses, however, almost exclusively on elites at the Capitol, taking rhetoric at face value, is bound to miss the role of artisans and mechanics in the towns, of squatters and great proprietors on the frontiers, of a rising body of Republican businessmen in the cities, and of religious and ethnic minorities in shaping party development. Sharp's depiction of southern Jeffersonians as champions of an anticommercial agrarian society who deplored debt and banks is conventional wisdom but offers no more satisfactory understanding of the great planters in the early republic than the Cavalier myth provides for the mid-nineteenth-century slavocracy.

Sharp's strongest contribution is to remind readers how dangerous partisan warfare had become by the late 1790s, arousing fears and even preparations for possible civil war, by carefully exploring a series of crises culminating in the deadlocked election of 1800. Yet, here too, there is a danger of reinventing the wheel and exaggerating party divisions and the potential for disunion. For when it came to the crucial issue of avoiding war with France, John Adams and George Washington, with a surer sense of their own party's sentiment, and of the national interest, sided in the end with the Republicans, not the Hamiltonians. Likewise, Adam's financial views were closer to Jefferson's than to Alexander Hamilton's.

As the author of the most illuminating study of the Bank War in Jacksonian America (*The Jacksonians versus the Banks* [1970]), a brilliant investigation of the complex, social sources of public policy, Sharp has unfortunately chosen in this latest book to revert to a traditional form of political narrative commonplace before the "new political history" reinvigorated the genre.

PAUL GOODMAN
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JOHN P. KAMINSKI. *George Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Republic.* Madison, Wis.: Madison House. 1993. Pp. viii, 342. $37.95.

Few American leaders of the revolutionary generation had as active, successful, or long a political career as George Clinton. First elected in 1777, Clinton served six successive terms as governor of New York. Then, after retiring in the face of increasing criticism in 1795, he staged a political comeback six years later, winning reelection as governor. He concluded his prolonged public service with his election as vice president in 1804 and again in 1808. And in this latter election he surely has the singular distinction of being the only person ever to be elected vice president on one ticket (with James Madison) while being Madison's chief presidential opponent on another ticket (with James Monroe as the vice presidential candidate).

John P. Kaminski's biography of Clinton dutifully recounts Clinton's long public career: his success as the military and political leader of New York during the American Revolution; his handling of the unsettling questions of Vermont secession, the loyalists and the Impost during the Confederation period; his opposition to ratification of the Constitution; and his emergence as a national political leader in the Republican coalition.

Stating that "George Clinton is an enigma," Kaminski explains that because of the destruction of many of Clinton's personal and public papers, "much of what we know about . . . [the governor] comes from what others said about him and from the events that surround him" (p. 1). Unfortunately, Clinton remains an enigma. Although following Clinton through every stage of his public life, the author ends up telling the reader little about Clinton and even less about the political society that produced him. For example, despite Clinton's obvious success, Kaminski fails to explain why the New Yorker was such a dominant figure. He only offers a number of clichés: Clinton was a "yeoman governor" (p. 165) of an "egalitarian and republican persuasion" (p. 7), he was a "fiscally conservative pragmatist" (p. 100), he was opposed by the "state's aristocrats" (p. 3), and his career, including his land speculations, was dedicated to enlarging the "number of yeoman freeholders throughout the state," for these "were the people who would preserve republicanism against the op-

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pression of aristocracy" (p. 250). These descriptions, however, do not tell us anything meaningful about the nature of New York political culture and, indeed, are misleading.

In a similar vein, Kaminski argues that the gubernatorial campaign of 1788 "took place within a highly developed system of political parties" (p. 139) and that by 1792 "Republicans" became "synonymous with Clintonians in New York" (p. 224). Yet the author offers little evidence for these assertions, and, in fact, most of the evidence is to the contrary. Fierce loyalties, deep suspicions, and closely held principles—but not organized political parties—animated the politics of the early republic as Americans struggled to create institutions that would preserve republicanism and American independence. Political parties, as historians would now recognize them, would come later. They were unknown in a political society that would countenance the spectacle of George Clinton running against himself, as it were, in the election of 1808.

Throughout the book Kaminski challenges other historians: "Historians portray Clinton" (p. 109); "Contrary to the interpretations of many historians" (p. 115); "Historians have not recognized" (p. 164). His footnotes, however, do not reveal who these historians might be. And while Kaminski generously thanks several earlier historians for their work on New York, including E. Wilder Spaulding, Harold Hastings, and Al Young, he curiously does not include, or use, Edward Countryman's excellent *A People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York 1760–1790* (1981), which is extremely valuable for helping to sort out and understand the complexities of postrevolutionary politics in New York.

JAMES ROGER SHARP
Syracuse University

CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS. *Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xviii, 406. Cloth $54.95, paper $18.95.

Christopher L. Tomlins has now produced a second splendid volume in his effort to bring the role of the state, and in particular the courts, into the center of labor history scholarship. His earlier book, *The State and the Unions* (1985), established Tomlins as the major practitioner of the critical legal theory school among labor historians. In it he argued that the state, particularly through the interpretation and application of the law, not only succeeded in eviscerating collective attempts by the working classes to reverse their inferior position but also to consent to and even participate in their own domination by managers and those who employed them. Although his first book concentrated on labor and the courts during the Gilded Age and the twentieth century, this one turns back to the early republic to provide a sophisticated analysis of the formative legal developments that had the most profound immediate and long-term impact on the employment relationship.

Tomlins's goal is to demonstrate how the legal discourse contributed to the construction and legitimization of the unequal world of production and employment. But it is not merely an instrumentalist approach that focuses on the law simply as a formal framework for the expression of capitalist power and domination. Rather, in Tomlins's construct, the law was an integral element in the construction of this power. Law in this analysis is "a modality of discourse," constantly in flux, conditioned by its environment, and always contested (p. 32). But the result, incontestably, of the legal discourse was a world in which labor was subservient to capital and workers subservient to managers. Tomlins shows that what to Marxists were simply "bourgeois" values—liberty, self reliance—were actually highly valued by working people as well as capitalists. Tomlins's point is that workers' enjoyment of such values was constrained by doctrinal legal constructions that restricted their freedom in the social and economic spheres.

The optics through which Tomlins views this process are: the law of criminal conspiracy, which made collective action by workers a criminal offense; the law of master and servant, which construed employment contracts in such a way as to render the relationship into one of domination and subordination; and the common law rulings that released employers from liability to their employees for workplace injuries. The author believes that it is impossible to understand the outcomes of these discourses without understanding the broad circumstances—those of the development of the American polity in the colonial and early national period—and the crucial role of legal discourse in the creation of that polity. By the 1840s American democracy had emerged as "exclusively political and procedural," with most of social and economic life effectively insulated from its control (p. 388). Tomlins elegantly explains the role of the law in the creation and legitimization of that enduring American paradox, the coexistence of political democracy and economic authoritarianism.

Tomlins demonstrates convincingly the importance of legal discourse in that outcome. These discourses established a society of safeguarded property, separated public and private spheres of action, and disciplined actors. Law, according to Tomlins, taught the republic what it looked like. What it looked like then and what it looks like today, in the realm of labor, was a legally constructed workplace in which capitalist and manager are "masters" and workers are "servants." In the guise of sustaining mutually beneficial contract relations between equals, the law created an employment relationship that "legally sanctioned exploitation and inequality" (p. 291). Tomlins's scholarly exposition of how this happened transcends the

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labor question and illuminates the political, social, and economic history of the early republic.

RONALD L. FILIPPELLI
Pennsylvania State University

DAVID W. KLING. *A Field of Divine Wonders: The New Divinity and Village Revivals in Northwestern Connecticut, 1792–1822.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 296. $38.50.

Winner of the Kenneth Scott Latourette Prize in Religion and Modern History for 1993, David W. Kling's study of northwestern Connecticut during the Second Great Awakening is a rich texture of social and religious history. The first question that invariably jumps to mind after a look at its title is: why another book on New England religious history? Reading only a few pages will quickly dispense those misgivings, for Kling carefully outlines the contours of the New Divinity revivals and what set them apart from the other revivals of that awakening. In so doing he explores questions of class and gender, along with the intellectual currents that swept across the New England landscape in the early nineteenth century.

Kling's narrative quickly moves us through the religious cauldron of revivals and revivalists, converts and holdouts, that characterized northwestern Connecticut in these years. Individual chapters attend to the awakeners, the social agenda and institutions of the revival, the theology and preaching of the revival, and the awakened. He concludes with a look at the revival's characteristic themes and why it faded. In the middle of this narrative is a case study of First Church in Farmington, Connecticut. This chapter perhaps typifies the strength and richness of his volume, for it is here that Kling most successfully integrates the materials that comprise the "new religious history."

Farmington First Church began these years as a seat of contention that rejected even Edward Dorr Griffin, one of the more effective revivalists of the Awakening. Like many Connecticut churches, it underwent periodic battles among parishioners over matters of theology and ecclesiastical practice. In Farmington's case, the issue was how one defined a Christian and, in particular, New Divinity efforts to purify church membership through a scrupulous reliance on conversion experience. Local politics and ecclesiastical issues proved a volatile mix. Almost a century of religious dissent characterized Farmington First Church before New Divinity ministers created the climate for a revival and led to the settlement of the Reverend Joseph Washburn in 1795. Together with his ministerial colleagues, Washburn worked with the laity and promoted revival. By the onset of the nineteenth century the disruptions had receded. In addition to the ministry, Kling focuses on matters of converts and their gender, as well as questions of class and age. The author's study of age distribution throughout the revivals emphasizes the New Divinity focus on young people and is one of the strongest aspects of this volume. His study of class, however, is drawn chiefly from secondary works and is much less definitive. But this mixture produces a rich tapestry illustrating what unites as well as divides towns and peoples.

By the 1820s the New Divinity theological tradition waned. Kling cites the inability of the next generation to seize the popular imagination as the source of failure. This is at once the most intriguing part of the story and the weakest section of the book. Kling documents the changes but does not always account for them. Did the New Divinity revivalism lose its popular appeal for theological reasons or for stylistic reasons? How and why did Baptist and Methodist revivals supplant those of the older Protestant groups? Crises in leadership and other social forces were no doubt in part to blame, but what were those forces and why were Baptists and Methodists not similarly affected? Despite this concluding uncertainty, Kling's study is an important one, not the least because it is a model of integrative history.

JOHN A. ANDREW III
Franklin and Marshall College

WALTER H. CONSER, JR. *God and the Natural World: Religion and Science in Antebellum America.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1993. Pp. x, 191. $34.95.

The size and variety of the natural world fascinated Americans in the antebellum United States. For some, the excitement was in intellectual recreation or self-knowledge, the kind found in botany clubs and physiological societies that flourished in local communities. For others, the attraction of natural science defined professional aims or civic identity. Physicians kept meteorological records to chart the course of epidemics, the U.S. Army supported ethnographic studies of Native Americans, and state after state sponsored geological studies. Decades before Charles Darwin, Americans knew that Nature had secrets to reveal.

For many of these same Americans, there was also the secret of the soul's salvation. Another kind of journey, the search for inner assurance of grace, moved many thousands of evangelical Christians to join churches that promised the way. There was nothing in this quest that necessarily detracted from wishing to know nature. In fact, from pulpit and explorer's outpost came agreement that God's greatest wonder was the natural world, including and featuring humankind. Astronomers thrilled at the glory of God's night sky, anatomists at the intricacy of God's musculature, and botanists at the perfect fit between plants and environment.

Walter H. Conser, Jr.'s useful and informative book about nine American theologians shows how the thought of these men was shaped by the twin intellectual attractions of science and religion. Included in the group are theologians who have become well-

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known figures of the religious history of the era, such as Horace Bushnell, Charles Hodge, James Henley Thornwell, and James Marsh; the others will be less familiar to many historians: Philip Schaff, W. G. T. Shedd, James Warley Miles, Henry Boynton Smith, and Edward Robinson. What these well-placed theologians shared, Conser argues, was a "mediational theology" that struggled to understand the empirical, utilitarian approach of natural science in terms of Christian faith.

Conser looks at how these men made room in their thought for the significance of human and natural history, a redefinition of biblical literalism and language, and a sense of social change as part of the "natural" development of humankind. Even so, theirs was a profoundly conservative vision of the relation of religion to science. None of them departed from the conviction that the natural world was in essence a field for God's signs and works. They had little tolerance for the tedious effort of discovery in science and even less for any mode of thinking that did not assume, in one way or another, that what scientific effort revealed were the works of God in splendid harmony.

The focus of this study is closely on these aspects of the nine theologians' thought, and Conser proceeds thematically in a way that does not open up questions of specific changes in their thinking over their careers. Neither is Conser much concerned with the larger personal or professional contexts of these men. This is not a work about relations among the nine, but rather a study of the shared terrain of their thought. In a final chapter Conser does look at how these men debated social issues of the day, particularly antislavery, but for the most part he does not concern himself with the popular context of either Protestant Christianity or science. In fact, this study has little to say about the development or extent of antebellum science. It is about religious men redefining their traditional faith in the powerful terms of a new order of belief.

STEVEN M. STOWE
Indiana University, Bloomington

CHARLES HOFFMANN and TESS HOFFMANN. *Brotherly Love: Murder and the Politics of Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century Rhode Island.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1993. Pp. xvii, 184. $27.50.

Charles Hoffmann and Tess Hoffmann's book tells of the murder in December 1843 of Amasa Sprague, a wealthy textile manufacturer from Cranston, Rhode Island. Sprague was shot and bludgeoned to death with a rifle on a Sunday afternoon as he walked from his mansion to inspect an outlying farm. The evidence suggests that the murder was planned. Sprague took the same path every Sunday, and unknown hunters had shadowed him that day.

Suspicion fell on Nathaniel Gordon, an Irish immigrant who kept a store in Spraguesville, a mill village in Cranston dominated by Sprague's Calico Print Works. Gordon had lost his liquor license in July of that year, because Sprague had pressured the Cranston town council to withdraw it. Sprague was a temperance man, but he did not oppose the town's other taverns. He simply thought that Gordon's establishment was a bad influence on his Irish work force. Sprague kept a tight rein on Spraguesville. He housed and employed nearly all its 500 residents. He did not want to lose control. Gordon, for his part, did not want to lose his license, which had helped him become an independent proprietor and a freeholder. Sprague and Gordon had angry words after Gordon's license was revoked, and Gordon vowed to fix Sprague.

Gordon was in Providence the Sunday of the murder. His brothers, however, had headed home from Providence early that afternoon after attending church. The grand jury indicted John Gordon and William Gordon for the murder, and Nathaniel for inciting his younger brothers (who depended on him financially) to commit it. It is clear from the Hoffmanns' review of the evidence that the Gordons did not commit the murder. Most Rhode Islanders reached the same conclusion, but not until after John Gordon had been executed for the crime.

The Hoffmanns do a superb job of showing how Thomas Dorr's unsuccessful rebellion in 1842 against Rhode Island's government intensified prejudice against the Irish, who supported his campaign for democratic reforms. The Spragues were members of the "Law and Order" party that hated Dorr and feared the Irish. The party's leaders worked hard to convict the Gordons, none more than Amasa Sprague's brother, William, who quit his seat in the U.S. Senate so he could oversee the investigation. His participation compromised the judicial process, as did questionable rulings by "Law and Order" judges. But William Sprague and his allies accomplished their immediate goal. They pinned the murder on Irish Dorrites.

This volume is an excellent courtroom drama. No book conveys more clearly the limits of eyewitness testimony and nineteenth-century forensics. The authors falter only in their analysis of the society and culture of Sprague ville. The Hoffmanns theorize that William Sprague killed his brother so he could quit politics and run the family's manufacturing empire. But there is no evidence of tension between the brothers, except that William wanted to build more textile mills. Disgruntled workers could have arranged the murder of Amasa Sprague, but the Hoffmanns never examine tensions in the workplace, an important cause of murders in New England in the 1840s. That oversight is the only flaw in this engaging book.

RANDOLPH A. ROTH
Ohio State University, Columbus

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KATHERINE K. PRESTON. *Opera on the Road: Traveling Opera Troupes in the United States, 1825–60.* (Music in American Life.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1993. Pp. xvii, 479. $39.95.

In this book, Katherine K. Preston tells the story of various itinerant opera companies in the United States from 1825 to 1860, doing so by emphasizing primarily Italian and English troupes as well as vocal-star organizations. The book includes not only a history of musical performances but also socioeconomic factors in the evolution of this art form in the republic. It is not, however, a definitive study of opera and related concert presentations in the antebellum United States, for as Preston states in the preface, such an undertaking now is not possible because knowledge of American music history during this period remains incomplete. Instead, her purpose is to provide "scholars of American music, history, and culture a large body of information that can be expanded and built upon" (p. xiv). She accomplishes this interdisciplinary goal with myriad references to contemporary letters, diaries, reviews, commentaries, opera and concert programs, copies of sheet music, doctoral dissertations, travel conditions, audiences, business and advertising methods, and other sources. Particularly impressive are the chapters on the impresario Max Maretzek and his Astor Place Opera Company (1850–51) and the Pyne and Harrison English Opera Company (1855–56). Also noteworthy are the four appendixes, the copious notes to the text pages, and the extensive bibliography. Omitted from this list, however, are such important, relevant works as the impresario Maurice Strakosch's memoirs, Elizabeth Forbes's biography of the fabulous Italian opera stars Grisi and Mario, and the diaries of Philip Hone and George Templeton Strong. Still, the error quotient in the entire book is low.

Preston's style is dry and factual but, nevertheless, she manages to hold the reader's interest, especially through some colorful accounts of several musical pioneers associated with this nineteenth-century artistic world.

JOHN F. CONE
Fordham University

STANTON GARNER. *The Civil War World of Herman Melville.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1993. Pp. xii, 544. $29.95.

This dense, information-packed book takes a hazy period in Herman Melville's life—the Civil War years—and re-creates it as fully as is possible, given the currently available evidence. By putting these years under a scholarly microscope and enlarging them to unprecedented dimensions, Stanton Garner uses a historical-biographical technique that, if applied to Melville's whole life, would produce a Melville biography of the first order.

As it stands, Garner's book accomplishes a great deal. It recounts the lives of Melville and his relatives during the war years; it provides fresh analyses of the war poems collected in Melville's *Battle-Pieces* (1866); and it connects each of the poems to its historical background in painstaking detail.

The latter achievement is Garner's greatest contribution to Melville studies and American cultural history. Just as Melville scholars will need to read the book for the new light it casts on the author's life and works, so historians will want to study it for its masterful retelling of central events of the Civil War. Melville's war poems cover a remarkable range of war-related issues, battles, and personages, from John Brown through early Reconstruction. Garner follows the chronology of the war, discussing the numerous poems in the variegated contexts they successively represent. In doing so, he simultaneously grounds the poems in historical reality and brings alive this reality in new ways.

Drawing from an impressive array of primary documents, many of them in the Melville family papers, Garner illuminates the activities, the personality traits, and, most dramatically, the political views of Melville and his circle. We learn that most members of the extended Melville clan, including Herman, were conservative Democrats who disliked abolitionists, were sometimes warm toward the South, and supported Andrew Johnson's white-supremacist approach to Reconstruction. It is disconcerting to realize that supposedly progressive writers such as Melville, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Walt Whitman looked sourly on abolitionism and civil rights, but history must be told honestly and not with an eye to "political correctness." Garner manages to take into account Melville's politics while preserving a sense of the author as a sincere democrat who embraced people of all races, even as he viewed Radical Republicanism as violent and disruptive.

Garner alerts us to both the strengths and the weaknesses of Melville's poetry, and he lays the ground for a greater appreciation of certain poems. Yet his approach will win few fans for Melville as a poet. Despite his sensitivity to the poems, Garner presents himself as a historian and biographer rather than a critic. Valuative assessment of Melville's poetic achievement, he writes, "will become fully available only when the critical tools needed to measure it are forged by others. That work has barely begun" (p. 443). But in our age of canon bashing and the assault on aesthetic values, it is doubtful that new "critical tools" will be "forged by others" to foster greater appreciation of the poems of a canonical, politically conservative male writer like Melville. Garner's call for aesthetic evaluation harks back to a time when artistic value could be seriously discussed in academic circles.

More to the point, however, Garner's book is an exemplary exercise in literary history. There's much talk in English departments these days about "historicism" and "cultural studies," but rarely is it backed

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by hard research. Garner's book puts the lie to paper-thin historicism and theoretical posturing. It reminds us that although historical objectivity may be an impossible dream, our only hope for approaching it is through solid, wide-ranging research.

DAVID S. REYNOLDS
Baruch College
Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York

NATHANIEL CHEAIRS HUGHES, JR., and ROY P. STONESIFER, JR. *The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow.* (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993. Pp. xvii, 455. $34.95.

This is the first book-length study of Gideon J. Pillow, Democratic politician from Tennessee and general in the Mexican War and Civil War. Using Pillow's letters and other primary sources, Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., and Roy P. Stonesifer, Jr., provide a detailed, balanced study of Pillow that supersedes the traditional caricature of him as a buffoon. He was an excellent, hard-working organizer with much enthusiasm and charm. In 1861 and 1863 he recruited and organized thousands of troops for the Confederate Army. The authors discount the charge that he hid behind a tree in the battle of Stones River; he was consistently brave under fire. At Chapultepec, Mexico, he led his men through a shower of grape and canister to the foot of the castle. There, struck by a grapeshot that fractured his left foot and ankle, he ordered his men to carry him forward, and shouted encouragement as they scaled the walls.

Yet the book confirms that Pillow was one of the worst political generals. His uncontrolled and selfish ambition contributed to a pattern of insubordination and indecisiveness that led the Jackson *Daily Mississippian* to declare: "We look for disasters where Pillow goes" (p. 251). If an order was inconvenient, he disobeyed, and in times of crisis, he would lose direction and cast victory aside. In the battle of Fort Donelson, on February 15, 1862 his division defeated Ulysses S. Grant's right wing, opening the way for the Confederates to escape from the vulnerable fortress. But at the very moment of victory, he ordered the men to withdraw from the ground they had fought for all morning. Grant's forces closed in, and the next day the outnumbered Confederates surrendered. Pillow realized the depths of his selfishness and attempted to conceal his secret schemes of self-promotion from his closest friends and even from his beloved wife.

The writing varies from tedious to lively, and there should be more maps, especially for the Mexican War. The authors have found little information on Pillow's childhood and youth, and they offer no explanation of how Pillow became so self-centered. Nevertheless, the book contributes to our understanding of how Pillow gained powerful influence over President James K. Polk and others. Jefferson Davis never trusted him but found it unfeasible to remove him. According to this analysis, Pillow was a complex, powerful individual whose self-inflated image was punctured by ridicule.

JAMES A. RAMAGE
Northern Kentucky University

STEPHEN D. ENGLE. *Yankee Dutchman: The Life of Franz Sigel.* Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 333. $36.00.

Franz Sigel was the most prominent, and the most disappointing, of a handful of foreign-born generals in the Union Army during the Civil War. As Stephen D. Engle makes clear in this brief biography, Sigel's importance was primarily—indeed almost exclusively—that he was a symbol of German-American commitment to the Union war effort. That symbolic importance is what secured Sigel a major general's commission in 1862 after the Battle of Pea Ridge, and what kept him in positions of responsibility long after his indifferent military abilities were exposed on the battlefield. As Engle notes, "Sigel's greatest asset was his ethnicity" (p. 229).

Sigel was a "Forty-Eighter," one of those disillusioned liberals who fled Germany after the collapse of the Revolution of 1848. During that struggle in Sigel's native Baden, circumstances led him to the command of the Liberal Army as a mere lieutenant at the age of twenty-four. As a result, when Sigel arrived in America in 1852 he did so with a well-established, thoroughly romanticized, and altogether unjustified reputation as a military hero. Sigel migrated from New York to St. Louis and during the secession crisis he came to see the sectional issue as a clash between southern aristocracy and northern liberalism. His public support for Abraham Lincoln helped secure German-American commitment to the Union cause in Missouri.

Sigel's performance as a general was at best indifferent and at worst disastrous. Engle states candidly that "he was not a particularly good strategist and not a born military leader" (p. 66), and that "he could not master a combat situation" (p. 209). Moreover, he "possessed dislikeable qualities" (p. 128), particularly an annoying arrogance. Yet despite his poor performance in the field, any attempt to narrow the scope of his authority or restrict his influence provoked a storm of protest from the German-American press, which saw him as the standard bearer for Germans in America. Sigel, too, played this game with some success. Whenever he felt slighted by what he was convinced was anti-German prejudice from Union authorities (especially Henry Wager Halleck, whom Sigel called "the Trickster"), he resigned in a huff, provoking another flurry of public outrage from his backers. Each time he was coaxed back into the army with new responsibilities. Not until Sigel's humiliating defeat by an inferior force at New Market in May 1864 did U. S. Grant feel sufficiently secure to demote him to command of a reserve division. And a

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few months later, after Sigel failed to defend Harpers Ferry during Jubal Early's raid in July, Grant relieved him altogether.

Engle's biography is extremely well grounded in primary sources, both German and American, and if the prose lacks a certain dash, Engle's judgments are well reasoned and compelling. The greatest weakness of the volume is its brevity. Sigel played an important role in half a dozen campaigns, and in providing the context for each of these the coverage is understandably brief. Readers not already familiar with these actions may be confused. In addition, some of the important issues raised in the book are incompletely resolved. Sigel's conviction that Halleck and others were prejudiced against German officers may not have been entirely self-serving.

Engle's book helps explain Sigel's curious role in the Civil War and is likely to be the standard work on the subject for some time.

CRAIG L. SYMONDS
United States Naval Academy

JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR. *Partners in Command: The Relationships between Leaders in the Civil War.* New York: Free Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 286. $22.95.

Civil War leadership has attracted much scholarly attention, yet it remains in many ways poorly understood. Decisions and policies that helped shape the conflict remain difficult to explain convincingly. Joseph T. Glatthaar has in this book advanced our understanding of the process by looking at some of the most important relationships between war leaders.

This study focuses on six relationships: Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. Jackson; Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston; Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman; Grant, Sherman, and David D. Porter; and Lincoln and Grant. Each relationship is addressed in a chapter that reviews the well-known events in which the protagonists were involved together and then analyzes the nature of the relationship and its strengths or weaknesses. The retelling of the stories connected with these relationships is skillfully done but does not avoid a certain repetition that some may find tedious. Glatthaar's contribution lies in his analysis of the relationships.

The different relationships fall rather easily into the two categories: those that worked well and those that did not. The failed ones were those of Lincoln and McCellan, and of Davis and Johnston. In each case Glatthaar faults the recalcitrant general, who simply could not work well with his commander-in-chief. This is starkly presented in the chapter on McClellan, whom Glatthaar believes to have been psychologically dysfunctional and beyond the most heroic efforts of the amiable and pliable Lincoln to salvage. In an appendix, Glatthaar psychoanalyzes McClellan and suggests that he suffered from paranoid and narcissistic personality disorders. Johnston comes off considerably better than McClellan, and Davis considerably worse than Lincoln. Glatthaar believes Johnston failed because of his lack of necessary military attributes as well as his inability to get along with the stiff Confederate president.

The successful relationships are characterized in every case explored here by two or more individuals of exceptional talent and willingness to cooperate. They also involved individuals whose strengths complemented each other. Lee was a master of operational planning who required a bold and energetic subordinate to carry out his audacious ideas. Jackson was such a man, but needed Lee's direction in dealing with the enemy and his calming influences in dealing with fellow officers. Their relationship, in contrast to that of Grant and Sherman, remained formal and professional. Grant and Sherman based their winning partnership on warm personal friendship, solid trust, and the happy juxtaposition of Sherman's powerful but restless intellect with Grant's calm decisiveness. Porter, another restless and unorthodox man of great intellect, was added to the winning team through his own willingness to cooperate fully with the army as well as Grant's and Sherman's willingness to treat a naval officer as an equal. Glatthaar's Lincoln is limited in strategic abilities, particularly in his slowness to grasp Grant's and Sherman's raiding strategy. Yet the wartime president receives full credit for his remarkable intellect, interpersonal skills, flexibility, and ability to learn, even in the area of strategy.

In reexploring the familiar stories it contains, the book focuses thought on an important aspect of Civil War leadership. In so doing it makes a valuable contribution toward further exploration of a significant topic that is all too often neglected even amid the voluminous literature on the Civil War.

STEVEN E. WOODWORTH
Toccoa Falls College

DAVID B. CHESEBROUGH. *"No Sorrow Like Our Sorrow": Northern Protestant Ministers and the Assassination of Lincoln.* Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1994. Pp. xxii, 200. $24.00.

Examining more than 300 sermons delivered during the spring of 1865, David B. Chesebrough vividly depicts the powerful emotions swaying northern Protestant pulpits in the aftermath of Abraham Lincoln's assassination. Most ministers felt the president's murder as a deeply personal loss comparable to the death of a family member, and in their grief they exalted Lincoln to sainthood. They praised his honesty, his simplicity of character, and his representativeness as a man of the people. In sermon after sermon, the martyred president joined George Washington as the foremost of American leaders. Many compared Lincoln to Moses, who had brought his people to the verge of a promised land which he himself could not enter; and some, mindful that John Wilkes Booth had shot the president on Good Friday, saw the latter's

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death as a final blood sacrifice preparing the way for national rebirth, a rebirth often limned in millennial terms. But vengeance accompanied grief and the adulation of Lincoln. The clergy had no doubt that the South and its slave system bore ultimate responsibility for the assassination. Using Lincoln's death as an occasion to rehearse the brutality of southern society and to recount stories of alleged Confederate atrocities, the clergy called for harsh retribution against southern leaders. Many ministers suggested that Providence had permitted Booth's hideous crime in order to harden the American people to the necessity of expunging every vestige of southern treason, and some intimated that God had allowed the removal of the gentle Lincoln in order that the supposedly more stern Andrew Johnson might execute God's righteous judgment against rebels.

Chesebrough underscores several major legacies of the sermons preached in the seven weeks following the assassination. These discourses began the process by which the sixteenth president was swiftly elevated to the first rank in the pantheon of American heroes. The author also demonstrates that Protestant ministers formed one of the major groups pressing the North toward radical reconstruction. Indeed, they often demanded more extreme measures than most of the radical republican politicians. In describing their insistence on punishment of the South, Chesebrough reads signs of an America in which institutional consolidation replaced individualism and law and order replaced humanitarianism. "The preachers," he writes, "were reflecting an American spirit that had grown weary and even suspicious of experimentation, of revolution, of rapid change, of risk taking, of each person answering to his and her own inner light; they longed for a return to authority and a renewal of a faith in the formal institutions of churches, laws, and government" (p. 101).

Because other scholars have advanced these arguments, there is little novelty in Chesebrough's analysis. Specialists in the Civil War—at least those who have taken seriously the role of religion in the mid-nineteenth century—will not find anything to challenge conventional wisdom. The chief virtue of Chesebrough's book is to describe in great detail and with considerable evocative power the mind of the Protestant clergy in the painful days after Lincoln's death. In this regard, the book is a valuable addition to literature on the Civil War.

JAMES H. MOORHEAD
Princeton Theological Seminary

WILLIAM CLARK GRIGGS. *Parson Henry Renfro: Free Thinking on the Texas Frontier.* Austin: University of Texas Press. 1994. Pp. xiii, 257. $27.95.

Based on a trove of materials previously unavailable to scholars, this book basically is a family history told with obvious affection by a great-great grandson. Henry Renfro was a prominent Texas Baptist preacher, a Confederate soldier and chaplain, a Freemason, a wealthy farmer, and eventually a free thinker. An able and interesting figure, his life, as recounted here by William Clark Griggs, calls attention to family greed and envy, illuminates to some extent political and cultural conflicts of the nineteenth century, and personalizes religious controversies on the Texas frontier. Enhanced by numerous photographs, extensive endnotes, and an adequate index, this readable narrative will be of interest primarily to students of Texas history, particularly those interested in the Civil War and religion.

Born in 1831 in Tennessee, Renfro migrated with his family to Texas in 1851. With plans of becoming a minister, he enrolled a few months later in Baylor University at Independence. This brought him into contact with such notable Baptist leaders as Rufus Burleson, the school's president, and R. E. B. Baylor, both of whom saw in the talented young man a promising denominational star. Renfro, who had no objections to slavery and who had acquired three slaves when he married, served in the Confederate Army from 1862 to 1865. Afterward, when he returned home to Cross Timbers, an area a few miles southeast of Fort Worth, he poured his considerable energy into farming, promoting education, and preaching the gospel. Financially secure by the early 1880s, he thereafter devoted less time to economic pursuits and more to intellectual cultivation. He read Tom Paine, Robert Ingersoll, and Baruch Spinoza, and this led him into the free-thought movement.

Although this interesting tale sheds light on important historical events from the perspective of a particular family member, it is hardly a definitive biography. It lacks sufficient historical context. The names of David Swing, Charles Briggs, and Henry P. Smith, for instance, remind one that heresy trials such as Renfro's were neither confined to southern backwaters nor peculiar primarily to Baptists. It fails to pursue suggestive observations. A few casual remarks, for instance, is all that Griggs offers on Renfro's alleged sympathy for the Indians of central and west Texas. And how could one who fretted over the plight of Native Americans so easily accept the enslavement of African Americans? Finally, the book's subtitle is misleading. More attention is actually spent on family matters, Baptist affairs, and the Civil War than on free thinking, and for obvious reason. Renfro was a religious partisan for all but about the last two years of his life. He sharply rebuked other ministers, particularly Methodists, whose views strayed too far from his understanding of the Scriptures. His conversion to free thought was not a public matter until early 1883. He died in early 1885. Readers tantalized by the title, as I was, will be disappointed. More is promised than delivered.

JOHN W. STOREY
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MICHAEL A. GORDON. *The Orange Riots: Irish Political Violence in New York City, 1870 and 1871.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. Pp. xvii, 263. $35.00.

Michael A. Gordon has written a carefully researched and powerful account of Irish sectarian violence in New York City. The Irish are a people with extraordinarily long memories and, like all such people, they fill their calendars with annual celebrations of historical events, many of them sanguinary. Celebrations mean parades, and every July 12th Irish Protestants—the Orange—relive the victory of the Protestant King William over the Catholic James II in 1689. In Northern Ireland it must seem as if almost the entire summer—the "marching season," as it is known—is given over to sectarian celebration. The Protestants march; the Catholics stay under cover. It is an annual occurrence, these days of tension and often of violence.

On July 12, 1870, and again a year later, Irish Protestants indulged their marching habits in New York City. Unlike the Catholics of Northern Ireland, however, New York's Catholics did not stay under cover. Eight died in 1870. The following year the police and the National Guard, as "protectors" of the Protestant right to march, were added to the mix; the results were nearly predictable: sixty-seven people died in 1871, hundreds more were injured.

For late-twentieth-century Americans there is an otherworldly element to this kind of sectarian violence, whether in Ireland in 1970 or New York a hundred years earlier. Religion, they would argue, is not that important and only a benighted people would ever allow it to become such. It is the great strength of Gordon's book that he shows that religion was not that important in 1870 and 1871 either; that more was at work during New York's marching season than the Orange versus the Green.

"Polite" New Yorkers knew that in 1871, too. The violence of that and the previous year reminded them of the draft/race riots of 1863 or the Paris Commune of 1871. No one recalled the Counter Reformation. In other words, it was known at the time that social class and, for want of a better phrase, the "promise of American life" explained the events of 1870–71. Irish Catholics, overwhelmingly working class, had one version of America and the republican vision that animated it. In this version, Orangemen and those who supported them were not simply religious bigots but were also monarchists, seditious rebels, and subverters of the republican dream. In a neat reversal, the Orange accused Catholics of the same quite secular sins.

There is a great deal to be learned from Gordon's approach, and not just about the Orange riots in New York City. His description of the riots as battles between two opposing world views should be tested on other instances of ethnic and religious violence, both in Northern Ireland and the United States. I wish he had done more of that in this book, that he had dealt with the marching season in Belfast as well as New York, or that he had carried his story forward to other July 12ths and other instances of Orange-Green rivalry. That, however, is a relatively minor point. This is a fine book, fair and judicious in interpretation and sophisticated in analysis. His careful and original treatment of these two days of violence lights up some dark corners of American ethnic, working-class, and urban history.

DAVID M. EMMONS
University of Montana

MARK WYMAN. *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 267. $34.50.

The historical treatment of Southern and Eastern European migration to the United States before World War I concentrates, for the most part, on migrants who arrived and remained in the United States throughout their lives. Mark Wyman, however, examines those who passed through America and then returned to their home communities. His perspective changes the relative importance given to various aspects of the immigrants' American experiences. It elevates the importance of emigration to the communities of origin, in terms of both the impact from large-scale out-migration and later changes in these communities produced by those who returned with new resources and expanded cultural awareness.

There is, in the history of each national group, a recognition that many, if not most, emigrants set out on their sojourn with the intention of returning to their home communities. The "birds of passage" phenomenon (temporary migration of mostly young males intent on accumulating enough capital to redeem or advance family economic standing at home) is almost universally acknowledged by immigration historians. Wyman believes that important consequences of this emigrant motivation are less well recognized. As long as migrants saw their futures in their homelands, their experiences and choices in America were regulated by a particular calculus. Choice of employment, definition of acceptable working and living conditions, pressures to conform to American culture and norms in language, education, religion, calls to join in collective labor action, and investments in community building in this country all had to be evaluated in relation to their effects on the goals of accumulating capital and returning home. Many of the immigrant behaviors that seemed so irrational to contemporary observers and led them to question the newcomers' appropriateness for membership in American society appear entirely rational if viewed from the perspective of migrants contemplating imminent repatriation.

For those who held to the original intent to return home, their experiences had consequences that went beyond the economic resources they took back with them and the land, houses, and businesses they could

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purchase there. Returning emigrants took home with them new agricultural and industrial techniques. They introduced implements and technology encountered in their travels. They made contributions to culture, politics, and social organization at the local and, occasionally, at the national levels in their homelands. They often constituted a new stratum, the "Americani," in the local social structure and provided challenges to traditional authority.

Historical scholarship relative to each national group recognizes the initial intent of temporary sojourns on the parts of emigrants and includes at least some work on the repatriation movement. Wyman makes an important contribution by collecting this scattered work and integrating it with his own research in Polish and Irish archives along with published government documents and contemporary accounts from Italy, Sweden, and the United States. The result is a thorough synthesis that identifies the many commonalities among groups, as well as occasional differences.

Yet, even with Wyman's important contributions, one aspect of the story of this migration remains elusive. A substantial number of those who finally settled in America, or finally returned to their home villages, did so only after several transatlantic voyages involving self-testing, learning, and revising perspectives on their possible futures. Not all repatriates found that a single sojourn was sufficient to acquire the necessary capital to live as they wished at home. And, once they returned home, their actual experiences did not always live up to their expectations. When restricted circumstances of their traditional village clashed with their expanded visions, reemigration became an obvious possibility. This more complicated pattern of migration has yet to receive a general synthesis. Nevertheless, this book fills an important lacuna and will prove a welcome text for immigration history courses.

JOHN W. BRIGGS
Syracuse University

PETER MCCAFFERY. *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia: The Emergence of the Republican Machine, 1867–1933.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1993. Pp. xxi, 264. $35.00.

Peter McCaffery has contributed another work to the historiography of urban bosses and machines. His is probably the best full-length study to offer a rebuttal to sociologist Robert Merton's functional view of machine politics. This investigation of Philadelphia's Republican politics between 1867 and 1933 rises above the narrow case study to permit a testing of how structure and organization rather than large-scale social changes such as mass immigration help to explain machine development.

The book is tightly argued and well documented, although it becomes a bit heavy-handed in its conclusion when the author wishes to make certain that you understand his message and his disdain for the "social analysis" of urban politics. For McCaffery, contrary to the usual view, "genuine boss rule did not become a reality in Philadelphia until the late nineteenth century" (p. 190). The genuineness of the institution could be found in a structure that reflected a well-disciplined cohesive city-wide organization that was hierarchical. At the top of the hierarchy, the boss could exercise control over subordinates in party and public office and connect to voters through "organizational cement" such as the exchange of patronage and favors for votes.

These voters, however, often immigrants or blacks, and frequently poor, may have received some of the services that Merton proclaimed almost a half century ago, but they did so at a cost. Rather than being functional, the machine for McCaffery is dysfunctional and "actually did little to promote genuine social reforms that would have met the real needs of its constituents—for example, programs that would have provided decent housing, good schools and hospitals, clean water, full employment, and racial integration" (p. 125). The author is not the first to tell us that bossism was conservative and defensive, but he cushions his attack by demurring from a return to contemporary caricatures of the political boss. He simply wishes us to recognize that bosses "were not cultural pluralists, but as culturally narrow as the most nativist reformer" (p. 133). This is probably true, but the divergence from the "urban liberalism" thesis of scholars such as John D. Buenker and J. Joseph Huthmacher at some points exaggerates the evils of bossism and veers from a needed synthesis of function and dysfunction that this volume at certain points seems to promise.

If immigrant populations were not the key to machine success, neither was big business. McCaffery argues that the political machine developed independent of and not subservient to business interests. By so doing, he takes on Lincoln Steffens, who labeled Philadelphia in 1903 as "corrupt and . . . contented" and laid the blame for political corruption at the feet of selfish business interests in the classic Progressive portrayal of urban politics.

By considering Republican Philadelphia over two-thirds of a century, this study has the benefit of demonstrating change over time in the working of municipal and party politics. It does this well. It carries the debate over bosses and machines to a new level and raises a variety of useful questions, building on issues suggested during the last decade by scholars such as Terrence J. McDonald. To paraphrase George Washington Plunkitt, a New York not a Philadelphia ward boss, McCaffery "has seen his opportunities and took 'em."

BRUCE M. STAVE
University of Connecticut, Storrs

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WILLIAM B. WAITS. *The Modern Christmas in America: A Cultural History of Gift Giving.* (The American Social Experience Series, number 26.) New York: New York University Press. 1993. Pp. xxii, 267. $40.00.

The history of holidays and the "gift exchange" has long engaged anthropologists, and historians are beginning to catch up (or on). William B. Waits's study, however, adds relatively little to our knowledge. His profusely illustrated book is about Christmas giving from 1880 to 1940. Waits dates the appearance of manufactured Christmas presents (hence of the "modern" Christmas) to the 1880s; before that, he argues, gifts generally were handmade. For several decades after 1880 Americans gave cheap manufactured presents ("gimcracks") to a wide circle of acquaintances. In the 1910s, however, such gimcracks gave way to Christmas cards, whereas more expensive presents were exchanged only within the family circle. In successive chapters, Waits deals (on a decade-by-decade basis) with Christmas presents between husbands and wives, for children, and with community Christmas celebrations, Christmas charity to the poor, and Christmas bonuses to employees. A brief penultimate chapter carries the story up to 1980.

What is new here is outweighed by what is misleading. The book relies on older secondary works, ignoring recent scholarship, both general and specialized (the notes do not cite anything published after 1984), and it operates from a premise that the 1880s marked a fundamental divide between an earlier society of rural scarcity and a more recent one of urban abundance. As for primary sources, the book is based almost exclusively on mass-circulation magazines and trade journals from the 1880–1940 period. Waits extrapolates from essays and advertisements in these magazines to "America" as a whole, unselfconsciously and without investigating any other sources. Issues of class, or reading habits, are virtually absent. The resulting analysis is replete with (and depends on) such statements as that "Americans began to like luxury items during the late 1920s, when they began to develop a more favorable attitude toward spending money" (p. 67). As for the narrative, it is mostly flat and uninflected.

An even more serious failing is Waits's circular argument about the history of Christmas gifts themselves. Waits asserts that because the U.S. economy was pre-industrial before 1880, it follows that "Americans usually handmade the items they exchanged at Christmas" (p. 16). Such handmade presents disappeared after 1880 as industrialization transformed working habits and led to an economy of abundance; thereafter, Christmas presents were increasingly "manufactured," and chosen to satisfy vague inner cravings for happiness instead of basic needs (pp. 32–34). In short, Waits is dealing with the origins of "modern" problems of Christmas shopping, and of modern consumer society itself. Improbably, however, he has made no investigation of his own into pre–1880 Christmas gifts. Instead, his evidence for this transformation comes entirely from later recollections, the very magazine articles he has also used as primary sources for the post–1880 years. Unfortunately, these later recollections cry out for being read with some detachment. When a writer in 1912 recalls fondly how "every stitch" in the childhood Christmas scarf he had once received had been "worked by my mother's patient hands," one must at least be prepared to look elsewhere for supporting evidence. By accepting such nostalgic texts as accurate and sufficient historical descriptions of nineteenth-century Christmas gifts (and American society itself), Waits ends up echoing rather than analyzing the anomie of the early twentieth century.

STEPHEN NISSENBAUM
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

JEFFREY D. MASON. *Melodrama and the Myth of America.* (Drama and Performance Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 247. $29.95.

Jeffrey D. Mason's book, along with Bruce McConachie's *Melodramatic Formations* (1992), represent a pronounced trend among theater historians to enhance our understanding of melodrama by employing current methodologies such as semiotics, deconstruction, and especially Marxism. They have attempted to bring theater studies more into the intellectual mainstream even while they seek fresh things to say about old material. Mason has achieved this quite well, and in so doing he has produced a book not only theater specialists but also all historians of nineteenth-century social history may profit from.

Mason focuses on five melodramas of the nineteenth century: John Augustus Stone's drama of the noble savage, *Metamora* (1829), which became Edwin Forrest's great starring vehicle; W. H. Smith's morality play for temperance, *The Drunkard* (1844); various theatrical versions (including one by Harriet Beecher Stowe herself) of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852); Bartley Campbell's crime drama of the California gold fields, *My Partner* (1879); and Bronson Howard's sentimental rendering of the Civil War, *Shenandoah* (1889). Mason details the history lying behind each play's subject. He does this well, although most historians will likely find his accounts familiar. But the heart of his book is his showing how playwrights interpreted that history for contemporary audiences. Mason would also like to explain that holy of holies for historians of entertainment: understanding how audiences perceived and responded to what they watched. But like all before him he recognizes the epistemological limitations of that effort, and he must settle for conjecture.

Mason argues that melodramas were shaped by and helped to perpetuate a mythic view of America. Almost by definition this was a conservative view, one placing white Anglo-Saxon males in dominant roles.

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It also partook of a highly sentimental sensibility, empathetic, domestic to the core, and which defined all problems in individual terms rather than as a consequence of any systemic social failing.

The complexity of Mason's argument defies my brief recounting. Although usually persuasive, occasionally he strains to find significance beyond what the evidence will bear. And I detect an essential hostility toward the genre (or at least toward its message) that may be misplaced. For example, he finds that "the myth's exclusionary configuration undermines its validity, for it claims to encompass America, yet it rejects some of its constituents" (p. 192). But to conclude that melodramas suffered ethnic and gender parochialism does not mean they lacked validity as a source of mythic vision for our culture. The American idea of success has had remarkable staying power even while the groups given access to that dream expanded considerably.

Perhaps the most compelling chapter of the book deals with the drama of the Civil War. The earliest dramatic portrayals of the conflict were for the amateur stage, the professional theater not dealing with it until the late 1880s. When it did—in such plays as *Shenandoah*—the issue of slavery was virtually ignored. Instead, the conflict was transformed into a "troubled intersectional love affair." Conflict between individuals, not social strife, drove the war dramas, and a theme of sectional reconciliation underlay the plots. In short, Mason argues that rather than engaging audiences in a critique of the national experience, melodramas offered up a fare of reassuring myths about our collective past.

BENJAMIN MCARTHUR
Southern College of Seventh-day Adventists

H. WAYNE MORGAN. *Kenyon Cox, 1856–1919: A Life in American Art.* Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 290. $32.00.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Kenyon Cox was one of America's most prominent mural painters as well as a distinguished art critic and lecturer. Only a handful of specialists in the art and culture of the American Renaissance (ca. 1885–1915) now recognize his name, long since overshadowed by the reputations of contemporaries such as Winslow Homer, Thomas Eakins, Albert Pinkham Ryder, and an assortment of American impressionists, including Childe Hassam and William Merritt Chase. Recent revivals in the history of American art have begun to generate new interest in many neglected figures, but H. Wayne Morgan's biography is the first full-scale study of Cox and the first commentary of any length since the hefty obituaries and eulogies that followed the painter's death in 1919. This account of Cox's life represents extensive use of archival resources, which Morgan has shaped into a clear, coherent, and often entertaining narrative dense in useful details about art life during the turn-of-the-century decades.

Born into an Ohio family with Oberlin connections, Cox inherited the values of honor, duty, idealism, and self-help imported from New England by settlers of the Western Reserve. After studying art in Cincinnati and Philadelphia, Cox persuaded his parents to allow him to go to Paris, where he trained for several years in various *ateliers* and acquired the fine draftsmanship that would later distinguish his grand-scale public art. After returning to America and settling in New York, he worked hard as a jack-of-all-artistic-trades, teaching at the Art Students League, illustrating books and magazine articles, writing art criticism, and involving himself actively in the institutional life of the art world. As a young, cosmopolitan painter dedicated to improving and refining American culture, he was vividly typical of his generation. When the Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago gave American painters the chance to work on a monumental scale in decorating the huge exhibition halls, Cox was among the group whose experience there led directly to the organization of the mural movement. Over the next three decades, he produced high-minded, allegorical paintings and mosaics for courthouses, state capitols, libraries, and college buildings, while solidifying a reputation as the fierce opponent of what he considered to be the pathological egotism and eccentricity of modernist painting. Sadly for Cox, his own work and ideals were almost completely eclipsed by the institutional and cultural forces dedicated to promoting the modernist ideologies of progress, change, and self-expression in visual art.

The value of this study lies in the fullness with which it portrays the career of a successful and respected painter who in many ways was far more representative of his era than Eakins, Homer, and Ryder ever were. It comes as a surprise to learn that the producer of lofty, Renaissance-inspired murals started out in a far more naturalistic style before committing himself to the classical tradition. He also produced elegant portraits and attractive landscapes. Throughout the book, Morgan offers fascinating glimpses of the passionate, quirky, tactless, and often troubled figure behind paintings that seem at first to be the productions of a cold, correct, conservative, and conventional talent. The numerous excerpts from Cox's letters and critical writings contribute significantly to the reconstitution of his distinctive voice and often contain unexpected gems, such as the note from Paris mentioning his new fancy for "an odd old painter called Sandro Botticelli" (p. 43). Morgan gives a full and balanced account of the issues pertaining to Cox's art practice: the unending controversy about the nude, however pure and ideal, and the conviction that high culture could act as a fundamental, cohesive power in society. For all Morgan's conscientiousness, however, he tends to stay on the surface, seldom if ever pausing for a deeper and more critical look into the ideologies of race, class, and gender that Cox's visual language implicitly en-

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dorsed. Opportunities for a richer, more psychoanalytical exploration of the painter and his social relations have been passed over as well. This is, in other words, a straightforward, conservative, traditional biography, and in this author and subject seem well matched. There is one small but glaring error: the reference to influential editor and tastemaker Richard Watson Gilder's wife as "Rosamund" (pp. 114, 117), when she was in fact the painter Helena De Kay. Rosamond (not "Rosamund") was the daughter who edited Gilder's letters for publication. Given Morgan's longstanding involvement with late-nineteenth-century American history and culture, this is a surprising bit of sloppiness.

SARAH BURNS
Indiana University, Bloomington

KATHLEEN MINNIX. *Laughter in the Amen Corner: The Life of Evangelist Sam Jones.* Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 313. $35.00.

Kathleen Minnix's engagingly written and impressively researched book explores the life and sharp-tongued pronouncements of the white southern evangelist Sam Jones, who made himself into a media phenomenon late in the nineteenth century. Less influential than Dwight Moody and Billy Sunday, Jones nonetheless attracted enormous crowds to his folksy but highly theatrical Methodist sermons throughout the South and in major northern cities during the 1880s and 1890s.

Jones's popularity, acerbic wit, mercurial personality, and low-brow style did much to enliven his often dreary thoughts and ambitions, much as they energized his in-your-face sermons. Minnix deftly sketches the major traits of this charismatic evangelical personality and his habitual modes of social interaction, preserving a graceful but firm authorial distance from a proudly uneducated, racist, and obsessively voluble man.

The most interesting section of this handsome book explores the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that created the necessary historical context for Jones's rise to fame. Minnix treats him as a prophet of the New South and sectional reconciliation. Shaken by the economic devastation of the Civil War and the rise of African-American politicians under Reconstruction, white southerners found hope and diversion in Jones's traveling evangelical circus that both strengthened a paternalistic reaction in Dixie and further undermined northern support for Reconstruction. Jones helped to court northern financial investments in the industrialization of the South, reassuring his hearers of the poor white southerners' piety, jocular good will, and determination to provide businessmen with a plentiful supply of cheap obedient labor.

Specialists in religious history will profit from the author's explorations of Jones's involvement with the Social Gospel and the Holiness movements as well as her discussion of the tensions between denominationalism and popular evangelism. Despite Jones's protestations of deep personal acquaintance with African Americans, the words he used to express his garden-variety racism show the influence of blackface minstrelsy on his social attitudes. This source and the reports on Jones in black newspapers would have strengthened Mannix's treatment of "the clown of Conservative evangelicals' " impact on race.

The book's title seems misleading. Jones most often launched his pious wise-guy witticisms at someone else's expense, and his own manic depressive, alcoholic personality was certainly no laughing matter. He often comes across as a smart aleck redeemed only by his inspiring example of a largely successful personal struggle with alcohol and his deeply sad private duels with insanity. Minnix admits that Jones was hard for his contemporaries to take for any extended period of time. Her book offers a compelling analysis of Jones while at the same time keeping his abrasive presence under scholarly control. She has made a serious contribution to the field of American religious history and the history of the South.

WILLIAM KENNEY
Kent State University Kent, Ohio

EDITH L. BLUMHOFER. *Restoring the Faith: The Assemblies of God, Pentecostalism, and American Culture.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1993. Pp. x, 281. Cloth $42.50, paper $17.95.

Couched as a study of Pentecostalism's most prominent denominational institution, Edith L. Blumhofer's book is decidedly more than that. Early on, she lays the groundwork for a reanalysis of the theological impulses that inspired the movement some ninety years ago. Drawing on works emphasizing the radical millenarian milieu of early Pentecostalism, she identifies restorationism as the factor that gave the movement its essence. Blumhofer's story of the Assemblies of God is instructive precisely because it demonstrates the degree to which Pentecostalism has changed over the years; the restorationist theme reemerges periodically, "expressing itself differently as the movement improves its economic and social position" (p. 4).

Within a few years of Pentecostalism's arrival, theological differences and pragmatic considerations pointed many adherents toward some institutional control. When the Assemblies were formed in 1914, the alliance was loose, fitting the movement's anti-organizational bias and the restorationist theme of re-creating the spirit of the early church. Yet, with time—and more theological controversy—came a call for even stronger institutional control. Restorationism took a back seat to concern for proper doctrine and institutional welfare, and the Assemblies became "considerably less fluid and much more predictable than before" (p. 135). By the conclusion

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of the second generation, Blumhofer sees a new milieu, one of "waning restorationism and muted apocalypticism," one in which "right belief replaced right experience in marking a Pentecostal" (p. 158). As that happened, prominent Pentecostal organizations allied with fundamentalism, most notably as participating founders of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942. Marginal Pentecostals remained closer to their restorationist origins and avoided associations like the Pentecostal Fellowship of North America founded in 1948.

Blumhofer's discussion of recent trends in Pentecostalism is arguably her most innovative contribution. She identifies a second Pentecostal restorationism after World War II, one which denied that the earlier Pentecostal outpouring was the prophetic "latter rain." This new wave—existing on the margins of Pentecostalism—figured prominently in the emergence of both 1950s healing revivals and the subsequent charismatic movement. The result was an explosion of—and invariably redefinition of—Pentecostalism. Yet denominations remained suspicious and, Blumhofer postulates, out of touch. She faults denominational leaders who criticized the charismatic movement but reveled in the increased exposure it brought and the numbers that it added to church rolls. She also questions the Assemblies' use of statistics to convey the image of an institution friendly to females given the lack of any real opportunity for women.

The analysis of the movement's early origins is insightful, although historians of Pentecostalism will recognize that Blumhofer stresses the midwestern Reformed wing over the Wesleyan Pentecostals. Justified in the sense that this is the wing that predominated in the founding of the Assemblies, it perhaps limits her redefinition of Pentecostal origins. Because most Wesleyan Pentecostals had already formed denominations prior to accepting Pentecostal theology, it is likely that their aversion to organization and creed was weaker. Blumhofer's thesis at least challenges Pentecostal historians to examine more seriously restorationism and demonstrates clearly that what is needed now is another broad treatment of the movement.

James R. Goff, Jr.
Appalachian State University

Edith L. Blumhofer. *Aimee Semple McPherson.* (Library of Religious Biography.) Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 1993. Pp. xiii, 431. Cloth $24.99, paper $14.99.

Edith L. Blumhofer is to be congratulated for her detailed, scholarly study. As Blumhofer argues, the dramatic evangelist and healer, Aimee McPherson (1890–1944), is an important figure in the history of North American religion and merits attention as a woman who had a major effect on our culture. Yet she has received only modest attention and nothing to match this work, distinguished as it is by a searching and comprehensive scholarship, a rare biography that exists neither to praise nor to bury its subject.

Blumhofer takes us through McPherson's life, presenting the principal events and considering the major dramatic personae of her busy life. At times the book has the aura of a travelogue, perhaps an inevitable result given that the roofless McPherson was so often on the road, preaching her version of the Christian Good News or trying to accommodate or reconcile with one or another of the central people in her life. Her travels and stopping places, most famously Los Angeles in the 1920s, are clearly integral to a life story best understood as a restless migration with many stops and no certain destination.

This book is also very much a tale of loves won and lost over the course of McPherson's often tempestuous relations with her family, assorted husbands, and associates. These relationships are developed at length and there is as a result a considerable human interest dimension to this biography quite apart from everything else. Some readers might wish for a biographer slightly more willing to probe into McPherson's psyche, but Blumhofer chooses to provide her readers with the bountiful information she has discovered and leave any adventures in psychobiography to them.

The study also undertakes to give its readers insight into broader themes and concerns beyond the flamboyant McPherson. For example, Blumhofer tries hard to give us a grounding in Pentecostal Protestantism over the course of McPherson's life, in part to give us the background to understand McPherson and the content of her preaching. This background is necessary and usually clear. Equally clear is the author's evident conclusion that McPherson's preaching was not especially important in Protestant or Pentecostal theological terms.

Blumhofer makes a special project of emphasizing the Canadian connection both in regard to McPherson and religion in North America in general. She seeks to combine (while also distinguishing) U.S. and Canadian Protestant traditions in her reflections on McPherson, a native of Canada whose career was spent in the United States. Blumhofer's research in Canadian materials is distinctly valuable also for the information it yields about McPherson's childhood and about her mother, who was an important influence on McPherson all of her life. Here as elsewhere Blumhofer has seemingly left no stone unturned in her research efforts. She is a serious scholar who has done hard, scholarly work, with productive results.

Robert Booth Fowler
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Robert Gregg. *Sparks from the Anvil of Oppression: Philadelphia's African Methodists and Southern Migrants, 1890–1940.* Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 272. $39.95.

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This interesting book adds to our understanding of the history of the so-called "great migration" of African Americans from the South to the North, just before and after World War I. Robert Gregg's special angle of vision is Philadelphia (not intensively studied in the previous literature on the migration), which is enhanced by his concern for how black churches, especially those with Methodist connections, responded to the challenges of the migration. Thus, the author offers new information in two important areas of current historiography—internal migration studies of the black community and the history of the black church.

Gregg makes a number of useful distinctions in his analysis of the migrations from the South to Philadelphia. He sharply distinguishes southern rural blacks from migrants who came from southern cities, arguing plausibly that the urban dwellers were better prepared for life in a northern urban ghetto and more attractive to Philadelphia churches seeking to support (and perhaps win as new members) the African-American newcomers. Rural migrants also came in greater numbers after World War I (the second wave of the overall migration from the South). Black Methodists, the dominant church group in the Philadelphia black community before the war, attracted relatively few of these rural folk. Instead, they either joined and energized the Baptist denomination they were familiar with in the South, or created small, storefront charismatic congregations outside the mainstream church traditions. The pre and post–World War I migrations each came from different areas of the South—the earlier migrations from Maryland and Virginia (where Methodists were strong), the later migrations from South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida (where Methodists were weaker and the rural element was especially prominent). Gregg also has some interesting things to say about gender as a factor in the migrations.

The conventional historical view is that northern black churches did relatively little to help migrants when they first moved out of the South. In Philadelphia, the author says, this was not the case. The responses of the churches revealed some of the interior institution-building, similar to the process experienced by other urban ethnic groups, which occurred in the black community before and after World War I. Yet, Gregg argues, racial discrimination continually undermined that process, circumscribing opportunity and permanently ghettoizing Philadelphia blacks in ways unfamiliar to ethnic white Americans.

There are inadequacies in this study. Gregg's stated purpose to "highlight diversity within African American communities" (p. 218) is undercut by his insistence on lumping all Philadelphia black Methodists together, although they represented several denominations, even churches associated with the predominantly white Methodist Episcopal church. Lumping all black Methodists together is possible, Gregg argues, because they possessed a common "ideology" or theology; it is difficult to test this thesis properly because the author's discussion of Methodist doctrine is scattered and very brief. I also yearned for more words from the migrants about their new lives in the City of Brotherly Love. Perhaps oral history and more imaginative use of cited sources (letters of transmittal at Mother Bethel A.M.E. church, for example) could have helped in this regard. Nevertheless, the pluses of this book definitely outweigh the minuses. It clearly adds to our expanding knowledge of northern, urban black communities in the twentieth century.

JAMES FINDLAY
University of Rhode Island

DAVID C. FREDERICK. *Rugged Justice: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the American West, 1891–1941.* Foreword by SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1994. Pp. xiv, 331. $40.00.

Publication of institutional histories about federal courts at all levels has surged recently, with circuit courts of appeal in the lead. With the appearance of David C. Frederick's book, the Ninth Circuit Court is now among seven circuits that have been subjected to a scholarly microscope, all within the past seventeen years. Most of these histories have resulted from historically minded judges forming committees, organizing historical societies, and otherwise encouraging the study of their courts.

Like most institutional histories, this study was commissioned, but it hardly shows and does not detract. Frederick wisely insisted on two conditions before agreeing to write the book: "first, that the court would exercise no control over the substance of the manuscript; and, second, that the study would conclude before the time when any judge now living had been appointed to the court" (p. xi). As a result, Frederick was free to produce a study that, while generally congratulatory, is analytical and not at all boosterish.

Frederick begins with the origins of the circuit courts of appeal and the early appointments to the Ninth Circuit. The docket was dictated by matters important to the Ninth Circuit's geographical position in the Far West. Thus, the court heard important litigation arising out of railroad construction, Chinese exclusion, mining, and other natural resources. It was a very small court then, and individual judges very much mattered. One of the themes Frederick develops is the clash in judicial philosophies between Judges Erskine Ross and William Gilbert, with Ross, perhaps because of his former service in the Confederacy, opposing aggrandizement of federal power. Ross interpreted statutes literally; Gilbert searched for legislative intent. Ross construed contracts narrowly; Gilbert looked at the intention of the parties. Ross dealt with trial courts strictly; Gilbert was inclined to defer to the discretion of the lower courts.

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Moving forward in time, Frederick discusses the Ninth Circuit's disposition of World War I's draconian Espionage Act cases, prohibition prosecutions, and matters arising out of widespread industrial unrest and the New Deal. He traces the process and politics of judicial appointments and closes with the controversy over a proposed division of the circuit. In all of this Frederick presents a good analysis, well supported by documentary references.

One of the values of institutional histories is the evidence sometimes unearthed that can support or modify broader historical themes. Although not stressed by the author, there are nuggets of gold here for instrumentalist legal historians, who take the view that judges sometimes deliberately engineer the outcome of cases and the direction of the law in accordance with their own agendas and beliefs. In the early period Frederick suggests that Ross and Gilbert purposely limited their other judicial duties to be available for all appellate panels "so that each might blunt the influence of the other in the establishment of Ninth Circuit precedent" (p. 241). He shows that Curtis D. Wilbur used his power of assignment as senior judge to designate himself and another conservative judge, "with a regularity that belied randomness," to three-judge panels which then struck down New Deal legislation (pp. 204, 242). Still another judge wrote an opinion that twisted existing precedent and then bragged to a friend, regarding that opinion, that one "of the pleasant incidents of a life tenure" was that he could blend some disparate quotations "and make what at least reads like a logical argument" (pp. 197–98).

The book will be of greatest interest to specialists in western legal history. But Frederick presents so many insights into judicial actions and interactions and the appointment process that many others will want to read it.

DAVID J. LANGUM
Cumberland School of Law of Samford University

WILFORD M. MCCLAY. *The Masterless: Self and Society in Modern America.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 366. Cloth $45.00, paper $16.95.

The problems of philosophy, William James advised, might be conveniently summed up as a matter of confronting the competing claims of the one and the many. Efforts to reconcile these claims convincingly—especially when they take the form of the contending demands of self and society—have made little headway in American thought. American intellectuals seem to be forever seeking to redress an imbalance between individualism and social cohesion without ever arriving at a stable equilibrium that satisfies anyone for very long. One might well take this venerable and ongoing spiral to be the master theme of social thought in the United States, as Wilford M. McClay does in this fine study of the "centrifugal and centripetal impulses" at work in the thinking of the nation's public intellectuals for over more than a century.

If McClay's theme is familiar, so too is his cast of characters, which includes Walt Whitman, Edward Bellamy, Frederick Jackson Turner, Lester Frank Ward, Jane Addams, Herbert Croly, John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Erich Fromm, Hannah Arendt, and David Riesman. Yet even those conversant with the life and work of these thinkers can profit from McClay's nuanced portraits and readings, a few of which—such as his contextualization and interpretation of Riesman's *Lonely Crowd* (1950)—outshine anything that has gone before. And I would say this is a book of choice with which to begin the education of a student eager to explore the contours of modern American social thought. Not the least of its virtues is some of the best jargon-free writing to be found in contemporary intellectual history.

McClay begins with the transformation of "projective social ideals" wrought by the Civil War, as the consolidation of American political economy and society was matched by the emergence of an anti-individualist strain of social theory exemplified by the collectivist utopia of Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1889). During the early twentieth century, the ambivalence of figures such as Turner and Ward toward this centripetal dynamic was largely lost in the embrace by progressive intellectuals of a notion of the "social self," which dissolved all clear boundaries between self and society and invested authority in a "disinterested" new middle class. But a centrifugal backlash evident in the work of Lippmann and Niebuhr began in the late 1920s, and with the advent of "totalitarianism," which apotheosized the tendencies of consolidationist social thought into a negative utopia, this adversarial strain became hegemonic. By the 1950s Riesman and others were denouncing the social conformity of the American masses as "soft totalitarianism," while at the same time finding it hard to recapture an Emersonian "assurance of a hard, clear-cut sense of individuality" (p. 265). They thus articulated an uneasy and unstable defense of "autonomy" that found ruder form in the cultural politics of the 1960s.

Although one might well quarrel with the particulars of McClay's account, it is difficult to contest the outlines of his story. Neither is it easy to avoid his sobering conclusion. Examining sympathetically the various efforts of recent social thinkers such as Robert Bellah, Carol Gilligan, and Alasdair MacIntyre to broach more modest communitarian visions than those of earlier "consolidators" who dreamed of Great Communities, McClay nonetheless observes that even their less-grandiose arguments carry inadequate moral authority in a culture besotted with rights talk. For the foreseeable future, Americans seem destined to remain in "a dream of being both autonomous and connected, which in the end often

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settles for being merely lonely or crowded" (p. 295).

ROBERT B. WESTBROOK
University of Rochester

DAVID NASAW. *Going Out: The Rise and Fall of Public Amusements.* New York: Basic Books. 1993. Pp. viii, 312. $25.00.

David Nasaw synthesizes the growing body of scholarship on commercial popular amusements in American culture. Focusing on the 1880s through World War I, the author examines the development of the mixed-gender, mixed-class cultural institutions of vaudeville, amusement parks, baseball, dance halls, and motion pictures. Their rise marked an alternative to home-based entertainments and male-only saloons and variety theaters and hence mark a significant development in modern culture. For lower-middle and working-class men and women, these institutions provided a new arena for personal exploration. Overall, Nasaw argues that amusements became a democratic arena that unified whites regardless of gender, class, and national origin into a new public, but excluded or segregated African Americans as "the other."

Nasaw also examines opposition to popular entertainment. Moralists criticized Sunday shows and sexual performances as did Progressives who attempted to regulate and censor amusements in order to protect women and children. Whereas dance halls and cabarets stimulated public outrage, movies provided the basis for social anxieties because they were a cheap mass medium and extremely popular among the "undisciplined" immigrant young. One particularly strong chapter shows how studios waved the flag in World War I to deflect federal censorship efforts. Instead, Hollywood pledged self-censorship and created the Hays Office. By the 1920s, the public grandiosity of the movie palaces testified to the central place of movies in American culture.

The book has a number of strengths, among them analysis of technical and business developments, movies and World War I, race as a central issue in American entertainment, and the decline of urban amusements since the late 1940s. The scope of the volume, however, prevents a satisfactory treatment of many of its central themes. For example, the book shows the exclusion of blacks from the republic of amusement and their stereotypical treatment. While this rings true, there is little analysis of why this occurred. Similarly, no attention is given to the arena of black night clubs, dance halls, theaters, and popular music that developed under segregation as they functioned for African Americans and those whites fascinated by this culture. Moreover, the book's focus on the institutional development of various amusements usually downplays their cultural and thematic content. Although movies are discussed extensively, one learns little about the changing themes on screen.

To historicize his pre–World War I story, Nasaw offers a helpful overview of the decline of urban commercial entertainment in favor of suburban family parks, shopping center movie theaters, and sports centers removed from the city, public transportation, and blacks after World War II. Yet such a jump unfortunately obscures the role that these institutions played in the 1920s, the continuing opposition from moral forces disturbed by the growing power of the urban jungle, and the changes in popular amusements during the Great Depression and World War II. All of these periods witnessed enormous transformations in the amusement business, politics, and American culture. Although specialists may criticize it, this book's broad scope and lively style could find it a home in undergraduate courses and among general readers.

LEWIS A. ERENBERG
Loyola University of Chicago

ROBERT W. RYDELL. *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. x, 269. Cloth $49.95, paper $16.95.

This study reflects Robert W. Rydell's continuing interest in American involvement with international expositions. Whereas his previous book, *All the World's a Fair* (1984), focused on those monumental spectacles that took place between 1876 and 1916, the current work concentrates on those that followed during the roughly two-score years after World War I.

This volume is also a thematic extension of the prior study. The (partial) subtitle of that earlier book—"Visions of Empire"—could have served this book as well. For Rydell, the particular exposition sometimes seems of secondary importance. Whether European or American, whether occurring in the 1920s, the 1930s, or the post–World War II era, he regards these "Century-of-Progress Expositions" as imperialistic enterprises that beguiled the masses and further ensconced corporate capitalism and consumerism. Not surprisingly, he also draws attention to their racism and sexism. Who were the culprits? Politicians, businessmen, educators, and scientists all played their part in helping to fashion these both literally and metaphorically unseemly displays.

Rydell's research is both broad and imaginative, and he presents his views lucidly and frankly. But truth does not emerge fully grown from the archives like Athena from the head of Zeus: interpretation summons disagreement. All of which is not to say that these twentieth-century world's fairs lacked what the author claims they so egregiously manifested. It seems to me, however, that they were considerably more than ventures in political incorrectness. World's fairs may have indoctrinated but they also educated; they filled the coffers of the few but they brought genuine satisfaction and pleasure to the masses, who ardently wanted to participate in the culture of consumerism. Racism and sexism unquestionably attended these

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exhibitions, although perhaps not more and possibly less than the world outside their ambit. Did these extravaganzas in fact impose their values on people or did they essentially offer the public what it wanted?

In arguing his brief, Rydell does not strengthen his case—and indeed detracts from legitimate claims—by various irrelevant or overwrought comments and dubious assertions. Of what importance, for example, is it to know that some two hundred soldiers stationed at the Chicago Century of Progress Exposition (1933–34) suffered from venereal disease? Was the New York World's Fair (1939–40) a "techno-scientific utopia of planned bigotry" (p. 185)? Is it not an exaggeration, if not altogether misleading, to claim that "Science, as the handmaiden of monopoly capitalism, could not be restrained" (p. 101), or that Franklin D. Roosevelt performed a "complex pas de deux with the nation's business leaders" (p. 118)? Did a "military-industrial establishment" exist as early as the mid–1920s (p. 93)? Did the United States' participation in the Paris Colonial Exposition (1931) really help to pave the way for its support of French colonialism in Southeast Asia after World War II?

These criticisms and misgivings notwithstanding, this work is both genuinely informative and usefully provocative. But expect grumblings from the pews to interrupt the amens from the choir.

Robert Muccigrosso
Brooklyn College

Paul J. Zingg. *Harry Hooper: An American Baseball Life.* (Sport and Society.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 281. $29.95.

Baseball player Harry Hooper seems an unlikely subject for a scholarly biography. Although a member of the Hall of Fame, Hooper is less than a household name even among ardent baseball fans. He "seems at first," Paul J. Zingg notes, "little more than an interesting, if not noteworthy" figure, standing on the periphery of baseball history (p. 3). But out of Hooper's career and life, Zingg has crafted a model sports biography that illuminates not only the man and his game but also the era in which he played.

Hooper starred in the American League from 1909 to 1925, first with the great Boston Red Sox teams of Tris Speaker and Babe Ruth, and later with the post–Black Sox Chicago squad. During these years, he "witnessed events both on and off the Major League playing fields that forever affected the conduct and character of the game" (p. 3): the rise and fall of the Federal League, the emergence of Babe Ruth, the throwing of the 1919 World Series, the end of the "dead ball" era, and the transition of the game into a truly mass spectator and mass media sport.

Zingg makes good use of the colorful baseball anecdote and ably describes these changes. But, ironically, this study really distinguishes itself when Zingg takes his eye off the ball. Interwoven through Hooper's life are outstanding sections on growing up in turn-of-the-century California, the evolution of colleges and collegiate sports, and the life of the ballplayer off the field. Hooper attended St. Mary's College in Moraga, California, where, according to one writer, they "raise ball players in the oven" (p. 125). More than a dozen former St. Mary's athletes made it to the major leagues from the 1890s to the 1910s. Zingg, a former dean at St. Mary's, makes good use of the school's archives to outline how "larger developments affecting . . . American higher education" (p. 40) led to a greater emphasis on sports and environment in which Hooper, an excellent student, could flourish. Hooper, in turn, became the prototype of the college graduate in the major leagues, enhancing the respectability of his profession in the public eye.

This book also benefits from Zingg's access to Hooper's personal papers. Hooper's family preserved not just the usual player scrapbooks and memorabilia but also diaries, correspondence, and taped interviews, which present Hooper's "thoughtful observation and engaged perspective" (p. 7). As a result, Zingg offers a rare glimpse into the player's family life, relationships among the members of the Red Sox, baseball travel in the railroad era, and the traumas of life after baseball. Letters from Hooper's wife, Esther, provide a high point. In 1925, after thirteen years as a baseball wife, Esther rebelled. "This way of living is a joke," she complained from California. While Harry could "have a beautiful time, see things and then go and enjoy everything," she could not have a male neighbor over "to play the banjo . . . because they would say I was sleeping with him" (p. 200).

In his introduction, Zingg poses the questions of whether Hooper's "is a life worth telling and if the evidence exists to tell it" (p. 4). Zingg not only justifies his subject but also the potential of sports biography as a "knothole" into American life.

Jules Tygiel
San Francisco State University

J. Stuart Moore. *Chiropractic in America: The History of a Medical Alternative.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 228. $34.95.

This is a carefully researched, nicely organized, and well-conceived history of chiropractic in America. J. Stuart Moore's book ranges from the founding of chiropractic by Daniel D. Palmer in the 1880s, to the twentieth-century legal battles for the right to practice chiropractic and to utilize hospital facilities. The book is relatively short (149 pages of text), but it is based on extensive research, as indicated by the forty-three pages of notes and the eleven-page bibliographical essay. Although chiropractic was founded by Daniel D. Palmer, it was developed by his son, Barlett Joshua Palmer, who was a high school dropout with little formal education. An interesting aspect of this book, and of the history of chiropractic, is the

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competition and rivalry between father and son for what in effect was control of this alternative to the more traditional treatments that were being used by the members of the American medical profession.

This book will take a place on a bookshelf that is rapidly being filled with works on the history of unorthodox medicine, and on the relationships between those unorthodox sects and the "regular physicians" and the American Medical Association. My work on homeopathy was the first to appear (*Homeopathy in America: Rise and Fall of a Medical Heresy* [1971]). In 1976, Ronald Numbers published his work on Ellen White (*Prophets of Health*), the founder of the Seventh-day Adventist movement, and in the process he provided a marvelous study of the evolution of the medical beliefs of and those who became her followers. Six years later, Norman Gevitz published his fine book on the history of osteopathy (*The D.O.'s* [1982]). In the 1980s came two studies of hydropathy (the water cure), focusing on its relationship to the health of women (Jane Donegan, *Hydropathic Highway to Health* [1985]) and Susan Cayleff, *"Wash and Be Healed"* [1987]). More recently, John Haller published his study of the physio-medical sect (*Medical Protestants: The Eclectics in American Medicine* [1994]). Norman Gevitz's edited collection of essays (*Other Healers: Unorthodox Medicine in America* [1988]) provides an amazing amount of information on the various medical sects in a single volume. It seems clear, however, that in the light of recent contributions, those of Haller and Moore especially, Gevitz's work should be updated.

Notwithstanding these historiographical comments, Moore's history of chiropractic in America is a fine addition to the literature and to our understanding of the history of that important medical alternative.

MARTIN KAUFMAN
Westfield State College

TRACY CAMPBELL. *The Politics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1993. Pp. xii, 223. $28.00.

In this book, Tracy Campbell delivers a vivid object lesson in the obstacles to agrarian insurgency. Campbell examines the struggles of tobacco growers in Kentucky and Tennessee to extract a living wage from their crops, a goal elusive in the best of times and nearly impossible for those entangled in the crop lien system and indebted to the furnishing merchants who dominated agriculture after the Civil War. The task was made even more difficult as James B. Duke and the American Tobacco Company consolidated control over the industry in the early 1900s, obliterating competition among tobacco buyers in the region.

One of the most striking features of this well-written book is Campbell's clarity and concreteness in explaining causality in the building of mass movements. In what came to be called the Black Patch Wars, growers of dark tobacco in western Kentucky and Tennessee formed the Tobacco Growers Association in 1902 and the Tobacco Planters' Protective Association two years later. Organizers were dispatched to educate and recruit other tobacco farmers to form cooperatives, pool crops, and withhold them from the market until a better price was offered. The central Kentucky growers of burley tobacco, a variety in increasing demand for a fledgling cigarette industry dominated by Duke and the American Tobacco Company, formed the Burley Tobacco Society in 1906 and organized an unprecedented agrarian strike: they grew no tobacco in 1908 and held over their pooled crop from 1907 until Duke's company agreed to a higher price.

Campbell understands the sequential nature of the development of such movements, however, and delivers essential information about the "legacy of dissent" that made these two efforts possible (p. 32). The political activity that began with the Greenback-Labor Party in the late 1870s, followed by the Grangers, the Farmers' Alliance, and the People's Party in the 1880s and 1890s, gave local growers in the Black Patch and the burley region "the experiential knowledge in insurgent politics necessary for the movement of the early 1900s" (p. 37).

The author also makes clear the fragility of movement building. With no credit mechanisms to sustain them, it was difficult to persuade farmers who were already in grim financial circumstances to grow less or, as in the burley region of central Kentucky, to plant no tobacco at all. The resulting frustrations erupted in night riding in 1905, with gangs of armed and hooded men on horseback visiting planters who refused to join the association and pool their crops, trying to "enforce cooperation by coercion" (p. 76). In addition, an alliance with bankers who extended some credit to those withholding their crops ultimately ensured that no fundamental changes would be made to the structural problem of credit for farmers.

Campbell calls the Tobacco Wars "a special kind of American tragedy" (p. 161). The growers were defending values firmly grounded in prevailing, but increasingly embattled, republican traditions. Encroachment on those values by monopolies such as the American Tobacco Company was the "legitimizing notion" that powered the Tobacco Wars (p. 157). Campbell's dogged pursuit of on-the-ground sources, and his determination to uncover the agonies of race and class in the interior of the movement, make his an account of unusual clarity.

BARBARA S. GRIFFITH
Cleveland, Ohio

GARY M. FINK. *The Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills Strike of 1914–1915: Espionage, Labor Conflict, and New South Industrial Relations.* (Cornell Studies in Industrial and Labor Relations, number 28.) Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 180. $26.00.

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Since the late 1960s, scholars of the American South and labor have produced a considerable literature on the southern cotton mill worker. Recent scholars, among them Alan Tullos and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall and her colleagues at the Southern Oral History Program, have borrowed heavily from sociological methodology to place the history of organizational efforts among southern textile workers within the larger context of worker culture. Gary M. Fink's case study of the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills strike, although incorporating the findings of Tullos, Hall and others, relies heavily on the archival resources of the more traditional historian and in so doing presents a nuanced and highly readable account of a single battle in the southern textile mill workers' continuing, and essentially futile, struggle with management.

The outline of the Fulton Mills strike of 1914–15 is all too familiar. Poor pay, deplorable working conditions, and a system of fines that reduced their piecework wages drove workers to organize a chapter of the United Textile Workers of America in 1913. In the spring of 1914, Oscar Elsas, the mills' manager/owner and son of the mills' founder, discharged all known union employees, prompting the strike. This defensive struggle for existence was led by skilled workers, especially higher-paid male loom fixers. Despite significant aid from the Atlanta Federation of Trades, the United Textile Workers, and the American Federation of Labor, eventually the strike was broken through Elsas's use of a private security force to protect strikebreakers, industrial espionage agents to spy on the strikers, and eviction to remove strike supporters from company housing.

What Fink's work adds to the literature on southern textile workers is a detailed portrait of a strike and failed organization effort at a mill in the center of one of the region's largest cities, rather than in the rural and suburban Piedmont where most southern mills were located. The Fulton Mills strikers enjoyed advantages that their rural brethren seldom, if ever, encountered: a sympathetic public, the support of many mainstream Protestant churches, a favorably disposed city police department, the strong presence of the Atlanta Federation of Trades in local economics and politics, and the support of national labor organizations. They were confronting an owner whose labor policies were criticized by many of his fellow owners. Yet the strike fell victim to management's control of housing, a surplus labor force, and the willingness of other mill owners to supply Elsas with the skilled laborers he needed.

Fink also thoroughly explores the role of labor spies in the eventual collapse of the strike, providing an insight into one of the least-studied of management's weapons. Despite his obvious sympathy for the striking workers, Fink objectively assesses their weaknesses, including internal bickering among the strike's leaders, avoiding any hint of romanticizing his proletarian subjects. Although Fink might have placed more emphasis on the role of the owners' organization, the Southern Cotton Manufacturers Association, which was forged in successful earlier efforts to stifle fledgling organizational efforts, this work significantly expands our understanding of labor relations in the New South's premier industry.

MELTON A. MCLAURIN
University of North Carolina, Wilmington

NURITH ZMORA. *Orphanages Reconsidered: Child Care Institutions in Progressive Era Baltimore.* Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press. 1994. Pp. xvi, 240. $44.95.

In her book on Baltimore orphanages, Nurith Zmora claims that orphanages were far more successful than they were given credit for, especially if one considers the users' views. She argues that Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist* and the late-nineteenth-century belief that children should remain with their families gave orphanages an undeserved bad name and asserts that orphanages did not separate children and their families for extended periods. Moreover, orphanages provided greater educational opportunities than were generally available to poor children. To show how successful orphanages were, Zmora focuses on three Baltimore orphanages—the Hebrew Orphan Asylum, the Samuel Ready School for Girls (non-sectarian Protestant), and the Dolan Children's Aid Society (Catholic), agencies she chose in part because of the availability of written records. Zmora informs us that they were selected because they were middle sized, began with donations, and were run by the elite of the group that established the orphanages, thereby maintaining close community ties. Why middle-sized institutions are of greater interest than small or large ones is never explained. Why three religious orphanages were selected over the other twenty-five Baltimore orphanages is never clear. The records from the Dolan house were eventually closed to Zmora so that on numerous issues she could only compare two institutions.

The book begins with standard histories of the three institutions, including funding sources, the clientele, philosophies, and programs. This material provides a backdrop for how the clients themselves perceived and used the institutions. Zmora relies on institutional records and interviews, and by following the lives of over 120 children; she concludes that the children were happy, well cared for, and not cut off from their families since the institutions served as boarding houses or schools. Changes in parents' economic conditions or health resulted in children entering, leaving, and returning. The Ready School and Hebrew Orphan Asylum kept children beyond the age of twelve and provided education superior to what was available to children not institutionalized.

The book is weakened by minor flaws such as failing to identify William Raspberry (p. 3), misspellings of

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words, and referring to a child at the all-girls orphanage by the pronoun "his." Some sections need more citations. "Progressivism" is neither defined nor related to Baltimore or to any of the institutions. Tables and charts are not well done. Table 7 would have been improved by establishing categories rather than listing the ages separately.

A major flaw is that Zmora does not present a complete picture of these orphanages. State orphanages elsewhere were, in fact, specifically restrained from providing more than what was available in the public sphere. Zmora's Baltimore institutions did not generally accept or keep children with disabilities or retain children with juvenile records or behavior problems. Because she does not discuss the other Baltimore institutions, it is impossible to ascertain whether the achievements of the private institutions that took in problem children were as sterling. As a result, the book is primarily of value to people interested in Baltimore and not a study from which one can generalize about orphanages.

MIRIAM Z. LANGSAM
Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis

ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT. *Changing Schools: Progressive Education Theory and Practice, 1930–1960.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. xvii, 251. Cloth $38.95, paper $14.95.

Arthur Zilversmit has added his name to those thoughtful scholars who seek to determine the impact of John Dewey's philosophy of education on American school children. He begins with a definition of progressive education, then describes the manner in which Dewey's followers, mainly William Heard Kilpatrick, substituted their own interpretations for those of Dewey's ethical principles, and in the process relegated what Dewey intended as rigorous intellectual inquiry to a footnote. Dewey's version of the school as a child-centered and subject-centered institution soon incorporated efficiency reforms—intelligence testing and tracking—and reflected the anti-intellectualism of "activity curriculum" (p. 15).

Assailed by critics from the beginning, Dewey and his education philosophy had, by 1960, come to represent the evil force behind America's children's dismal school performances. Yet there has remained a corps of educators, and Zilversmit fits into this camp, who believed Dewey and his ideas have been wrongly blamed, mainly because of what school districts passed off as progressive education had little of what Dewey envisioned.

Zilversmit compares schools as varied as those in affluent Pasadena, California, with those of industrial Gary, Indiana. By analyzing material from a range of sources and geographical areas, he gives the study a broad base, although the most interesting sections focus on four communities north of Chicago: Lake Forest, Mundelein, Waukegan, Winnetka. These socially and economically diverse towns become a microcosm to study how Dewey's ideas operated in public schools.

Zilversmit confirms what many have suspected. Progressive education had been undermined long before 1957 and the unexpected Soviet launching of the first satellite, Sputnik, gave outspoken critics such as Admiral Hyman Rickover justification to discredit Dewey's pedagogy as "soft" (p. 115). All along educators had used misleading rhetoric. School districts boasted that they had incorporated progressive education into their curriculum when, in fact, they adopted little more than the terminology, substituting social studies for history, and adding a few innovations such as informal grouping and movable desks. The curriculum and methods remained the same.

Zilversmit presents his argument in a compelling manner and leaves few untidy ends. His analysis of how Winnetka's superintendent Carleton Washburn used and misused Dewey's ideas offers a comprehensive view of that fascinating educator as well as insight into the complicated issues of implementing progressive education. Nevertheless, there are a few areas he leaves unexplored. I expected to hear more women teachers' voices in a book that studies programs predominantly in elementary schools at a time when the teaching force was overwhelmingly female. Also, he assigns too great a role to Columbia University Teachers College in 1940 in shaping the ideas of the nation's teaching force without providing much evidence. At that time, most of America's rank-and-file teachers held degrees from state colleges, which, until a few years before, had been simply teachers' colleges. It seems likely that many of their instructors were holdovers from earlier times, pedagogues who had only nodding acquaintance with major research universities.

These few cavils aside, this is an important work that provides interpretations and is a welcome addition to twentieth-century American education history.

JUDITH R. RAFTERY
California State University, Chico

BERNICE JOHNSON REAGON, editor. *We'll Understand It Better By and By: Pioneering African American Gospel Composers.* (The "Wade in the Water" Series.) Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution. 1992. Pp. xii, 384. Cloth $49.95, paper $19.95.

This large, handsomely illustrated volume edited by cultural historian and Smithsonian curator Bernice Johnson Reagon explores the lives, times, and accomplishments of six of the most influential composers of gospel music: Charles A. Tindley, Lucie E. Campbell Williams, Thomas A. Dorsey, William H. Brewster, Sr., Roberta Martin, and Kenneth Morris. Although most of them reached the height of their fame during the Great Depression, the earliest, Tindley, was born

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before the outbreak of the Civil War, and the last survivor, Dorsey, died in 1993. The book is intended as a companion volume to Reagon's radio show, "Wade in the Water."

The book displays a pleasing unity, belying the fact that it was written by ten different authors. Reagon and her co-authors seek to bring the composers to life as vivid personalities, often through telling anecdotes. Many stories illustrate the generosity, selflessness, and strong religious faith of these individuals. Tindley, for example, turned his Methodist church into a full-fledged embodiment of the Social Gospel, organizing a soup kitchen, a savings bank for first-time home owners, and many similar endeavors. Some of the anecdotes clearly illustrate the struggles that these men and women experienced. Charles Walker investigates the reasons that the strong-willed Williams was "churched" (excommunicated) from two Baptist churches. Accustomed to getting her way, she was inclined to brook no opposition, even if that opposition was shared by a large majority of her fellow church members. These biographical sketches leave room for much further scholarly exploration, but they do helpfully illuminate the personal joys and sorrows that lay behind the inspirational music.

Musicologist Horace Clarence Boyer's six chapters clearly anchor the volume. He takes on the technical tasks of analyzing each composer's music and attempting to describe their musical innovations. Like other black American music, gospel music encouraged improvisation of text, melody, harmony, and rhythm, but unlike black spirituals, it responded directly to the urban religious experience. Tindley (and others) did not simply focus on heaven's joys, but he "gave attention to such important concerns of Black Christians as worldly sorrows, blessings, and woes" (p. 57). Campbell "had a passion for the gospel ballad, a slow song in which the singer thinks out loud about joy or sorrow" (p. 85). Dorsey had a gift for writing poetic lyrics and composing singable melodies, Martin stood out as a choir organizer and music publisher, and Morris was the first to use a Hammond organ in his performances.

Boyer also makes it simple for readers to explore these composer's works more deeply on their own. His articles contain extensive lists of compositions for each of his subjects. In addition, the complete music, including musical notations, for sixty-six gospel songs has been included in this volume. Readers will also find useful annotated bibliographies and many black-and-white illustrations.

Reagon writes that gospel music "is by far the most vibrant, community-based musical genre within African America" (p. 6). Advocates for other musical forms may wish to argue, but it is difficult to read her book or to listen to her radio series without being profoundly moved by the wonderful, elevating nature of the music and by gratitude for the men and women who birthed it into existence in twentieth-century America. For anyone wanting a closer acquaintance with one of our American treasures, gospel music, this book is highly recommended.

STEPHEN W. ANGELL
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KENNETH L. STEWART and ARNOLDO DE LEÓN. *Not Room Enough: Mexicans, Anglos, and Socio-economic Change in Texas, 1850–1900.* Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 148. $27.50.

At the same time that Anglo-Americans found opportunity to improve their lives in frontier Texas, Mexicans lost ground. Kenneth Stewart and Arnoldo De León seek to explain the growth of inequality in wealth, status, occupation, and education between Anglo and Mexican Texans in the last half of the nineteenth century. Their answers possess a clarity and concision that will appeal to undergraduates and a nuance and theoretical range that scholars will value.

Stewart and De León challenge the conventional explanation that inequality arose from ethnic differences in resources, social status, occupations, or literacy. Rather than regard those differences as causes, the authors see them as results: the products of structural changes introduced by Anglo-Americans who overwhelmed Texas demographically in the mid-nineteenth century. History, the authors argue, is "a force that shapes and molds the differences among people, not one that merely manifests these differences" (p. xii).

Stewart and De León find that Mexicans in Texas, conventional wisdom aside, adapted well to the new Anglo-American political and economic regime, changing even their mode of family life. In politics, the Tejano minority continued to hold offices on the local level, where they stood the greatest chance to benefit their communities and themselves. Demography and Anglo-American prejudice, however, prevented them from winning statewide offices.

In the economic realm, Tejanos found themselves isolated in the southern part of the state where an agricultural economy offered few skilled jobs. Anglos, who brought their capital and institutions to the region, usually reserved the best jobs for themselves. Unskilled work became "Mexican work." Northern and eastern Texas, their infrastructures more closely linked to the rest of the United States and dominated by Anglo-Americans, offered opportunity for better employment for Mexicans, but Anglos in those regions made it clear that Mexicans would not be welcome to live among them (nor did competing with blacks and European immigrants hold much appeal for Mexicans). The new order, then, left Mexicans in a south Texas cul-de-sac.

As might be expected from the sophisticated authors of *Tejanos and the Numbers Game: A Socio-Historical Interpretation from the Federal Census, 1850–1900* (1989), Stewart and De León build many of their generalizations on a firm statistical base, teasing fresh

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insights out of census data. We learn, for example, that in 1850, 7 percent of Mexicans below the age of twenty-one had attended school within the year as opposed to 1 percent of Anglos. By 1900, the proportion of Mexicans who had attended school dropped to 2 percent, while the Anglo percentage rose to 17.

To their credit, Stewart and De León do not shy away from cultural questions where statistics offer little help. Although they might have probed more deeply into the effects of ongoing immigration from Mexico, they demonstrate effectively that simply being Mexican was the greatest obstacle to economic and educational advancement for Tejanos in a racist and ethnocentric Anglo-American society. Frontier Texas did not offer opportunity for all Texans. Rather, it was a land with "not room enough."

DAVID J. WEBER
Southern Methodist University

GEORGE J. SÁNCHEZ. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 367. $35.00.

For Mexican immigrants of the early twentieth century, the California Dream began in Los Angeles. George J. Sánchez's study of culture and identity in Los Angeles during the first half of this century is more than just an examination of Mexican survival in a city known for its glamor and rapid industrial growth. It is a story of adversity and change and an account of how Mexicans became Americans.

Sánchez tells a compelling story and his discussion of immigration, family life, culture, and politics are solid and illuminating. His main focus is on Mexican immigrants' intent to gain a foothold in their adopted homeland. The author documents slow gains and shows how, over time and with some economic stability, immigrants turned their attention to religion, mass culture, and community life.

Sánchez relies extensively on naturalization records located in the Southern California branch of the National Archives. The author gleaned much from his sample of 2,238 applications, including birthplace, marital status, age, occupation, and residence. From this naturalization sample Sánchez demonstrates that the largest proportion of Mexican families in the county resided in Belvedere, a working-class community outside of the Los Angeles city boundaries. The second largest Mexican settlement surrounded the old Spanish Plaza. A smaller concentration of Mexicans lived in the downtown area, Lincoln Heights, Brooklyn Heights, and Boyle Heights.

But this analysis, explained in large part by the map "Mexican Residences in East/Central Los Angeles for 1920–1940," leaves us with some unresolved issues. Approximately one-third of the Mexican immigrants left Los Angeles during the 1930s. The question of the stability of residential distribution in the 1920s and 1930s is important given that the author suggests that rather than "intense segregation" there was a "widespread dispersal of Mexican homes throughout central and eastern Los Angeles" (p. 76). Perhaps so, but the evidence from the naturalization sample for the 1920–40 era is not convincing on that account. These were years of great fluctuation in population and marked transitions. Other sources, including city directories and church records, could have been used to corraborate Mexican-American residential patterns, since mobility was the common pattern rather than the exception. Moreover, most of the residents traced from his principal sources did not include households headed by women in any significant numbers, thus the distribution is based on single men and some families.

In addition, through his examination of a Los Angeles youth organization called the "Mexican American Movement," formed in the 1930s, Sánchez concludes that the "cultural identity and sense of self of the Mexican American second generation was already shaped before the war" (p. 256). Earlier, however, Sánchez argues that "the majority who stayed in Los Angeles [in the 1930s] became ambivalent Americans, full of contradictory feelings about their place in American society" (p. 210). It is difficult, given Sánchez's statement about ambivalence, to determine if the "sense of self" was clearly established prior to the war.

Overall, Sánchez's book is an important contribution to ethnic and urban history. His story is engaging, and his research is solid. This volume has an important place as a well-written account of the historical experiences of America's largest Mexican-origin community.

RICARDO ROMO
University of Texas, Austin

BENJAMIN MÁRQUEZ. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization.* Austin: University of Texas Press. 1993. Pp. x, 141. Cloth $35.00, paper $11.95.

The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) is one of the oldest and best known Hispanic organizations in the United States. It took form in South Texas in 1929 when various community and civic groups merged in an attempt to achieve greater unity and influence. By the 1980s LULAC had gained significant national visibility through its involvement in the civil rights movement and its federally funded social programs.

Benjamin Márquez provides the first comprehensive portrait of LULAC, historically a traditional and conservative organization. We learn that its founders and early members were middle-class and affluent Mexican Americans who promoted education, patriotism, and assimilation. During the years of pronounced discrimination against dark-skinned peoples, many "Lulacers," insisting they were of the

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"white" race, sought to establish distance between themselves and the masses of poor immigrants streaming in from Mexico, and from African Americans marginalized by Jim Crow laws. LULAC preached that in order to succeed in the United States, Hispanics needed to learn English, become well educated, and master the mainstream culture. To improve the image of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in American society, Hispanics needed to be law-abiding, loyal citizens. That ideology of accomodation guided the activities of the organization for decades.

Yet from the beginning LULAC fought civil rights battles that helped build the foundation for the better-known struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. "Lulacers" consistently protested discrimination, in particular school segregation. Pressure on local school boards and lawsuits were popular strategies employed by LULAC years before the court challenges of the 1950s that led to the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954. And in the 1980s, various LULAC presidents assertively pursued a liberal agenda on behalf of Hispanics.

A central point of the book is that LULAC has lost much of the idealism forged during the days of grass-roots activism, becoming a heavily bureaucratized apparatus financed by government funds and corporate donations. LULAC conventions have turned into largely social affairs. Its membership, said by some of its flamboyant leaders to be around 100,000, has actually been much lower than that. At its peak in the late 1970s, paid members numbered approximately 6,300. With the emergence of other, more forceful civil rights organizations in the Hispanic community, LULAC has lost much of its glow.

In sum, this concise, well-written book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of community activism among an important segment of the Hispanic community. Márquez provides a strong historical narrative and analysis. For theoretically minded political scientists he explains the fluctuating membership and activism of "Lulacers" during different periods within the framework of incentive theory. Thus, this book will be of interest to students of history as well as politics.

Oscar J. Martínez
University of Arizona

Sandra C. Taylor. *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xix, 343. $35.00.

In this book, Sandra C. Taylor tells with rich detail the story of the Japanese Americans from the San Francisco Bay Area who were interned in the War Relocation Authority's (WRA) Topaz concentration camp near Delta, Utah, during World War II. There are some things about this book that make it useful for scholars; every serious library ought to buy it. But it is a frustrating book and one that fails to break much new ground.

The strengths of the book are in its detail and in Taylor's unswerving focus on this one camp among the ten run by the WRA. We learn about almost every subject we can imagine: prewar occupations and housing in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor in San Francisco's Japanese community; evacuation day; internment for a time at Tanforan Racetrack south of San Francisco; transfer to Topaz in the Utah desert; camp politics; leaving camp for the Midwest; returning home to San Francisco at war's end. There are lots of individual stories, for Taylor interviewed three dozen former inmates and interweaves their stories with those gleaned from archives and published accounts.

Despite those strengths, the book is less exciting than one might hope for. The prose is clear and succinct, but leaden. She writes, for example, that "The overall appearance of Tanforan was decidedly institutional" (p. 65). This is true, but it is boring. Somehow, Taylor fails to convey the drama of one of the most dramatic events in American history. Part of the problem is that, despite the detail and the focus, she really does not have much to say. There is no important statement of fact or interpretation here that has not already appeared somewhere else.

The other part of the problem is that Taylor seeks to avoid controversy, and in so doing she does her subject a disservice. Starting on the first page and consistently throughout the text, she hauls out terms such as "relocation" and "evacuation" that have scarcely been used by Japanese Americans or by scholars for a generation. These were euphemisms employed first by government bureaucrats and then by some Japanese Americans themselves to mask the reality of what was done to them: they were summarily thrown in concentration camps because of their ancestry. "Evacuation" was the WRA's favorite term, for it implied that the government was doing something to save Japanese Americans, when actually what it was doing was jailing them. "Relocation" is less pernicious, for at least it is more or less neutral: it speaks of moving things from one place to another. But no knowledgeable and fair-minded person can pretend that this was a neutral experience. "Internment," "incarceration," and "imprisonment" are all better terms than "relocation," and they are the ones that have generally been used by scholars and community leaders for the past generation. "Concentration camps" and "prison camps" are better than "relocation centers," the term that the WRA coined and Taylor uses.

The result of Taylor's approach, not only in her choice of terms but also in her resolute refusal to make historical judgments, is a flat account that asks none of the critical questions that need to be asked of the people who made this episode in imprisonment. It is a far cry from other recent books by other veteran historians of Japanese America, such as Roger

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Daniels's *Prisoners without Trial* (1993) or Gary Okihiro's *Cane Fires* (1991). Taylor's volume will be useful to scholars in that it contains a competent, chronological account of just about everything that happened to the people at Topaz. But it is not a book that will be much remembered for its intellectual impact.

PAUL R. SPICKARD
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EILEEN H. TAMURA. *Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei Generation in Hawaii.* (The Asian American Experience.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1994. Pp. xx, 326. Cloth $49.95, paper $19.95.

Hawaii, from the perspective of students of race relations, appears "unorthodox," according to sociologist Romanzo Adams, in that the islands' diverse racial and ethnic groups since the beginning have succeeded in living together in harmony. Although in basic agreement with Adams's conclusion, Eileen H. Tamura establishes a different trajectory toward that end, revealing conflict as well as consensus. By eroding some of Hawaii's alleged exceptionalism, Tamura shows the parallels and intersections of Hawaii's race relations and immigration history with their mainland counterparts.

The ordeal of Tatsue Fujita, on the eve of World War II, exemplified the social processes detailed in Tamura's account. A second-generation Japanese American (or *nisei*), Fujita was denied a teaching diploma after having studied for five years at the University of Hawaii Teachers College, ostensibly because she was "one-half devoted to American culture and institutions and one-half to Japanese culture and customs," according to a newspaper reporter who had interviewed the dean of Teachers College (p. 45). Fujita argued that her interest in her ethnicity was of "a cultural nature and free from any political prejudice," and that her behavior was entirely within the spirit of democracy (p. 46). The incident caught the attention of the ethnic press, but ultimately Fujita dropped the matter, earned a degree in philosophy, and opened a floral shop in her home.

Fujita's plight, writes Tamura, revealed the antiforeign sentiment that fueled the Americanization movement, both in Hawaii and on the mainland, during the 1920s and 1930s. The case also highlights the concepts that are examined in Tamura's study: Americanization, acculturation, and ethnic identity. Americanization, she notes, was essentially assimilation or Anglo conformity as applied during the interwar period. Americanization meant for Hawaii's Japanese dropping Japanese culture and replacing them with European-American thoughts and behaviors, as was advocated by the Americanizers comprised mainly of the territory's elites. Acculturation, according to Tamura, was what the *nisei* wanted and believed as being truly democratic and American. Acculturation, she posits, "refers to the adaptation of a group to American middle-class norms and assumes that the process entails the persistence of ethnic identity" (p. 52).

Tamura documents the conflict between those opposing definitions of membership in the American community, between the elites and the *nisei.* The contest involved an "Americanization movement" in Hawaii led by the sugar planters, politicians, Christian church leaders, newspaper editors, and educators who sought to inculcate in the youth the ideals of democracy: liberty, justice, tolerance, fair play, and service. The elimination of Japanese-language schools and Americanization of the public schools were key elements in this campaign for the hearts and minds of the *nisei.* The language schools spread Japanese nationalism, Americanizers held, and the public schools should provide the youth with a technical training that would mold them into useful workers for Hawaii's industries and keep them on the sugar plantations. The segregated English standard and nonstandard schools, which separated most of the middle and working-class whites from Hawaiians and Asians, and the plantation schools helped to advance those educational aims of the Americanizers.

Hawaii's Japanese, however, sought "acculturation" by retaining their ethnic identity while absorbing certain European-American values and strived to use the very institutions and rhetoric of the Americanizers to achieve what Tamura calls "American middle-class norms." The *nisei,* like Tatsue Fujita, perceived no contradiction between an ethnic and American identity. In truth, they believed their position was in keeping with the republic's ideals and saw the Americanizers as less than American. The result, according to Tamura, was "cultural misunderstanding and miscommunication," in which both the Americanizers and Japanese agreed that the second generation should conform to "American ways," but "each group had its own interpretation of what that meant, and as a result, the two groups often talked past each other" (pp. xiii, xiv).

The real contribution of Tamura's book is its detailed account of Hawaii's Americanization campaign. The explanatory frame on which that description depends, however, suffers from an uncertainty over the movement's origins, whether they were found in "cultural misunderstanding," or "ignorance, fear, xenophobia, and racism" (p. 61), or "all of the above." In the end, Tamura argues optimistically, the *nisei* overcame the Americanizers, who despite their "prestige and power," failed to control the course of Hawaii's education, social and cultural life, and employment patterns. "Their failure furnished clear evidence of the triumph of acculturation over Americanization" (p. 239).

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JACK SHULIMSON. *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880–1898.* (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1993. Pp. xiii, 274. $35.00.

Jack Shulimson's splendidly written monograph is, as he notes, "a study of connections" (p. xi). He explores the marine corps' connection to post–Civil War army concerns, to the birth of the "new navy," to technological developments, to partisan politics, and to a changing foreign policy. He probes the connection between the corps and the search for order, control, and rationality that historians believe characterized American society in the late nineteenth century. He examines the transformation of the corps from a structural anomaly to a modern organization with all the trappings of professionalism.

The process that led to marine corps professionalism was, Shulimson demonstrates, a "sometime thing" (pp. 29, 136): tentative, circuitous, "iconoclastic and individualistic" (pp. 78, 203). Given the evidence, this is an understatement. What emerges from this insightful study is the corps' tortuous struggle to overcome "institutional and professional schizophrenia and paranoia" (p. 208), brought on by the Civil War's debilitating effects on the military, by the corps' historic links to the navy, and by the same forces of modernization then affecting civilian society. Marine Corps officers seemed cemented to their traditional shipboard mission, lacked a clear concept of their role, and articulated "no common broad vision for their service" (p. 203). Ultimately, the aftermath of war with Spain and the rationalistic impulses of late-nineteenth-century America, which emphasized efficiency, specialization, technology, and the "centrality of professions to the social and economic structure of modern civilization" (p. 3), helped the corps adapt to the challenges of modernization and assure institutional survival.

Professionalization of the Marine Corps was haphazard at best. Austere budgets, career anxieties, fear of amalgamation with the army, or worse, abolishment, stimulated officer associations and forward-looking individuals to demonstrate the corps was vital to the navy. But a succession of Marine Corps commandants who attempted to improve the service by making recruitment, education, and performance more efficient rarely envisioned a broader mission. Reform was tempered by patronage and frustrated by lassitude or internal feuds among officers. Until the mid–1880s, the corps remained resistant to new directions, confined to mundane concerns of training, promotion, line and staff relations, and improving the lot of enlisted personnel. Significant reform resulted from outside forces: progressivism, the rebirth of the navy, public anxiety about military vulnerability, and a new diplomacy based on fear, suspicion, rivalry, and a dose of Social Darwinism. In the early 1890s, as a naval renaissance became reality, "reform in the Marine Corps was almost inevitable" (p. 94). Once Marines appreciated the need to intertwine their mission with that of the new navy, they would still struggle for status and jurisdiction, but new life would be infused—precariously and unevenly—into the service. New ships and colonies "would settle the questions of organization and mission" (p. 167) more than the agonizing efforts of a few mavericks. By 1900 the corps was recognized as "an essential part of the Navy" (p. 201) and officers had attained "all the outward appurtenances of the modern professional" (p. 206).

Shulimson aptly demonstrates how Marine Corps reformers suffered from lack of cohesion and unifying strategies. He cogently illustrates how substantive change resulted more from progressives' perceptions of defense needs coupled with a new paradigm in foreign policy. I wish, however, that the anguished process of Marine Corps professionalization could have been more convincingly connected to the specific diplomatic events that nearly led to war prior to 1898. Much more persuasive is the author's thesis that the Marine Corps' search for a mission was "part of the basic search for structure that characterized much of American life during the last decades of the nineteenth century" (p. 209).

JOYCE S. GOLDBERG
University of Texas, Arlington

CRAIG M. CAMERON. *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xiii, 297. $24.95.

Craig M. Cameron's sophisticated and fascinating study of the First Marines in the Pacific War demonstrates just how well new modes of analysis can be applied to the most traditional of historical subjects. Bringing together his knowledge of military organization and warfare with a lively interest in "myth" and "imagination," Cameron gives us the battlefield of the imagination, arguing persuasively that "imaginary constructs were key throughout the Pacific War" (p. 8), for in "projecting their assumptions onto people, events, and situations, combatants actively shape the landscape in which they must kill and destroy" (p. 270).

Cameron's greatest concern is with the ways violence is enacted and legitimized in times of war: how and why did the war in the Pacific become so inhumanly brutal? He also proposes that studies such as his will help us understand what is nationally distinctive about the conduct of war and the behavior of combatants.

In a series of roughly chronological chapters, Cameron analyzes the historical construction of the image of the Marine before World War II and the training and indoctrination of recruits. He then takes us through three island campaigns. Guadalcanal, where combat consisted largely of "jungle stalking," was cast at the time as a symbolic gladiatorial contest between the United States and Japan: "a clash of warring

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samurai" (p. 88). The Peleliu campaign, which exacted staggering casualties from the Marine division, was marked by severe interservice rivalry and serves to highlight the institutional differences between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in "solving complex problems of organizing and leading men in large-scale violence" (pp. 164–65). On Okinawa, the Marines became part of a "large, complex machine engineered for wholesale, impersonal destruction" (pp. 184–85), and although they complained that the combat they called "processing" was not suitable for elite combat units such as themselves, they nonetheless harnessed the new technological means to the exterminationist ideology developed in the course of the war.

In each of the campaigns, we see transformations in the Marines' understandings of themselves and their enemies based on a complex interaction between beliefs and preconceptions (imaginary constructs) and experience. Cameron's myths are neither timeless nor archetypal: they are malleable in the face of life and death; they are purposely employed as indoctrination by those who must motivate men to risk their lives and also teach them the possible means to survival; they are products of the larger society and heavily invested with the weight of contemporary understandings about race and gender, Self and Other. In fact, Cameron's analysis of the multiple uses and meanings of gender in this war is perhaps the best part of an exceptionally good book.

The central problem with this book I can cast as either fundamental or largely a matter of semantics. Cameron, for all his reliance on "myth" and "imagination," is never very precise in his uses or definitions of either term. I am not sure how either differs, here, from "culture," or why he uses constructs that carry so much baggage that he is content to ignore. Nonetheless, this is a book of great deftness and sensitivity, with much to offer to a variety of audiences.

BETH BAILEY
Barnard College

PETER MASLOWSKI. *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II.* New York: Free Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 412. $29.95.

World War II may be the war most with us. A search through just about any on-line catalogue or index will produce many more citations for this war than for World War I, Korea, or Vietnam. The same phenomenon holds true for images, and despite Vietnam's reputation as the "television war," the number of still and moving photographs from World War II is disproportionately greater than those for other American wars of this century. Lately this enormous photographic record has received considerable scholarly attention, with Frederick Voss weighing the products of celebrity photographers such as Margaret Bourke White and W. Eugene Smith (*Reporting the War* [1994]), and George Roeder measuring the motives of Washington officials who sometimes rationed and sometimes broadcast the grisly visual evidence of modern warfare (*The Censored War* [1994]). Peter Maslowski concentrates on yet another aspect of World War II photography, and in this book focuses on those little-known, ordinary GIs who produced a huge number of the war's images.

These men often worked under very trying circumstances. Camouflage, night action, and long-distance combat all made photography difficult and risky, and these photographers performed with exceptional valor. As Maslowski indicates, photography units most likely suffered casualties at twice the rate of ordinary infantry units. Thus, Maslowski has a potentially fascinating topic here, for these men put themselves at grave personal risk as they played their part in making World War II America's most photographed war. Clearly the project mattered, mattered very much for these individuals, and that intense commitment needs explaining.

Maslowski gives us a series of partial explanations. Some of the men were simply good soldiers, performing the jobs they had been assigned. Others loved making pictures and continued in the kind of work they had done prior to the war. Still others had a sense of themselves as historical witnesses and were determined that their testimony be recorded. But an overall synthesis eludes Maslowski, and instead he becomes preoccupied with elements common in military histories, telling us a good deal of small-unit history, chronicling a fair share of bureaucratic nightmares, and showing that photography was not immune to interservice rivalry (one Navy film, *The Fighting Lady*, was a terrific success and therefore an enormous mortification to the Army Air Forces). He is likewise attentive to the issue of staging, detailing the dubiousness of John Huston's documentary *San Pietro*, as well as the authenticity of Joe Rosenthal's photo of Marine flag-raisers on Iwo Jima.

Such details overwhelm the book's themes, and it may be that Maslowski was just too close to the material. One of the prominent combat photographers in the study is his own father, Karl Maslowski, and the author begins by expressing his thanks to "all the other cameramen-fathers" (p. x) who treated him as a son while he worked on the project. There is much rich material in this book, and Maslowski has honored those people who recorded the war. But we still need more work to explain why they risked so much to get their photographs.

DAVID P. PEELER
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CLAUS-DIETER KROHN. *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research.* Translated by RITA KIMBER and ROBERT KIMBER. Foreword by ARTHUR VIDICH. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 255. Cloth $40.00, paper $15.95.

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Claus-Dieter Krohn has written a disappointing book. In the last decade a score of books and several film documentaries have examined the European refugee intellectuals who came to the United States in the 1930s. On the whole, the refugees' stories are now well known and well told. Almost all of these efforts, however, have been undertaken by American scholars who focused largely on the most important refugees and from an American viewpoint. The refugee story has yet to be told from a European perspective and many minor figures have been overlooked, in particular a circle of German economists who founded the graduate faculty at the New School for Social Research in New York City. Krohn seems well qualified to study these economists from a European perspective.

Inexplicably, in his relatively short monograph, Krohn devotes only about one-third of it to this largely unexamined group. He spends the remaining two-thirds of his book telling already well-known stories, adding virtually nothing to our understanding of the refugees or the New School. Drawing heavily on the work of Lewis Coser, Martin Jay, H. Stuart Hughes, Anthony Heilbut, Peter Rutkoff, and myself, among others, but with virtually no acknowledgement, curiously, Krohn views the refugees from an American perspective, offering only sketchy and superficial accounts of his primary subject, the New School economists, whom he has labeled "reform economists." Krohn neither explores in detail reform economics nor offers a fresh viewpoint. Disappointingly, he provides only superficial descriptions of their work and unfair stereotypes of all opposing views, especially the Austrian neoclassical economists, who thrived after coming to the United States. Krohn does not address the theoretical inconsistencies in reform economics, and he makes no effort to explain their jargon or their political categories, leaving readers perplexed and confused. The key questions remain: Were reform economists important or not? Was their thought coherent and did it offer a viable alternative? After reading Krohn, it is impossible to know.

Unquestionably, these German expatriates were an interesting ensemble. Drawn from the Kiel Institute and various Weimar governmental agencies, and most importantly, the Prussian state bureaucracy, these men and one woman in the 1920s had tried to transform postwar Germany into a democratic, socialist nation. For complex reasons, some international, some domestic, others historical, they failed, probably through no fault of their own. Favored by the Rockefeller Foundation, they fled Germany. After the trimph of Adolf Hitler they found a congenial home at the New School for Social Research. Chastened socialists, they nonetheless remained wedded to a managed economy run by bureaucrats, advised by technocrats. In the United States such economic intervention and planning enjoyed brief favor in the early New Deal. After 1937, however, the German reform economists found themselves largely ignored. Individuals associated with the New School gained some hearing and even fame, but on the whole the New School's reform economists exerted little influence on postwar American economic policy or thought.

Clearly, Krohn believes that this represents a tragic loss. He may be correct. But until we have an extended, detailed, probing, and detached study of the New School reform economists, they remain an obscure, if tantalizing, group of refugee intellectuals.

WILLIAM B. SCOTT
Kenyon College

RICHARD O. DAVIES. *Defender of the Old Guard: John Bricker and American Politics.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 271. $35.00.

Historians of post–World War II America are familiar with the Bricker amendment and its failure in the Senate; most scholars, however, are not as familiar with the life and ideology of John W. Bricker. Richard O. Davies has remedied this situation by writing this thoughtful political biography. Bricker was governor of Ohio for three terms, an unsuccessful vice-presidential candidate with Thomas E. Dewey in the election of 1944, and a two-term senator elected first in 1946 but defeated in 1958. As Davies explains, Bricker left little, if any, positive political legacy and is best remembered for trying to promote legislation that would have impaired the president in the execution of foreign policy.

A real strength of this work is that it places Bricker in context. Born in 1893, his rural Ohio background shaped his values and beliefs. As the United States changed through World War I, the Depression, the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War, Bricker clung ever tighter to past values. After World War II, although he denied that he was an "isolationist," he opposed nearly all foreign involvements. His was an intellectual and emotional mind-set that was deeply rooted in an older, simpler United States, and thus Bricker was unable to embrace the dramatic changes of the first four decades of the twentieth century. Yet, as a "Defender of the Old Guard," Bricker did represent and was supported by great numbers of Ohioans, as well as countless others throughout the country.

Davies has extensively used manuscript collections, including Bricker's papers (which he wishes were more comprehensive), and judiciously employed secondary works. Although there is little that is startling or surprising, particularly in view of the literature about the Bricker amendment, Davies makes an important contribution by demonstrating how Bricker first gained and then lost his state and national political power. In the early 1950s, Bricker's actions exasperated Dwight Eisenhower and caused his administration much potential embarrassment. In 1958 he ran for a third Senate term, endorsing a "right to

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work" law. He was defeated by Democrat Stephen Young.

What can be said of Bricker? In Ohio politics, despite his overall popularity, he was overshadowed by Robert Taft, his Senate colleague, who gained a reputation as a Republican conservative statesman for his foreign policy support of the Eisenhower administration. By comparison, Bricker is remembered merely as a Republican conservative.

ALLEN YARNELL
Montana State University

JOHN A. GOLDSMITH. *Colleagues: Richard B. Russell and His Apprentice, Lyndon B. Johnson.* Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press. 1993. Pp. xxi, 221.

Biographers of Lyndon Johnson have often identified Senator Richard Russell of Georgia as one of the "political daddies" on whom Johnson relied during his public career. A friendship that blossomed when Johnson came to the U.S. Senate in 1949 ended in sour bitterness twenty years later in a dispute over a Georgia judicial candidate and the controversy arising from the nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice. John A. Goldsmith, who covered Russell's Senate career for United Press International, has now provided a narrative treatment of these two strong-willed figures that emphasizes the erosion of their regard for each other during the Johnson presidency.

Goldsmith's account is based on research in the papers of Russell and Johnson as well as personal interviews and oral histories at the Johnson and Russell libraries. He likes Russell the man while deploring the intractable Georgian's racist attitudes. Goldsmith has more sympathy for Johnson's domestic policy goals during the 1960s but focuses on the president's character failings in understanding his personality. Some of the author's judgments will give pause, such as "It was not difficult for Lyndon Johnson to espouse racial equality" (p. 181). In fact, Goldsmith believes that Johnson had always "been perfunctory" (p. 65) as an opponent of civil rights, which is a new twist on the older view that Johnson came late to the issue of racial justice. For all of Goldsmith's special pleading on his behalf, Russell comes across in this book as a narrow, self-absorbed individual whose mind had stopped growing early in his life.

Goldsmith's use of his sources is undiscriminating. He relies on the books of Sam Houston Johnson, Doris Kearns, and Richard N. Goodwin on controversial issues regarding Vietnam and the president's psychological state with little recognition of the problems these studies pose in terms of their reliability. Goldsmith's text is similarly credulous in its use of oral history sources.

This volume leaves the impression that Russell and Johnson's "friendship" was never a genuine personal relationship, but rather a mutual exploitation of perceived political advantage. Johnson courted Russell and the Senate elders to build a power base in the Senate and preserve links to the South. Russell saw Johnson as an expedient moderate on racial matters whom segregationists could tolerate. When Johnson became president in 1963, their lives diverged and their closeness waned. Goldsmith's book has modest value as a supplement to Gilbert Fite's thorough biography of Russell (*Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator from Georgia* [1991]). The sad record of how Johnson and Russell descended from warmth to acrimony is further testimony to the wisdom of Harry S. Truman. If you want to have a real friend in Washington, Harry Truman once said, buy a dog.

LEWIS L. GOULD
University of Texas, Austin

STEPHEN VAUGHN. *Ronald Reagan in Hollywood: Movies and Politics.* (Cambridge Studies in the History of Mass Communications.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xiv, 359. $24.95.

To appreciate Stephen Vaughn's interweaving of biography, film history, and social and political commentary, one must take a different view of a well-known career. Although the public knows Ronald Reagan as a former actor, few realize the extent to which he was influenced by his films, and fewer still by the role Warner Bros., the studio with which he is most identified, played in the creation of his persona. This study, like Gilbert Highet's *The Classical Tradition* (1949), is structured with two audiences in mind: its text speaks to the general reader while the notes are designed for the scholar. The notes represent meticulous scholarship that has been skillfully distilled into a relatively brief text whose main point is that Reagan came to Warners at the right time, in 1937. Because he looked like a Grail knight, he was the ideal middle-class hero who could double as reformer/defender of the poor (oppressed and falsely accused), moving on to secret service agents and air heroes as Warners became preoccupied with espionage and military preparedness, and graduating to his signature role, Drake McHugh, in *Kings Row* (1942), in which he played a character who triumphed despite the loss of his legs. Triumph Reagan did, but not in the way his other Warners colleagues did, whose fame did not rest on a single film. Although Bette Davis and Humphrey Bogart identified with their screen image, becoming inseparable from it, they did not identify with their studio's politics. Reagan did both, living his clean-cut American hero off the screen and adopting the Warner Bros. credo with its jingoistic Americanism and virulent anticommunism, which grew stronger during the investigation of the Hollywood community by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in the late 1940s and culminated in his influencing the Screen Actors Guild to require the equivalent of a loyalty oath and deny membership to Communists.

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Vaughn shows how Reagan capitalized on the camera's enhancing and idealizing powers and the microphone's ability to make an undistinguished voice distinctive, but he does not pay sufficient attention to Reagan's postwar comedies: *Voice of the Turtle* (1947), *John Loves Mary* (1949), and *The Girl from Jones Beach* (1949), in which Reagan revealed a comedic ability that relied on looking boyishly bemused, perplexed, and often downright goofy. It was the ability to look ingenuous when reporters asked questions, which would have made anyone else uncomfortable, that made him seem too naive to be part of a conspiracy, mainly because he appeared so non-conspiratorial.

This book is not about "The Films of Ronald Reagan," but instead about the films set against the background of the studio, the country, and the star, whose transition from liberal to conservative has already been noted, but not in this way. I have two cavils: Sterling Hayden never made a film called *Skid Row* (p. 212), unless the title was eventually changed; and nudity was not an issue in *The Outlaw* (p. 221) but rather Jane Russell's breast size, which was exaggerated by the notorious cantilevered bra designed by Howard Hughes.

BERNARD F. DICK
Fairleigh Dickinson University

PATRICK ALLITT. *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950–1985.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 315. $29.95.

The importance of Roman Catholics in the development of post–World War II conservative thought is fairly well known in a general way, if only through the prominence of William F. Buckley, Jr. Going beyond the general in this thoughtful, fluent, and well-researched book, Patrick Allitt not only provides the fullest account to date of these social theorists, scholars, and polemicists but also aspires to place their ideas in the broader context of American life.

Allitt's story passes through four phases. First, in the 1950s, Catholic critics attracted attention as self-conscious traditionalists, critics of the welfare state, and fervent anticommunists. Their ranks ranged from Francis Wilson and Ross Hoffman, learned converts from Protestantism who had assailed cultural relativism in the 1930s; to Thomas Molnar and Frederick Wilhelmsen, passionate refugees from Nazism and communism; to Buckley, L. Brent Bozell, Jr., and John T. Noonan, Jr., bright young men trying to mix conservatism and cosmopolitanism. Second, moving into the early 1960s, Allitt surveys the Catholic Right's response to John Kennedy's presidential candidacy, liberal trends within their own church, and rapprochement with such non-Catholic kindred spirits as Will Herberg.

The best part of the book treats the third phase—what might be called the "high 1960s"—from roughly 1965 to 1974. For Catholics, as for the rest of the United States, the high 1960s was a period of polarization rather than the predominantly radical era of legend and most historiography. The increasingly divided Catholic community split over birth control, papal authority, race relations, and the Vietnam War. Although Philip Berrigan and Daniel Berrigan moved left to pour blood on draft records, Bozell moved right and pronounced Francisco Franco's Spain the model of the good society. The fourth phase consisted of the new generation of conservative Catholic intellectuals that began to emerge in the 1970s. He interrupts his largely chronological account with chapters on two pairs of social critics, the Hungarian émigrés Molnar and John Lukacs, and the ex-seminarians Garry Wills and Michael Novak.

Allitt succeeds in showing the diversity, tensions, and (sometimes ironic) shifts within the Catholic Right. For example, he argues that many of these political conservatives were "liberal" Catholics in the sense that they sought an enhanced role for the laity. He notes that Bozell showed greater understanding of the civil rights movement than Buckley, his more reputable brother-in-law. Allitt also provides a good introduction to the rich work of Lukacs, a historian who deserves more recognition from our profession than he has received. Unfortunately, Allitt never delivers on his promise to place the Catholic Right in the broader context of American life. We learn that the Catholic conservatives, like intellectuals throughout the political spectrum, were affected by the post–World War II Red Scare and the apocalypticism of the high 1960s. Yet, aside from issues directly related to church polity or doctrine, Allitt never makes clear what, if anything, was distinctively Catholic about their version of American conservatism. Perhaps there is nothing much different. Novak's trajectory from Left to Right resembles David Horowitz's and David Stockman's. This limitation aside, Allitt's book merits serious attention, not only from students of religion or conservatism but also from anyone trying to move beyond historiographical clichés about the "1950s" and "1960s," as well as the legacies those decades left to the politics and intellectual controversies of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

LEO P. RIBUFFO
George Washington University

JAMES G. HERSHBERG. *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1993. Pp. ix, 948. $35.00.

This biography by James G. Hershberg is a compelling account of one of the architects of the atomic age. James B. Conant was a prominent chemist who left the world of science to become president of Harvard, then served as a key administrator of the Manhattan Project, which created the world's first atomic bomb. Hershberg writes vividly of the role Conant played in both educational and policy-making circles and shows how his story mirrored America's transition from a

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reluctant belligerent to a global superpower during World War II and the postwar period.

Hershberg notes at the outset that Conant was singularly silent when speaking of himself. Indeed, he referred to himself as a "cold reserved New Englander" (p. 9). His autobiography, *My Several Lives* (1970), Hershberg declares, was a disappointment: "the skeleton was there, but the marrow had been sucked out" (p. 3). Working around Conant's reticence, Hershberg has combed the archives and interviewed family members in a successful effort to provide a good portrait of this able leader and the ways he affected others.

This is not a full biography. It deals briefly with Conant's early career as an organic chemist and reflects on his role as president of Harvard, but pays most attention to his work as atomic administrator during World War II and his activities as nuclear adviser and later government official in the postwar years.

Hershberg focuses on the centrality of Conant's role in the Manhattan Project. Committed to the defeat of Germany, Conant was interested in gaining the support of American science for military research. In 1940, even before the United States entered the war, he became involved with the new National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), headed by Vannevar Bush, a fellow scientist and administrator, and then head of the Carnegie Institution. Conant recruited scientists and worked closely with other university officials around the country to secure leaves and research facilities. In mid–1941, he became head of the NDRC as Bush organized a new Office of Scientific Research and Development. Together, the two men assumed responsibility for the nuclear development effort.

Hershberg's book follows the unfolding of this enormous project. When it came time to decide how the new weapon should be used, it was Conant, Hershberg notes, who argued for dropping the bomb on Japan. In the words of the Interim Committee minutes for the meeting of May 31, 1945, "At the suggestion of Dr. Conant the Secretary [of War Henry L. Stimson] agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses" (p. 224). Later we see Conant at Alamogordo, for the first test of a nuclear device in the summer of 1945, which he described as "an enormous pyrotechnic display with great boiling of luminous vapors" (p. 233).

Yet Hershberg shows at the same time Conant's fears about the consequences of nuclear development, both during and after the Manhattan Project. In one particularly important section, he reveals how Conant's position about trying to create a new international order was similar to that of Niels Bohr, the eminent Danish physicist who tried without success to persuade Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt to share the atomic secret in an attempt to head off a postwar arms race. Hershberg even notes Conant's marginal comments in his personal copy of historian Martin L. Sherwin's book, *A World Destroyed* (1975), which was the first full account of this effort.

As he writes of the struggle to come to terms with nuclear developments after 1945, Hershberg observes that "Conant felt the very survival of civilization resting on his shoulders" (p. 240). Although Conant justified use of the bomb and supported America's Cold War policy, he worried about further nuclear development. He was one of those on the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Committee who recommended against development of the hydrogen bomb.

Hershberg's book is an engaging examination of one of the central figures of the nuclear age. It succeeds in showing "one man's intersection with great events and issues" (p. 7) and in the process illuminates those issues for us all.

ALLAN M. WINKLER
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio

CRAIG MINER. *Wolf Creek Station: Kansas Gas and Electric Company in the Nuclear Era.* (Historical Perspectives on Business Enterprise Series.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 393. $39.50.

Since the late 1960s, the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity has triggered controversy that in duration and passion has been unique among modern technologies. Publications on the subject have often reflected the partisan tone of the debate. In recent years, however, a few scholars have examined nuclear power issues with greater detachment, and Craig Miner's book is an excellent example of that approach. The book was sponsored by the Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E), the managing owner of a consortium of utilities that built the Wolf Creek nuclear station between 1968 and 1985. KG&E sought an objective and accessible history of its experiences, and Miner has fulfilled that objective. He has written an admirably balanced and richly detailed account of the often bitter controversy over the Wolf Creek plant at the local level.

Miner outlines the reasons that KG&E decided to build a nuclear plant in the first place. Solely dependent on natural gas, the utility needed to diversify its fuel sources. In the late 1960s, coal seemed to be a less attractive choice than nuclear power. KG&E made its decision to build a nuclear plant just as the controversy over the technology was growing, and the plans for Wolf Creek quickly produced debates over a number of issues. At first, the central issue was the risk of radiation exposure; later, as the plant neared completion, it became a fear of rate shock. Miner scrupulously reports both sides of the debate, evaluating the bases and in some cases the soundness of their arguments. In tone and content, he maintains a position of studied neutrality.

In a book on such an emotional and recent contro-

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versy, Miner's fairness to both sides is commendable. His balanced approach does not mean that he refuses to make judgments, but it does mean that he does not restrict his criticisms to one side. He demonstrates that Wolf Creek opponents raised valid questions about the plant, but he also shows that on occasion they distorted evidence and exaggerated hazards to win support. He suggests that KG&E acted responsibly in building Wolf Creek but he faults the utility for poor cost projections, lax supervision in the early phases of construction, arrogance toward the state legislature, and a lack of understanding of the social impact of technology.

Miner's book contains some flaws. His focus on local events understates the importance of federal licensing procedures and regulatory decisions. The book includes a few factual errors of some consequence. Miner is incorrect, for example, in suggesting that nuclear vendors offered "turnkey" contracts in the 1950s. He wrongly describes the Calvert Cliffs decision of 1971 as a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court (it was handed down by a federal court of appeals) that forced the Atomic Energy Commission to hold public hearings (which Congress had mandated in 1957). But these are quibbles. Miner has produced a first-rate contribution to the literature that should serve as a model for studying the subject of nuclear power.

J. Samuel Walker
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Amos Perlmutter. *FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943–1945.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 331. $29.95.

Maxim Litvinov, Soviet ambassador to the United States, described Franklin Roosevelt as the most pro-Russian of all prominent Americans, while George Kennan viewed him as "superficial," "ignorant," "dilettantish," and "severely limited" intellectually. Amos Perlmutter accepts the judgment of both Kennan and Litvinov, but his own message turns out to be strangely ambivalent. On the one hand, he asserts that the flaws of the man who appeased Joseph Stalin "continuously" have "too often been overlooked or excused" (pp. xiv, 91, 211–12). On the other hand, he never alludes to any of the president's damaging concessions on China. Nor are readers ever apprised of the abject servility running through Roosevelt's correspondence with "Uncle Joe," in particular his ceaseless begging for a summit conference coupled with frequent offers of aid (which were "accepted" by the Kremlin boss in a lordly manner).

Adding to the weight of an already formidable exculpatory literature, Perlmutter blames the loss of Polish independence on the Poles themselves, giving scant indication of FDR's relentless pressure on Stanislaus Mikolajczyk and his London group to "cooperate" with Moscow (p. 125). Joseph Davies, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, is cast in the familiar role of scapegoat, along with Harry Hopkins, and Winston Churchill is said to have endorsed American policy on Poland when, in fact, 10 Downing Street and the White House were often at cross purposes. Again and again, the president's failing health is cited as a factor in the American sell-out at Yalta, even though, as the author himself points out, FDR understood neither Stalin nor Russian imperialism, and even though events at Yalta were but the logical outcome of what transpired at Teheran.

Few statements could be more misleading than Perlmutter's description of the president as "catapulting Chiang [Kai-shek] into the status of a major player," while other props for the Roosevelt mystique add up to little more than speculation. We are told, for example, that a roseate view of Stalin and the Soviet Union was needed to assure American support for the grand alliance; that FDR had "no reason" to fear a Hitler-Stalin deal after 1941; and that Stalin's position on Poland was "not negotiable" (pp. 4, 184). Why, one wonders, did the man from Hyde Park not listen to Averell Harriman or William Bullitt?

From a scholarly standpoint, Perlmutter's work leaves much to be desired. His bibliography is sketchy, he relies heavily on secondary material, and he seems unaware at times of recent trends in historiography. Every so often, one will stumble on an old chestnut, long since discredited, such as the notion that FDR was immobilized during his first term by the forces of isolationism (pp. 33, 193). Perlmutter claims to have been the first foreigner to crack Soviet Foreign Ministry archives, but it is unclear what impact, if any, such access has had on his conclusions. To his credit, he is candid enough to report a "paucity of plausible, illuminating information" at Russian research centers, and he is properly circumspect when it comes to the line of Soviet writers.

All in all, this book is puzzling, if not downright obfuscatory, in its approach to one of the nation's most critical periods. If it has its moments of grace and excitement, it also suffers from editorial lapses. On the strictly technical side, photo-essay captions that put flippant words into the mouths of historical personages are not calculated to inspire confidence. Perlmutter, or one of his editors, has written an imaginary script for unwitting actors.

Frederick W. Marks III
Forest Hills, New York

Elizabeth Kimball MacLean. *Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1992. Pp. xii, 247. $47.95.

Elizabeth Kimball MacLean has discovered the core of the relationship between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph E. Davies and written an excellent study of the diplomatic and political career of one of the most complex and calumniated personalities in FDR's Department of State. By tracing Davies's career from his Wisconsin roots and his rise in the political firmament

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of the Woodrow Wilson administration, MacLean brings forth the complete Davies, warts and all, and still gives credit where it is due. She clearly illustrates that Davies was often correct in his assessments of Soviet strengths and weaknesses and of European developments from his posts in Moscow and Brussels, albeit for the wrong reasons.

Clearly Davies was sycophantic in his correspondence with FDR, as was William Christian Bullitt. These two political appointments came in for criticism by the professional diplomats and by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. MacLean outlines enough similarities in the world views of FDR and Davies to make it clear that the president would sometimes prefer to hear Davies's evaluations over the professional diplomats, for both men looked on the "white spat boys" in the department suspiciously. This was especially true after Davies's predictions about the survival capacity of the Red Army proved more accurate than those coming from some members of the State Department and U.S. Army and Navy experts. FDR was also impressed by Davies's prediction that if the British and French did not act to gain a Soviet alliance then Joseph Stalin would turn in the other direction to ensure Russian security.

Davies's ego and arrogance, his inability to deal with his staff as equals in intellect and insights, and his penchant for taking credit for the despatches emanating from the Moscow embassy when they were often the work of his subordinates are clearly delineated and give ample reason for the rebellious attitude and later condemnations of the ambassador by George F. Kennan and Charles Bohlen. It is also apparent that the professional diplomats failed to assess Davies accurately because of the failings of his personality when in fact the ambassador did paint an accurate picture of Soviet strengths and was not as much taken in by the Soviet leaders as he seemed to be. Davies was too forgiving of Stalin's character flaws in the name of revolutionary fervor, but this did not prevent him from accurately assessing the directions Soviet policy might go or the importance of the Soviets in any developing crises that Europe might face.

In her epilogue MacLean notes the irony that after serving President Harry Truman as an emissary, as he did for FDR, Davies came to oppose the hardening of the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union on the same basic arguments used by Kennan. Davies and Kennan, old antagonists, both believed that an acceptable relationship with the Soviets could only rest on recognition of Soviet spheres of influence and long-term, patient containment of Soviet expansionist tendencies via the route of diplomatic communication.

EDWARD M. BENNETT
Washington State University

HUA QINGZHAO. *From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman's Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945–1953.* (Cornell East Asia Series, number 64.) Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University. 1993. Pp. 267.

Hua Qingzhao's book is a detailed analysis of post–World War II foreign policy issues and challenges facing the U.S. government. What makes this study different from the dozens of similar works based on Harry S. Truman's recently released papers is that Hua writes from a Chinese perspective. Although the author stresses objectivity in his account, he offers Western readers sometimes surprising interpretations in his candid assessments of American, British, Soviet, and Chinese motives. He also demonstrates a deep understanding of the conflicts and divisions within the "big four" administrations in their dealings with postwar problems and with each other. Hua details the often conflicting suggestions made by the various advisors to Truman, Clement Attlee, Mao Zedong, and Chiang Kai-shek. He also considers the impact of domestic problems on decision making. The result is a thoroughly researched account that acknowledges the complexities of the issues and the apparent misunderstandings that encouraged the development of the Cold War.

Among Hua's sources are collections of Chinese documents, such as *Party Documentaries* (1989), *Party Documentary Materials Bulletin* (1987), and the diaries of several of Mao's advisors, which provide new insight to the problems the Chinese communists faced after World War II. One of Hua's arguments is that Mao was in a difficult position after the communist victory because neither of the two superpowers supported the Chinese Revolution. The United States was backing Guomindang while the Soviet Union "strongly suspected" that the People's Republic was in fact another Yugoslavia (p. 165). Hua laments that Chinese-American relations continued to deteriorate so that Joseph Stalin became the beneficiary, to the point where the Soviet Union was "the biggest winner" in the Korean War (p. 226).

In the final chapter, Hua departs from his chronological format and outlines "the key factors affecting foreign policy decisions in Truman's administration" (p. 229). Here he summarizes why he considers Truman's legacy to be a "regrettable heritage" that includes the superpowers' attempts "to impose their wills on other nations and to interfere in their internal affairs" (p. 235).

Hua's study challenges many assumptions about the postwar period. It is a good springboard for further research. The book, however, has a couple of flaws: the careful reader will note that there are several chapters with missing endnotes. An index also would have been helpful.

JUNE GRASSO
Boston University

VAN GOSSE. *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left.* (The Haymarket Series.)

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New York: Verso. 1993. Pp. x, 270. Cloth $59.95, paper $18.95.

The theme of Van Gosse's book is that Fidel Castro and his revolution contributed to the rise of the American New Left in the early 1960s. Gosse contends that historians have overlooked the significance of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the appeal and influence of Castro. Moreover, "Cuba served as a political touchstone—or as a *tabula rasa*; in all cases it was a springboard," the author contends. In 1960, like the "mass sit-in movement of southern African-American students that broke out in these same months, Cuba provided both a vision of praxis and an unambiguous call to solidarity" (p. 137).

Gosse demonstrates that the Cuban Revolution excited some young scholars, such as Saul Landau, Staughton Lynd, and LeRoi Jones (later Imamu Amiri Baraka). The author is most interesting when he discusses Castro's revolution and the initial positive reaction in the United States, the two dozen American citizens who went to Cuba and fought, the public questioning over the Bay of Pigs invasion, and obscure activists in Fair Play committee such as Robert F. Williams, an outspoken "Black Fidel Castro of the South."

But the author's endless attempts to be provocative damages his book. In a typical flourish, Gosse proclaims that the New York demonstration opposing the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 was "the largest leftwing demonstration there or anywhere else in the US since the execution of the Rosenbergs" (p. 216). This is nonsense; many larger rallies were held opposing atmospheric atomic bomb tests, and much more social activism supported the southern sit-in movement. Another example of such flourish is, "Even if we never know the exact truth about 22 November 1963, it seems safe to say that not only did an obsession with Cuba corrupt the presidency of John F. Kennedy: in the end it destroyed him" (p. 199).

Although the author criticizes historians for not examining the Fair Play committee, even he admits that Castro was overwhelmingly unpopular in the United States by 1961, and that Castro had no influence on many future activists. In fact, the author states (p. 6) that the committee was small and that at the peak of its influence in 1961 it "could mobilize only some thousands," whatever that means.

The main problem with this book is Gosse's claim that "virtually every current of the later sixties upsurge briefly cohered around the defense of Cuba" (p. 3). Gosse fails to prove this assertion, most of his evidence here being circumstantial, and few readers will agree that it was Castro and the Fair Play committee (which dissolved in 1961) that brought about a decade of social activism in the United States, when, in fact, the engine for activism was discrimination against minorities and women combined with a lost cause in Vietnam. Turning the question around, it would be easier to prove that if Castro had never existed, America still would have experienced the upheaval remembered as the 1960s.

Nevertheless, this book examines the development of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which often is based on the author's interviews, and because of that, the study is useful.

TERRY ANDERSON
Texas A&M University

CANADA

CYNTHIA R. COMACCHIO. *"Nations Are Built of Babies": Saving Ontario's Mothers and Children 1900–1940.* Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1993. Pp. xv, 340. $44.95.

This book by Cynthia R. Comacchio is one of the first studies written of early twentieth-century child care in Canada. The title reveals the focus of the child-care experts: save babies and save the mothers so that the babies can survive. Maternal mortality became a priority only because it pertained to women's function of mothering. This perspective was shared by federal, provincial, and local government agencies, although the municipal visiting nurses who came in contact with the women were often more sympathetic to them than the officials and "experts" who did not.

Ontario is an excellent focus for this examination of child and mother care in Canada, for Ontario led the way in various innovative programs whose common aim was to lower the high infant and maternal mortality rates. But why did the concern for the loss of lives emerge in the years that it did? Comacchio argues that by 1900 the family was no longer able (assuming that it had ever been able) to protect and ensure the health of its members. In addition, it was becoming clear that healthy workers made better workers. Capitalists did not want to pay to insure the health of their workers and their families, and individual workers could not pay, so the state was expected to step in. In Canada, health and welfare is largely a provincial and local responsibility, thus it was the provincial government that responded. Comacchio traces that response through four turbulent decades. She examines the high rate of infant and maternal mortality and the ability of physicians to alleviate it. She then describes the various campaigns to lower death rates, focusing first on medical innovations and then the educational campaign that inundated parents with advice. In an innovative chapter, she assesses parents' responses to the rule of the experts and, through careful perusal of working-class newspapers and other sources, illuminates the class dimension of the advice and the class response to it. Although it is difficult to assess the results of all the efforts to improve child and maternal welfare over four decades, Comacchio challenges the optimistic note of most government statistics. She points out that aggregate figures distort the regional and class variations of survival figures in the province.

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Several themes permeate this study. One is the attempt by various groups to "modernize" the Canadian family. Not only did the meaning of what a healthy family was change over time but the individuals giving the advice did as well. Whereas at one time female voluntary organizations led the campaigns to reform, by the 1920s their role had been usurped by a government bureaucracy increasingly dominated by trained social workers. Comacchio illuminates the tension between the tendency to blame the individual parent for problems faced by the child and the desire to change society in such a way as to ensure that the parent behave responsibly. This is one of the reasons why there was such a stress on education: through education the individual parent can be told what to do. In this way, government officials, physicians, and other experts could feel that they were doing something without touching what Comacchio argues was the fundamental problem facing many families: their inability to help themselves because of poverty. Today, when 15 percent of Canadian families with young children live below the poverty line, this book's analysis is timely.

WENDY MITCHINSON
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DAVID MACKENZIE. *Arthur Irwin: A Biography.* Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 323. $45.00.

Canadian nationalism, or the lack thereof, is the hardy perennial of Canadian intellectual discourse. From Confederation in 1867 through a century-and-a-quarter of nationhood, Canadians have fretted about their inability to develop a binding nationality that would differentiate them from Americans, distance them (gradually) from the British, and tie together those of English and French origin along with the polyglot "ethnics" who ended up north of the 49th parallel.

Media and magazines naturally played their part in this process, and foremost among the latter was *Maclean's*, a Toronto-based popular product that self-consciously tried to instill Canadianism in its large circulation. In his twenty-five years at *Maclean's* from 1925 to 1950, Arthur Irwin was the leading proponent of this process, the editor who tried to tell Canadians about their country and to wean them away from Britain, while reminding them that they were not the same as those who lived south of the line. Under his aegis, once he had rescued the magazine from what Pierre Berton in the foreword calls a "silly-ass Englishman," some of the best Canadian writers, like Ralph Allen and Berton, found their way to *Maclean's*. Under him the magazine launched a crusade against the defense policies of Mackenzie King's Liberal government around the time the war broke out in September 1939. His publisher's object was to drive King from office; Irwin's intent was more limited—to force out the weak Defence minister, Ian Mackenzie, and to get defense contracting on a sound basis. Irwin achieved his goals; his publisher did not.

This was just as well for Irwin, who in 1950 parlayed his connections with the younger, more progressive Liberals and the civil service mandarins into a post at the head of the National Film Board (NFB). His assigned task was to drive out the communists, for witch hunting in the much more polite Canadian variant had crept north from the United States, and the NFB (earlier headed by John Grierson, who had been glancingly referred to in the investigatory aftermath of Igor Gouzenko's defection in 1945) was seen as a hotbed of radicalism. As David MacKenzie describes it, Irwin did his job with sensitivity and discretion, and casualties were few.

As his reward for ending the government's embarrassment, Irwin happily went off to diplomatic life, serving as high commissioner to Australia and ambassador to Brazil and Mexico. These were not important posts in the 1950s and 1960s, and Irwin clearly vegetated in luxury. Now very old, he continues to live on Canada's west coast.

His was an interesting life then, one well told by MacKenzie, who makes excellent use of archival sources and interviews. A quiet, competent man, Irwin was arguably the representative figure in Canadian journalism in the first half of this century, one of the archetypal nationalists who helped create the symbols that increasingly desperate Canadians still rally around.

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LATIN AMERICA

ROBERT W. PATCH. *Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1648–1812.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 329. $49.50.

Designed to despoil traditional consideration of Yucatan as a backwater of New Spain, Robert W. Patch's book not only brings the peninsula into the colonial mainstream but situates it for the modern era as well. In essence a comprehensive socioeconomic history that focuses on the development of indigenous and hispanic populations over the course of the colonial era, Patch's study demonstrates the relevance of local ecology and culture to the articulation of the two groups. This is classic regional history made holistic by the subtle, evolving connectedness of provincial locales to a global schema. An impressive array of maps, lists, and tables documents Yucatecan production and supply to the various markets.

Although teased by Western economists' theories to fit the circumstances of development in colonial Yucatan (and all Latin America) into an either/or feudalism or capitalism paradigm, Patch reveals the limitations of such applications where, because of immediate and probably particular conditions, impe-

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rial institutions merged with autochthonous systems and then operated in tandem for centuries. In Yucatan the watershed was the mid-seventeenth century, when Spaniards and Mayas alike were devastated by a series of yellow fever epidemics, droughts, and the sequelae that resulted in a severe cultural disequilibrium.

The Mayas lost ground, literally, as their populations diminished and Hispanics, including mestizos and mulattoes, gradually established *estancias* on vacated lands. What had once been two quite distinct republics were increasingly less so as the Indians' autonomy and their monopoly of land use and maize cultivation were compromised. Assemblages of *estancias* became haciendas, and production for consumption and export shifted from the Mayas' familiar corn, cotton, and wax to the estates' more profitable commodities of sugar, beef, rice, logwood, and henequen, with most grains, ultimately, imported from the United States.

In large part this volume is about Spaniards, and it is the first to detail and elaborate the intricacies of Hispanic social and economic consolidation on the peninsula. For Patch, "colonialism," with all its epithets (see pp. 22, 45, 67, 81, 90, 92, 133, 137), is the vector in Yucatan. "If the Indian is lacking, so is everything else" (p. 35). Colonialism is responsible for leveling a proud Maya polity to a common peasantry, while furnishing channels for cultural accommodation. What worked best and longest was the *repartimiento*, which was illegal but nevertheless was sanctioned by various kings who had been convinced of its benefits for the Indians.

Everyone in Yucatan, it seems, participated; but of all the forms of *repartimiento*, surely the most unconscionable actions were the unrelenting sales of indulgences to the Mayas. Profits made were often more than 100 percent. Yet the *repartimiento* called for no radical change in production methods, and when exactions were too onerous, the Indians fled, reconstituting their communities by means of traditional lineage practices in new locations. The Mayas' capacity for mobility, their tendency to keep themselves *fuera de campaña* (p. 52), and their concerted efforts to conserve traditions through language, lineage systems, and sodalities kept the Spaniards from ever feeling completely secure, no matter how entrenched they had become. That so many of the same Maya place-names and polities are extant across Yucatan is evidence of more than token cultural persistence.

But the wealth of information about the business of *repartimiento* is only one of the strengths of this fine work. Yucatecan society itself was far more complex and dynamic than is known, to say nothing of the peninsula's important role in the world marketplace. We now appreciate the unique characteristics of Yucatan as integral to a much greater entity.

SUSAN SCHROEDER
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GUSTAVO GUTIÉRREZ. *Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ.* Translated by ROBERT R. BARR. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis. 1993. Pp. xxii, 682.

On New Year's Day, 1994, a massive Indian uprising, led by a self-styled *Zapatista* "army of liberation," broke out in the Mexican state of Chiapas, a state with a centuries-long history of poverty and oppression. The event caused panic in Mexican governmental circles. The government first launched a savage military counterattack; then, responding to a storm of national and international criticism, it halted its offensive, announced an amnesty for the rebels, promised sweeping social and economic reforms, and called on Samuel Ruiz, bishop of the highland town of San Cristóbal de las Casas, to serve as mediator in the conflict. Ruiz was an exponent of liberation theology and the pro-Indian teachings of the first bishop of Chiapas, Bartolomé de Las Casas; prior to the outbreak of the conflict he had been under severe pressure to resign his post from both the government and the Vatican, which accused him of a "Marxist" interpretation of the Gospel and fomenting social conflict in his diocese.

The Mexican government's decision to ask a Lascasian bishop—the only public figure who enjoyed the trust of the Mayan peasantry—to intervene in the Chiapas conflict reflects the continuing vitality and relevance of Las Casas's doctrines in the modern world. That relevance helps to explain the flowering of Lascasian studies of the past half-century. Lewis Hanke, the great pioneer of those studies, often stressed the links between Las Casas's struggle for justice in the Spanish conquest, his insistence that "all humankind is one," and the modern struggle against racism; the important writings of the Colombian scholar Juan Friede accented the anticolonial, anti-imperialist, antifeudal content of Las Casas's thought; and the brilliant revisionist studies of the American scholar Helen Rand Parish, in addition to giving us a virtually new life of Las Casas, stressed the modernity of his antiwar stance and the kinship between Las Casas's doctrines and today's liberation theology, with its "preferential option for the poor."

This book by Gustavo Gutiérrez, the most searching study of the development of Las Casas's thought I know of, expands and deepens this rapprochement between Las Casas's doctrines and the advanced social and political thought of our own time. A prominent Peruvian theologian as well as social activist, Gutiérrez sometimes uses the technical terms of medieval scholastic philosophy and theology—terms that may dismay some lay readers—as he explains the development of Las Casas's thought and the issues in the debates between Las Casas and his adversaries. But that scholastic language and reasoning, of which Las Casas was a master, was the political and sociological mode of discourse of the times, and behind the battle of books waged by Las Casas and his opponents, behind the theoretical disputes over the nature of the

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Indians, just war, and the rights of Spain to the Indies, were concrete issues of Indian life and liberty, of Indian death and slavery. In those disputes, as Gutiérrez shows, Las Casas anticipated some of the most advanced ideas of coming centuries, proclaiming the full humanity and equality of the Indians and their right to self-determination, rejecting their forced conversion, and, in a display of cultural relativism that shocked and evoked cries of heresy from his opponents, demanding respect for Indian religious customs, including human sacrifice, which, Las Casas argued, was evidence of profound religious feeling and a most elevated conception of God.

Gutiérrez's book illuminates many issues of Las Casas's life and work. I found especially suggestive his stress on Las Casas's ideological debt to the valiant band of Dominicans who began the struggle against Indian slavery on Hispaniola in 1511. "Underlying their approach . . . is a perception of the Indian . . . as an oppressed neighbor; as the poor one, as the neighbor par excellence, whom one is under an obligation to love" (p. 44). Las Casas, notes Gutiérrez, made this viewpoint more explicit, but it was already present in their texts. For those Dominicans, as for Las Casas, Christianity was primarily a religion of the oppressed. And Gutiérrez expands on this theme: "In other words, human rights, to be sure. But not in a laissez-faire, liberal, merely formal egalitarian perspective, rather along the lines of the rights of the poor, who are condemned to death by the oppressor whose quest is for gold" (p. 44). As early as 1511, then, before Las Casas had even experienced a spiritual conversion and begun his defense of the Indians, the Dominicans on Hispaniola had already expressed a key idea of Las Casas's teachings and today's liberation theology, its "preferential option for the poor."

This book offers a thoughtful, detailed analysis of the evolution of Las Casas's thought, of its sources, advances, fumblings, errors, and corrections, culminating in a harmonious, integrated vision of the brotherly, nonexploitive relation that should exist between the peoples of the Old World and the New, between Europeans and "the other." Unfortunately, that vision, regarded as utopian and radical in Las Casas's time, still awaits acceptance in our own time of deepening exploitation and impoverishment of the Third World by the ruling classes of a few favored countries in the name of an illusory "neoliberal" doctrine.

BENJAMIN KEEN
Northern Illinois University

JASPER RIDLEY. *Maximilian and Juárez.* New York: Ticknor and Fields. 1992. Pp. 353. $24.95.

The story of Maximilian and Carlota has called forth a new telling. Again it is a pageant of romance and intrigue and battle. The author, Jasper Ridley, is a long-time professional biographer. After service in World War II and six years in the legal profession, he produced a biography of his ancestor, Nicholas Ridley, bishop of Rochester, who was martyred in 1555 under Mary Tudor. He has been writing ever since, alternating between sixteenth and nineteenth-century topics. The present book is an extension of his *Napoleon III and Eugenie* (1979). Thus, he is rather familiar with the European materials, especially French, but less so with Mexican sources, which in this work tend to be outdated.

Ridley opens the story with the scene of Maximilian and Carlota taking leave of Miramar, bound for Mexico. He then moves back in time, as the civil wars of Mexico and the imperial schemes of Napoleon III converged on the figure of Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian Habsburg. The international winds blow, and we see Maximilian equivocate and then follow his heart, the plan of Napoleon III. The French move into Mexico and call on Maximilian to assume his role. We hear the familiar story of the well-intentioned Maximilian caught between international forces and an unyielding Benito Juárez. It is a long, action-filled tale, with heroism and savagery on both sides. In the grand style, usually with European sources, it is played out to Maximilian's execution at Queretaro's Hill of Bells in 1867.

Ridley tells the story in competent fashion, intermingling a large cast of characters and of nations. As it emerges in this book, it is a drama largely of European and American actors with Mexico as a backdrop. Juárez shares the title, and Ridley seems to feel more sympathy for him, his constancy counting for more than Maximilian's romantic impulses. But Maximilian and his circle receive much more attention.

Although critics termed him an iconoclast in earlier works, even "idiosyncratic," Ridley here follows the safe middle road in his judgments, doubtlessly because of his limited contact with Mexican sources. In any event, he quickly passes over the issues that agitate historians, such as the distribution of church lands. With his broad approach one can expect factual errors, some of which are in the area of my own specialty, the earlier years.

This will not matter greatly to Ridley's faithful readers, who will expect and receive an exciting story gracefully told in a clean, straightforward style. His realm is the narrative, and he fills his pages with stirring scenes and sharply drawn personalities. He has stated that while he enjoyed research, it was only preparation for the writing, the bringing to life of individuals of past centuries. As for history professors, they can add to their stock of anecdotes.

STAN GREEN
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DAVID BLOCK. *Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon: Native Tradition, Jesuit Enterprise, and Secular Policy in Moxos, 1660–1880.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1994. Pp. xiii, 240. $30.00.

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The Moxos, a 200,000 square-kilometer region situated in northeastern Bolivia, bounded by the Guaporé, Mamoré, and Beni rivers, consists of tropical grasslands and forests laced by a myriad of tributary streams. Before the arrival of the first Europeans during the sixteenth century, its thirty tribes numbered an estimated 350,000. As a result of subsequent enslavement and the introduction of varieties of contagion, the survivors were reduced to about 100,000 by 1690. Between 1682 and 1744 Spanish Jesuits, based in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and in Lima, established twenty-five missions in the Moxos, of which nine were abandoned by the early 1750s. Those missions, their European supervisors, their indigenous occupants, and the cultural forms that developed there comprise the principal subjects of David Block's generally well-crafted monograph.

This revised and expanded dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first delineates the setting and is followed by chapters devoted to the establishment of the missions, the Jesuits who served them (30 percent were non-Spaniards by the 1720s), the daily lives of the neophytes, the partial fusion of European and indigenous cultures, and the survival of the missions after the Jesuits were expelled (1767). Block contends that indigenous peoples were attracted to the missions because they offered escape from Spanish slavers and hostile tribesmen and access to the fruits of European technology. As elsewhere, mission Indians were indoctrinated in the missionaries' faith and learned European techniques of weaving, carpentry, and animal husbandry, but they retained their traditional methods of growing basic crops: manioc, maize, and cotton. The missions never became wholly self-sustaining and relied on subventions furnished by the order's properties near Santa Cruz de la Sierra and coastal Peru, which produced wheat, wine, and sugar.

In contrast with former Jesuit missions in Paraguay and in the Brazilian Amazon, the departure of the missionaries did not bring about the decline or collapse of the missions for another half century. After independence in 1825, however, the preservation of the missions and their distinctive culture became increasingly difficult because of immigration by white settlers, the shift to commercial agriculture (especially the production of cotton, cacao, and rubber), the intruders' appropriation of mission herds, lands, and labor, indigenous uprisings, and the flight of many Amerindians elsewhere. The onset of the Amazonian rubber boom spelled the end of the Moxos missions.

Besides utilizing a wide-ranging bibliography of published works, Block relies on manuscript materials found in Bolivia, Peru, Spain, and the Jesuits' archives in Rome. There are, nevertheless, occasional lapses that suggest that ecclesiastical history is not the author's forte. The Society of Jesus was founded in 1540, not 1534 (p. 33); its General Congregations met, on the average, every 10.5 years, not every third year (p. 66) between 1558 and 1758; the Jesuits were active in Baja, not Alta California, as a casual reading of one table would suggest (p. 106); fathers Eusebio Kino and Samuel Fritz were hardly "freelances" in the sense usually connoted by that term (p. 175). After their expulsion Spain gained control over only some, not all, of the Jesuits' archives (p. 76); the suggestion that "Jesuits seemed to lack both the ability and the will to dominate the market at the expense of their rivals" (p. 77) misperceives the society's objectives; and the contention that other missionary orders remained entirely dependent on annual royal stipends to support their missionary enterprises (p. 175) is incorrect. Nevertheless, this is a useful addition to our understanding of the complexities of Jesuit spiritual enterprise in colonial Latin America and is especially helpful in revealing what happened to a particular group of missions and their occupants after the Jesuits left.

DAURIL ALDEN
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MARTIN MINCHOM. *The People of Quito, 1690–1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass.* (Dellplain Latin American Studies, number 32.) Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1994. Pp. xvii, 297. $48.50.

Martin Minchom has turned notes from extensive archival research in Britain, Spain, Peru, and Ecuador into this monograph that, despite its parochial sounding title, holds lessons for many students of historical sociology, demography, and political science. The author examines the role of an "underclass" of the Spanish colonial city of Quito—specifically, the *barrio* (district, neighborhood, or *parroquia*) of San Roque—in eighteenth-century civil unrest. He uses such themes as socio-demographic change, mobility, and social disturbance to measure the popular dimensions of economic and political pressures, especially those wrought by the top-down changes designed and instituted by the Bourbon reformers in the late eighteenth century.

In highly nuanced prose, Minchom describes Quito as a colonial urban context for ethnic and cultural interaction. He finds that the city had a slow acculturating influence on its inhabitants. Ethnicity was cultural, not strictly racial, and loosely defined before about 1770. One's identity was based on clothing, language, surname, appearance, and occupation, as well as on public opinion. Lay brotherhoods strengthened horizontal loyalties, especially for merchants, craftsmen, and artisans.

Minchom chose the barrio of San Roque to explore the popular roots of social disorder because it was large, popular, declining, with few upper-class connections (and, thus, little elite control), and near the city center. He contends that the inhabitants of San Roque constituted a community and a social class as far back as the 1740s (the time of a previous disturbance). Some twenty years later, an epidemic, a drive

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for ethnic reclassification (which was a successful attempt to tighten racial designations and push persons of ambiguous status into the tributary group), an increase in the Bourbon control of a weak economy, and, more specifically, the direct administration of the *aguardiente* (brandy) monopoly and sales tax touched off the rebellion of 1765. After a summary review of other outbursts, commotions, and riots into the early nineteenth century, he finds a "continuous tradition of popular action, with barrio roots" (p. 253), and, in this case, he concludes that "the eighteenth century riots and rebellions were the work of a community and a class" (p. 256).

His analysis will attract the attention of serious scholars for several reasons. First, he touches on the debate over caste and class, coming down firmly on the existence of the latter. His case would be stronger if he had included a deeper and more detailed discussion of the development of a strong *barrio* identity. Posters on which some claims of identity were based were anonymous, often affixed to church doors and placed at crossroads. Readers therefore do not know who served as spokespersons for the insurgents. The report of 1768, in which a witness saw "rioters running down the streets shouting 'Viva el barrio' " (p. 255), needs elaboration. It contained the responses to questions of twenty-five witnesses, including six merchants and two notaries. Only one was an artisan (and a San Roqueño?), a silversmith, "and therefore from the upper reaches of non-elite society, who was heard last, and took pains to distinguish his own like from the 'more rustic people of the barrios' " (p. 229). Minchom comments on the "in-built bias towards Quito's creole elite" (p. 229) in this report. Can we then accept the phrase "Viva el barrio" as evidence of a strong *barrio* identity coming as it most assuredly did from persons who wanted to distinguish themselves from the commoners and perhaps pass blame onto the unrepresented? Could this not be a reflection of a growing self-awareness of the Creoles inspired by the Bourbon reforms?

Another notable point is Minchom's too-short discussion of the roles played by women in the eighteenth-century rebellions and in the underground or bazaar economy. Here he might have elaborated on how the Bourbon reforms threatened the domestic economy and perhaps tied it to the thoughts of James C. Scott (*The Moral Economy of the Peasant* [1976]) on the violations of the moral economy as a cause for civil disobedience and rebellion in Southeast Asia. Finally, and related to this point, Minchom has interspersed many references in his text to "everyday forms of resistance," another phrase that Scott used (*Weapons of the Weak* [1985]), without using those precise words. These efforts to counteract colonial rule might have been encapsulated in the summary or elsewhere as a balancing dimension to the sporadic outbreaks of popular wrath that he highlights so well. In other words, one weakness in this study is the author's failure to link his findings to broader theories of historical continuity and change.

SUSAN E. RAMÍREZ
De Paul University

ANTHONY MCFARLANE. *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics under Bourbon Rule.* (Cambridge Latin American Studies, number 75.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 399. $59.95.

Notwithstanding its importance, third in population and fourth in area in Latin America, Colombia has largely been ignored by foreign scholars when compared to their efforts on other major Latin American countries. Even Colombians, with their recent record production by a new generation of historians, have turned out few general histories of Colombia, and none are satisfactory. David Bushnell's *The Making of Modern Colombia* (1993) adequately covered the national period. What was missing was a similar effort on the colonial period.

Anthony McFarlane's study fills this void. A paperback edition is definitely in order. McFarlane's masterful synthesis is achieved by a thorough and careful reading of the available historiography and by extensive research in Spanish and Colombian archives. The threads of the story are complex and involve articulating the salient features of Colombia's individual regions and how their development since the sixteenth century came together to form New Granada or colonial Colombia. Historians have largely been preoccupied with examining the conquest and independence and, more recently, with defining the individual regions and their population, economy, and society. McFarlane has benefited from this work. But he goes beyond a basic synthesis and reorders much of the material into compatible geographic, demographic, political, economic, social, and ideological components that bring the panorama into sharper focus. For example, he reconstructs the population of New Granada in the late eighteenth century, and, for the coastal region, he does this on a pueblo-by-pueblo basis. Unfortunately, he fails to tell us whether the figures for the interior can be disaggregated below the provinces and why the province of Tunja totals 236,429 in some places (pp. 353–54) and 129,000 elsewhere (pp. 50, 361).

With his synthesis in place, McFarlane moves on and reconsiders a wide range of questions that have long interested historians regarding Spanish imperial policy and its ability to effect change. Primarily focusing on the commercial elite of Cartagena and the urban patricians of Bogotá in the period between the accession of the Bourbons in 1700 and the fall of royal government in 1810, McFarlane shows how the new monarchy struggled to rebuild Spanish power, at least in the Colombian case, by reforming institutions and developing the economy. Although New Granada in 1719 became the site of the first new viceroyalty in

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Spanish America since 1542, the magnitude of the task initially overwhelmed the authorities and the viceroyalty was suppressed in 1723 only to be reestablished in 1739. Improvement in the economy resulted, but it was gradual, and New Granada rarely produced a surplus for Spain. The main outlines of the economy did not change in the course of the eighteenth century.

The limits of "reform," or what could be extracted economically, came with the far-reaching changes of José de Gálvez, Charles III's minister for the Indies, and his visiting regent, Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres. Their measures produced the *comunero* rebellion in 1781. McFarlane correctly maintains that the revolt did not seek to overthrow the colonial regime and was not a social conflict. It did slow change, however, and some of the main features of Bourbon reform elsewhere in Spanish America, such as the *intendants*, were never introduced in New Granada. Yet the botanical expedition and enlightened ideas backed by Archbishop-Viceroy Antonio de Caballero y Góngora led creole patricians to reexamine their *patria* and reformulate their expectations of the Bourbon monarchy. Spain, enfeebled by war and the succession crisis, was unable to meet creole demands. The collapse of the colonial regime and the emergence of the independence movement inevitably followed.

MAURICE P. BRUNGARDT
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CARLOS AGUIRRE. *Agentes de su propia libertad: Los esclavos de Lima y la desintegración de la esclavitud 1821–1854.* Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru. 1993. Pp. 335.

Carlos Aguirre's book is a reworking of his master's thesis for the Catholic University in Lima, Peru. This might raise concerns in some quarters about its scholarly merit, but Aguirre's analysis and extensive historical detail should dispel any worries. Based largely on court cases and notarial records from the national archives in Lima, the book examines slavery in the Peruvian capital in the years between independence and abolition. Its argument is encapsulated in the title: that it was the slaves who were the major force in the disintegration of Peruvian slavery.

Aguirre begins by describing the socioeconomic framework of the slavery system in Lima. The slave population of the area was not large: in 1821 there were around 8,500 slaves; by the 1840s the number had fallen to 4,500. Of these, over half were urban based. Most were owned by small proprietors, with a handful of sugar planters the only large-scale owners. Ownership was, thus, spread through society, a fact that Aguirre uses to explain why no abolitionist movement appeared in Lima and why abolition in Peru was a gradual process. His discussion of slave life indicates that Lima's rural slaves had to contend with harsher conditions than their urban counterparts. Yet violent resistance in the rural sector was rare, partly because the slaves enjoyed some degree of self-control, partly because they were divided between field hands and foremen, and partly because the conditions that produced violent agitation elsewhere were not present here, except on a few estates where some unrest occurred. Another important factor that prevented violent resistance was the declining number of slaves, which prompted owners to offer concessions in order to maintain their property. This produced some leeway in the system that the slaves, particularly urban slaves, used to their own advantage.

The actions taken by the slaves to undermine slavery constitute the second part of the book. Slave resistance was largely of the nonviolent sort, with manumission the most effective and favored means. Using several tables Aguirre shows that purchase, either by the slaves or by third parties, was the usual form of manumission. Between 1840 and 1854 only one quarter of Lima's freed slaves were manumitted by their owners, who were unwilling even to free slaves born into their households. Manumission may have been the decisive element in slavery's disintegration, as Aguirre argues, but it was also weakened by other forms of slave resistance. For example, flight was common, with many of the fugitives joining the bandit gangs that infested the Lima area. About 90 percent of these gangs were black, explaining in part why slaves were drawn to them. The book concludes with the requisite examination of slave rebellions—more often conspiracies than rebellious acts and restricted to a few estates—and some final words on abolition and its immediate aftermath.

Although some of Aguirre's points have been discussed elsewhere, his focus, numerous examples, and statistical tables make this book a useful addition to the literature. There are some weaknesses. The picture is rather static as the changes occurring over time are not well developed. The discussions of prominent theories about slavery that begin each chapter indicate Aguirre's awareness of the broader issues, but their relevance to his case studies is not always clear. His assertion that the slaves' "supreme ideal was not necessarily absolute independence" (p. 212) is not entirely convincing and seems to be contradicted by his evidence. And other factors played a more prominent role in the abolitionist pressures than he is prepared to accept. Nonetheless, his book lays out in impressive detail the nuances and complexities of slavery in early republican Lima and marks the beginning of what should be a very fruitful career.

PETER BLANCHARD
University of Toronto

EDUARDO SILVA. *Prince of the People: The Life and Times of a Brazilian Free Man of Colour.* Translated by MOYRA ASHFORD. New York: Verso. 1993. Pp. xii, 219. $34.95.

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Eduardo Silva, author of several books on Brazilian slavery, has pieced together from scattered documentation the life of a remarkable black Brazilian, Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, known to his contemporaries as Prince Obá II d'Africa. Claiming descent from Yoruban chiefs of West Africa—and the honors and privileges deriving therefrom—Fonseca Galvão began life about 1845 as the son of a freed African slave in the Bahian diamond-mining town of Lençóis. Little is known of his early years, although he seems to have learned of his royal heritage from his father. In 1865 he volunteered for service in the Paraguayan War, experiencing the hardships and "glory" of military life that strongly influenced his thinking in later years. In the 1870s he settled in Rio de Janeiro, where he won renown as a self-styled African prince, a revered leader of the city's blacks and *pardos*, and author of many articles published in the local press. Decked out on public occasions in exaggerated formal dress, Dom Obá was often characterized as paranoid or deranged, but to his many admirers in Rio's popular quarters he was looked on as a genuine royal prince worthy of their homage and tribute.

Silva begins his book with detailed accounts of events and places that helped to form Dom Obá's personality: the turbulent boomtown of his boyhood, the grim ordeal of Paraguay, the prolonged decline and collapse of slavery that he witnessed and wrote about, and the city of Rio in the empire's final years. In these early chapters, Silva often loses sight of Dom Obá as he concentrates on the scenes of his life. Fortunately, however, when he later analyzes Dom Obá's writings and attempts to fathom his mind, a strong portrait emerges of a complex and contradictory man. Despite his race and modest background, Dom Obá was a monarchist who held strong allegiance to the imperial family and claimed that the authority he exercised over his own followers derived from God and from his sacred African lineage. In politics he was a supporter of the Conservative Party and on many issues reasoned like a genuine conservative. Yet, despite his overt political views, an effect perhaps of his royal pretensions, his writings and other aspects of his personality suggest a compassionate and progressive man capable of poetic insights, sympathy for his suffering compatriots, and instinctive opposition to racial prejudice. Brazil was a country, he once wrote, "where the true and desired civilization does not reign completely because there are those who still believe in the foolishness . . . of colour prejudice and where everywhere there are conquests and more conquests yet to be won and life is dust, mire, everything is nothing" (p. 131).

In an appendix Silva has published six brief examples of Dom Obá's writings, three of them letters to the emperor, but in a book as short as this he might easily have offered a much broader selection of articles, allowing readers to decide for themselves the kind of person Dom Obá really was. Nevertheless, by focusing on this unusual man's painful struggle to rise above the status Brazilian society would normally have imposed on him, Silva has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of Brazilian social life during the last decades of slavery. It will be read with profit by specialists and general readers alike.

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JOEL WOLFE. *Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, 1900–1955.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 312. Cloth $45.00, paper $17.95.

In this ambitious book, Joel Wolfe surveys the labor history of São Paulo from 1900 to the death of Getulio Vargas in 1954, focusing on the experience of female textile workers and male metal workers. The author challenges conventional wisdoms, drawing on his research in labor, government, and business archives, and from oral histories and popular culture. Wolfe's stress on the importance of women textile workers and grass-roots factory commissions in the strike movements of the mid–1940s and early 1950s is a useful contribution to scholarship.

But Wolfe makes larger claims for his research that are more controversial, arguing that for half a century these factory commissions existed as the independent class organizations of the overwhelming majority of São Paulo workers, who distrusted the "political" unions of the anarchists and communists and the coopted *pelego* unions of the *Estado Novo.* These unions only succeeded, he argues, when they followed the lead of the commissions. Moreover, he maintains, it was the women's commissions in the textile industry that showed the way, with the male metal-worker commissions following their example. In Wolfe's reading of São Paulo labor history, therefore, it is women textile workers gathered in their independent factory commissions who play the central roles, and he claims to reveal the "hidden transcripts" of their experience.

These are bold claims, which would significantly alter our understanding of Brazilian labor history if they were substantiated. But Wolfe presents inadequate evidence for his claims, particularly for the earlier period on which his interpretation pivots. Instead, he repeats them like a litany throughout the book, as if the mere repetition of a claim increases its credibility. Too often, the "transcripts" he claims to have revealed remain hidden to the reader, even in his notes. Too often, his citations have little to do with his claims, leaving the reader to question on what they are based. Moreover, although Wolfe's bibliography lists a host of oral history interviews, the book lacks the richness of quotation that one associates with oral history.

Wolfe is aware of new currents in history and social science, but his efforts to embrace them often miss the mark, and their presence in his introduction proves no guarantee of their importance in his anal-

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ysis. Central to Wolfe's argument is his claim to have done a gendered analysis. But his account of women workers falls short of that goal: it is confined to the workplace, and even within that limited setting rarely goes beyond the public transcript or differentiates among women workers. Neither does his sketchy account of the factory commissions—which lacks a bottom-up perspective of their operation and dynamics—constitute a true history from below. In the end, Wolfe offers an appealing but romanticized and unsubstantiated view of both factory commissions and women workers that challenges conventional wisdoms but fails to overturn them.

These failings are unfortunate. Wolfe has read widely and conducted extensive primary research on an important subject. His desire to use new approaches to explore the distinctive experience and roles of women workers is laudable, as is his wish to study grass-roots factory-level organizations. Much of what he has done is valuable. In the end, however, Wolfe has written a book whose reach exceeds his grasp.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

GENERAL

HANS-JÜRGEN NITZ, editor. *The Early Modern World-System in Geographical Perspective.* (Erdkundliches Wissen, number 110.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1993. Pp. 403. DM 96.

ROBERT A. DODGSHON, The Early Modern World-System: A Critique of Its Inner Dynamics. GERARD A. HOEKVELD, World-System Theory: Implications for Historical and Regional Geography. HANS-JÜRGEN NITZ, The European World-System: A von Thünen Interpretation of Its Eastern Continental Sector. TAEKE STOL, The Northern Netherlands: Centre and Periphery in the European Core. PIETER SAEY and ANTOON VERHOEVE, The Southern Netherlands: Part of the Core or Reduced to a Semi-Peripheral Status? WILHELM MATZAT, Northern Italy: Secondary Core or Reduced to a Semi-Peripheral Role? SALVATORE CIRIANCONO, The Venetian Economy and the World-Economy of the 17th and 18th Centuries. ROBIN A. BUTLIN, Proto-Industrial Regions in England, with a Brief European Contextual Perspective. JACQUES PINARD, The Industries of the Western Regions in France from the 15th to the 19th Century. DIETRICH DENECKE, Early Modern Mining Regions of the Continent. ANNA DUNIN-WASOWICZOWA, Spatial Changes in Poland under the Impact of the Economic Dynamics of the 16th and 17th Centuries. HALINA SZULC, The Impact of the Evolution of Large Estates on the Rural Settlements of Silesia and Pomerania. KEVIN WHELAN, Ireland in the World-System 1600–1800. KARL-ERIK FRANDSEN, Beef Cattle Production in the European Periphery: A Case Study from the Island of Zealand, Denmark. VERA ZIMÁNYI, The Hungarian Economy with the Modern World-System. TIM UNWIN, Wine in the Early Modern World-System: Profit, Production and Exchange. IAN G. LAYTON, The Timber and Naval Stores Supply Region of Northern Europe during the Early Modern European World-System. URSULA EWALD, Economic Evaluation and Reconstruction under Spanish Dominance: Middle America and the Caribbean. DAVID WATTS, The Early Modern World-System—Periphery-Core Interactions as Exemplified by Plantation Regions of the Caribbean. ARTHUR J. RAY, At the Cutting Edge: Indians and the Expansion of the Land-Based Fur Trade in Northern North America, 1550–1750. J. MALCOLM WAGSTAFF, The Role of the Eastern Mediterranean (Levant) for the Early Modern World Economy 1500–1800. WOLF HÜTTEROTH, The Role of the Ottoman Empire for the Early Modern European World-System. A. J. CHRISTOPHER, Plan and Reality in the Evolution of the Cape Colony. BRIAN J. MURTON, Commercial Manufacturing in Southeastern India in the Early Modern Period. WOLFRAM JÄCKEL, The Changing Role of Port Cities as Part of the European Expansion in the Southeast Asian Archipelago: Outlining an Approach.

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MEDIEVAL

GEORGE GARNETT and JOHN HUDSON, editors. *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xviii, 387. $69.95.

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ARTICLES

TO THE EDITOR:

David Joravsky is probably right: some historians have been too ready to see the Western system of constitutional representative government as the "model of progress, which all other, less fortunate or less virtuous nations must follow" (*AHR*, 99 [April 1994]: 843). But the comparative record of constitutional governments in achieving peace and prosperity is better than he indicates. It was the autocrat Napoleon Bonaparte at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the semi-autocratic monarchies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in 1914 that were chiefly responsible for plunging the world into war. It was a combination of autocratic states—Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan, joined temporarily by Stalinist Russia—that precipitated World War II.

Britain, on the other hand, launched and spread the Industrial Revolution, which raised the living standards of its own people and those of many other countries. Thereafter, Britain often used its influence to preserve peace and the balance of power down to World War I. Succeeding to Britain's role as the leading world power, America twice intervened to save Europe from domination by autocratic nations, and after World War II it initiated an alliance that secured a half-century of freedom as well as peace and prosperity for Western Europe.

Again, Joravsky makes a valid point on behalf of an anthropological relativist approach to the study of revolution when he writes that "the fall of the Russian tsar and the Chinese emperor [did not bring] those countries within reach of liberal democracy" (p. 854), but nothing is more evident than the desire of those who are or were under Communist rule to achieve constitutional government and some form of capitalism comparable to but not necessarily modeled on that which exists in the West. This desire contradicts the condescending view of some relativist historians who believe that the human aspiration for freedom is a mere conditioned response, which in more "backward" societies can be satisfied through egalitarian social reforms by a one-party Marxist state. The historian's choice does not lie, as Joravsky seems to think, between an unthinking moral absolutism and a wise anthropological relativism but in the realization that in different situations an absolutist or a relativist judgment may be appropriate. Historians who believe that the West has developed a unique and valuable system of democratic constitutional government that meets certain universal human needs do not make this claim self-righteously. We know that Western society and democracy have flaws, which we hope other nations moving in our direction will avoid. But there is no need for false humility. We recall the wry comment of Winston Churchill, whose historical judgment Joravsky derides, that Western democracy is "the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried."

AMOS C. MILLER
University of Houston

David Joravsky does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITOR:

What a great beginning to the lead [*sic*] article in the October issue [*AHR*, 99 (October 1994): 1074–1111]: "ALTHOUGH THE TELEPHONE WAS INVENTED IN THE UNITED STATES . . ."

And how terribly wrong.

The telephone was invented by Alexander Graham Bell at his homestead in Brantford, Ontario, which—at last reckoning—is in Canada. There is in Bell's own hand a marvelous description of how the technological breakthrough came to him while lying in a hammock slung between two birch trees overlooking the Grand River.

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Would it have removed one jot of impact to have the sentence read: Although the telephone was invented in Canada, the United States led the world . . . ?

It certainly would have made for greater historical accuracy.

CHRISTOPHER G. TRUMP
Tweed, Ontario

KENNETH LIPARTITO REPLIES:

With all due respect to our northern neighbor, what do you mean by "invent"? If you mean that Bell, who resided in Boston from 1874, had some important ideas while visiting his parents' home in Brantford, Ontario; if you mean that these ideas, along with others conceived at different times and different places, were crucial in making a working telephone, then yes, I agree. But is invention a eureka moment or a process? Bell had been pondering many ideas for a number of years, as had others, such as Elisa Gray. On March 3, 1876, Bell applied, in the United States, for a patent on his "gallows" telephone, which he and Watson had built in Boston. It transmitted speech sounds but not intelligible speech. On March 10, Bell transmitted his famous, "Mr. Watson, come here, I want you," in his Boston laboratory. If one must pick a single moment, this seems to me to be the best choice: the moment when Bell's work culminated in the practical achievement of the end he had sought.

After the value of Bell's patent became apparent, others also claimed, or had claimed for them, priority on the telephone. Many Italian Americans persist in believing that a resident of Staten Island, Antonio Meucci, invented the telephone in the 1850s. Lawyers who tried to litigate his patent caveat found that, quite simply, his invention did not and could not be made to transmit speech, or anything else. The German Johann Reis built a device that he called a "telephone," in 1861. Reis sought and achieved transmisson of musical tones but did not try to send a human voice over the wires.

If all invention is ideas, then the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci make him the father of much modern technology. But one cannot fly in a drawing of an airplane, no matter how elegant its representation or scientifically valid its aerodynamics. Invention is not a fact historians uncover; it is a concept they use to order and present what they learn.

KENNETH LIPARTITO
University of Houston

TO THE EDITOR:

Florencia E. Mallon's article on Subaltern Studies, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," in the *AHR*'s volume 99, no. 5, contains two noteworthy factual mistakes regarding Chilean political history in the twentieth century.

Firstly, the post-Pinochet Christian Democrats have neither hailed the dictatorship's massive privatizations nor have they described such policy as "modernization." Upon taking office in March 1990, Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin realized that the reforms imposed by the military regime were so deeply entrenched, and so closely linked to an international capitalist system of finance and trade, that he had no alternative but to manage them with a capitalist rationale, which did not prevent him from loudly complaining about the "cruelty of the market" while trying to counter its negative social impact with his policies of "growth with equity." There is a rich body of documentation, easily available, to substantiate this point.

Probably more serious is Mallon's confusion of the Popular Front and Popular Unity governments in Chile. There is no "first 'popular unity' government of the late 1930s" (p. 1491) in Chilean history; that was the government of the Popular Front under the leadership of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a contemporary of the French Popular Front under Léon Blum. The Popular Front of the late 1930s and the Popular Unity of Salvador Allende in 1970 may have some elements in common, but they also have a specific, separate identity in Chilean history. In our profession, we are supposed to be careful about these things.

MARTÍN POBLETE
Northeast Hispanic Catholic Center

TO THE EDITOR:

I am writing to protest the first paragraph of Florencia E. Mallon's contribution to the December 1994 *AHR Forum*, which insults every scholar in the *AHR* who does not happen to support Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements ["The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *AHR*, 99 (December 1994): 1491–1515]. Mallon is entitled to express her views, but she and the editors of the *AHR* show shocking discourtesy when she uses "scholar," or "progressive scholar," to refer only to those who agree with her. I have yet to come across a more striking example of the kind of exclusionary politics that are so fashionably attributed to white males.

Indeed, I would submit, as a hypothesis, that the publication of this passage suggests that the politicization of the AHA has now gone much further than at any time in the supposedly benighted past. What, I ask myself, would a comparable article written by a conservative at some point in decades past have looked like? One might imagine, for instance, an old student of Ulrich B. Phillips writing in 1955, "These are difficult times for scholars who work on slavery. How can they maintain the thesis that the Peculiar Institution benefited both the white and Negro races,

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while the Supreme Court of the United States endorses the pernicious doctrine of equality?" Or perhaps an economic historian writing in 1937: "How can we continue to exalt the supremacy of the market and freedom of contract, when a Bolshevik in the White House refuses to act against sit-down strikes?" Or a political or social historian writing in the early 1920s: "How shall we contribute to the maintenance of the family and Western civilization, now that female suffrage has moved us that much closer to the destruction of the family?"

Any actual articles from past *AHR*s that read like any of my hypothetical examples would tend to show that today's climate is, at least, no worse than that of the past. Yet, somehow, I doubt that anyone can find any. I leave aside the question of the historical worth of the approaches described in the *Forum.* I would, however, appreciate an apology from Florencia Mallon and the editors of the *AHR* for using the word "scholar" in a sense that obviously excludes a large majority of the membership of the AHA.

David Kaiser
Naval War College

Florencia Mallon replies:

I most definitely agree with Martín Poblete that, "in our profession, we are supposed to be careful" about things like fact and context. That is why I welcome the opportunity to respond to the two letters received about my article "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies." To begin with Poblete's remarks, which address two short passages in the first paragraph of my article, I did not say that the post-Pinochet Christian Democrats "hailed the dictatorship's massive privatizations [and] described such policy as 'modernization.' " I said that the Christian Democrats "hailed the dictatorship's *radical privatization and free market reforms as 'modernization.'* " A picky distinction, perhaps; but what I actually said fits better with what Poblete then went on to say is Aylwin's "different" position. One may complain loudly about the "cruelty of the market"; one may support policies of "growth with equity"; but, in the end, the new market economy in Chile has gotten the support of the post-Pinochet regimes and, because of this, has ushered in a new (some might say "modern"?) era in which state-sponsored economic growth is seen as a vestige of the past.

I also agree with Poblete that his second objection is more important. I am perfectly aware that the Cerda government was known as the Popular Front and that it has a "specific, separate identity in Chilean history." That is why I did not capitalize "popular unity" when referring to the 1930s and also why I put it in quotation marks. The purpose of the statement was rhetorically to link the "elements in common"—most important, the participation of Communist, Socialist, and Radical political parties in both and the common commitment to a state and welfare-oriented policy of economic growth. The reason Poblete's second objection is more important is that, through a history lesson of such an elementary nature, based on a quick and superficial reading of my argument, Poblete aims to devalue any authority I might have to speak of contemporary Chilean politics. This would then make less credible my broader point, which is that the present free-market-oriented hegemony by Christian Democrats in Chile has broken dramatically with the traditions of coalition politics and state-oriented economic policy that animated Chilean governments from the late 1930s through the Popular Unity government of 1970–1973. This was the main point I was making, and I stand by it.

Interestingly enough, David Kaiser's objections also concentrate only on the first couple of paragraphs of my article. Here, however, the obfuscation and misunderstanding is a great deal more serious. First of all, there are important differences between "scholars," "all scholars," and "progressive scholars." I never conflated the three, as Kaiser does in his accusations. Further, at the very beginning of my first paragraph, I delimited clearly the universe about which I was speaking: scholars who work on Latin America. Kaiser may not be aware of this, but among scholars working on Latin America, the Cuban Revolution's challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere was welcomed by a much broader group than those who "support Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements." And beyond Cuba, there was certainly a much broader community of support for the Chilean Popular Unity government of 1970–1973, for the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979, the Guatemalan opposition of the 1980s, and for an end to U.S.–supported military repression in El Salvador. Within this community of Latin Americanists interested in the future of political autonomy, social justice, and human rights in the countries they study, I suggested, recent events have produced an intellectual crisis of great proportions. In this context, what is a progressive scholar—of Latin America, it has been already determined—to do?

If David Kaiser so desires, I would be happy to include him in this group; yet, given the tenor of his remarks, I doubt that he would want to be part of it. If he had not left aside "the question of the historical worth of the approaches described in the *Forum,*" he might have noticed that the academic issues involved are quite complex. Since they concern the so-called Third World and political developments after World War II, of necessity they must include issues of nationalism and revolution. But the perspective taken is far removed from the "support [for] Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements" he so quickly imputes to my article through a mistaken reading of the first two paragraphs. Indeed, when Kaiser asserts that the publication of these paragraphs "suggests that the politicization of the AHA has now gone much further than at any time in the supposedly benighted

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past," I cannot help but wonder if the shoe is being placed on the wrong foot. If politicization means eschewing reasoned academic discussion in favor of name-calling and grandstanding, then Kaiser's letter serves as an excellent example of the politicization he denounces.

FLORENCIA E. MALLON
University of Wisconsin, Madison

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

TO THE EDITOR:

Please allow a few corrections and rejoinders to Douglas Brinkley's review of my book, *Controlling the Waves* [*AHR*, 99 (October 1994): 1423]. Brinkley begins with a revealing complaint about the "annoying" regularity with which I supposedly use the word "paradigm." In reality, this word appears just four times—twice in the introduction and twice in the conclusion—as anyone who read the intervening chapters should certainly have known. Contrary to Brinkley's rather fanciful portrayal of my methodology, *Controlling the Waves* was deliberately and systematically constructed around the core elements of seventeen U.S. policy statements—all that were formally approved for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, and Indochina during the period 1945–1951. Brinkley commends me as "a historical archaeologist" (his pejorative for "researcher"), but then, by innuendo, he tries to raise doubts about my interpretation of the newly discovered "memoranda." First, many of what he is apparently calling National Security Council memoranda are actually NSC policy statements, signed by the president. These were not, as he describes, applied to policy; they were the official policies. Second, if these documents are so new to Brinkley, how does he know that they were not correctly interpreted? Not only did I interpret them honestly and forthrightly but in most instances I quoted them directly, and frequently I quoted additional passages in my footnotes.

By splitting hairs, Brinkley manages to find just two "errors." For the sake of brevity, in a one-paragraph sketch of Dean Acheson's early career, I wrote that he was fired from Treasury instead of including the rather involved story of how FDR revealed Acheson's "resignation" first to the press and then to him. And, a proofreading mistake resulted in one wrong date in this same paragraph. Based on these two instances, Brinkley glibly pronounces my entire book (the product of eight years of meticulous research) to be "larded with . . . errors and oversights." This is simply not true. He goes on to charge that I do not understand the "nuanced attitudes and relationships" of the policymakers. In response, I can only refer him to my extensive correspondence with the surviving policymakers, the notes from some of my numerous telephone conversations with them, and my tape-recorded interviews—all currently available at the Truman Library. (Some of these policymakers even remarked on how well I understood them.) Brinkley further contends that I ignored the whole issue of racism. Perhaps racism was not handled in the sweeping, judgmental language he prefers, but it was strongly implied in many places and specifically discussed, with supporting evidence, on page 277.

At no point does Brinkley offer a substantive response to my thesis (apart from repeating the book-jacket description), nor does he address any of the complex issues raised in my five main chapters, nor does he demonstrate even the slightest knowledge of Asian policy. Having done almost no work of his own on Truman–era Asian policy, he clearly lacks the expertise to judge mine. His current book, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years*, portrays Acheson as detached and uninvolved when it came to Asian issues—an ill-considered assumption that *Controlling the Waves* quite obviously demolishes. Near the end of the review, therefore, Brinkley writes: "Acheson may have spent a great deal of time on Asian affairs, but . . ." Here, at last, Brinkley unwittingly allows a fleeting glimpse into his real concerns.

RONALD L. MCGLOTHLEN
Northern Illinois University, and
Northwestern University

Douglas Brinkley does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITOR:

Although I don't wish to seem ungrateful for T. Michael Ruddy's generous appraisal of my book, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* [*AHR*, 99 (December 1994): 1779], I believe that two of his comments require further clarification.

The first of these concerns the Truman administration's reasons for fabricating the war-scare melodrama in March 1948. After noting that the administration hoped to use the scare to achieve passage of the European Recovery Program and a peacetime selective-service act, Ruddy states, "More important, in the author's estimation, the private aircraft industry faced imminent bankruptcy without an infusion of federal contracts." I myself, however, make no such claim. While it is possible that the imperiled aircraft industry might have been "more important" to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, that certainly was not the case with Secretary of State George C. Marshall—and without Marshall's ardent and vigorous participation in propagating it, the war scare, as I have attempted to show (especially on pp. 124–41 *passim*), was not likely to have attained its authors' goals.

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I might also mention in this connection that Ruddy omits an additional reason why Harry S. Truman himself—seeking against the odds to be returned to the White House later that same year—might have found a war scare welcome in the spring of 1948. "There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin," Clark M. Clifford, the counsel to the president, had advised Truman in a long memorandum on political tactics. "The worse matters get, . . . the more is there a sense of crisis. In times of crisis, the American citizen tends to back up his President."

Second, I would like to make it explicit that although Ruddy's sentence, "The Soviet Union, in no condition to mount a military offensive, posed more of a political threat," may express his own point of view, it in no sense conveys mine. So far as I can discern, the Soviets posed no serious military *or* political threat to the ambitious schemes of the Truman administration—and its top officials knew it. At most, Soviet actions amounted to an impediment here or a source of frustration there; but by 1948 if not earlier, it must have been evident to Washington that, in the final analysis, the Soviets lacked the will and/or the capability to prevent the administration from putting into effect its most cherished economic and military measures for Western Europe and Japan. For the evidence that supports this thesis, I must, of course, refer the interested reader to my book.

FRANK KOFSKY
California State University, Sacramento

T. MICHAEL RUDDY REPLIES:

Let me briefly respond to Frank Kofsky. First, my review acknowledged a number of reasons for the alleged war scare. By "more important," I was expressing a judgment based on the emphasis he places on the role of the pending bankruptcy of the aircraft industry in administration planning. My review did not distinguish between particular officials who advocated one cause or another. One need look no further than the first pages of Kofsky's introductory chapter, which he begins with a quote from the president of Bell Aircraft Corporation—"As soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available"—and the pages following to discern his emphasis. Although it is not the only issue, the aircraft industry's plight plays a prevalent and recurring role throughout his book.

On the question of the administration's assessment of the military and political threat posed by the Soviet Union, I must note that this is not my personal opinion. In the book, Kofsky makes a case for discounting the Soviet military threat. However, I am not so sure he made a convincing argument that, as he suggests in his letter, "the Soviets posed no military or political threat." I am not so quick to write off expressions of concern by high officials as disingenuous. Perhaps what he characterizes in his letter as "an impediment here or a source of frustration there," I might have read as a source of concern for at least some of the high officials, even if this concern was not of the magnitude of a military threat. Kofsky's point might have been obscured by his tendency so often to engage in speculation based on what might have been said or done behind closed doors.

I concur with Frank Kofsky that interested readers should turn to the book to judge his argument for themselves.

T. MICHAEL RUDDY
St. Louis University

ERRATA

In the December 1994 issue, the forthcoming book *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992* by Shahid Amin was wrongly attributed to Gyanendra Pandey. (See Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," p. 1482, n. 21.) We regret introducing this error and apologize to the authors named.

THE EDITORS

In her Featured Review of Alain Corbin's *The Lure of the Sea* and John R. Stilgoe's *Alongshore* (*AHR*, 99 [December 1994]: 1634–36), Rosalind Williams attributed the phrase "dialectics of back-tracking" to Stilgoe; instead, it should have been attributed to Corbin, who quotes it (from another source) on page 179.

The editors and Professor Williams regret the error.

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
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
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
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G. ROBINA QUALE is Professor of History at Albion College. She is the author of *A History of Marriage Systems* (Greenwood Press, 1988) and *Eastern Civilizations* (1966; 2nd ed. 1975).

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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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